Etica & Politica
Ethics & Politics

XXV, 2023, 2

Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XXV, 2023, 2

M o n o g r a p h i c a

CITIZEN SCIENCE WITH AND WITHIN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

S y m p o s i u m

Paula Biglieri, Luciana Cadahia, *Seven Essays on Populism: For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Polity Press, Cambridge UK 2021

V a r i a

6

Monographica

CITIZEN SCIENCE WITH AND WITHIN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

8

CITIZEN SCIENCE WITH AND WITHIN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES
GUEST EDITORS' PREFACE

ALESSIA SMANIOTTO
École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris
OpenEdition Centre/OPERAS
alessia.smaniotto@openedition.org *(lead and correspondent author)*

ANTONELLA PASSANI
T6 Ecosystems
a.passani@t-6.it

ABSTRACT
The guest editors' preface to the special issue of Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics "Citizen Science with and within the Social Sciences and the Humanities" discusses the background of citizen science development in Europe with a specific focus on the social sciences and the humanities. It traces the challenges faced in giving visibility to the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) in the citizen science field, and highlights the advantages of using an "umbrella term" to unify citizen science and participatory research practices across disciplines.

KEYWORDS
Citizen science, Social Sciences and Humanities, Citizen Social Science, Participatory Research, Public humanities.

The social sciences and humanities (SSH) are perceived as less represented than other disciplines, especially natural sciences, within the citizen science field. This is despite the fact that citizen science is an interdisciplinary endeavour, and that SSH disciplines have a long tradition of collaboration with society to tackle societal challenges and carry on civic engagement[1].

Some hypotheses have been advanced regarding the lack of recognition of the contribution of social sciences and humanities to citizen science. These refer to a

---

[1] Albert, A., Balázs, B., Butkevičienė, E., Mayer, K., and Perelló, J. (2021). Citizen Social Science: New and Established Approaches to Participation in Social Research. In: The Science of Citizen Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_7

preponderant epistemological orientation, within citizen science, towards the paradigm of the natural sciences, or to an enduring controversy over the legitimacy of SSH and its academic status. Others attribute the lack of recognition to methodological and ethical concerns when dealing with 'sensitive' SSH topics, or to the depoliticisation and marginalisation of SSH with the "neoliberal" turn in academia[2]. In this respect, citizen science with and within the SSH seems to inherit the same lack of visibility as the social sciences and humanities. There is, however, value in exploring other arguments, starting with the multilingual, socio-culturally grounded practices of the SSH disciplines. First, this means that any search relying only on "citizen science" as a keyword in English is very likely to end with an underrepresentation of SSH projects. This becomes even more evident if the search is limited to the major bibliographic databases like Scopus or Web of Science, within which social sciences and humanities are already underrepresented[3].

Secondly, the issue of language, particularly represented by the term "citizen science" itself, is yet another possible explanation for this underrepresentation. Indeed, different terms are used to refer to longstanding practices of engagement by non-professional "scientists" in research: "participatory research methods", "action-research" and "co-design", just to name a few of the terms describing the collaboration between professional researchers (in academic and other research performing organisations) and non professional researchers/citizens[4]. And again, taking into account that most SSH research is undertaken in languages other than English, these labels could be used within SSH in other languages when talking about participatory research practices. Finally, it may also happen that such practices are documented without a label at all[5].

Even if not bundled under the term "citizen science", participatory practices have a long tradition in SSH disciplines, especially within the fields of public humanities[6],

---

[2] Tauginienė L., Butkevičienė E., Vohland K., Heinisch B., Daskolia M., Suškevičs M., Portela M., Balázs B.& Prūse B.. (2020). Citizen science in the social sciences and humanities: the power of interdisciplinarity. *Palgrave Communicatoins* 6(1): 89 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0471-y

[3] Pranckutė, R., (2021). Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus: The Titans of Bibliographic Information in Today's Academic World. Publications 9 (1), 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/publications9010012

[4] Such as *peer-to-peer science, participatory science, community science, community-based research, public participation in research, crowdsourced science, etc...* (See Lewandowski, E., Caldwell, W., Elmquist, D. et Oberhauser, K., 2017, Public Perceptions of Citizen Science, in Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 2 (1), p.3)

[5] To provide only one example, see Lovell, R.E., & Dissell, R. (2021). Dissemination and Impact Amplified: How a Researcher–Reporter Collaboration Helped Improve the Criminal Justice Response to Victims With Untested Sexual Assault Kits. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 37(2), 257–275. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986221999880

[6] See for example how collaborative practices with local communities can be tackled within the applied anthropology field (Cf. Lamphere, L., The Convergence of Applied, Practising, and Public Anthropology in the 21st Century, Human Organization; Winter 2004; 63, 4; pg. 431-443), how citizen science might look like within public archeology in the Italian article by Dragoni, P. &

and they can be researcher-led crowdsourcing, or participatory approaches that involve all the stakeholders in all the phases of the research cycle. Therefore, the issue of terminology needs to be considered in order to make it even more explicit why the term "citizen science" - and the terms therein - matter[7], and consequently to clarify their effects on practices and the eventual politics of science.

The aim of this special issue is to give visibility to initiatives of social sciences and humanities that *self-identify* with the label of citizen science and to showcase the potential of citizen science practices with and within the SSH. We hope then that this special issue can improve the dialogue and the understanding related to citizen science across disciplines.

WHY INTRODUCING CITIZEN SCIENCE IN THE SSH IN A DISCIPLINE-BASED ITALIAN JOURNAL

As guest editors, we were pleased by the proposition from the directors of Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics for a special issue on citizen science with and within the social science and the humanities, not only because Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics is a diamond open access journal, at no cost to either authors or readers[8]. By discussing/exploring citizen science in a philosophy journal,

---

Cerquetti, M. (dir.)(2019). L'archeologia pubblica prima e dopo l'archeologia pubblica (in Il capitale culturale - Studies on the Value of Cultural Heritage Supplementi 09 / 2019, eum edizioni università di macerata), or how it might look like within the public history field looking, for example at the five year (2020-2025) project "Public History as the New Citizen Science of the Past (PHACS)", coordinated at the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C²DH) at the University of Luxembourg, that develops public history and participatory models for interpreting the past (Cf. "FNR ATTRACT Fellow Thomas Cauvin to join the University of Luxembourg", published on 9.03.2020 on the website of the Luxembourg National Research Fund, https://www.fnr.lu/fnr-attract-fellow-thomas-cauvin-to-join-the-university-of-luxembourg/). Finally, see also how the digital humanities field encounters public history and citizen science, thanks to this reflection of Deborah Paci on "Conoscere è partecipare: digital public history, wiki e citizen humanities" (Cf. Paci, D. (2021). Knowing is participating: digital public history, wiki and citizen humanities. Umanistica Digitale, 5(10), 235–249. https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2532-8816/12555). The US-based database Humanities for All is an interesting source where public humanities projects can be found, including those applying citizen science and participatory research approaches.

[7] Eitzel, M.V., Cappadonna, J.L., Santos-Lang, C., Duerr, R.E., Virapongse, A., West, S.E., Kyba, C.C.M., Bowser, A., Cooper, C.B., Sforzi, A., Metcalfe, A.N., Harris, E.S., Thiel, M., Haklay, M., Ponciano, L., Roche, J., Ceccaroni, L., Shilling, F.M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Kiessling, T., Davis, B.Y. and Jiang, Q., (2017). Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key Terms. *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice*, 2(1), p.1. http://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.96

[8] As defined in the Action Plan for Diamond Open Access, the adjective "diamond open access" refers to a model of scholarly publication in which "journals and platforms do not charge fees to either authors or readers. Diamond Open Access journals represent community-driven, academic-led and -owned publishing initiatives. Serving a fine-grained variety of generally small-scale, multilingual, and multicultural scholarly communities, these journals and platforms embody the concept of

we have the opportunity both to highlight how researchers in the humanities and social sciences contribute to citizen science, also called "participatory research", and to introduce the topic to those not already accustomed to its approaches. As readers will acknowledge by browsing the journal archive, this special issue will appear as a rather eccentric one for a traditional discipline-based journal. We believe that, in the way of mainstreaming citizen science as a recognized research practice, it is fundamental that the discussion is brought to disciplinary circles other than the citizen science community itself. In this sense, this special issue comes in addition to recent suggestions in the last years for discipline or study-based journals[9]: the aim is to make citizen science practices increasingly visible in academia, and also to demonstrate how much participatory practices like citizen science imply disciplinary practices being anchored in the research tradition.

A second reason we are pleased to introduce this collection of contributions in Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics, is because the journal focuses on ethics and politics rather than epistemology. In this respect, citizen science is a particularly interesting field of activity to showcase how epistemology - the way of doing science and thinking about science - is connected to ethics and politics.

Finally, Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics is an Italian philosophy journal. Citizen science is spread across Europe with numerous networks that have been established for several years in countries like Austria, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK. They are connected all togethers in a pan-European network thanks to the community gathered, at the European level, around the European Citizen Science Association (ECSA) and its digital platform Eu-Citizen.science. In Italy, the national association of citizen science (Citizen Science Italia ETS[10]) was officially born in 2023, after several years of existence as a community of practice.

For all these reasons, this collection of contributions is aptly made available to the readership of Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics. The eight contributions here collected are authored by professionals from different European countries and are for the most part written by citizen science practitioners and researchers that do not

---

bibliodiversity." (Cf. Ancion, Z., Borrell-Damián, L., Mounier, P., Rooryck, J., & Saenen, B.. (2022). Action Plan for Diamond Open Access. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6282403)

[9] See for example "Many Modes of Citizen Science", special issue of the Science & Technology Studies journal (Vol. 32, No. 2, 2019. https://doi.org/10.23987/sts.74404), focused on "the epistemological and ontological diversity of citizen science, and the sometimes contested attempts to define it, as an interesting and fruitful phenomenon to explore from vantage points or perspectives in STS", as Dick Kasperowski and Christopher Kullenberg put it in the editorial of the issue; or the collection of the journal Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, "Citizen social science - active citizenship versus data commodification" (2020). https://www.nature.com/collections/cihfchiheh); or the country-focused "Citizen science programs in Florida", published in 2014 in the journal Florida Scientists by the Florida Academy of Sciences (https://www.jstor.org/stable/i24313958), focusing on environmental conservation programs, as well as the special issue introduction by James D. Austin.

[10] https://www.museonaturalemaremma.it/csi/

come specifically from philosophical disciplines: in keeping with the highly interdisciplinary and inter-professional endeavours of citizen science, this special issue aims to offer space for a large diversity of experiences and standpoints.

FINDING "CITIZEN SCIENCE" WITHIN THE SSH

From the onset, we knew that uncovering "citizen science" contributions within the social sciences and the humanities could prove challenging, not because these contributions would not exist - we both work to demonstrate the contrary - but because we have experienced, in our current and past projects[11], that most researchers in the SSH disciplines do not recognize their practices fit under the umbrella term of "citizen science", although their practices - at least from our viewpoint - can be aligned with at least one of the 34 definitions of citizen science[12] that have been suggested so far.

Given this "underlying doubt" - *do SSH researchers and social actors engaged with researchers in these disciplines recognize themselves under the umbrella term "citizen science"?* - we were concerned by the importance of the outreach for our call for abstracts, and we acted accordingly. So, dear reader, please, allow a short parenthesis with some figures.

The call for abstracts for this special issue was published on April 6th 2022 through the online platform Calenda[13], a platform that according to its annual report recorded 1.3 million visits in 2021, almost half of which came from outside Europe. The call for abstracts was also disseminated through social media, especially Twitter and LinkedIn, and through personal and professional accounts. It also was circulated through the Italian citizen science community, the European level mailing list of the European Citizen Science Association (ECSA), the ECSA newsletter, as well as through discipline-based professional mailing lists addressing philosophical communities, hosted in France (3 mailing lists) and the UK (2 mailing lists), known and subscribed by international researchers, and including the Liverpool List PHILOS-L. Additionally, it has been sent through several French-

---

[11] One of the guest editors of this special issue, Alessia Smaniotto, coordinated two citizen science projects involving SSH disciplines: the France-based PLACES project (places.hypotheses.org), funded by the French Ministry of Culture and Communication, and the EU-funded project COESO (coeso.hypotheses.org). The other guest-editor, Antonella Passani has more than twenty years of experience in the fields of international and interdisciplinary innovation projects. To name a few recentt citizen science-related projects, she has been the community manager and the person responsible for impact assessment in the ACTION project (actionproject.eu) and she is now involved in the Impetus project (impetus4cs.eu) again as the person responsible for the impact assessment.

[12] Haklay, M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Manzoni, M., Hecker, S., Vohland, K. (2021). What Is Citizen Science? The Challenges of Definition. In: The Science of Citizen Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_2

[13] https://calenda.org/

based mailing lists with a large base of subscribers, including international SSH researchers, addressing respectively the fields of political science, anthropology, epistemology and history of science as well as science and technology studies, and communication studies. Finally, several emails were sent to European colleagues working in the field with the request of circulating further the call for abstracts in other mailing lists and communities.

If we spent all these lines in operational details, it is to show how much we believed that disseminating through these channels should have offered the possibility to reach several thousands of people with this information, knowing that the ECSA newsletter alone reaches more than 2000 subscribers - according to their 2022 annual report - while the PHILOS-L list claims more than 13.000 subscribers in over 60 countries - according to their website.

Still, at the end of this supposedly large dissemination campaign, we ended-up receiving 28 proposals for abstracts. Twelve of them were disqualified mainly because they were out of scope or not in accordance with the call requirements, or because they did not meet the maturity expected. The authors of the 16 remaining abstracts were invited to submit the full paper within six months. Out of the 16 invitations, we received 12 full papers, and the 8 that are now included in this collection are the ones accepted for publication after a single round of double blind peer-review. At this point we would like to warmly thank all the colleagues that have contributed to the quality of this issue; an open peer-review would have certainly resulted in a higher recognition of their precious backstage work. Among the papers finally selected through this process, the majority come from EU-funded, large-scale, collaborative projects.

Why are we providing these raw figures? Because we found the number of proposals received quite low with respect to our expectations, and still with an unfavourable representation of hands-on citizen science endeavours with and within the SSH. We also share these figures because these numbers alone cannot tell us why: we still don't know if the majority of SSH researchers and social actors engaged with researchers in these disciplines do not - or do *not want* to - recognize themselves under the umbrella term "citizen science"; or if "citizen science" is still a keyword to which most of them don't pay attention in the hundreds of emails and social media entries they scroll everyday. Or it may be that the discipline-based venue - an Italian philosophy journal, although indexed in international databases and counting for researchers' evaluation - was perceived by potential contributors as too much of an unusual venue to share citizen science experiences and their ethical and political implications, or even as a low-impact venue in terms of scientific recognition in their respective fields - side-effect of increasingly siloed scientific conversations. There could be additional underpinning hypotheses worth exploring, but the most important point for us now is to draw attention to the open question we think the European citizen science community should be concerned

with at this point: under which conditions could SSH researchers and social actors engaged with researchers in these disciplines recognize themselves under the umbrella term "citizen science"?

This question should guide a larger exploration of the disciplinary and country-based practices involving the SSH that can be identified under the current "citizen science" label, thus contributing to a more precise knowledge of the present and past contribution of the SSH to citizen science.

CITIZEN SCIENCE AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

The identification of "citizen science" as an "umbrella term" or "common name" entailing a "wide range of activities and practices"[14], together with a rising interest for renewed collaborations between research and society[15], has determined a steady increase in visibility for citizen science practices in recent years.

This special issue is published in a European context where citizen science is already mainstream at the level of European research institutions, and where there is a solid base of researchers and practitioners engaged in citizen science activities across different European countries.

Concerning the European institutional level, consecutive European research funding programmes over the last twenty years, designated as Science and Society[16] between 2002 and 2006, Science in Society[17] between 2007 and 2013, and finally Science with and for Society (SWAFS)[18] between 2014 and 2020, has contributed

---

[14] Haklay, M., Motion, A., Balázs, B., Kieslinger, B., Greshake T. Bastian, Nold, C., Dörler, D., Fraisl, D., Riemenschneider, D., Heigl, F., Brounéus, F., Hager, G., Heuer, K., Wagenknecht, K., Vohland, K., Shanley, L., Deveaux, L., Ceccaroni, L., Weißpflug, M., Gold, M., Mazzonetto, M., Mačiulienė, M., Woods, S., Luna, S., Hecker, S., Schaefer, T., Woods, T., Wehn, U. (2020). ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758668

[15] Mahr, D., Gobel, C., Irwin, A. et Vohland, K., (2018). *Watching or being watched. Enhancing productive discussion between the citizen sciences, the social sciences and the humanities*, in Hecker, S., Haklay, M., Bowser, A., Makuch, Z., Vogel, J. et Bonn, A., Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy, UCL Press, London. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv550cf2.14

[16] Under the FP6 framework: Science and society: specific programme for research, technological development and demonstration : "Structuring the European Research Area" under the Sixth Framework Programme 2002-2006, https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/id/FP6-SOCIETY/fr

[17] Under the FP7 framework: Specific Programme "Capacities": Science in society, https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/id/FP7-SIS/fr

[18] Under the Horizon 2020 framework, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en. See also the report of the SWAFS programme published in 2020: European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Iagher, R., Monachello, R., Warin, C., et al., *Science with and for society in Horizon 2020: achievements and recommendations for Horizon Europe*, Delaney, N.(editor), Tornasi, Z.(editor), Publications Office, (2020). https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/32018

in shaping the current approach of the Horizon Europe funding programme, and including citizen science as one of the pillars of Open Science.

The last SWAFS program is of particular interest because it grouped citizen science together with two core components of the previous frameworks in supporting the connections between research and society: the responsible research and innovation approach (i.e. the effort to make research and innovation better aligned with societal needs and challenges and to assure the engagement of different stakeholders in technological and scientific innovation), and science communication.

Looking specifically at the building of a European community of practice around citizen science during the last decade, this was possible thanks to the encounter of both community-lead and institutional-supported movements that happened in particular, but not exclusively, within the framework of the SWAFS programme. The European Citizen Science Association (ECSA)[19] was launched in 2013 and officially founded in 2014. ECSA works jointly with other associations around the world through the Citizen Science Global Partnership (CSGP)[20], and is part of the steering committee of CSGP together with the American Citizen Science Association (CSA), that is just one year younger than ECSA (initiated in 2012, officially founded in 2013), and the Australian Citizen Science Association (ACSA), initiated in 2014 and founded in 2016.

Within this context, while in Europe projects like Doing-it-Together science (DITOs)[21] reinforced the knowledge of citizen science on the ground and among policy makers through a variety of participatory events, citizen science has also been developed as a field of research in itself, especially thanks to a dedicated journal, launched in 2014, called *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice* (CSTP), promoted by the American Citizen Science Association and published by the UK-based publisher Ubiquity Press.

In terms of scientific publications and policy reports, a series of dedicated reports and handbooks gathering contributions and recommendations from the community have been published in Europe during the last decade. The White Paper on Citizen Science for Europe[22], published in 2014 by the "Socientize - Society as e-Infrastructure through technology, innovation and creativity" consortium[23] has been a report providing policy recommendations to shape a citizen science ecosystem in Europe, taking into account the institutional and public policy

---

[19] https://www.ecsa.ngo/

[20] http://citizenscienceglobal.org/

[21] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/709443

[22] Socientize consortium (2014), White Paper on Citizen Science in Europe, https://eu-citizen.science/resource/8

[23] Coordinated by the University of Zaragoza between 2012 and 2014. See: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/312902

frameworks of citizen science practice. The report provided also a definition of citizen science bridging it with the public engagement field, and specifying that citizen science includes those public engagement activities were citizens actively contribute to science[24]. In France, a report dedicated to citizen science - here called participatory research (*recherches participatives*) - was published in 2016, after being requested by the French ministry of research and the ministry of education. The report *Les sciences participatives en France*[25] was coordinated by François Houllier, then director of the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INRA) and aimed at presenting the landscape of participatory research and providing recommendations for the future. This report has been followed by another one, published in 2019 and requested this time by the French ministry of culture: *Recherche Culturelle et Sciences Participatives*[26]; it was coordinated by the Museum of Natural History of Paris and was written by a network of some thirty researchers, curators and scientific mediators, and focused on participatory research in the cultural fields. In 2016, the German citizen science community published, in German, the *Green Paper Citizen Science Strategy 2020 for Germany*[27], focusing on the benefits and opportunities of citizen science.

Moving on from policy-oriented reports to "handbooks" collecting research reflections on the theory and practice of citizen science, we should mention "*Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy*"[28] and "*The science of citizen science*", published respectively in 2018 and 2020. "*Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy*" is one of the main outcomes of the DITOs project; it considers the role of citizen science in the general context of open science and open innovation, and includes a chapter specifically focused on

[24] "*Citizen Science refers to the general public engagement in scientific research activities when citizens actively contribute to science either with their intellectual effort or surrounding knowledge or with their tools and resources.*" (Socientize consortium (2014), White Paper on Citizen Science in Europe, p.8. https://eu-citizen.science/resource/8)

[25] Houllier, F., Merilhou-Goudard, J.-B., (2016). *Les sciences participatives en France: Etats des lieux, bonnes pratiques et recommandations.* https://hal.science/hal-02801940/

[26] Particip'Arc, *Recherche Culturelle et Sciences Participatives*, Report, 2019, https://www.participarc.net/ressources/azgfg-2019-rapport-particip-arc

[27] Bonn, A., Richter, A., Vohland, K., Pettibone, L., Brandt, M., Feldmann, R., Goebel, C., Grefe, C., Hecker, S., Hennen, L., Hofer, H., Kiefer, S., Klotz, S., Kluttig, T., Krause, J., Küsel, K., Liedtke, C., Mahla, A., Neumeier, V., Premke-Kraus, M., Rillig, M. C., Röller, O., Schäffler, L., Schmalzbauer, B., Schneidewind, U., Schumann, A., Settele, J., Tochtermann, K., Tockner, K., Vogel, J., Volkmann, W., von Unger, H., Walter, D., Weisskopf, M., Wirth, C., Witt, T., Wolst, D. & D. Ziegler (2016). Green Paper Citizen Science Strategy 2020 for Germany. Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), German Centre for integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig, Leipzig, Museum für Naturkunde Berlin, Leibniz Institute for Evolution and Biodiversity Science (MfN), Berlin-Brandenburg Institute of Advanced Biodiversity Research (BBIB), Berlin. https://eu-citizen.science/resource/42

[28] Hecker, S., Haklay, M., Bowser, A., Makuch, Z., Vogel, J. and Bonn, A., (2018). Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy, UCL Press, London. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv550cf2

social sciences and the humanities[29]. "*The science of citizen science*", instead, is the main result of a COST action[30] addressing the relationship between citizen science and topics such as policy, education, research quality, and data standards. The COST action supported the networking of the several working groups of ECSA, and the development of the citizen science platform EU-Citizen.Science. *The science of citizen science* includes two chapters focusing on social sciences and humanities within citizen science: a chapter introducing the role of citizen science in the humanities and building on the denomination of "citizen humanities", and another chapter underlying citizen science approaches that are already present in the social sciences, while introducing the term of "citizen social science".

The existence of a real community willing to engage in participatory research and citizen science, has recently been testified by the number of proposals received by European projects running calls for citizen science projects: even considering only the three projects in which we have been, or still are, engaged (Antonella Passani in ACTION and IMPETUS; Alessia Smaniotto in COESO)[31], the request for funding and mentoring support exceeds the offer in a considerable way. These calls enabled teams that were not already engaged with citizen science to train themselves and those already working in the field to professionalise further and give sustainability to their previous work.

Since the last calls of Horizon 2020 and now within Horizon Europe, citizen science is mentioned as a method of citizen engagement and appears as a strong recommendation under different topics. The extremely brief and far from exhaustive reconstruction we offer here, of the progressive entry of citizen science within the European research agenda, shows the achievement of a community that grew in recent years and is able to attract an increasing number of actors. Yet, happy as we are with the steps taken, it is useful to remember that, to take just one example, a similar journey could be drawn for another term that is now mentioned in different calls under almost all European Missions[32]: "Social Innovation". Especially during the Seventh Framework Program, the European Commission invested considerably on this topic, financing dedicated programs such as CAPS (Collective

---

[29] Mahr, D., *et al.*, *op. cit.,* 2018.

[30] COST Action CA15212 - Citizen Science to Promote Creativity, Scientific Literacy, and Innovation throughout Europe.

[31] For the COESO project which focuses on SSH citizen science, 172 proposals have been received, for 5 grants availables. For ACTION, 196 proposals have been received for 10 grants available where the focus of the open call was on the topic of pollution. IMPETUS ran its first open call recently and received 225 proposals and 34 secured the grants.

[32]   https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe_en

Awareness Platforms for Sustainability and Social innovation)[33], creating working groups and studies on this and establishing the European Social Innovation Prize (which is still ongoing). These actions stimulated the grouping of a community of practitioners, quite an interdisciplinary one indeed, with a relevant presence of SSH researchers. When the programs explicitly and directly mentioning Social Innovation ended, the community rearranged and - at least to some extent - moved under other "labels".

This additional detour in the history of European research programmes - which, we know, would need a more detailed discussion - aims to highlight the risk often associated with the mainstreaming of a term or a research practice: that of scattering the community and eroding the spaces for sharing and reciprocal learning. In this sense the role of the national and European associations, of dedicated journals and conferences, of training programs within tertiary education is crucial.

Following this glimpse on the European context, we turn our attention now to what is entailed in this collection for Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics. As mentioned, our goal was to introduce the history, current landscape and potentialities of citizen science practices involving the Social Sciences and the Humanities, focusing more on the cases where SSH *perform* citizen science than to the ones in which SSH reflect or study citizen science. This choice of giving priority to hands-on citizen science endeavours might have played a role in reducing the number of abstracts received, in addition to the other factors previously discussed. Moreover, we were particularly interested in the ethical and political aspects of doing citizen science. The eight contributions in this collection mainly provide examples pertaining to citizen science within the SSH realm, and also showcase some of the fundamental questions that the citizen science field raises in terms of ethics and politics, including few examples from non-SSH related projects.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CITIZEN SCIENCE WITH THE SSH

Although constituting a limited number of examples of citizen science with and within the SSH, the papers collected in this special issue introduce some of the main fundamental issues - the basics - on which any citizen science project should build on: (1) the diversity characterising citizen science projects and endeavours; (2) the fact that citizen science is a research oriented activity - not necessarily lead by professional researchers, but definitely oriented to the production of new knowledge; and (3) that citizen science is based on ethical principles that represent the core values of its practice. Finally, even if less explicitly explored in this collection, a citizen science project needs to pay attention to what is political in social

---

[33] Anania, L. and Passani, A., (2014). A Hitchiker 's guide to digital social innovation, 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106838, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

activity; particularly with respect to the governance of the projects as well of the infrastructures and services supporting citizen science, and with respect to the collective benefit of the activity, both internal to the project participants and external towards the society, regardless of the size of the social groups that can benefit from a specific citizen science project.

Diversity

Citizen science can be described as a multi-/ inter-/ cross-disciplinary and interprofessional activity. The papers collected for Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politics are authored by researchers, research managers, entrepreneurs, research assistants, associate professors and professors, freelancers, post-doctoral researchers and PhD candidates. They work for public universities and research institutions, private social enterprises, non-profit organisations, or as self-employed professionals. They are trained in, or working within, the disciplinary fields of linguistics, psychology, history, sociology, epidemiology, bioethics, statistics, computer science, ethnology, ecology, economy, human geography, agroecology, political science, and health studies. And this is just a sample from eight papers: the diversity of the contributors to the field of citizen science is much larger, as well as the epistemic diversity we find within.

In the same way, the participants involved in citizen science activities and projects that the readers will see mentioned in this collection, are equally diverse: patients, youths, children and elders, civil servants, town dwellers, laypersons, prisoners, schoolteachers, parish priests, pharmacists, doctors and lawyers. How much socially diverse are the participants - in the specific social dimensions that are relevant for a project's aim and scale - is a concern for most citizen science projects, and social inclusiveness is one of the challenges that citizen science faces[34]. Finally, the citizen science field is multilingual, as we wished to showcase by accepting papers in different languages.

Research approaches

Citizen science is characterised by a diversity of approaches. In the last two decades, this diversity has been described and classified. We could refer to the well-known classification by Bonney *et al.*[35] (2009) that considers contributory,

---

[34] Pateman, R. M., Dyke, A. and West, S. E. (2021). The Diversity of Participants in Environmental Citizen Science. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice. ISSN 2057-4991

[35] Bonney, T., Cooper, C. B., Dickinson, J., Kelling, S., Phillips, T., Rosenberg, K. V., Shirk, J., (2009), Citizen science: a developing tool for expanding science knowledge and scientific literacy. BioScience 59: 977–984. ISSN 0006-3568, electronic ISSN 1525-3244. by American Institute of Biological Sciences

collaborative and co-created projects, or to the one proposed by Haklay[36] (2013) that considers extreme, participatory, distributed intelligence and crowdsourcing projects. Both classifications by Bonney and Haklay have in common that they focus on the *type* of collaboration. Other classifications also exists[37], such as the one by Andrea Wiggins and Kevin Crowston[38] (2011), which focuses more on the *objective* of a citizen science project ("action", "heritage conservation", "investigation"), as well on its level of "virtuality", and if yes or not the project includes an "educational" dimension.

For the scope of this introduction, we suggest to focus only on two macro categories: one for those projects driven by participatory practices and one for those based on crowdsourced/contributory ones. How can one recognize these categories? In *contributory projects*, also called *crowdsourced,* one identified leader defines a problem and the methodology, and asks for contributions to collect usually a large amount of data that requires a lot of resources to be completed. Thus, the participation consists of the provision of resources; the cognitive engagement can be minimal or more elaborated, depending on the project. In *participatory practices*, instead, the diverse parties involved participate in the different phases of the research, from the problem definition to the data collection and analysis; sometimes they also work together on a common final output. Participatory research, when pushed to its extreme potential, can be described as a "fully integrated"[39] activity where participants can be involved in all the phases of the research from its design to its dissemination.

We are well aware that citizen science practices can engage citizens in different ways and that a separation between two categories may appear belittling. However, if these categories are viewed as the two poles of a continuum, then we can identify and understand the level of engagement within a project by moving the cursor between these two poles.

---

[36] Haklay, M. (2013). Citizen Science and Volunteered Geographic Information: Overview and Typology of Participation. In: Sui, D., Elwood, S., Goodchild, M. (eds) Crowdsourcing Geographic Knowledge. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4587-2_7

[37] See Shirk, L. J., Ballard, H. L., Wilderman, C. C., Phillips, T., Wiggins, A., Jordan, R., McCallie, E., Minarchek, M., Lewenstein, B. V., Krasny, M. E., Bonney, R., (2012). Public participation for scientific research: a framework for deliberate design. Ecology and Society 17(2):29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-04705-170229; and Schaefer, T., Kieslinger, B., Fabian, C. M., (2020). Citizen-Based Air Quality Monitoring: The Impact on Individual Citizen Scientists and How to Leverage the Benefits to Affect Whole Regions. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 5(1): 6, pp. 1–12.https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.245

[38] Wiggins, A., Crowston, K., (2011). From conservation to Crowdsourcing: A Typology of Citizen Science. In: Proceeding of 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Science (HICSS), pp.1-10. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2011.207

[39] Haklay, M. *op. cit.,* 2013.

The levels or types of participants' engagement (from contribution to participation) can be differently mobilised with respect to the context and needs of the research itself. There seems to be no specificity of the SSH with respect to STEM on this matter: activities in the entire spectrum of the continuum can be found in the SSH fields. Citizen science - this is the second fundamental we mentioned - is indeed a research practice: it is a research-oriented activity aiming at the production of new knowledge. Each specific project will choose the most appropriate level of participants' engagement according to the research objectives and needs, as well as the methodologies and expectation of the involved disciplinary and professional fields.

For instance, in this collection of contributions, the dialect glossary of French-speaking Switzerland described by Nissille and Kloetzer in their paper "*Le Glossaire: 125 ans de sciences citoyennes en dialectologie*", constitutes a concrete example of a contributory citizen science project in the field of linguistics: initiated in 1897 and launched two years later, it mobilised around 200 contributors in 10 years that participated in the endeavour thanks to a specific protocol for collecting contributions by correspondence. The description of the Warlux project instead by Janz in "*The participatory aspect of creating a collection on WWII*" introduces in the discussion a citizen science contributory approach from the field of history, presenting how they obtained material that did not make its way into archival collections.

Examples of participatory approaches in this special issue are in two papers. The first one, by Canto-Farachala *et al.* ("*Participatory Communication and Citizen Social Science*"), presents how young citizen scientists have been involved in an European project called YouCount, where they contributed in both the design and use of qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as in the development, use and evaluation of a dedicated application for smartphones and computers (the YouCount App). Additionally, the paper provides a theoretical contribution by introducing the Participatory Action Research (PAR) as one of the epistemic foundations of citizen social science, while introducing the concept and foundations of Participatory communication. The second paper, by Malavasi *et al.* ("*Epidemiologia ambientale ben temperata: etica, sociologia e storia in un progetto di citizen science*"), presents a co-created citizen science project in the field of public health, designed to tackle a local health issue in the context of potential industrial pollution. Here, researchers from the SSH collaborate with others from the health sector and with citizens in all the phases of the research work: from the definition of the research objective to the collection, analysis and dissemination of the research results, and the suggestion of policy recommendations.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this preface, different terms are used to refer to longstanding practices of engagement by non-professional "scientists" in

research. Some of these practices, like participatory methodologies or action-research, are particularly present in the SSH disciplines. We also mentioned a specific field where citizen science practices within the SSH could be found but are not labelled as such: the public humanities. Both Janz and Malavasi *et al.* articles open a dialogue with the field of public history.

Even though not all the actions in the fields of public humanities and public social sciences include citizen science practices - i.e. the *active* participation of non-professional researchers in a common research activity - it is nonetheless possible to find in these fields research practices that can be related to citizen science. However, under what conditions? The article by Lucia Ziglioli ("*Filosofia pubblica e citizen science: verso una citizen philosophy?*") suggests an answer to this question for the field of public philosophy. Through examples in which philosophy is mobilised as a discipline within participatory approaches, she provides arguments for labelling specific public philosophy activities as citizen science, provided that the participants are effectively engaged in producing new knowledge together with the professional researchers. In the case of philosophy, this means that not only this knowledge is collected and recognized in its existence by the scientific community, but also that this knowledge is incorporated in return in the philosophical discussion, and gives the possibility to shift questions and concepts.

Ethics and politics

The questions raised in the background of some of the papers tackle the ethical aspects of doing citizen science. These are related to different strands of citizen science: from the management of personal data, to the difficulty in matching the ethical requirements of standard research processes (and ethical committee) when doing citizen science and touching the very nature of the relationship and the power asymmetries between professional and citizen scientists. On the latter topic, Remmers *et al.* in their paper "*Mind the relationship: a multi-layered ethical framework for citizen science in health*" identify respect and justice as the core values in engaging citizens in science (they developed the framework within the Health sector, but we would add that this could apply also outside of it). Besides these, five ethical *desiderata* and two fundamental qualities[40] are considered as crucial in making citizen science "a humanising endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans".

The centrality of "transparency" is called upon as a central value for citizen science also by Thuermer *et al.*, in their paper "*Talking metadata: understanding privacy implications of volunteer contributions in citizen science projects*". In their

---

[40] The five ethical *desiderata* identified by Remmers *et al.* are "relationship between equals", "recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency", "reciprocity", "openness for different goals", and "openness for different research methods and paradigms". The two fundamental qualities are symmetry and transparency.

analysis on how data and metadata are created, managed and understood by citizen science projects coordinators and by the citizens involved, they point out that in many cases, citizen scientists collect data and consequently contribute metadata without knowing, thus without being able to question the possible risks and consequences (for example in terms of privacy) for them and other concerned people. This is associated with other ethically-relevant topics such as data ownership and recognition of contributions: all aspects that should be discussed in an open and transparent way with volunteers at the beginning of a project as they might influence important technical and activity-related choices.

Considering the papers in this special issue, the question of the possible connections between citizen science and politics is not directly tackled. The contribution of citizen science projects to policy making is an important topic for the community[41] and, while there are several good practices in this sense[42], ways of supporting a more structured collaboration between citizen science practitioners and decision makers are still under discussion in many EU countries.

This topic is often tackled by looking at how citizen science projects can deliver data for evidence-based policy making; however, the paper by Bedessem *et al.* ("*Citizen science for public deliberation of local environment policies*") suggests a step forward with a possible path to combine this need with public deliberation. The authors report on two pilots in which a digitally-mediated framework is used to involve more directly the public in policy-making by combining data crowdsourcing with, indeed, local public deliberation practices. The authors describe a project in the field of environmental psychology and, bridging the literature on digital political deliberation and citizen science, present a case study that sees citizen science as a support "tool" meant to foster good quality deliberation. In this case the role of citizen science is that of "training" citizens on a topic to be discussed in public deliberation. In other words, by gathering data on a given topic, citizens self-educate themselves on that topic and learn about the political relevance of it. Finally, this process can give them trust in their own capability to take a position in the democratic debate.

---

[41] See: Haklay, M., (2015). Citizen Science and Policy: A European Perspective. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Citizen_Science_Policy_European_Perspective_Haklay.pdf; Nascimento, S., Rubio Iglesias, J. M., Owen, R., Schade, S., & Shanley, L. (2018). Citizen science for policy formulation and implementation. UCL Press; and Luneau, A., Demeulenaere, E., Duvail, S., Chlous, F., Julliard, R.. Le tournant démocratique de la citizen science: sociologie des transformations d'un programme de sciences participatives. *Participations - Revue de sciences sociales sur la démocratie et la citoyenneté*, 2021, 2021/3 (31), pp.199-240. https://doi.org/10.3917/parti.031.0199

[42] Göbel, C., Nold, C., Berditchevskaia, A., Haklay, M. (2019). How does citizen science "do" governance? Reflection from DITO's project. Theory and Practice, 4(1): 31, pp. 1–13. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.204

Supporting citizen science

Finally, there is a crucial point in the growth of citizen science, namely the possibility to create and sustain in the long run support services and digital platforms that facilitate and foster citizen science both in physical and digital spaces, and allow data exchange and their conservation following open science approaches. This question is not specific to the SSH, but the lack of recognition of these disciplines, may add to an already challenging question.

Without of course diminishing or neglecting the role that digital platforms and services play today in facilitating and supporting citizen science practices[43], we made the choice for this preface to stress only one point, strongly highlighted in the papers collected here: the relevance of the human resources needed to support citizen science projects.

The example of the glossary of French-speaking Switzerland showed not only that the project coordination could rely on existing infrastructures such as the postal service to run their project, but also that the long term availability of the editorial team was paramount to ensure a continuous follow-up with the core participants, and keep their engagement in the long run. The example of the Warlux project shows how important it has been for the participants to have the possibility to reach out and ask questions to the research team, while the example of *Aria di ricerca* in Malavasi *et al.* (*Epidemiologia ambientale*) stresses the crucial role that local associations and their members had in the success of the research project. Finally, the example provided by Bedessem *et al.* of the SPOT project, built in coordination with two French municipalities, tells us how much a platform alone is not enough to onboard and keep engaged participants in a citizen science project: the mediation

---

[43] The readers willing to explore this topic may start with the following references: a guide collecting contributory platform in the cultural fields that has been published in 2022 in French, edited by Marta Severo, Sébastien Shulz and Olivier Thuillas, including a postface by Francesca Musiani (Cf. Severo M., Shulz S., Thuillas O. (2022). Culture en partage. Fyp, 2022); an article by Baudry *et al.* investigates how collectives are formed and governed within selected online crowdsourced citizen science platforms, and suggests two ideal-types of government (Cf. Baudry, J., Tancoigne, É., & Strasser, B. J. (2022). Turning crowds into communities: The collectives of online citizen science. *Social Studies of Science*, *52*(3), 399–424. https://doi.org/10.1177/03063127211058791); an example of a platform specifically designed to support participatory science process (see Moustard, F., Haklay, M., Lewis, J., Albert, A., Moreu, M., Chiaravalloti, R., Hoyte, S., Skarlatidou, A., Vittoria, A., Comandulli, C., Nyadzi, E., Vitos, M., Altenbuchner, J., Laws, M., Fryer-Moreira, R., and Artus, D. (2021). Using Sapelli in the Field: Methods and Data for an Inclusive Citizen Science. *Front. Ecol. Evol.* 9:638870. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.638870); and finally, for an example of the usage of a non-citizen science specific digital platform, in support of participatory research within the SSH, see Chibois, J. and Smaniotto, A. Open digital infrastructures for bridging professional cultures: the case of extreme citizen science between journalism and research. Open Research Europe 2023, 3:3. https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15262.1

put in place by the municipalities - only focused on advertising and promotion - was not enough to ensure participation.

This necessary support cannot be provided only by the research teams that run the projects; dedicated services can be provided within research institutions or in collaboration with them, while playing an important role in facilitating collaborations and raising awareness about their challenges and needs. The sciences shops are an example of these support services: most of them are action-research or local innovation oriented, and in almost 50 years of existence in Europe - through several trials and errors - they developed a consolidated expertise in facilitating collaborations between researchers and civil society organisations and individuals.[44]

More recently, since citizen science is considered at the European policy level an open science pillar, research libraries, incited by their European association Liber, are particularly mobilised in shaping new support approaches to accompany researchers in this paths[45]. In this respect, it is not surprising that a comprehensive overview, available in Italian, on the current landscape of citizen science was written by a research support librarian and researcher in library and information science: in her article published on the Italian journal of Library Science, Archival Science and Information Science (JLIS.it), Rossana Morriello includes considerations about the support services such as infrastructures, platforms, libraries, although she mainly focuses on crowdsourced citizen science.[46]

However old or new these support services providing human resources to facilitate participatory processes are, there is still a long way to reach full recognition and support, in order to be able to assist in return the research teams and their partners and project's participants. As Canto-Farachala *et al.* remind us in their paper "*Participatory Communication and Citizen Social Science*", building trusted relationships enabling co-creative practices takes time and resources; however, the conditions that are necessary for citizen social science to develop - and we may add, necessary in general for developing any participatory research practice - are still not fully incorporated in institutional structures and in research funding organisations.

---

[44] Cf. Savoia, A., Lefebvre, B., Millot, G. & Bocquet, B. (2017). The Science Shop Concept and its Implementation in a French University. *Journal of Innovation Economics & Management*, 22, 97-117. https://doi.org/10.3917/jie.pr1.0006

[45] The working group dedicated to citizen science of the LIBER association of European research libraries started a collaborative work to provide the librarian community with a guide on "Citizen Science for Research Libraries", and the first two parts, respectively about needed skills and infrastructures, are available on Github (Cf. Citizen Science Skilling for Library Staff, Researchers, and the Public, doi: https://doi.org/10.25815/hf0m-2a57, and "Library Infrastructures and Citizen Science", doi: DOI: https://doi.org/10.25815/tz0x-m353

[46] Morriello, R. (2021). "Citizen science. One of the eight pillars of open science identified by the European Union." JLIS.it 12, 3 (September 2021): 33–52. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4403/jlis.it-12761

IN THE END, SHOULD WE KEEP CALLING IT "CITIZEN SCIENCE"?

At the end of this journey to introduce citizen science with and within the social sciences and humanities, why do we still need to ask this question? The reason is that despite - or more likely because of[47] - the steady increase in visibility for citizen science practices in recent years, and the rise of citizen science as a specific disciplinary field within the academia, the discussion around the perimeter of the practice - its "definition" - has lead to a large panel of descriptive, programmatic or policy oriented definitions: a collective of six researchers engaged in shaping the citizen science field in Europe, gathered and categorised 34 of these definitions[48].

As we mentioned at the very beginning of this preface, and as it appeared as a point of attention throughout our text, it has not to be taken for granted that all the researchers and practitioners implementing contributory or participatory approaches within the SSH, recognize themselves as practitioners of citizen science. Neither can "citizen science" as an umbrella term, or "big-tent" term, be taken for granted.

The American Citizen Science Association seems to be reaching an end with its long term reflection about, precisely, its name. After a long process, the association is moving towards a new name; the new candidate name is "Association for Advancing Participatory Sciences", even though, after the announcement at the end of the association's annual conference in May 2023, the process of name changing still has to be officially validated. Citizen science will then possibly be categorised as one of the ways of doing "participatory sciences".

The discussion around the term "citizen science" in America has a lot to do with a political stance, aroused from reflections on epistemic justice, that started several years ago: the first steps of that discussion have been summarised by a collective of more than twenty citizen science researchers and practitioners, mainly belonging to environmental studies and the natural sciences field, in the article "Why terminology matters"[49]. If one quote has to be taken from it, it is the following:

---

[47] These kinds of discussions are relevant when an emerging field finds its way among the institutions, and are more a testimony for its lively existence, rather than a sign of weakness. Among similar examples we could find in recent years, the emergence of the digital humanities fields garners several similarities, among which is its recognition as a "not a unified field but an array of convergent practices that explore a universe" (Cf. Schnapp, J., Presner, T. *et al.* (2009). The Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0. UCLA Mellon Seminar in Digital Humanities), and being a "methodological commitment" (Cf. Matthew K. Gold, collected in the section "Day of DH: Defining the Digital Humanities", in Debates in the Digital Humanities, University of Minnesota, https://doi.org/10.5749/9781452963754) contributing to renew current approaches in performing and teaching research.

[48] Haklay, M., *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 2021.

[49] Eitzel, M.V., Cappadonna, J.L., Santos-Lang, C., Duerr, R.E., Virapongse, A., West, S.E., Kyba, C.C.M., Bowser, A., Cooper, C.B., Sforzi, A., Metcalfe, A.N., Harris, E.S., Thiel, M., Haklay, M., Ponciano, L., Roche, J., Ceccaroni, L., Shilling, F.M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Kiessling, T., Davis, B.Y.

"Because citizen science is a form of knowledge production, citizen science terminology has the power to allow some peoples' knowledge to be included and the knowledge of others to be excluded. This power potentially presents epistemic (knowledge) justice issues and has consequences for the quality of our understanding of the world."[50]

With no naive stance in understanding that people draw boundaries using language, the defence of "citizen science" as an umbrella term allowing the gaining of support and building a community, has been expressed right after the end of the last American Citizen Science Association conference, in a passionate blog post by Muky Haklay[51], one of the leading actors of the citizen science movement on both sides of the Atlantic. Haklay, before diving into a reflection building 16 arguments, underlines that he endorsed, from his start of engagement with participatory mapping and citizen science, "a pluralist position that accepts as many activities as possible under the umbrella, as this helps secure funding, recognition, and resources for all these activities".

We can agree with Haklay that a pure terminology quarrel, devoid of practical reason, is pointless. A theoretical argument for its own sake would not bear fruit: it needs to implant itself in practices, and grow with them and in their ethical and political dimensions, to nurture conceptual bunches that will keep it all together. We would also like to point out that where Haklay and Jennifer Shrink - the current executive director of the American Citizen Science Association, seem to agree, it is that, whatever the umbrella term, this name should not affect the way researchers and practitioners describe their own work on the field, since these descriptions is very likely to vary by context, as suggested by the 34 definitions and the diversity of labels that can be mobilised in the field.

If it is not really the name that matters, but the work behind that name, yet, the worry about the possibility that a name change could eventually undermine the "momentum" for citizen science, is telling us something that it is worth making explicit: it highlights how much "politics of science" there is behind and surrounding the building of a community of practice around citizen science, whose members seek support, recognition and funding at the policy levels, both locally, nationally, and internationally.

---

and Jiang, Q., (2017). Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key Terms. *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice*, 2(1), p.1. http://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.96

[50] *Ibid*. In this quote, Eitzel *et al*. refer to Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001; and Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective *Feminist studies* 14(3): 575–599, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066

[51] In his personal blogging space povesham.wordpress.com. See Muki Haklay, C*Sci 2023 and the new name of the (US) Citizen Science Association, 10 June 2023, https://povesham.wordpress.com/2023/06/10/csci-2023-and-the-new-name-of-the-us-citizen-science-association/

While avoiding of a terminology quarrel, but still without dismissing what is good in reflecting upon terminology, if we can propose a suggestion in line with the wish to keeping building a solid research community around citizen science, this would be to focus on the power of translations: translating disciplinary languages, as we do with natural languages of which they are part, bridging what there is in common, and learning from what is untranslatable. Focusing then, specifically, on the descriptions of work within the diverse disciplinary fields - the actual collaboration practices, and then identifying how the same contributory and participatory approaches are - and were - called within these disciplinary-based or practice-based communities, linking them with the common "umbrella term".

On the contrary, what the persistence of an excessive airtight siloing between disciplinary labelings might show, is that the potential of translation in uniting forces behind a common interest - that is, rethinking and reshaping the role of research practices with and for our society, their spaces, and their actors - is still locked.

For those willing to contribute unlocking this potential, and join this effort of translation, there are several resources on which to rely that the European community produced in recent years, in addition to the ones already mentioned above, that ambitioned to set the common ground for a European citizen science community of practice: the principles and the characteristics of citizen science[52], and the criteria helping citizen science networks and platform coordinators to decide if a project should be listed as citizen science in their databases, thus facilitating the exchange of projects between networks, as well as making projects more comparable.[53]

This collection of articles for Etica&Politica/Ethics&Politcs is a contribution to this translation effort we are calling for. A first attempt at collecting examples of hands-on practices, documenting the presence of citizen science practices within the SSH, regardless of whether these practices were or are actually called "citizen science". We began this endeavour because, when thinking about politics of science, it seemed to us fundamental that in the progressive institutionalisation of citizen science the humanities and social sciences are not lost in translation: we believe that the whole citizen field, and not only the SSH, will benefit from the recognition of the specific contributions of these disciplines to the citizen science

---

[52] Both the ECSA principles (currently translated in more than 30 languages) and the characteristics of citizen science are available on the open repository Zenodo. Cf. ECSA (European Citizen Science Association). (2015). Ten Principles of Citizen Science. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/XPR2N; Haklay, Muki, et al.. (2020). ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758668; and Haklay, Muki, et al.. (2020). ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science: Explanation Notes. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758555

[53] Dörler, D. *et al.*, Criteria for listing citizen science projects on citizen science online platforms. European Citizen Science Association (ECSA) Working Group Citizen Science Networks. 2022. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7249085

field, equally ensuring a larger epistemic diversity and working towards a real interdisciplinary practice.

REFERENCES

Albert, A., Balázs, B., Butkevičienė, E., Mayer, K., and Perelló, J. (2021). *Citizen Social Science: New and Established Approaches to Participation in Social Research.* In: The Science of Citizen Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_7

Anania, L. and Passani, A., (2014). *A Hitchiker's guide to digital social innovation,* 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106838, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

Ancion, Z., Borrell-Damián, L., Mounier, P., Rooryck, J., & Saenen, B.. (2022). *Action Plan for Diamond Open Access.* Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6282403

Austin, J. D. (2014). *Introduction: A special issue on Florida's "citizen science" programs.* Florida Scientist, 77(4), 163–166. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24321921

Baudry, J., Tancoigne, É., & Strasser, B. J. (2022). *Turning crowds into communities: The collectives of online citizen science.* Social Studies of Science, 52(3), 399–424. https://doi.org/10.1177/03063127211058791

Bonn, A., Richter, A., Vohland, K., Pettibone, L., Brandt, M., Feldmann, R., Goebel, C., Grefe, C., Hecker, S., Hennen, L., Hofer, H., Kiefer, S., Klotz, S., Kluttig, T., Krause, J., Küsel, K., Liedtke, C., Mahla, A., Neumeier, V., Premke-Kraus, M., Rillig, M. C., Röller, O., Schäffler, L., Schmalzbauer, B., Schneidewind, U., Schumann, A., Settele, J., Tochtermann, K., Tockner, K., Vogel, J., Volkmann, W., von Unger, H., Walter, D., Weisskopf, M., Wirth, C., Witt, T., Wolst, D. & D. Ziegler (2016). *Green Paper Citizen Science Strategy 2020 for Germany.* Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), German Centre for integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig, Leipzig, Museum für Naturkunde Berlin, Leibniz Institute for Evolution and Biodiversity Science (MfN), Berlin-Brandenburg Institute of Advanced Biodiversity Research (BBIB), Berlin. https://eu-citizen.science/resource/42

Bonney, T., Cooper, C.B., Dickinson, J., Kelling, S., Phillips, T., Rosenberg, K.V., Shirk, J., (2009). *Citizen science: a developing tool for expanding science knowledge and scientific literacy.* BioScience 59: 977–984. ISSN 0006-3568, electronic ISSN 1525-3244. by American Institute of Biological Sciences

Chibois, J. and Smaniotto, A. *Open digital infrastructures for bridging professional cultures: the case of extreme citizen science between journalism and research.* Open Research Europe 2023, 3:3. https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15262.1

Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Brounéus, F., Cieslinski, M., Duerinckx, A., Gijsel, L. Grossberndt, S. Kragh, G. Luis, C. Tiago, P., European Citizen Science Association (ECSA) Working Group Citizen Science Networks. (2022). *Criteria for listing citizen science projects on citizen science online platforms.* Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7249085

Dragoni, P. & Cerquetti, M. (dir.) (2019). *L'archeologia pubblica prima e dopo l'archeologia pubblica,* in IL CAPITALE CULTURALE Studies on the Value of Cultural Heritage Supplementi 09 / 2019, eum edizioni università di macerata

Eitzel, M.V., Cappadonna, J.L., Santos-Lang, C., Duerr, R.E., Virapongse, A., West, S.E., Kyba, C.C.M., Bowser, A., Cooper, C.B., Sforzi, A., Metcalfe, A.N., Harris, E.S.,

Thiel, M., Haklay, M., Ponciano, L., Roche,J., Ceccaroni, L., Shilling, F.M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Kiessling, T., Davis, B.Y. and Jiang, Q., (2017). *Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key Terms*. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 2(1), p.1. http://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.96

European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Iagher, R., Monachello, R., Warin, C., *et al.*, (2020). *Science with and for society in Horizon 2020: achievements and recommendations for Horizon Europe*, Delaney, N.(editor), Tornasi, Z.(editor), Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/32018

Fricker, M. (2007). *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

Göbel, C., Nold, C., Berditchevskaia, A., Haklay, M. (2019). *How does citizen science "do" governance? Reflection from DITO's project*. Theory and Practice, 4(1): 31, pp. 1–13. https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.204

Haklay, M. (2013). *Citizen Science and Volunteered Geographic Information: Overview and Typology of Participation*. In: Sui, D., Elwood, S., Goodchild, M. (eds.) Crowdsourcing Geographic Knowledge. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4587-2_7

Haklay, M., (2015). *Citizen Science and Policy: A European Perspective*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Citizen_Science_Policy_European_Perspective_Haklay.pdf

Haklay, M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Manzoni, M., Hecker, S., Vohland, K. (2021). *What Is Citizen Science? The Challenges of Definition*. In: The Science of Citizen Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_2

Haklay, M., Motion, A., Balázs, B., Kieslinger, B., Greshake T. Bastian, Nold, C., Dörler, D., Fraisl, D., Riemenschneider, D., Heigl, F., Brounéus, F., Hager, G., Heuer, K., Wagenknecht, K., Vohland, K., Shanley, L., Deveaux, L., Ceccaroni, L., Weißpflug, M., Gold, M., Mazzonetto, M., Mačiulienė, M., Woods, S., Luna, S., Hecker, S., Schaefer, T., Woods, T., Wehn, U. (2020). *ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science*. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758668

Haklay, M., Motion, A., Balázs, B., Kieslinger, B., Greshake Tzovaras, B., Nold, C., Dörler, D., Fraisl, D., Riemenschneider, D., Heigl, F., Brounéus, F., Hager, G., Wagenknecht, K., Heuer, K., Vohland, K., Shanley, L., Deveaux, L., Ceccaroni, L., Weißpflug, M., Gold, M., Mazzonetto, M., Mačiulienė, M., Woods, S., Luna, S., Hecker, S., Schaefer, T., Woods, T., Wehn, U. (2020). *ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science: Explanation Notes*. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758555

Haraway, D. (1988). *Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective*. Feminist studies 14(3): 575–599. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066

Hecker, S., Haklay, M., Bowser, A., Makuch, Z., Vogel, J. and Bonn, A., (2018). *Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy*, UCL Press, London. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv550cf2

Heinisch, B., Oswald, K., Weißpflug, M., Shuttleworth, S. and Belknap, G. (2021). *Citizen Humanities*. In: The Science of Citizen Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_2

Houllier, F., Merilhou-Goudard, J.B. (2016). *Les sciences participatives en France : Etats des lieux, bonnes pratiques et recommandations.* https://hal.science/hal-02801940/

Kasperowski, D. and Kullenberg, C. (2019). *The many Modes of Citizen Science*, Science & Technology Studies, 32(2), pp. 2–7.https://doi.org/10.23987/sts.74404

Lamphere L., (2004). *The Convergence of Applied, Practising, and Public Anthropology in the 21st Century*, Human Organization; Winter 2004; 63, 4; pg. 431-443.

Lewandowski, E., Caldwell, W., Elmquist, D., Oberhauser, K., (2017). *Public Perceptions of Citizen Science*, in Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 2 (1). https://theoryandpractice.citizenscienceassociation.org/article/10.5334/cstp.77/

Lovell, R.E., & Dissell, R. (2021). *Dissemination and Impact Amplified: How a Researcher–Reporter Collaboration Helped Improve the Criminal Justice Response to Victims With Untested Sexual Assault Kits.* Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 37(2), 257–275. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986221999880

Luneau, A., Demeulenaere, E., Duvail, S., Chlous, F., Julliard, R. *Le tournant démocratique de la citizen science: sociologie des transformations d'un programme de sciences participatives.* Participations - Revue de sciences sociales sur la démocratie et la citoyenneté, 2021, 2021/3 (31), pp.199-240. https://doi.org/10.3917/parti.031.0199

Mahr, D., Gobel, C., Irwin, A. et Vohland K., (2018). *Watching or being watched. Enhancing productive discussion between the citizen sciences, the social sciences and the humanities*, in Hecker S., Haklay M., Bowser A., Makuch Z., Vogel J. et Bonn A., Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy, UCL Press, London. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv550cf2.14

Morriello, R. (2021). *Citizen science. One of the eight pillars of open science identified by the European Union.* JLIS.it 12, 3 (September 2021): 33–52. https://doi.org/10.4403/jlis.it-12761

Moustard, F., Haklay, M., Lewis, J., Albert, A., Moreu, M., Chiaravalloti, R., Hoyte, S., Skarlatidou, A., Vittoria, A., Comandulli, C., Nyadzi, E., Vitos, M., Altenbuchner, J., Laws, M., Fryer-Moreira, R. and Artus, D. (2021). *Using Sapelli in the Field: Methods and Data for an Inclusive Citizen Science.* Front. Ecol. Evol. 9:638870. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2021.638870

Nascimento, S., Rubio Iglesias, J. M., Owen, R., Schade, S., & Shanley, L. (2018). *Citizen science for policy formulation and implementation.* UCL Press.

Paci, D. (2021). *Knowing is participating: digital public history, wiki and citizen humanities.* Umanistica Digitale, 5(10), 235–249. https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2532-8816/12555

Particip'Arc (2019). *Recherche Culturelle et Sciences Participatives*, Report. https://www.participarc.net/ressources/azgfg-2019-rapport-particip-arc

Pateman, R.M. , Dyke, A. and West, S.E. (2021). *The Diversity of Participants in Environmental Citizen Science.* Citizen Science: Theory and Practice. ISSN 2057-4991

Pranckutė, R., (2021). *Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus: The Titans of Bibliographic Information in Today's Academic World.* Publications 9 (1), 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/publications9010012

Savoia, A., Lefebvre, B., Millot, G. & Bocquet, B. (2017). *The Science Shop Concept and its Implementation in a French University*. Journal of Innovation Economics & Management, 22, 97-117. https://doi.org/10.3917/jie.pr1.0006

Schaefer, T., Kieslinger, B., Fabian, C.M., (2020). *Citizen-Based Air Quality Monitoring: The Impact on Individual Citizen Scientists and How to Leverage the Benefits to Affect Whole Regions*. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 5(1): 6, pp. 1–12.https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.245

Schnapp, J., Presner, T. *et al.* (2009). *The Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0*. UCLA Mellon Seminar in Digital Humanities.

Severo M., Shulz S., Thuillas O. (2022). *Culture en partage*. Fyp, 2022

Shirk, L.J., Ballard, H.L., Wilderman C.C., Phillips, T., Wiggins, A., Jordan, R., McCallie, E., Minarchek, M., Lewenstein, B.V., Krasny, M.E., Bonney, R., (2012). *Public participation for scientific research: a framework for deliberate design*. Ecology and Society 17(2):29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-04705-170229

Socientize consortium (2014), *White Paper on Citizen Science in Europe*, https://eu-citizen.science/resource/8

Tauginienė, L., Butkevičienė, E., Vohland, K., Heinisch, B., Daskolia, M., Suškevičs, M., Portela, M., Balázs, B.& Prūse, B. (2020). *Citizen science in the social sciences and humanities: the power of interdisciplinarity*. Palgrave Communications 6(1): 89 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0471-y

Wiggins, A., Crowston, K., (2011). *From conservation to Crowdsourcing: A Typology of Citizen Science*. Proceeding of 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Science (HICSS), pp.1-10. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2011.207

EPIDEMIOLOGIA AMBIENTALE BEN TEMPERATA: ETICA, SOCIOLOGIA E STORIA IN UN PROGETTO DI *CITIZEN SCIENCE*

GIULIA MALAVASI
Società per l'Epidemiologia e la Prevenzione "Giulio A. Maccacaro" (Milano)
giuliamalavasi82@gmail.com (corresponding author)

BRUNA DE MARCHI
Società per l'Epidemiologia e la Prevenzione "Giulio A. Maccacaro" (Milano)
Senter for vitenskapsteori (SVT), Universitetet i Bergen (Bergen)

ANTONELLA FICORILLI
Società per l'Epidemiologia e la Prevenzione "Giulio A. Maccacaro" (Milano)
Dipartimento di Biologia Ambientale, Università La Sapienza di Roma

ANNIBALE BIGGERI
Società per l'Epidemiologia e la Prevenzione "Giulio A. Maccacaro" (Milano)
Dipartimento di Scienze Cardio-Toraco-Vascolari e Sanità Pubblica, Università degli Studi di Padova

ABSTRACT

The article presents the research performed by an Italian multi-disciplinary team jointly with a group of citizen scientists. The research was part of the project *CitieS-Health* (Citizen Science for Urban Environment and Health) funded by the EU under the Horizon2020 Programme. *Aria di Ricerca in Valle del Serchio*, one of the project five pilot studies, was performed in eight municipalities of Valle del Serchio (Lucca, Tuscany) and addressed the prevalence of chronic kidney diseases in the context of potential industrial pollution on health and, in particular, the presence of heavy metals in the environment. Since long, health and environmental issues have been of concern for the local residents who over the years promoted many initiatives to ensure adequate monitoring and appropriate policy interventions. Inspired by the PNS (Post-Normal Science) approach, and in particular the idea of Extended Peer Community, the study addressed local concerns and expectations integrating a multiplicity of competences, knowledges and perspectives. Researchers from Social Sciences and Humanities – namely history, sociology and ethics – collaborated with others from the health sector – epidemiology in particular – and with citizens in all the phases of the work: from the definition of the research objective to the collection, analysis and dissemination of the research results, and the suggestion of policy recommendations.

1. IL PROGETTO *CITIES-HEALTH*

Il progetto europeo *Citizen Science for Urban Environment and Health* (*CitieS-Health*) ha perseguito l'obiettivo di «porre al centro della ricerca in epidemiologia ambientale tematiche di particolare importanza per i cittadini»[1]. Condotto in cinque paesi dell'Unione Europea (Italia, Lituania, Olanda, Slovenia, Spagna), *CitieS-Health* ha realizzato studi di epidemiologia ambientale in aree esposte a fattori di inquinamento ambientale di diversa origine. Partendo da questo comune tema, ogni partner ha definito il proprio specifico quesito di ricerca.

Si è trattato di un progetto di *citizen science* che ha visto il coinvolgimento attivo dei cittadini[2] nella produzione di dati scientifici e di informazioni rilevanti sulla relazione fra ambiente e salute nei diversi territori oggetto di studio. *CitieS-Health* è stato realizzato secondo lo schema degli studi "co-creati" (Bonney et al., 2009; Froeling et al., 2021; Haklay et al. 2023), nei quali i cittadini sono coinvolti in tutte le fasi della ricerca: la definizione degli obiettivi, la stesura del protocollo di studio, la raccolta dei dati, la strategia di analisi, l'interpretazione e la disseminazione dei risultati, la valutazione degli scenari e delle implicazioni di sanità pubblica[3].

La scienza post-normale (PNS) è stata un riferimento teorico condiviso fra i cinque *partner* del progetto in quanto le problematiche affrontate rientravano perfettamente nel suo "mantra": «fatti incerti, valori controversi, poste in gioco elevate, decisioni urgenti» (Funtowicz e Ravetz, 1993/2020; Funtowicz 2022; Ravetz 2022). In tali casi, i tradizionali approcci di ricerca e di valutazione della stessa si rivelano insufficienti, e la proposta è di chiamare in causa una *Extended Peer Community* (EPC), una comunità allargata di pari, consistente in un gruppo più ampio e variegato della ristretta comunità di accademici tradizionalmente impegnati a condurre la ricerca e valutarne la qualità. L'assunto, è che, oltre a quella scientifica, altri tipi di conoscenze – di cui sono portatori soggetti altri dagli scienziati – siano necessari per affrontare il problema in esame e per individuare possibili soluzioni. La EPC non è necessariamente un luogo di risoluzione dei conflitti, ma è un forum aperto a cui qualunque persona interessata può accedere con le proprie conoscenze e interessi e con l'intenzione di tenere in considerazione quelli degli altri. La qualità della conoscenza prodotta si valuta in base alla correttezza ed inclusività del

---

[1] https://citieshealth.eu/ (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023). Il progetto ha recentemente ricevuto un riconoscimento nell'ambito del *European Union Citizen Science Award*, https://www.isglobal.org/en/-/cities-health-mencion-honorifica-premio-union-europea-ciencia-ciudadana (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

[2] In letteratura il termine cittadini è comunemente adottato in riferimento alla loro partecipazione a progetti di ricerca; in questo contributo useremo intercambiabilmente i termini cittadini o residenti per indicare l'insieme delle persone che hanno seguito il progetto, e il termine "scienziati di comunità" (Dosemagen et al., 2022) per indicare coloro che sono stati più attivi in tutte le fasi dello studio.

[3] Il progetto *CitieS-Health* ha disegnato un portale web (https://citizensciencetoolkit.eu/) che contiene un toolkit, ossia un insieme di strumenti utilizzabili da quanti sono interessati a progetti di *citizen science* (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

processo attraverso il quale è stata elaborata ed è concepita come patrimonio comune (Waltner-Toews et al. 2020; Kovacic e Biggeri 2023).

La scelta di ascoltare varie voci e includere quanti più soggetti possibile nelle varie fasi del processo – dalla identificazione del quesito di ricerca fino alla individuazione di possibili interventi – è apparsa subito la più adatta per un progetto come il nostro, fortemente orientato a proporre soluzioni di *policy*. Nel dibattito interno all'epidemiologia ambientale, da tempo è stata riconosciuta l'importanza di mantenere una coerenza tra i temi di ricerca e l'impatto in termini di sanità pubblica (Galea, 2013): coinvolgere i cittadini in progetti di *citizen science* è visto da un crescente numero di ricercatori come un modo efficace per garantire che gli obiettivi della ricerca corrispondano a tematiche di particolare importanza per loro (Altopiedi 2022).

Al progetto *CitieS-Health* hanno collaborato varie discipline: considerando la modalità di lavoro adottata, riteniamo che l'aggettivo "transdisciplinare" sia quello che meglio lo caratterizza (Knapp et al. 2019). Come ben sintetizzano Kaiser e Gluckman, «la transdisciplinarietà è chiaramente distinta da altre forme di collaborazione accademica, come ad esempio la multi- e inter-disciplinarietà[4] e non implica alcun tipo di super teoria, nuova epistemologia o metodologia rivoluzionaria» (Kaiser e Gluckman 2023: 23-24). La differenza cruciale consiste in un dialogo e una collaborazione fra pari che riconoscono e integrano diversi tipi di conoscenze, oltre a quelle strettamente scientifico-disciplinari, come essenziali per affrontare problemi complessi[5]. Al fine di trovare delle soluzioni adeguate e condivise, l'attenzione al contesto socio-culturale e politico è considerata essenziale (Kaiser e Gluckman 2023).

2. *ARIA DI RICERCA*: LO STUDIO ITALIANO

Aria di Ricerca in Valle del Serchio[6] (da qui in poi *Aria di Ricerca*) è stato lo studio pilota italiano del progetto *CitieS-Health*. Il *team* comprendeva sette ricercatori con diverse specializzazioni: bioetica ed etica della ricerca, epidemiologia ambientale, informatica, scienze ambientali, sociologia, statistica medica, storia. Rispetto agli altri *team* la componente di studi di scienze sociali e umane era più rilevante, e l'integrazione fra discipline è stata facilitata da precedenti esperienze di ricerca condivise e realizzate con un simile approccio[7].

---

[4] Con il termine "multidisciplinare" vogliamo indicare la collaborazione fra varie discipline, con "interdisciplinare" la loro integrazione.

[5] Per le conoscenze non strettamente disciplinari o scientifiche useremo l'espressione "conoscenze laiche".

[6] https://www.ariadiricerca.it/ (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

[7] Il clima di fiducia e disponibilità al confronto tra i ricercatori derivava, oltre che da un'adesione all'impostazione metodologica dello studio, anche da esperienze passate di progetti condotti a

Il quesito di ricerca, formulato attraverso un processo partecipato descritto in seguito, era stimare la prevalenza di malattia renale cronica in un'area estesa a otto comuni della Valle del Serchio in provincia di Lucca, Toscana[8].

Per gli abitanti della Valle del Serchio la qualità dell'aria è motivo di grande preoccupazione da decenni, insieme alla consapevolezza che la sua valutazione è circondata da molte incertezze. Gli effetti sulla salute umana dell'esposizione cronica a inquinanti ambientali originati da diverse fonti sono stati una questione che ha sollevato apprensione sin dagli anni '80 del Novecento. Nel 2018 era già stata realizzata la prima installazione di quella che oggi è una rete di quattro stazioni di monitoraggio indipendenti per misurare la concentrazione di polveri respirabili (in dettaglio le frazioni con diametro inferiore a 10 e 2,5 micron, rispettivamente PM10 e PM2,5), assemblate da residenti locali. In seguito, è emerso un ulteriore elemento di attenzione tra i cittadini: nel 2019 l'industria locale di metallurgia non ferrosa KME (ex SMI, Società metallurgica italiana), presente a Fornaci di Barga (frazione del comune di Barga) da oltre cento anni, ha presentato un piano industriale di investimenti, diventato oggetto di un processo deliberativo partecipativo (Bobbio, 2010)[9]. Il piano, che prevedeva la costruzione di un pirogassificatore nei terreni di proprietà della fabbrica, ha incontrato una forte opposizione locale e la mobilitazione di migliaia di persone.

L'idea di includere l'area in una proposta di progetto di ricerca da presentare alla UE è stata accolta favorevolmente dalla popolazione. Alcune associazioni del territorio, in particolare La Libellula[10], sono state molto attive nella sensibilizzazione degli abitanti della Valle per diffondere informazioni e favorire il sostegno all'iniziativa. Non appena il finanziamento della proposta è stato approvato, si sono svolti una serie di incontri preliminari con i residenti interessati e alcuni amministratori su come organizzare la ricerca, in modo che il maggior numero possibile di persone potesse essere coinvolto. I cittadini più sensibili alle tematiche di salute – molti dei quali già attivi in associazioni locali e spontaneamente riunitisi in un comitato – hanno favorito il dialogo e una costante collaborazione con gli amministratori locali e il *team* di ricercatori professionisti.

L'opzione di adottare una struttura formale è stata scartata a favore di una più aperta ed inclusiva, con la prospettiva di favorire l'accesso al maggior numero possibile di persone e di incoraggiare il loro impegno nelle attività di ricerca e nelle decisioni di *policy*. Questa si è rivelata una scelta efficace: infatti, mentre lo "zoccolo

---

Manfredonia (Foggia) e Sarroch (Cagliari) (Mangia, Biggeri, De Marchi 2022; De Marchi et al., 2017; De Marchi, 2011; Biggeri et al., 2008).

[8] Barga, Borgo a Mozzano, Coreglia Antelminelli, Fabbriche di Vergemoli, Fosciandora, Gallicano, Pieve Fosciana e Molazzana.

[9] Processo realizzato in base alla Legge regionale della Regione Toscana, n. 46 del 2 agosto 2013 "Dibattito pubblico regionale e promozione della partecipazione alla elaborazione delle politiche regionali e locali".

[10] http://www.movimentolalibellula.com/tag/barga/ (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

duro" di chi ha seguito tutte le fasi del progetto è rimasto stabile a 15-20 persone, in alcuni passaggi chiave, come la preparazione del protocollo dello studio o la presentazione di alcuni risultati preliminari, il numero di coloro che hanno contribuito alla discussione è aumentato fino a 50-100 persone. Coloro che hanno partecipato in maniera più attiva e continuativa alla ricerca meritano l'appellativo di veri e propri "scienziati di comunità" (Dosemagen et al., 2022).

2.1 Uno studio co-creato

Nella prima fase del lavoro sono state pianificate diverse attività di informazione e comunicazione, in modo da far arrivare la notizia dell'esistenza del progetto a quanti più cittadini possibile; l'intento era di suscitare un interesse generale e possibilmente di ottenere un'ampia partecipazione, così da fare di *Aria di Ricerca* un progetto veramente co-creato, ossia, come detto nell'introduzione, voluto e condiviso, disegnato e condotto in tutte le sue fasi da una comunità allargata di pari. Nello svolgimento di queste attività, l'indagine epidemiologica è stata affiancata da uno studio più ampio sulla popolazione, in particolare le abitudini di vita, il contesto culturale e sociale, il rapporto con la produzione industriale locale. In questa direzione sono stati sviluppati i lavori di analisi sociologica e di ricerca storica, volti ad approfondire questioni rilevanti per la comprensione dei dati di salute: nel contesto attuale la prima e con la necessaria profondità temporale la seconda.

A seguito di un primo incontro pubblico, è stata lanciata un'indagine con questionario cartaceo autosomministrato e anonimo per rilevare opinioni, conoscenze e percezioni dei residenti in relazione allo stato dell'ambiente e della salute nella Valle; le risultanze dovevano stimolare un'ampia discussione, base di partenza per una decisione condivisa sul quesito dello studio epidemiologico. Con l'indagine si voleva anche rendere i residenti consapevoli dei risultati degli studi più recenti sullo stato di salute locale[11], e chiarire il significato di un progetto di *citizen science* condotto congiuntamente da ricercatori professionisti e da portatori di "conoscenze laiche". Il passaparola fra residenti e l'impegno in prima persona di molti di essi – in maggioranza membri di 18 associazioni locali – si sono rivelati essenziali nell'ottenere un successo dell'indagine superiore alle aspettative: 1052 questionari distribuiti con un altissimo tasso di restituzione di 922 questionari compilati, di cui 915 validi.

Dall'analisi delle risposte è risultata un'ampia consapevolezza dell'esistenza in loco di varie patologie, alcune già indagate[12], altre non ancora oggetto di analisi approfondite. Sulla base di tali risultati, presentati in un incontro pubblico a Barga

---

[11] Nuvolone D., Voller, F., Biggeri A., *Stato di salute dei residenti nell'area della Valle del Serchio*, Presentazione per conferenza, Fornaci di Barga, 3 ottobre 2018. https://www.ars.toscana.it/images/determinanti_salute/news/Presentazione_ARS_Barga_03ott2018.pdf

[12] Ibidem.

nel dicembre del 2019, ricercatori e cittadini hanno concordato il quesito di ricerca, ovvero stimare la prevalenza della malattia renale cronica. La motivazione di tale scelta poggiava su due valutazioni: a) l'area di studio era caratterizzata dalla presenza di attività produttive potenzialmente inquinanti (con dispersione di metalli pesanti e tra questi il cadmio) in particolare lo stabilimento metallurgico non ferroso; b) era stata documentata un'aumentata frequenza di ricoveri per patologie renali[13], per le quali i metalli pesanti e il cadmio sono noti come importanti fattori di rischio.

In seguito a una discussione con tutti gli intervenuti – fra cui amministratori pubblici e alcuni sindaci – è stato convenuto che per ottenere stime adeguate della prevalenza di malattia renale cronica fosse opportuno ricorrere a prelievi di campioni biologici (sangue e urine), in accordo con i protocolli internazionali. Questa scelta, molto impegnativa sul piano organizzativo e finanziario, era motivata anche dalla possibilità di utilizzare il materiale biologico conferito con tali prelievi in eventuali futuri studi di biomonitoraggio.

Nello stesso incontro pubblico è stato compiuto quello che potremmo definire un esercizio di anticipazione, consistente nella prefigurazione di alcuni possibili risultati dello studio e ricavandone quattro ipotetici scenari relativi allo stato di salute, così denominati: 1. *tutto bene*; 2. *luci ed ombre*; 3. *criticità*; 4. *danni causati dall'inquinamento*. Per ciascuno di questi sono stati indicati possibili interventi di *policy* a tutela dell'ambiente e della salute da valutare innanzitutto a livello locale fra amministratori e cittadinanza[14].

L'illustrazione e la discussione degli ipotetici scenari hanno permesso di evidenziare e spiegare le limitazioni della ricerca epidemiologica in generale e dello studio in questione in particolare, incluse le irriducibili incertezze di tipo tecnico, metodologico ed epistemologico. È stato anche sottolineato come il disegno dell'indagine epidemiologica, così come la lettura dei suoi risultati, dovessero tener conto del contesto e delle conoscenze locali da acquisire con la ricerca sociologica e storica.

In questa prima fase, il coinvolgimento delle competenze etiche ha portato a elaborare un percorso innovativo di etica della ricerca, arricchendo il dibattito sulla trasformazione della responsabilità morale dei ricercatori in direzione di una democratizzazione della ricerca scientifica. Si è proceduto con una modalità di fare scienza che ha richiesto un paradigma etico diverso da quello tradizionale paternalistico. Vale a dire, un modello partecipativo di relazione tra ricercatori e cittadinanza, in cui si individua in modo inclusivo e condiviso quale bene perseguire, tramite quali modalità farlo e quali possibili conseguenze ritenere moralmente e socialmente accettabili.

---

[13] Ibidem.

[14] Una descrizione approfondita degli scenari e delle conseguenti implicazioni in termini decisionali è riportata in un articolo firmato congiuntamente dai ricercatori, da alcuni scienziati di comunità e dai sindaci degli otto comuni della Valle oggetto di studio: Biggeri et al., 2021.

La riflessione etica ha fornito un contributo per individuare e affrontare le innovative questioni derivanti dal doppio ruolo assunto dai cittadini quali co-produttori di scienza (partecipanti attivi) e al contempo soggetti di ricerca (partecipanti passivi). La partecipazione attiva della cittadinanza è una caratteristica nuova nella ricerca che coinvolge soggetti umani, il che implica un cambiamento normativo ed etico. Infatti, nel quadro di riferimento tradizionale, le norme giuridiche e i requisiti etici concernono la protezione dei diritti e del benessere degli individui coinvolti negli studi come partecipanti passivi e non affrontano questioni relative al coinvolgimento di partecipanti attivi. In questo caso, la riflessione etica comportava il tenere in considerazione aspetti quali i metodi e strumenti di ricerca, la qualità dei dati, la condivisione dei dati (Resnik, 2019). Inoltre, la partecipazione attiva implicava che i principi e i valori dell'attuale etica della ricerca dovessero diventare un patrimonio comune di regole condivise e rispettate.

Conseguentemente, da una parte è emersa la questione di come armonizzare il ruolo attivo dei cittadini con le attuali procedure di approvazione etica delineate per la ricerca tradizionale che coinvolge soggetti umani (particolarmente rilevante trattandosi di ricerca medica con uso di campioni biologici); dall'altra è maturata la consapevolezza di dover tenere in considerazione, oltre alle responsabilità tradizionali e ormai consolidate, due ulteriori responsabilità che entrano in gioco nei contesti di *citizen science*: la responsabilità dei ricercatori di trasferire e narrare l'etica della ricerca alle persone attivamente coinvolte nelle fasi di uno studio di ricerca, e quella degli scienziati di comunità di fare propri tali standard etici e attivamente proporre loro punti di vista ed esigenze. Questi aspetti sono stati man mano messi a fuoco, discussi e affrontati in riunioni pubbliche fra cui un evento esteso a tutta la popolazione.

2.2 Metodi e strumenti di ricerca

Definito il quesito di ricerca, si è passati alla stesura del protocollo e alla elaborazione degli strumenti che sarebbero stati utilizzati, non solo per la parte strettamente epidemiologica ma anche per la ricerca storica. L'approccio tradizionale della ricerca storica, che assegna un ruolo esclusivo allo studioso nel reperimento, analisi e interpretazione delle fonti, è stato rimodulato al fine di perseguire in ogni fase del progetto la partecipazione dei cittadini e la valorizzazione del sapere diffuso in relazione alla storia locale. Un riferimento è stato a quanto elaborato nelle discipline storiche dalla *public history*, che ha posto l'accento sulla promozione di una interpretazione critica delle fonti con modalità accessibili e coinvolgenti per "il pubblico", al di là dei circoli accademici (Bertella Farnetti et al., 2017), e aperte alla collaborazione con molteplici soggetti produttori di storia: proprio nel principio di autorità condivisa promosso dalla *public history* (Cauvin, 2022) abbiamo riscontrato un'assonanza con la comunità integrata di pari.

All'avvio dei lavori è stata organizzata una discussione preliminare per confrontarsi con i cittadini sull'apporto che una ricerca storica poteva dare in una indagine di epidemiologia ambientale, ovvero restituire la complessità del contesto indagato andando oltre i soli dati relativi alla salute. In seguito, in vari incontri è stato condiviso il focus dello studio, individuato nella storia dello stabilimento SMI (Società metallurgica italiana) di Fornaci di Barga, ed è stata scelta una periodizzazione: dall'avvio della produzione nel 1916 fino ai primi anni Duemila, quando l'azienda, attraverso un riassetto della proprietà, è diventata KME.

Grazie al confronto con gli scienziati di comunità, la ricostruzione si è allargata al rapporto tra la ex SMI e la comunità locale nei suoi aspetti sociali, economici e culturali. La ricerca ha così contribuito a inquadrare i dati relativi alla salute e all'inquinamento ambientale in oltre cento anni di produzione industriale e di conseguenza ha consentito di coinvolgere la cittadinanza nell'analisi del contesto in cui potevano essersi sviluppate le criticità che l'indagine epidemiologica era chiamata a verificare.

In questa fase è stato anche discusso come procedere nell'analisi dei dati epidemiologici. Alcuni scienziati di comunità hanno manifestato l'intenzione di parteciparvi direttamente: con loro sono state condivise metodologia e modalità di interpretazione dei risultati, nonché una riflessione sulle incertezze inerenti qualsiasi indagine scientifica e sulla responsabilità dei ricercatori nello scegliere ed esplicitare il proprio punto di vista.

Il contributo della riflessione etica è stato fondamentale sia in riferimento al contesto tradizionale degli studi di epidemiologia ambientale, sia rispetto all'approccio innovativo di uno studio di *citizen science*. I ricercatori hanno illustrato e discusso con gli scienziati di comunità gli aspetti etici da considerare nella stesura del protocollo di studio e dei relativi allegati: foglio informativo e modulo di consenso informato (da qui in poi documenti correlati). Ci si è soffermati in particolare sul rispetto: a) del principio di autonomia tramite la richiesta del consenso informato a partecipare allo studio e il diritto di ritirarlo in qualsiasi momento; b) del principio di protezione dei dati personali e dei campioni biologici mediante l'attenersi al segreto professionale e l'adozione di procedure di pseudonimizzazione.

Il protocollo dello studio epidemiologico e i documenti correlati sono stati scritti dai ricercatori e dagli scienziati di comunità, dando spazio al confronto sulla comprensione dei contenuti. A questo riguardo, la collaborazione con gli scienziati di comunità ha sollecitato un'attenta scrupolosità nell'essere trasparenti e chiari riguardo a ciò che si sarebbe fatto nello studio e a cosa avrebbe implicato per i partecipanti. È risultato decisivo l'adottare un approccio non paternalistico da parte dei ricercatori così da evitare di far prevalere il loro punto di vista e favorire invece un dialogo costruttivo tra conoscenza dei tecnici e conoscenza/percezione dei residenti. Nel protocollo e documenti correlati sono state descritte nuove

informazioni concernenti il ruolo attivo della cittadinanza, ed è stata chiaramente indicata la natura co-creata dello studio. Alcuni scienziati di comunità che hanno co-elaborato tali materiali sono stati indicati come co-proponenti dello studio. Per alcuni di loro, coinvolti nella conduzione di interviste o nelle attività di *biobanking*, è stato costruito e attuato un percorso di formazione standard analogo a quelli previsti per il personale tecnico in qualsiasi studio epidemiologico, integrato da un approfondimento in etica della ricerca e del *biobanking* (Ficorilli, 2021).

Partendo dalla considerazione che in Italia la figura normalmente indicata come responsabile scientifico di uno studio è un ricercatore professionista o un medico, e non è legalmente contemplata la co-responsabilità di ricercatori e scienziati di comunità, nonostante il loro coinvolgimento congiunto in tutte le fasi della ricerca, si è convenuto che un medico di medicina generale coinvolto nell'associazionismo locale assumesse il ruolo di "responsabile dello studio". Gli scienziati di comunità hanno formalmente svolto le attività scientifiche per conto e sotto la sua responsabilità. Su questo sfondo, il passaggio alla condivisione delle responsabilità è stato considerato come un elemento centrale nella creazione di una comunità allargata di pari[15].

Il protocollo epidemiologico e i documenti correlati sono stati approvati dal Comitato Etico Regionale per la Sperimentazione Clinica della Regione Toscana[16]. Si tratta di un risultato importante, che potrebbe diventare un punto di riferimento per altri studi epidemiologici basati su un approccio partecipato. Allo stesso tempo, questa esperienza ha fornito l'opportunità di arricchire il dibattito etico-scientifico concernente l'adeguato processo di valutazione etica per gli studi nell'ambito della ricerca non clinica[17].

2.3 Il lavoro sul campo

La fase attuativa del progetto è stata articolata dalle varie discipline in maniera integrata.

La conduzione dello studio epidemiologico ha comportato la predisposizione di strumenti di rilevazione, la somministrazione di questionari su dieta, storia occupazionale e stile di vita, l'organizzazione di colloqui telefonici con i cittadini per informarli sul progetto e raccogliere il loro consenso al prelievo di materiale biologico, l'effettuazione dei prelievi. La pandemia Covid-19 ha rallentato e reso più difficili alcune attività, che originariamente programmate in presenza hanno dovuto svolgersi online. Inoltre, non era pensabile di poter utilizzare gli ambulatori

---

[15] Per maggiori dettagli si veda De Marchi, Ficorilli, Biggeri, 2022.

[16] Sezione Comitato Etico Area Vasta Nord Ovest pertinente per i residenti nella Valle del Serchio.

[17] Per maggiori dettagli si rimanda a Ficorilli, 2022, in cui si sottolineano anche alcuni problemi che sono derivati dalla sottoposizione di uno studio eziologico osservazionale partecipato ad un Comitato Etico per la ricerca clinica istituito per valutare gli studi clinici che coinvolgono sperimentazioni cliniche.

dell'Azienda sanitaria locale ed è stato necessario allestire un ambulatorio dedicato la cui sede è stata individuata dagli scienziati di comunità.

La gestione amministrativa (appuntamenti, contatti di vario tipo tra il gruppo di ricerca e i partecipanti), l'esecuzione dei colloqui, i prelievi biologici sono stati realizzati da un insieme di operatori che comprendeva, oltre ai ricercatori, sia personale tecnico a contratto nell'ambito del progetto *CitieS-Health*, sia dipendente da università o istituti di ricerca, sia scienziati di comunità che hanno avuto per l'occasione specifici contratti retribuiti e che sono stati impegnati in corsi di formazione e aggiornamento professionale. Eventuali dubbi o suggerimenti da parte loro sono stati discussi con i vari esperti del gruppo di ricerca a seconda delle questioni da chiarire e/o affrontare.

I cittadini hanno inoltre partecipato al reperimento delle fonti necessarie alla ricerca storica attraverso la raccolta di memorie orali e con il recupero di documenti conservati privatamente o in piccoli archivi locali. La raccolta di fonti orali ha consentito di mettere in pratica il principio di autorità condivisa, punto di contatto tra storia orale e *public history* (Cauvin, 2022), ed oggetto di confronto con gli scienziati di comunità. Sono stati discussi i punti di forza della storia orale, promotrice di un approccio dal basso, fondamentale in un progetto di *citizen science*: è intrinsecamente una "storia interattiva", nella quale la fonte è creata nel momento in cui si instaura il dialogo tra ricercatore e persona intervistata; consente di dare voce a soggetti sociali tradizionalmente meno considerati dalla storia ufficiale (Gribaudi, 2020; Casellato, 2021); offre un meta-livello di analisi di grande ricchezza, poiché in base a come gli eventi vengono ricordati, con quale livello di approfondimento e di dettaglio, è possibile ricostruire l'importanza e il significato che essi assumono per la persona intervistata (Portelli, 2007; Bonomo, 2013). Condividere questo approccio con gli scienziati di comunità ha consentito di coinvolgerli direttamente nell'individuazione dei potenziali intervistati. Il lavoro è stato sviluppato attraverso interviste semi-strutturate, che partendo da una scaletta di temi individuati nella fase preparatoria, lasciavano poi la possibilità alla persona intervistata di raccontare liberamente episodi e ricordi ed esprimere riflessioni personali.

Le tecniche utilizzate appartengono anche alla tradizione della ricerca sociologica, ma poiché l'obiettivo era di cogliere sviluppi e cambiamenti della situazione locale in un ampio arco di tempo, le rilevazioni sul campo sono state condotte interamente dalla storica del gruppo. Intensa è stata però la collaborazione con la collega sociologa nella fase di impostazione del lavoro. Insieme si è considerato quali aspetti privilegiare nella scaletta dell'intervista; quali criteri utilizzare per identificare testimoni in grado di fornire informazioni e raccontare storie rilevanti; come presentare loro lo scopo dell'intervista in modo da rendere chiare le modalità e la finalità della ricerca storica e dell'intero progetto in cui il loro contributo sarebbe stato inquadrato.

La raccolta di memorie ha favorito anche il coinvolgimento dei cittadini nel recupero di fonti documentali: varie interviste si sono svolte presso la loro abitazione, e questo ha consentito di prendere visione di articoli di giornale, fotografie, scritti sulle vicende locali che essi avevano conservato; sono state messe a disposizione della ricerca tesi di laurea ed elenchi bibliografici prodotti dai cittadini e relativi a studi sul territorio. Questa documentazione è stata interessata da una selezione proprio ad opera dei cittadini, che a suo tempo hanno scelto cosa conservare in base alle loro sensibilità, alle loro esperienze di vita, ed oggi cosa rendere disponibile. Talvolta le persone intervistate si sono calate nel ruolo di "guide" con visite nei luoghi nevralgici della narrazione storica (in particolare lo stabilimento e le opere edilizie costruite dall'azienda nel paese di Fornaci di Barga), raccontando aneddoti ed evidenziando le situazioni di particolare cambiamento del contesto attuale rispetto al passato. Si è anche tentato di ottenere un coinvolgimento diretto della KME (ex Società metallurgica italiana) che però non ha avuto successo.

La storia del territorio è risultata essere oggetto di una conoscenza diffusa: è stato così possibile raccogliere il contributo di ex dipendenti dello stabilimento, di residenti disponibili a raccontare il loro vissuto rispetto alle dinamiche tra fabbrica e comunità, di studiosi coinvolti nella redazione di articoli di giornale e volumi di storia e tradizione locale, attivamente impegnati in associazioni culturali e di ricerca e promotori di mostre ed eventi per la valorizzazione del territorio.

L'integrazione delle competenze di storia, sociologia ed etica ha portato alla stesura della liberatoria per le interviste storiche alla luce del Regolamento Generale sulla Protezione dei Dati (GDPR, 2016). Un passaggio di importanza fondamentale considerata la novità dello strumento elaborato: all'avvio della ricerca, infatti, non era ancora stata diffusa in Italia una proposta di liberatoria per la raccolta, la conservazione e l'utilizzo di fonti orali per fini di ricerca storica in ottemperanza a quanto previsto dal GDPR; uno strumento che è stato ora pubblicato a cura dell'Associazione italiana di storia orale solo diversi mesi dopo[18].

Nella fase di interpretazione delle fonti raccolte, gli scienziati di comunità hanno partecipato all'individuazione e alla discussione delle tematiche emerse con la ricostruzione storica. Il loro punto di vista ha portato ad evidenziare la carica innovativa introdotta nella società locale da un grande complesso industriale, con ampia quota di manodopera femminile fin dal suo avvio durante la Prima guerra mondiale, in un contesto montano e a economia prevalentemente agricola; il ruolo propulsore giocato dalla SMI nel produrre il benessere nella Valle del Serchio; le opere realizzate dall'azienda nel solco del paternalismo industriale dei primi decenni del Novecento, dalle scuole, alle case operaie, alle attività ricreative rivolte all'intero paese; la rigida divisione sociale tra operai e impiegati e il pervasivo controllo della "Metallurgica" nella vita sociale e civile della comunità nel secondo

---

[18] https://www.aisoitalia.org/buone-pratiche/ (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

dopoguerra; le descrizioni dei cicli produttivi interni allo stabilimento, le lotte sindacali e per la tutela della salute in fabbrica.

2.4 Analisi e restituzione dei risultati

L'ultima fase dello studio *Aria di Ricerca* è stata dedicata alla condivisione dei risultati con gli scienziati di comunità e alla loro comunicazione all'intera cittadinanza.

Per quanto riguarda la parte storica è stata sottoposta agli scienziati di comunità la bozza del volume esito della ricerca (Malavasi, 2023), e sono state raccolte le loro valutazioni, correzioni e integrazioni prima di presentarlo all'editore per la pubblicazione. Parallelamente, si è proceduto a condividere i risultati dell'analisi dei dati epidemiologici raccolti con questionari e campioni biologici. In un incontro tra ricercatori, scienziati di comunità e sindaca di Barga si è convenuto che lo scenario 2 (*luci e ombre*), tra quelli previsti nella fase iniziale, fosse il più atto a rappresentare la situazione locale, e che questa fosse l'interpretazione da condividere con la cittadinanza.

Conseguentemente, nel giugno 2022 sono stati presentati i risultati del progetto in un evento aperto alla popolazione e alla presenza di tre sindaci del territorio, dell'Agenzia regionale di sanità e dell'Azienda sanitaria locale. L'evento ha restituito, inquadrandoli appunto nello scenario 2 (*luci ed ombre*), tutti i dati raccolti ed elaborati nello studio, comprensivi delle misurazioni della qualità dell'aria effettuate con le centraline auto-costruite dai cittadini, dei dati di salute emersi dal biomonitoraggio, e degli elementi emersi con la ricerca storico-sociologica.

In relazione al monitoraggio dell'aria è emerso che – pur rimanendo nei limiti di legge – è stato costantemente superato il livello di PM2.5 e PM10 indicato dalle linee guida dell'OMS (Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità) pubblicate nell'autunno del 2021[19]. Soprattutto per il PM 2.5 il limite OMS è stato superato quasi costantemente con valori almeno di tre volte superiori. Questi risultati hanno fornito ulteriori argomenti ai sindaci per reclamare l'installazione di stazioni di monitoraggio dell'Agenzia per la Protezione dell'Ambiente della Toscana, che mancano nel territorio dalla metà degli anni '90 del secolo scorso.

I risultati dello studio epidemiologico, elaborati sulla base di analisi di laboratorio dei materiali biologici raccolti in un campione di 400 residenti nella Valle del Serchio, hanno confermato un rischio maggiore di malattia renale per la popolazione residente. Nello studio, diabete, ipertensione, lavoro o residenza in prossimità di industrie metallurgiche non ferrose sono stati i fattori più associati ad una diminuita funzionalità renale.

---

[19] WHO global air quality guidelines: particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide: executive summary (ultimo accesso: 5/6/2023).

La ricerca storica e quella sociologica hanno consentito di ricostruire alcune attività della produzione industriale del passato che possono avere influito sulle condizioni ambientali e di salute attuali; nell'incontro pubblico è emerso come il coinvolgimento dei cittadini nelle interviste abbia contribuito a generare interesse per i risultati della ricerca; in alcuni casi, le interviste a persone molto anziane sono diventate una sorta di lascito ereditario donato alle nuove generazioni del paese di Fornaci di Barga.

Stando a questi risultati, lo studio epidemiologico sulla prevalenza di malattie renali croniche non ha fornito una risposta conclusiva, ma comporta implicazioni ben precise in termini di *policy*. Pochi giorni dopo l'evento con la popolazione, nell'incontro che ha concluso il progetto europeo *CitieS-Health*[20] la sindaca di Barga – Caterina Campani – ha sottolineato:

«I dubbi sugli eventuali effetti nocivi dell'inquinamento ambientale subìto escono rafforzati. Le implicazioni sono immediate: bisogna chiarire quale sia lo stato dell'ambiente. Il coinvolgimento delle istituzioni preposte alla tutela ambientale diventa fondamentale e la programmazione della sorveglianza ambientale e la messa in atto di tutti gli strumenti per garantire trasparenza e informazione diventano oggetto di dibattito».

3. AUTO-VALUTAZIONE DEL LAVORO

In considerazione del ruolo chiave dei cittadini nel progetto, nella sua ultima fase tutti i cinque partner di *CitieS-Health* hanno concordato sull'opportunità di ascoltare i loro pareri sull'esperienza per mezzo di una breve indagine. È stato elaborato un questionario comune, lasciando a ciascun *partner* la possibilità di introdurre modifiche e aggiustamenti per adattarlo allo specifico caso di studio e consentendo inoltre la scelta della modalità di somministrazione, sempre nel rispetto dell'anonimato.

Il questionario italiano, in forma cartacea e autosomministrato, consisteva di 27 domande pre-strutturate (chiuse) e tre aperte, tutte finalizzate a raccogliere opinioni, critiche e aspettative relativamente al progetto in generale e ad ottenere una valutazione personale degli intervistati in termini di soddisfazione, acquisizione di conoscenze e abilità, anche in relazione a precedenti casi di impegno su questioni ambientali e sanitarie. Nel maggio del 2022 sono stati distribuiti 60 questionari e ne sono stati compilati 51, con un tasso di restituzione decisamente elevato. Benché la maggioranza dei rispondenti abbia asserito di essere da lungo tempo consapevole dei problemi ambientali locali e ben un quarto di essere stato precedentemente impegnato in diverse iniziative sul tema, pressoché la totalità ha dichiarato di non aver avuto nessuna esperienza di progetti di *citizen science,* né di aver saputo in che

---

[20] Tenutosi a Roma il 14 giugno 2022.

cosa consistessero prima di partecipare ad *Aria di Ricerca*. Complessivamente, la soddisfazione riguardo al progetto è risultata alta e molto positivi sono stati anche i giudizi sull'interazione coi ricercatori e la comprensione della relazione fra inquinamento ambientale e salute. Come era logico aspettarsi, nonostante un'accresciuta familiarità con il processo di ricerca e le relative incertezze, l'acquisizione di specifiche competenze e abilità è apparsa limitata con riguardo agli aspetti più tecnici, quali l'elaborazione di un protocollo di ricerca e l'analisi dei dati. Infine, alla convinzione che i risultati del progetto possano contribuire al miglioramento delle condizioni locali in tema di ambiente e salute, si è affiancato un certo scetticismo sulla possibilità che essi vengano tenuti in considerazione nell'arena politica e nelle decisioni di *policy*. Ciò sulla base di precedenti esperienze deludenti, a livello sia locale sia nazionale, che a fronte di comprovate situazioni di stress ambientale e disagio sociale non hanno visto un pronto riconoscimento da parte delle istituzioni pubbliche e tanto meno un impegno a ricercare soluzioni adeguate.

Si è voluto proporre un simile esercizio di valutazione anche a tutti i ricercatori professionisti impegnati nei cinque casi studio, utilizzando un questionario analogo, adattato ovviamente al loro ruolo. Anche in questo caso i temi trattati riguardavano principalmente soddisfazione, apprendimento, precedenti esperienze e aspettative. Tutti i 30 ricercatori coinvolti nel progetto *CitieS-Health* hanno preso parte all'indagine, che si è svolta a ridosso della chiusura del progetto. Fra i sette ricercatori del gruppo italiano il livello di soddisfazione per l'esperienza si è rivelato molto elevato ed è aumentato il loro apprezzamento per progetti di *citizen science*, così come la propensione a ripetere simili esperienze e a promuoverle nel proprio campo disciplinare. Risulta aumentata anche la capacità di tradurre questioni di rilevanza locale in specifiche questioni di ricerca, come pure quella di collaborare efficacemente con ricercatori di altre discipline e con cittadini e scienziati di comunità nelle varie fasi della ricerca e di pensare alla diffusione dei suoi risultati in modo ampio ed articolato, non limitato a pubblicazioni scientifiche. Come i cittadini, anche i ricercatori hanno manifestato delle perplessità sulla possibilità che i risultati e le indicazioni emerse dalla ricerca influenzino le future scelte di *policy*. In generale, si sono osservati gli stessi andamenti anche negli altri quattro gruppi di ricerca, pur con qualche scostamento.

I tempi e il bilancio del progetto non hanno consentito una valutazione più approfondita. Ad esempio, delle interviste condotte faccia a faccia avrebbero permesso di ottenere informazioni più dettagliate e di cogliere molte sfumature che un questionario pre-strutturato, per di più autosomministrato, necessariamente appiattisce. Consapevoli di tali limitazioni, i ricercatori hanno condiviso l'idea di poter condurre in futuro – pur a progetto concluso – delle interviste approfondite almeno con i cinque responsabili scientifici dei cinque casi studio, al fine di compiere una valutazione più sofisticata ed articolata dell'esperienza di ciascun

team e dell'intero progetto dal punto di vista di professionisti che hanno consapevolmente accettato la sfida di lavorare in compartecipazione con cittadini e scienziati di comunità, scelta ancora non convenzionale e non necessariamente popolare in molte delle discipline coinvolte.

4. CONCLUSIONI

Le criticità incontrate nel progetto *Aria di Ricerca* sono state in gran parte dovute alla pandemia Covid-19, che ha rallentato i tempi di realizzazione di alcune attività; peraltro, i periodi di *lockdown* sono stati utilizzati da ricercatori e scienziati di comunità per rimodulare il lavoro con creatività e capacità di riorganizzazione. Al contempo, vari incontri online hanno permesso l'approfondimento di problematiche e argomenti di interesse ai fini dello studio. Questo ha consentito di mantenere saldo il legame con la comunità e di riprendere celermente i lavori sul campo non appena è stato possibile.

Come esito del lavoro di ricostruzione storico-sociologica, la questione della responsabilità sociale dell'industria per quanto riguarda il rapporto ambiente-salute è diventato un tema di dibattito affrontato apertamente. La ricerca ha offerto ai cittadini l'opportunità di riflettere sulla loro storia comune e di affrontare in un confronto mediato eventuali dissidi e contrasti.

In campo etico, la natura co-creata del progetto ha consentito di salvaguardare e applicare in maniera più adeguata i principi di autonomia e trasparenza, e ha garantito la possibilità di partecipazione per tutti i soggetti interessati. Inoltre, il coinvolgimento degli scienziati di comunità e degli amministratori locali nella fase di interpretazione degli esiti della ricerca e delle relative implicazioni di sanità pubblica, insieme all'impegno dei sindaci di continuare a gestire le possibili ricadute della ricerca sulla popolazione tramite un dibattito e confronto pubblico, hanno rappresentato un modo inclusivo e condiviso di salvaguardare il principio di giustizia. L'aver ricevuto da parte di un Comitato etico l'approvazione del protocollo dello studio e dei documenti correlati è un risultato rilevante, considerata l'attuale mancanza di un percorso definito ed istituzionalizzato per l'approvazione etica di studi co-creati.

Grazie al progetto *Aria di Ricerca*, il tema della salute renale è ormai una problematica riconosciuta dalla popolazione del territorio, dagli amministratori locali e dalle istituzioni regionali. I risultati che ha prodotto, se raccolti, possono diventare strumenti di azione politica nelle mani di cittadini e amministratori locali: si è visto come il monitoraggio ambientale effettuato con le centraline autoprodotte abbia fornito ai sindaci dati utili a reclamare un intervento da parte dell'Agenzia per la Protezione dell'Ambiente della Toscana, e come gli esiti del biomonitoraggio abbiano evidenziato la necessità di ulteriori approfondimenti.

Inoltre, la messa in opera del progetto è servita da stimolo a che professionisti di altre discipline programmassero e svolgessero ulteriori indagini nella zona: in particolare, alcuni geologi dell'Università di Pisa hanno misurato la contaminazione del suolo e dell'acqua da metalli pesanti (Petrini et al., 2022).

Ad inizio 2023 l'area della Valle del Serchio è stata inserita in un nuovo progetto di *citizen science* che prevede nel triennio 2023-2026 ulteriori attività di biomonitoraggio in particolare sulla esposizione umana a cadmio ed altri metalli pesanti[21].

Nell'ottica di nuovi studi, il presente contributo vuole essere una proposta metodologica su come valorizzare l'integrazione tra varie discipline, ottenere la partecipazione dei cittadini, costruire spazi di dialogo tra questi ultimi e le amministrazioni locali per una effettiva programmazione di politiche in risposta a situazioni di particolare attenzione nella tutela della salute e dell'ambiente.

Conflitti di interesse

Nessun conflitto di interesse da dichiarare.

---

[21] Progetto "Valutazione della esposizione e della salute secondo l'approccio integrato One Health con il coinvolgimento delle comunità residenti in aree a forte pressione ambientale in Italia", finanziato dal PNC-PNRR (Piano nazionale complementare del Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza). Codice Unico di Progetto CUP H75I22000280001, di cui all'Investimento E.1 "Salute-Ambiente-Biodiversità-Clima" del Piano Nazionale per gli investimenti Complementari al PNRR, approvato con D.L. 06/05/2021, n 59, conv. con mod. dalla L. 1/07/2021, n. 101.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

Altopiedi R. (2022). Prendere le comunità sul serio. La ricerca in campo ambientale "con" le comunità interessate. In: Ferraro S., Petrillo A. (eds.), Flussi e comunità: tra rischio ambientale e governo della salute pubblica. «Cartografie Sociali» VII, 14 (numero speciale): 17-36.

Bertella Farnetti P., Bertuccelli L., Botti A. (eds.) (2017). Public history: discussioni e pratiche. Milano-Udine, Mimesis.

Biggeri A. (2011). Rapporto sullo stato di salute delle popolazioni residenti nell'area della   Valle   del   Serchio. http://www.biostatistica.net/cd/analisi_geografica/mappe_mortalita/assolute/mor_rapp_ assolute.htm

Biggeri A., De Marchi B., Donzelli G., Ficorilli A., Fusco P., Malavasi G., Doccioli C., Campani C., Amadei V., Angelini F., Andreuccetti P., Giannini M., Lunardi M., Saisi D., Talani A. (2021). Aria di ricerca in Valle del Serchio: scenari e implicazioni. «Epidemiologia & Prevenzione» 45 (1-2): 22-26. https://doi.org/10.19191/ep21.1-2.p022.034.

Biggeri A., Lagazio C., Catelan D., Pirastu R., Casson F., Terracini B. (2006). Ambiente e salute nelle aree a rischio della Sardegna. «Epidemiologia & Prevenzione» 30(1) Suppl 1: 1-96.

Bobbio L. (2010). Types of deliberation. «Journal of Public Deliberation» 6(2). https://doi.org/10.16997/jdd.105

Bonney R., Ballard H., Jordan R., McCallie E., Phillips T., Shirk J., Wilderman C.C. (2009). Public Participation in Scientific Research: Defining the Field and Assessing its Potential for Informal Science Education. A CAISE Inquiry Group Report. Washington, Center for Advancement of Informal Science Education (CAISE).

Bonomo B. (2013). Voci della memoria. L'uso delle fonti orali nella ricerca storica. Roma, Carocci.

Casellato A. (ed.) (2021). Buone pratiche per la storia orale: guida all'uso. Firenze, Editpress.

Cauvin T. (2022). Public History. A textbook of practice. New York-London, Routledge.

De Marchi B., Ficorilli A., Biggeri A. (2022). Research is in the Air in Valle del Serchio. «Futures» 137 (2022) 102906 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2022.102906

De Marchi B., Biggeri A., Cervino M., Mangia C., Malavasi G., Gianicolo E.A.L., Vigotti M.A. (2017). A Participatory Project in Environmental Epidemiology: Lessons from the Manfredonia Case Study (Italy 2015-2016). «Public Health Panorama» 3 (2): 141-356.

De Marchi B. (2011). La Bioteca di Sarroch: comunicare con i fatti. «Epidemiologia & Prevenzione» 35 (3-4): 243-244.

Dosemagen S., Kimura A.H., Frickel S., Parker A. (2022). Disaster, Participatory Science, and Infrastructure. «Citizen Science: Theory and Practice» 7(1): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.513

Ficorilli A. (2022). Aetiological observational studies and ethical clearance: An Italian co-created study in Tuscany Region (Central Italy). «Epidemiologia & Prevenzione» 46(4): 273-277. DOI: 10.19191/EP22.4.A484.066

Ficorilli A. (2021). Nuovi territori per l'etica nella ricerca scientifica. Milano-Udine, Mimesis.

Froeling F., Gignac F., Hoek G., Vermeulen R., Nieuwenhuijsen M., Ficorilli A., De Marchi B., Biggeri A., Kocman D., Robinson J.A., Grazuleviciene R., Andrusaityte S., Righi V., Basagaña X. (2021). Narrative review of citizen science in environmental epidemiology: setting the stage for co-created research projects in environmental epidemiology. «Environment International» 152 (July) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2021.106470

Funtowicz S. (2022). Cosa è e cosa non è la scienza post-normale. In: L'Astorina A., Mangia C. (eds.), Scienza, politica e società: l'approccio post-normale in teoria e nelle pratiche. CNR Edizioni: 43-47. DOI: 10.26324/SIA1.PNS3.

Funtowicz S., Ravetz J.R. (1993/2020). Science for the post-normal age, «Futures» 25(7): 739–755. https://doi.org/10.21428/6ffd8432.8a99dd09
(Republished   2020.
https://commonplace.knowledgefutures.org/pub/6qqfgms5/release/1).

Galea S. (2013). An argument for a consequentialist epidemiology. «American Journal of Epidemiology» 178(8): 1185–1191. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwt172

GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), (2016). Regolamento (UE) 2016/679 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 27 aprile 2016, relativo alla protezione delle

persone fisiche con riguardo al trattamento dei dati personali, nonché alla libera circolazione di tali dati e che abroga la direttiva 95. https://eur-lex.europa.eu

Gribaudi G. (ed.) (2020). Testimonianze e testimoni nella storia del tempo presente. Firenze, Editpress.

Haklay M., König A., Moustard F., Aspee N. (2023). Citizen science and Post-Normal Science's extended peer community: Identifying overlaps by mapping typologies. «Futures» 150 (Special Issue: *PNS 30 years on*), 103178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103178

Kaiser M., Gluckman P. (2023). Looking at the future of transdisciplinary research. International Science Council discussion paper. DOI:10.24948/2023.05

Knapp C.N., Reid R.S., Fernández-Giménez M.E., Klein J.A., Galvin K.A. (2019). Placing Transdisciplinarity in Context: A Review of Approaches to Connect Scholars, Society and Action. «Sustainability» 11(18), 4899. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11184899

Kocman D., Righi V., Errandonea L., Maccani G., Creus J., Froeling F., Hoek G., Andrusaityt S., Grazuleviciene R., Ficorilli A., De Marchi B., Biggeri A., Ftičar J., Gignac F., Toran R. and Basagaña X. (2023). *Toolkit for conducting citizen science activities in environmental epidemiology.* «Frontiers in Environmental Science» 11, 1177413. DOI: 10.3389/fenvs.2023.1177413

Kovacic Z., Biggeri A. (2023*). Post-normal science 30 years on. Editorial Introduction: Ongoing conversations about knowledge, science practices, integrity and quality through Post-Normal lenses.* «Futures» 150 (Special Issue: *PNS 30 years on*), 103183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103183

Mangia C., Biggeri A., De Marchi B. (2022). Manfredonia: come trasformare uno studio di epidemiologia ambientale in una ricerca post-normale, in: L'Astorina A., Mangia C. (a cura di), Scienza, politica e società: l'approccio post-normale in teoria e nelle pratiche, CNR Edizioni: 191-196. DOI: 10.26324/SIA1.PNS25.

Malavasi G. (2023). Rame quotidiano. La Società Metallurgica Italiana di Fornaci di Barga. Milano, Jaca Book.

Nuvolone D., Voller, F., Biggeri A. (2018). *Stato di salute dei residenti nell'area della Valle del Serchio.* Presentazione per conferenza, Fornaci di Barga, 3 ottobre 2018. https://www.ars.toscana.it/images/determinanti_salute/news/Presentazione_ARS_Barga_03ott2018.pdf

Petrini R., Ghezzi L., Arrighi S., Genovesi L., Frassi C., Pandolfi L. (2022). Trace Elements in Soil and Urban Groundwater in an Area Impacted by Metallurgical Activity: Health Risk Assessment in the Historical Barga Municipality (Tuscany, Italy). «International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health» 19, 13419. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013419

Portelli A. (2007). Storie orali. Racconto, immaginazione, dialogo. Roma, Donzelli.

Ravetz J. (2022). La scienza post-normale: il nostro futuro in: L'Astorina A., Mangia C. (eds.), Scienza, politica e società: l'approccio post-normale in teoria e nelle pratiche. CNR Edizioni: 47-51. DOI: 10.26324/SIA1.PNS4.

Resnik D.B. (2019). Citizen Scientists as Human Subjects: Ethical Issues. «Citizen Science: Theory and Practice» 4(1): 11. http://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.150

Waltner-Toews D., Biggeri A., De Marchi B. Funtowicz S., Giampietro M., O'Connor M., Ravetz J.R., Saltelli A., Van der Sluijs J.P. (2020). Pandemie post-normali. Perché CoViD-19 richiede un nuovo approccio alla scienza. «Recenti Progressi in Medicina», 111(4): 202-204. DOI: 10.1701/3347.33181

LE GLOSSAIRE : 125 ANS DE SCIENCES CITOYENNES EN DIALECTOLOGIE

CHRISTEL NISSILLE
Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande,
Université de Neuchâtel
christel.nissille@unine.ch

LAURE KLOETZER
Institut de Psychologie et Éducation
Université de Neuchâtel
laure.kloetzer@unine.ch

ABSTRACT

The *Glossary of the Patois of Western Switzerland* is a pioneering citizen science project in the field of linguistics and dialectology: born at the end of the 19th century, it has been continuously funded, and active, ever since. The Glossary is based on the collection and analysis of the local variants of the French-speaking patois, which were threatened by rapid extinction, through the written exchange of questionnaires, instructions, data and feedbacks with a network of dedicated "correspondents".

In this article, we analyse this project with a modern reading grid by looking at how citizen participation in a research project was conceived and designed more than a hundred years ago. We examine three types of questions: the scientific objectives of the project and its historical context; the design and organisation of citizen collaboration in the project, in particular the nature of the tasks entrusted to citizens and the strategies for controlling the quality of the data; and finally, the various communication tools of the project, which allowed citizen participation during a long (10 years) data collection process, as well as the continuous engagement of the political funders (French-speaking Cantons and the Swiss Confederation) during 125 years so far.

KEYWORDS

Dialectology; citizen participation; data quality; project communication; humanities

Cet article présente un projet précurseur de sciences participatives dans le domaine des sciences du langage et de la lexicologie, le *Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande* – appelé *le Glossaire* dans la suite de l'article – qui frappe l'imagination par sa longévité : en 2024, le glossaire fêtera ses 125 ans de recherche scientifique ininterrompue, l'entreprise de rédaction collective du Glossaire s'étant poursuivie de façon continue depuis la fin du XIXème siècle. L'intérêt historique du projet est redoublé du fait que, depuis un siècle, en tant qu'institution comme en

tant qu'ouvrage, les présupposés, la philosophie, l'organisation, le fonctionnement et les difficultés du Glossaire sont précisément documentés. On peut donc suivre son évolution.

Nous avons choisi d'analyser ce projet avec une grille de lecture moderne, celle des sciences citoyennes[1], en nous intéressant à trois ensembles de questions :

- premièrement, ses objectifs scientifiques dans un contexte historique singulier : quels sont les objectifs du projet ? Dans quel contexte politique et scientifique prend-il place ? Quelles sont les questions que les concepteurs du projet se sont posées à la fin du XIXème siècle ? Comment y ont-ils répondu ?

- deuxièmement, la conception de la collaboration avec les citoyens qui sous-tend le projet : comment la contribution des citoyens est-elle envisagée, et organisée ? Qui sont les citoyens impliqués dans ce projet scientifique ? Quelles sont les tâches qui leur sont confiées ? Comment leurs contributions sont-elles évaluées, contrôlées, valorisées ?

- troisièmement, la communication du projet : pourquoi et comment le Glossaire communique-t-il ? Quel rendu de ses résultats propose-t-il et à quel public ?

Ce faisant, nous cherchons à valider ou invalider notre hypothèse générale, qui est que, de par sa nature même (la langue en usage, ici par des experts patoisants), le projet du Glossaire est pensé dès l'origine par et pour les locuteurs. Dans cet article, nous espérons donc montrer comment on concevait un projet de sciences citoyennes il y a plus de cent ans, quelles ont été les questions posées par un tel projet et les réponses qui leur ont été apportées en leur temps.

1. PRÉSENTATION DU GLOSSAIRE

Le Glossaire est une entreprise débutée en 1899 ayant pour but d'assurer la sauvegarde du patrimoine dialectal de Suisse romande et de participer, grâce à une analyse philologique des matériaux, à l'étude du vocabulaire des langues romanes. Sa mission est de documenter le plus complètement possible les dialectes[2] romands, d'en faire l'analyse lexicologique et de rendre celle-ci accessible au public et au

---

[1] Les sciences citoyennes, ou participatives (Citizen Science en anglais) désignent un ensemble d'approches dans lesquelles des volontaires participent activement à un projet de recherche, de manières variables (conception du projet, recueil des données, analyses, etc.) (voir Vohland et al., 2021 ; Hacklay et al., 2021).

[2] Pour désigner les variétés linguistiques régionales utilisées parallèlement au français de référence, le terme « patois » possède encore souvent, contrairement à son synonyme « dialecte », une connotation négative, ayant été largement utilisé dans des contextes de dénigrement de ces variétés. Les fondateurs du Glossaire privilégient « patois », suivant en cela la pratique des locuteurs dialectaux.

monde scientifique sous la forme d'un dictionnaire dialectal de grande ampleur. Le résultat de ces recherches fait l'objet de publications sous forme de fascicules depuis 1924 et est aujourd'hui consultable en ligne[3]. La fin du projet est envisagée pour 2050.

Considéré comme une entreprise à la fois scientifique et patriotique, le Glossaire s'inscrit dès l'origine dans une dimension participative en mobilisant environ 200 informateurs bénévoles. Certains patois étant aux débuts de l'entreprise déjà moribonds, la tradition orale qui était recherchée a dû être récoltée rapidement. Pour ce faire, les fondateurs du Glossaire – Louis Gauchat, Jules Jeanjaquet et Ernest Tappolet – ont mis sur pied une enquête systématique par correspondance courant de 1900 à 1910. Celle-ci s'est faite sur la base de 227 questionnaires thématiques ciblés (cf. annexe), envoyés à des « correspondants » diversement recrutés, et qui devaient permettre de récolter la majeure partie du vocabulaire des dialectes ciblés. Les localités sélectionnées constituaient un réseau serré de points supposés offrir une représentation suffisante des régions linguistiques de la Suisse romande. Les matériaux récoltés sont donc très abondants et contiennent des informations tant linguistiques qu'encyclopédiques, le grand nombre d'exemples fournis par les correspondants illustrant la vie d'une époque et d'une région.

Notre entreprise de relecture historique du Glossaire dans le contexte contemporain des sciences citoyennes profite de la qualité de la documentation de ce projet. Les différentes étapes d'élaboration ainsi que les questionnements, les difficultés et les décisions sont consignés dans plusieurs écrits manuscrits ou imprimés. Cette démarche de documentation répond à une triple prise de conscience des fondateurs : a) le désir de visibiliser un projet conçu dès son origine comme une entreprise patrimoniale autant que scientifique ; b) le besoin de transmission, lié à la conscience nette que la temporalité de l'œuvre dépasserait celle des fondateurs ; c) la conscience que des successeurs pourraient avoir un jour à cœur de faire l'historique de cette entreprise.

Les sources à disposition sont de nature diverse. Pour les besoins de cet article, nous nous sommes appuyées principalement sur celles indiquées en bibliographie[4].

2. HYPOTHÈSE GÉNÉRALE ET PROBLÉMATIQUE

Notre travail vise, à travers un ensemble de questions, à comprendre comment les initiateurs de ce projet vieux de plus de cent ans concevaient la participation des citoyens à l'époque.

---

[3] https://gaspar.unine.ch.

[4] Les archives contiennent encore nombre de documents qui n'ont pas encore pu être compulsés ou répertoriés.

Dans une présentation de 1897 destinée aux instances administratives et scientifiques susceptibles de parrainer l'entreprise du Glossaire, le projet est présenté comme étant « d'un caractère à la fois populaire et scientifique », idée qui sera véhiculée dans plusieurs autres communications publiques ultérieures. Le Glossaire est pensé d'emblée comme un projet participatif : il s'agit de « faire écrire le Glossaire par le peuple romand lui-même » (Gauchat, conférence de 1937). Les patois, objets d'étude des linguistes, vivent en effet dans l'usage qu'en font les locuteurs. Ces derniers sont donc de facto la source privilégiée de l'entreprise scientifique du Glossaire. Par ailleurs, les résultats (traitements, analyses, etc.) obtenus par les chercheurs ne consistent généralement pas en des données exclusivement linguistiques : ils touchent à une réalité communautaire qui rappelle que la langue est avant tout un fait social. Cela ne signifie pas, toutefois, que tout projet de linguistique serait un projet de sciences citoyennes – cela dépend de la conception de l'étendue et de la nature de cette participation citoyenne à l'enquête scientifique, que nous explorons précisément dans cet article.

Nous analyserons donc si, et comment, le Glossaire intègre la contribution active des citoyens, dans la collecte de données comme dans la restitution des résultats de la recherche. Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons majoritairement sur la façon dont cette dimension participative a été conçue dans le projet d'origine. Ses évolutions dans le temps feront l'objet de recherches ultérieures.

3. CONTEXTE, QUESTIONS SCIENTIFIQUES ET CADRE INSTITUTIONNEL DU PROJET

3.1 Contexte d'élaboration du projet

À la fin du XIXème siècle, les dialectes romands ont perdu de leur importance en Suisse par rapport à la langue standard, le français. Cette rapide disparition est un des arguments phares du projet de leur conservation :

> Ce travail est de toute urgence, car chaque jour nous enlève plus d'un vieillard auquel le patois est encore familier. Déjà, on ne perçoit plus, dans plusieurs cantons, qu'un faible écho des sons qui ont charmé l'enfance de nos grands-pères, et, plus nous tardons, plus sera ardue la réalisation de ce devoir patriotique (Gauchat, Projet de 1897).

La sauvegarde de ce patrimoine linguistique a, pour Gauchat, des implications politiques comme scientifiques.

Au plan politique, la langue est investie d'une dimension patriotique et patrimoniale, sur le modèle explicite du premier projet visant ce genre de recension

en Suisse, à savoir le Schweizerisches Idiotikon[5] pour les dialectes suisses alémaniques :

> Quand la Suisse allemande donna, par son *Idiotikon,* l'exemple d'une brillante publication, à la fois scientifique et patriotique, l'idée se présenta d'en faire autant dans la Suisse romande, c'est-à-dire d'utiliser les nombreux matériaux existants, de les compléter par une enquête systématique, menée parallèlement dans les six cantons romands, et d'élaborer un ouvrage qui fût digne d'être placé à côté de l'*Idiotikon* (*Bulletin* 1899, p. 1).

Alors qu'en France et en Allemagne la variété standard s'impose aux dépends des dialectes, on observe en Suisse au début du XXème siècle la naissance d'un mouvement de protection du patrimoine (Heimatschutz), qui identifie les dialectes parmi les éléments patriotiques à sauvegarder et à cultiver (Haas 1982, p. 92). Des voix se font alors entendre en faveur de la défense des dialectes. Du côté alémanique, les arguments sont pour partie les mêmes que ceux qui sont alors utilisés pour imposer les variétés standard : celui de l'identité particulière à un peuple, la langue permettant de le distinguer des autres ; celui de l'égalité démocratique, le dialecte étant vu comme élément non discriminant ; enfin l'argument historique : les idiomes traditionnels sont pensés comme des restes d'états de langue antérieurs, auxquels on attache de la valeur à la fois pour l'histoire patrimoniale et pour la recherche scientifique (Haas 1981, p. 12).

Tandis que pour divers facteurs (voir à ce propos Haas 1982, p. 92 ss.), les dialectes alémaniques se sont maintenus parallèlement à la langue standard, du côté romand, le déclin des dialectes n'a pu être freiné, malgré plusieurs tentatives (Knecht 1982, p. 153 ss.) et des raisonnements sur l'identité locale semblables à ceux invoqués en Suisse alémanique. Sans chercher à lutter contre la suprématie du français, Gauchat plaide donc pour la conservation de ce patrimoine en cours de disparition :

> Il ne servirait à rien de vouloir déplorer cet état de choses. Au contraire, le remplacement du patois par le français, offre des avantages indéniables. Mais il fallait à tout prix sauver ce qui restait de notre langue nationale, de cette langue romande, seule de son espèce que nos ancêtres avaient formée et pliée à leurs besoins pendant une vingtaine de siècles (...). La Suisse romande a eu une fois une langue à elle, telle qu'elle n'existe nulle part ailleurs. Cette langue, qui était vraiment de chez nous, la Suisse est en train de la perdre. Mais la Suisse, qui fait tant de sacrifices pour la conservation d'espèces végétales ou animales menacées de disparition, ne ferait-elle rien pour sauver d'un oubli total l'instrument si original de la pensée de nos pères, la langue qui pendant des siècles a servi à exprimer leurs joies et leurs souffrances ? (Gauchat 1914, p. 4-5).

La sauvegarde du patrimoine linguistique va, dès le début du XXème siècle, prendre une réelle dimension nationale avec la parution en parallèle des quatre

---

[5] https://www.idiotikon.ch.

vocabulaires, puisqu'à l'Idiotikon et au Glossaire se joignent le Dizionari rumanch Grischun[6] et le Vocabulario della Svizzera Italiana[7], avec les mêmes méthodes et des enjeux patrimoniaux et identitaires similaires. Tous quatre sont alors, et jusqu'à aujourd'hui, financés par la Confédération.

Pour la Suisse romande, l'ambition de Gauchat de produire, non pas un répertoire de mots, mais « un vrai miroir de la civilisation helvétique, un modèle d'information précise » dans une optique de conservation du patrimoine culturel et linguistique, suppose de recueillir les mœurs et les modes de pensée en même temps que l'histoire de la langue :

> Nous élèverons ainsi à nos patois, avant qu'il soit trop tard, un monument qui rappellera aux générations futures le temps des mœurs simples et franches, le temps de la gaieté et de la bonne humeur (Gauchat, Projet de 1897).

Au plan scientifique, l'élaboration d'une telle œuvre s'inscrit dans l'effort commun pour l'étude des langues romanes. La spécificité des dialectes de la région lyonnaise et de la majeure partie de la Suisse romande vient d'être reconnue, et ceux-ci ont été réunis par des chercheurs en un groupe linguistique que l'on nomme dès lors « francoprovençal » : la mise au jour des caractéristiques linguistiques de ces dialectes montre que ces variétés ne peuvent être rattachées ni aux variétés dialectales du domaine d'oïl (dont fait partie le français) ni à celle de l'occitan (voir à ce propos Kristol 2023, p. 12-13). De fait, les recherches menées dans le cadre du Glossaire permettront d'expliquer certains points qui résistaient encore à notre compréhension, notamment au niveau de l'histoire du vocabulaire et de l'étymologie. De plus, la dialectologie a bien évolué dans ses pratiques, méthodes et enjeux (voir à ce propos Saint-Gérand 1990 ; Desmet *et al.* 2002) : de l'avis de Gauchat, le Glossaire arrive à point nommé pour en profiter.

3.2 Cadre institutionnel

Le fonctionnement du Glossaire est basé sur la collaboration de trois romanistes, élèves du même maître (le professeur Heinrich Morf, romaniste à l'université de Zurich), qui prennent en charge la rédaction du Glossaire. Ce « comité de rédaction » ou « Rédaction », comme elle se nomme parfois, s'adjoint l'aide de copiste(s) et d'un secrétaire. Il s'agit du « Bureau » (dont la fondation date de 1899). On y accueille peu à peu des doctorants et des collaborateurs. Le rédacteur en chef est l'initiateur du projet, Louis Gauchat.

Le comité de rédaction se trouve séparé géographiquement, ce qui complexifie les échanges et nécessite une abondante correspondance, utile pour notre

---

[6] https://www.drg.ch.

[7] www4.ti.ch.

entreprise de relecture historique. Les matériaux sont eux-aussi éloignés d'une partie de la rédaction, étant stockés au domicile du rédacteur en chef.

L'exemple de l'Idiotikon, financé par une société savante à sa création en 1862 (Société des antiquaires de Zurich) puis par la Confédération depuis 1874, permet à Gauchat d'insister sur le caractère national du projet auprès de la Confédération et des départements cantonaux de l'instruction publique[8], qui co-financeront le Glossaire[9].

Deux organes de contrôle sont mis en place en 1899 : la commission administrative et la commission philologique. La première est composée des Chefs des Départements de l'Instruction publique des six cantons romands, avec pour responsable un des conseillers d'État neuchâtelois : sa tâche principale est de régler les questions financières. La seconde, dont les membres sont des romanistes travaillant dans les universités suisses et étrangères, discute des questions techniques. Ces deux commissions se réunissent une fois par année et le rédacteur en chef fait le lien entre les deux commissions en rapportant à la commission administrative l'avancement des travaux et les décisions prises au sein de la commission philologique. Par ailleurs, Gauchat soumet à la communauté scientifique certains points à discuter, tels que les questions de l'ordre et du regroupement des mots dans le Glossaire, de la présence d'illustrations et des conventions de transcription. Le projet scientifique est donc placé sous la responsabilité du politique, qui en assure la pérennité.

3.3 Temporalité du projet

Le projet a été pensé d'emblée sur le temps long. Les étapes envisagées comprennent le développement d'une méthode permettant de collecter des données, la récolte elle-même, le tri des matériaux rassemblés, et enfin la publication des résultats.

Le recueil des données s'appuie sur une double démarche :

- Le rassemblement des matériaux déjà existants par les rédacteurs ou des copistes (dépouillement des ouvrages lexicographiques et littéraires publiés ou manuscrits, qui doivent être copiés et fragmentés pour être divisés en mots).

- La collecte de matériaux ciblés produits par des correspondants sélectionnés (enquête par correspondance pensée sur une période d'une

---

[8] La Conférence intercantonale de l'instruction publique de la Suisse romande et du Tessin (CIIP), crée en 1874, est composée des Conseillers, Conseillères d'État et Ministres en charge de l'éducation des cantons de Berne, Fribourg, Genève, Jura, Neuchâtel, Tessin, Valais et Vaud.

[9] Pour les différentes restructurations des subventions de la Confédération, suite notamment aux difficultés financières dues à la deuxième guerre mondiale, cf. Fuhrer, à paraître. Notons qu'un appel à donation a été lancé au début des années 1950, afin de soutenir l'effort de la Confédération par des apports financiers institutionnels et privés (cf. *Rapport annuel de la rédaction* 1953, p. 13-14).

dizaine d'années afin de faire le tour du vocabulaire) ou récoltés lors d'enquêtes ponctuelles menées par les fondateurs ou des collaborateurs.

Une étape préalable à cette récolte, très importante d'un point de vue méthodologique et épistémologique, est la création de protocoles de recueil des données. L'équipe élabore ainsi 227 questionnaires thématiques, couvrant l'ensemble de l'univers familier des patoisants : les rédacteurs ont « divisé toutes les notions qui constituent le monde matériel et moral en groupes homogènes : le corps humain, les maladies, le caractère, l'agriculture, etc., qui se subdivisent suivant les besoins en sous-groupes. Ce sont ces derniers qui faisaient généralement l'objet d'un questionnaire » (Gauchat 1914, p. 15). Premier essai de ce genre, l'élaboration de ces questionnaires semble avoir été une tâche complexe. Ces questionnaires feront par la suite référence et seront partiellement copiés par des entreprises scientifiques similaires en Allemagne, en Autriche, Italie, en Espagne, en Russie, au Canada, en Argentine (ainsi que par les équivalents tessinois et romanches de l'entreprise). Sont également élaborées les modalités de récolte des matériaux et de recrutement des correspondants, ainsi que plusieurs outils d'analyse (cf. point 5.2).

Le classement des matériaux a constitué, lui aussi, une étape plus ardue que la Rédaction ne l'avait prévu. Lors de leur réception par les rédacteurs, les réponses de chaque correspondant sont regroupées par matière, puisqu'elles correspondent aux thématiques abordées dans les questionnaires. Dans l'optique lexicographique qui est celle du Glossaire, ces réponses doivent donc être redistribuées et regroupées par mot.

Enfin, la mise à disposition des résultats se fait sous forme de glossaire (cf. point 5.1). Au niveau de la temporalité, cette dernière étape s'est, par sa complexité, inscrite dans un temps long. Envisagée initialement comme pouvant durer un peu plus de dix ans, elle dure encore à présent et aura duré, selon les prévisions actuelles, 150 ans.

4. CONCEPTION DU ROLE DES LOCUTEURS DANS LE PROJET

4.1 Un projet citoyen par philosophie et par pragmatisme

Gauchat, sensibilisé par ses études au fait que la langue parlée n'est rendue qu'imparfaitement par les textes conservés, prend conscience que la langue vivante s'en va et que les sources écrites disponibles sont d'une qualité insuffisante : les ouvrages disponibles ne traitent que d'une région limitée ou d'une partie du vocabulaire (dictons, chansons, langue littéraire), et sont souvent d'une qualité médiocre. Sur ces sources fragmentaires, il n'y a pour Gauchat « pas moyen de bâtir notre Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande » (Conférence de 1930). Par ailleurs, les fondateurs rêvent d'un projet qui prennent en compte la langue en usage chez les « particuliers » :

Les intonations, les sons patois, que ces textes ne rendent que très imparfaitement, disparaîtront pour toujours, si toute la Suisse romande ne se réunit pas pour publier un glossaire basé sur l'état actuel des patois vivants. Plusieurs cantons ont déjà fait dans ce sens des efforts qui méritent toute notre admiration. On recherche pieusement les dictons et chansons du bon vieux temps et on en publie de fort beaux volumes ; outre ces recherches plutôt littéraires, des particuliers ont passé leur vie à recueillir des mots, mais ces matériaux gisent ignorés dans les bibliothèques, et, très souvent, se perdent, on ne sait trop comment (Gauchat, Projet de 1897).

La plus grande difficulté de l'entreprise est, selon Gauchat, le problème de la récolte des matériaux linguistiques. Il faut bien sûr collecter les sources écrites : la littérature et les documents d'archives offrent des sources précieuses mais rares ; un autre apport important est celui des ouvrages lexicographiques rédigés antérieurement, à une période où le dialecte était encore vivant, mais par des amateurs éclairés manquant de méthode. Afin de combler les manques induits par les faiblesses précitées, il est possible d'envisager la solution de l'enquête sur place, qui a ses qualités et ses limites. Celle-ci donne accès à la langue vivante recherchée, mais les enquêteurs se heurtent à plusieurs problèmes : le temps et les ressources humaines nécessaires à ce genre d'enquêtes, le manque de connaissance de la langue et des coutumes ou habitudes locales de la part des enquêteurs, la difficulté d'accès au lexique subtil des émotions par la méthode d'interrogation directe, l'absence du contexte d'interlocution qui dirige généralement le choix des mots ou l'apparition d'expressions et de tours de phrases, etc.

L'Idiotikon, déjà évoqué, offre alors pour la Rédaction un modèle quant aux méthodes, puisque la collaboration avec un réseau de correspondants leur permet de contourner certaines de ces difficultés. Pour aller chercher la langue chez les sujets parlants, les fondateurs vont donc s'en inspirer et, par l'enquête par correspondance qui formera leur source principale, solliciter directement les patoisants en les impliquant dans le projet :

Nous préserverons ces manuscrits de l'oubli ; nous rechercherons les vieillards qui parlent encore le patois et qui se rajeuniront en nous révélant les secrets de ce parler d'un autre âge (...). Que toute la Suisse romande veuille bien répondre à cet appel patriotique ! (Gauchat, Projet de 1897).

4.2 Modalités de collaboration avec les correspondants

Dans le projet de 1897, Gauchat indique que contrairement à ce qui a été fait pour l'Idiotikon, les correspondants suivront une méthode imposée. Tandis que pour l'équivalent suisse alémanique chacun des 400 collaborateurs recrutés faisait des recherches « pour son compte, sans plan général » (Gauchat, Projet de 1897), les modalités de collaboration du Glossaire ont été pensées avec beaucoup de soin. L'analyse était dévolue aux rédacteurs, la collecte des informations pour partie au Bureau (pour ce qui est du dépouillement des sources déjà connues et disponibles)

et à des collaborateurs externes (correspondants, historiens, romanistes, experts). La publication était dévolue à la Rédaction, exclusivement. Les tâches sont donc strictement découpées entre les différents participants au projet. Explorer la dimension participative du projet suppose de nous intéresser en premier lieu aux correspondants.

La tâche des correspondants a été structurée selon une collecte mensuelle de matériaux par l'intermédiaire des questionnaires envoyés par la Rédaction. Les matériaux sont transmis sous forme de fiches dont le format a été défini préalablement. Concrètement :

- Chaque mois le correspondant recevait par la poste une enveloppe renfermant 2 questionnaires imprimés, un carnet à souches avec 100 fiches détachables (de 11cm sur 8,5 cm) pour inscrire les réponses et une enveloppe pour le renvoi qui devait être fait avant la fin du mois. Pendant les mois d'été, qui est la saison des grands travaux à la campagne, il n'y avait qu'un seul questionnaire.

- Les fiches des carnets à souches ont une couleur différente selon les cantons, ce qui permet de les trier plus facilement au moment de la rédaction. De plus, elles sont estampillées selon la provenance, afin de ne pas perdre cette information.

- Chaque fiche remplie ne doit, selon les instructions, contenir qu'un seul mot, accompagné de son (ou de ses) sens et d'un ou de plusieurs exemples. Ceci doit permettre de faciliter la lecture par la Rédaction et d'éviter des étapes de duplication des fiches au moment de la distribution des réponses par mot.

Les questionnaires sont un élément essentiel du dispositif, qui permet de garantir la systématicité et une certaine exhaustivité du projet scientifique. Ils sont pensés de façon à permettre « de faire, en un temps calculable, le tour du vocabulaire ; par leur concentration, ils forcent à explorer à fond chaque domaine ; ils communiquent la vision des choses, et les mots s'appellent les uns les autres » (Gauchat 1914, p. 16). Ils permettent, « surtout si le correspondant est bien encadré et qu'il prend le temps, d'avoir de meilleurs résultats que dans le cadre d'un interrogatoire direct, notamment pour les locutions rares, les proverbes, et certains domaines abstraits » (id.). Afin de profiter de ces qualités du mode d'enquête de façon la plus efficace, les correspondants sont encouragés à assurer un double rôle : d'une part, comme patoisants, ils sont évidemment des contributeurs directs ; d'autre part, on leur demande d'être des relais locaux du projet, incités à aller sur le terrain pour rencontrer les experts et nommer les choses. Ce qui leur est demandé, c'est de faire le tour des réalités concernées, par l'observation de ce qui les entoure et la consultation d'autres patoisants ou d'experts des domaines impliqués (maréchal ferrant, boulanger, etc.) :

> Le corr[espondant] reçoit donc p. ex. le questionnaire sur l'écurie. S'il veut bien répondre, il n'a qu'à s'y rendre, à voir tout ce qui s'y trouve, à réfléchir à ce qui s'y dit. Il a un mois pour s'acquitter de sa tâche. Il peut consulter d'autres personnes. Ainsi un mot, une locution appelle les autres. Tout se tient dans ce milieu, reconstitué artificiellement et nous avons des chances d'être renseignés complétement (Gauchat, Conférence de 1930).

4.3 Recrutement, profil et formation des correspondants

4.3.1 Recrutement

Les correspondants sont des citoyens associés sur le long terme au projet, puisque la récolte des matériaux est planifiée sur onze ans. Ceux-ci ont été recrutés par divers biais : recrutement direct par les fondateurs qui ont parcouru le territoire à la recherche de patoisants, par des circulaires du Département de l'instruction publique, par des appels dans la presse, etc.

Par ces démarches, la Rédaction espérait obtenir le concours de 120 collaborateurs : 3 pour Genève, 7 pour Neuchâtel, 15 pour Fribourg, 15 pour le Jura bernois, 40 pour Vaud et 40 pour le Valais, chiffres « établis en tenant compte de la diversité des patois parlés dans un même canton et de leur vitalité » (Gauchat, Projet de 1897). Cette projection laissait évidemment ouverte la porte à toute contribution supplémentaire non sollicitée. Selon Gauchat, ce nombre est suffisant, le vocabulaire ne variant pas sensiblement dans un même canton : « des mots qui semblent n'appartenir qu'à *une* localité se retrouvent ordinairement ailleurs, et, supposé qu'on atteigne par exemple le nombre de quarante collaborateurs pour le canton de Vaud, on peut compter que les principales variantes phonétiques de ce canton seraient à peu près reproduites » (id.). La réalité des données lui donnera toutefois tort :

> Notre enquête par questionnaires adressés à plusieurs personnes de la même région, a aussi mis en lumière le fait que le vocabulaire des patois vivants et infiniment plus riche qu'on ne le croyait jusqu'à présent. Toutes nos prévisions à cet égard ont été dépassées. Ainsi on savait sans doute qu'il existe une grande variété d'expressions pour désigner les états de la folie ou de l'ivresse. Mais n'est-on pas étonné d'en trouver jusqu'à 120 pour la folie et 150 pour l'ivresse ? Et qui aurait cru que dans le petit domaine de la Suisse romande on trouverait de 25 à 30 équivalents patois pour chacune des idées verbales de « ruisseler », « mouiller », « barboter », « gicler », « accoucher », « dorloter », etc. Bien entendu, il s'agit dans ces chiffres de radicaux différents, il n'est pas même tenu compte des dérivés (Gauchat 1914, p. 16-17).

Le nombre de correspondants s'est finalement élevé à 200. Les statistiques détaillées du nombre de carnets rentrés chaque année dans les différents rapports de la part de la Rédaction montrent qu'en moyenne, il a été estimé qu'on recevait par correspondant entre 40 et 45 fiches par questionnaire.

Avec le temps, le nombre de correspondants fidèles a cependant diminué. Dans son journal, Gauchat écrit : « de 200 à 100, 75 puis 64, et ça devrait être suffisant ». Ces défections sont dues à des décès, mais surtout à la lassitude et à la charge de travail :

> Les environ 200 adhésions de la première heure se sont considérablement réduites à l'arrivée des premiers questionnaires. Lorsqu'on a vu quel travail les réponses supposaient, on s'est vite découragé. La plupart se sont heurtés à la difficulté de transcrire convenablement le patois, avec ses sons si bizarres, qui n'ont pas d'équivalents en fr. Les défections furent donc nombreuses et pendant toute la durée de l'enquête nous avons eu de la peine à combler les vides laissés par les démissionnaires et à remplacer les défunts. Mais une bonne trentaine de nos collaborateurs du début nous sont restés fidèles jusqu'au bout, et plusieurs de ceux qui ont été enrôlés tardivement ont tenu à reprendre toute la série des 227 questionnaires : ainsi nous avons toujours eu une équipe d'env. 80 correspondants (Gauchat, conférence de 1930).

Les lacunes n'ont pas toujours pu être comblées. De nouveaux recrutements et des enquêtes complémentaires ciblées par la Rédaction, imposant au dialectologue d'arpenter le territoire avec les difficultés connues (méconnaissance des dialectes par le dialectologue, difficulté d'accès, etc.), ont cherché à compenser ces défections.

4.3.2 Profil

La Rédaction a donc fait appel aux patoisants sans souci de réelle représentativité, si ce n'est celle de la localisation géographique : le critère principal de recrutement est la capacité linguistique du correspondant, ainsi que ses aptitudes à rendre avec justesse les informations demandées et sa motivation pour un travail exigeant et de longue haleine.

Les premiers sollicités (et qui constituent les trois-quarts des correspondants qui ont finalement répondu à l'appel) sont les instituteurs, leur culture grammaticale et leur capacité de définition des mots facilitant l'analyse des réponses. De plus, ils possèdent une écriture lisible ainsi que « la ponctualité et la patience » requises (Gauchat, conférence de 1930). Il en est de même pour les pasteurs et curés. Toutefois, ceux-ci ne savent généralement pas le dialecte, sortant ordinairement de milieux citadins où il n'est plus pratiqué et ayant suivi une formation en séminaire qui le fait disparaître totalement, caractéristiques qui s'appliquent pour partie aussi aux pharmaciens, médecins, et avocats. Les habitants des villages ruraux sont, pour Gauchat, les plus susceptibles de maîtriser convenablement le dialecte, mais manquent parfois de la capacité à rendre ces connaissances dans toutes leurs nuances.

Les informations fournies par les fondateurs concernant le profil de chaque correspondant sont sommaires (cf. point 4.4.) et éparses :

> Ils se recrutaient dans tous les milieux : professeurs et instituteurs, curés et pasteurs, présidents de tribunal et notaires, pas mal de simples paysans intelligents et amoureux de leur langue, aussi quelques artisans, un imprimeur, un menuisier, un cordonnier, qui, interrogé sur sa langue, proférait les mots de son cher patois de Court avec autant de force et de fracas qu'il maniait son marteau. Les femmes ne manquaient pas non plus (...). Quel zèle déployé à notre intention et quels témoignages touchants d'attachement à notre œuvre ! Pour pouvoir répondre à nos questionnaires, un pasteur du Pays-d'Enhaut, ignorant lui-même le patois, ne s'est pas lassé, pendant une période de onze ans, d'aller consulter les vieilles femmes de sa paroisse (Tappolet 1923, p. 301).

Une étude est menée actuellement sur les sources afin de mieux comprendre les profils de chacune d'entre elles (Fuhrer & Nissille, en cours). Sur la base de la correspondance archivée ainsi que de l'analyse de la qualité des réponses fournies par chaque correspondant, il est possible de faire une typologie des capacités et des attitudes des correspondants dans leur participation à l'enquête linguistique et de leurs représentations face à la langue. Les premiers résultats montrent une grande diversité d'expertise et le développement avec les années d'un noyau dur de correspondants devenant de vrais experts du domaine, certains s'engageant notamment dans une correspondance plus poussée avec la Rédaction. Cette configuration est commune à de nombreux projets de sciences citoyennes contemporains, où un petit nombre de participants assidus acquiert une expertise intéressante de la tâche, et parfois du domaine.

4.3.3 Formation et encadrement

Le manque de formation explique une partie des divergences observées dans les matériaux reçus en réponse aux questionnaires. On y trouve une grande diversité dans les habitudes de transcription phonétique des mots patois et certaines façons de procéder personnelles ont souvent introduit une part d'artifice dans les réponses des correspondants : traduction du dictionnaire de français de référence, copie de dictionnaires dialectaux antérieurs, traduction littérale du questionnaire, etc.

Initialement, la Rédaction avait planifié l'élaboration d'une brochure, qui devait former les correspondants (méthodes d'investigation et système de transcription). Mais ce guide n'a pu, faute de temps, être finalisé. Selon Gauchat, l'expérience a montré qu'il n'était finalement pas nécessaire pour obtenir des résultats suffisants. Seules quelques pages d'instruction contenant des fiches modèles et un descriptif du système de transcription ont été finalement envoyées (cf. annexe).

4.4 Contrôle de la qualité des données

Il est d'emblée évident, pour la Rédaction, que les matériaux récoltés sont de valeur inégale. Dans les publications ainsi que dans les notes internes, on trouve des réflexions sur les limites de la méthode et sur les types de données qui peuvent être

collectées par questionnaire ou par entretien auprès de citoyens experts. Le sérieux de certains correspondants est souligné, mais on admet que la qualité n'est pas homogène. Les correspondants, nous l'avons dit, sont pour la majorité des intellectuels (curés, notaires et surtout enseignants), pour une minorité des personnes possédant le dialecte sans connaissances théoriques (cultivateurs, ouvriers, artisans). Ceci pose des problèmes différents : un lettré risque de modifier les informations, un utilisateur instinctif fournira des données fiables mais brutes, non analysées. Pour les fondateurs, la valeur de l'entreprise compense ses faiblesses.

> Malgré des instructions précises, l'unité de méthode n'a pas pu être entièrement obtenue de tant de collaborateurs de valeur très inégale ; bon nombre d'entre eux sont souvent restés au-dessous de leur tâche et nous ont envoyé des renseignements insuffisants ou douteux, des mots inexactement transcrits ou mal définis. La révision des matériaux, au moment de la rédaction, permettra de découvrir et de faire disparaître un grand nombre de ces insuffisances. Tant qu'il y aura des patoisants, nous nous appliquerons à contrôler sur place les cas douteux. Mais les possibilités de contrôle, qui font déjà fréquemment défaut aujourd'hui, iront en diminuant toujours plus, et il arrivera aussi que bien des erreurs, n'étant pas manifestes, passeront inaperçues. Une œuvre collective de l'étendue du *Glossaire* contient forcément des éléments inexacts. Nous nous rendons parfaitement compte des défectuosités de notre enquête, mais nous savons aussi qu'elle a mis au jour des trésors dont la richesse et l'originalité dépassent toute attente (Gauchat et al. 1924, p. 8)

Les difficultés sont communiquées en toute transparence au grand public. Les défauts les plus courants sont une mauvaise transcription (les instructions jointes pour la transcription phonétique du dialecte étant bien trop complexes pour la plupart des correspondants), des mots douteux, mal définis ou simplement des renseignements insuffisants (manque d'exemples et de phraséologie).

Les rédacteurs cherchent donc à vérifier et améliorer la justesse et de la validité des données. Pour ce faire, il avait été projeté que chaque fondateur soit responsable d'un ensemble de correspondants, dont il devait chercher à optimiser les contributions. Ainsi Gauchat note dans un journal de travail : « Chaque rédacteur étudie exactement les réponses de ses correspondants et écrit des lettres aux principaux collaborateurs pour redresser quelques grosses erreurs et pour les en corriger, et leur indiquer dans quel sens spécialement ils doivent continuer leurs recherches ». Si les deux premiers carnets à souche rentrés ont été étudiés avec soin et ont été suivis par une correspondance (lettres et circulaire) signalant aux correspondants les principales erreurs commises afin de modifier leur pratique future, le temps semble avoir manqué par la suite pour ce genre de démarches, dont il ne subsiste dans nos connaissances actuelles pas de traces. La vérification au cas par cas des données fournies auprès des correspondants a elle aussi été abandonnée rapidement, la possibilité de contrôle direct nécessitant de grandes ressources (déplacements ou échanges épistolaires fournis).

Le contrôle de la qualité des données a donc été réalisé par des voies multiples et détournées.

Tout d'abord, la Rédaction documente la qualité des correspondants, évaluant les capacités linguistiques du locuteur, ses conventions de transcription, la valeur des exemples donnés, etc. La plupart de ces informations sont à usage interne, seuls les éléments purement factuels étant consignés dans des notices officielles publiées dans une recension critique des sources disponibles pour l'étude des variétés parlées en Suisse romande (Gauchat & Jeanjaquet 1920, p. 197-224 ; cf. point 5.2) : nom du correspondant, localisation du dialecte renseigné, numéros de questionnaires auxquels le correspondant a répondu, son métier ou son secteur d'activité. Il est cependant à noter que nous sommes peu renseignés sur le profil linguistique des participants à l'enquête par correspondance, contrairement aux témoins interrogés par les fondateurs lors d'une enquête parallèle visant à documenter les principales caractéristiques phonétiques des patois romands (les *Tableaux phonétiques*, Gauchat *et al.*, 1925). Les informations collectées sur ces témoins et publiées avec les *Tableaux* permettent de faire la différence entre les caractéristiques phonétiques personnelles et celles du dialecte :

> Villars-le-Terroir, district d'Échallens, commune de 581 habitants. Patois du Gros-de-Vaud. Sujet : M. *Auguste Pitet-Grognuz,* agriculteur et juge de paix, 72 ans ; est né et a toujours vécu dans la localité ; la langue de sa famille était le patois.
> Sujet possédant bien l'idiome local ; un peu dur d'oreille ; les dents manquent. Les finales atones *-o* et *-e* sont plutôt fermées (...) (30 mars 1905) (Gauchat *et al.* 1925, 161).

Ces considérations s'inscrivent dans la continuité des travaux de Gauchat, qui dans des relevés de 1899 et de 1903 auprès de sujets d'une commune romande du canton de Fribourg (Charmey), a pu observer que la variation existant dans un même dialecte peut être due à des facteurs humains. Son travail est considéré comme l'un des précurseurs de la sociolinguistique (cf. Gauchat 1905). Dans cette étude, il insiste sur les différences qui ne peuvent manquer d'exister entre les sujets parlants faisant l'objet d'une enquête. Ses observations portent surtout sur l'âge et le degré d'instruction des sujets, leur genre (Gauchat a remarqué que les femmes semblent avoir une génération d'avance, c'est-à-dire un dialecte plus moderne) ainsi que l'histoire de la famille et des témoins eux-mêmes.

Ensuite, l'éventuelle multiplicité des sources pour un même dialecte (ou pour des dialectes voisins) permet une comparaison entre les réponses reçues et nécessitant une analyse. Le mode de récolte permet cette méthode de contrôle envisagée avant même le début du projet : les réponses à chaque questionnaire devant arriver à la même période au Bureau, il est possible d'opérer une comparaison entre des matériaux de provenance géographique proche afin d'identifier les problèmes (formes douteuses, réponses incomplètes, etc.). La

défection d'une partie des correspondants recrutés en nombre suffisant pour appliquer largement cette méthode ont affaibli ce mode de contrôle.

Finalement, c'est au moment de la rédaction même de chaque article que le traitement lexicographique des matériaux permet de déceler de corriger les imprécisions et les erreurs.

Ainsi, la disparité très importante (de régularité ou de qualité) et les défections induisent une perte de validité linguistique des matériaux bruts qui doit être compensée au moment de la rédaction, ce qui implique une analyse approfondie et critique. Les rédacteurs considèrent en effet les fiches comme des textes et leur appliquent une approche philologique : « Chaque fiche est un texte, sur lequel peut et doit s'exercer la critique des textes » (Gauchat, conférence de 1930). Ainsi, tout élément doit être contrôlé avant d'être publié, ce qui amène, de l'aveu même de Gauchat, une surcharge de travail et ralentit la production. Ces défauts et complexités sont, pour la Rédaction, un mal inévitable mais compensé par la richesse des matériaux récoltés.

5. DIVERSITE DES COMMUNICATIONS AUTOUR DU PROJET

5.1 La production principale : le Glossaire

La publication principale est le résultat de l'analyse des matériaux sous forme de glossaire. Il prend la forme d'un répertoire exhaustif et raisonné des variantes phonétiques et des sens que peut prendre un mot dans tous les dialectes répertoriés de la Suisse romande. Ces éléments sont articulés pour favoriser la comparaison entre les éléments dissemblables et regrouper ceux qui sont communs à plusieurs localités ou régions. Les sens sont illustrés par des exemples, permettant non seulement de documenter les structures de la langue, mais aussi de donner des informations sur les us et coutumes des localités concernées, ainsi que sur une part du folklore et de la sagesse populaire (dictons, proverbes). Chaque article se termine par un historique qui propose des informations sur l'origine du mot, son évolution, ses caractéristiques.

Si le but premier du Glossaire est la sauvegarde du patrimoine linguistique et la participation aux études des langues romanes, plusieurs communications de la Rédaction montrent qu'elle cherche à ouvrir le lectorat en soulignant l'utilité documentaire (pour les historiens, géographes, ethnographes par exemple), didactique (pour enseigner aux élèves les différences entre le français de référence et les variétés régionales et certaines réalités anciennes) ou politique de l'entreprise. Au-delà de l'aspect linguistique, il s'agit plus largement « de retracer le plus fidèlement possible la vie de ce petit peuple romand, qui parle français, mais qui continue à penser en romand, son histoire ayant été distincte de celle de la France » (Gauchat, conférence de 1930).

5.2 Communiquer sur le Glossaire

Plusieurs autres publications complètent le Glossaire. Adressées aux correspondants, au grand public, ou plus spécifiquement aux politiques, elles constituent une sorte de « péri-structure » indispensable à la bonne réalisation du projet dans le temps. Les fondateurs doivent en particulier très vite justifier les retards pris par le projet.

Certaines publications, très intéressantes pour notre étude, visent à instaurer une communication régulière avec les personnes impliquées dans le projet, afin de garantir leur engagement fidèle année après année. Les *Rapports annuels* envoyés aux correspondants et aux officiels permettent de suivre l'avancement des travaux. Les *Bulletins du Glossaire*, publication trimestrielle de 1902 à 1915, ainsi que d'autres publications ponctuelles présentant des résultats intermédiaires, permettent de faire patienter le lectorat, de le tenir au courant des avancées et de lui soumettre des questions ou propositions scientifiques. Ces *Bulletins* sont présentés comme permettant d'« établir un lien avec [les]correspondants », de « susciter l'intérêt pour les recherches sur les patois », de « les initier à toutes sortes de questions philologiques », de « leur faire comprendre les beautés et l'originalité de leurs parlers » (Gauchat, Conférence de 1930). Ils s'adressent d'emblée aux correspondants actifs, mais ont aussi pour but de recruter de nouveaux contributeurs experts :

> (La Rédaction) a songé tout d'abord à cette vaillante cohorte de collaborateurs, qui, depuis deux ans à la tâche, ne se lassent pas de répondre mois après mois à nos multiples questionnaires. Bien du temps s'écoulera encore avant qu'ils puissent voir le fruit de leur travail et de leur dévouement. En attendant, ils seront certainement heureux de trouver dans le *Bulletin* un guide qui s'efforcera de leur montrer l'intérêt qu'offre l'étude des parlers populaires, qui mettra sous leurs yeux des spécimens variés de nos différents patois, des recherches sur leur histoire et leur littérature, et qui fera ressortir par un examen comparatif la richesse et la diversité de leur vocabulaire. Mais ce n'est pas seulement à ceux dont le concours est déjà acquis au Glossaire que s'adresse notre *Bulletin*. Son but principal est bien plutôt d'intéresser à cette entreprise nationale les nombreuses personnes qui n'ont pu lui témoigner jusqu'ici qu'une sympathie toute passive. (...) Mis au courant de nos travaux, ils pourront désormais y prendre part : ils compléteront nos matériaux, ils préciseront et développeront nos renseignements, ils nous signaleront les mots rares et curieux. A leur instigation, l'artisan, le chasseur, le pêcheur nous communiqueront ces termes originaux qu'ils sont presque seuls à connaître : en un mot chacun contribuera dans la mesure de ses forces à l'avancement de l'œuvre commune. C'est à ce prix seulement, par le concours de toutes les bonnes volontés, que nous pourrons espérer créer un ouvrage qui soit véritablement ce qu'il doit être : l'imagine fidèle et vivante de notre vieille civilisation romande, telle qu'elle se reflète, sous ses aspects si divers, dans une langue bientôt disparue (*Bulletin* 1902, 1, p. 2)

Les rédacteurs interviennent aussi dans des conférences auprès du public, certaines nous étant connues par des recensions de ces événements dans la presse ou des brouillons du texte de présentation conservés dans les archives. Ces différentes communications témoignent d'une nécessité de motivation de toutes les bonnes volontés, de fidélisation des correspondants mais aussi de construction de la visibilité d'un projet scientifique sur du très long terme.

Par ailleurs, le travail de Rédaction repose sur de nombreux documents internes de travail, visant à faciliter l'organisation du projet. Nous sont ainsi parvenues les notes personnelles de Gauchat, sous la forme de deux journaux rédigés pendant les premières années, ainsi que la correspondance des fondateurs sur le projet (entre eux et avec tous les autres participants). Notons aussi la présence dans la documentation conservée des procès-verbaux d'assemblées administratives et scientifiques. Ces sources sont caractéristiques des premières années, le temps manquant par la suite pour poursuivre cet effort ou les archiver.

Enfin, l'entreprise scientifique amène à la conception d'ouvrages, manuscrits ou imprimés, élaborés afin de servir d'outils de travail communs à la Rédaction. Pour faciliter la récolte des matériaux, une recension critique des sources disponibles pour l'étude des variétés parlés en Suisse romande est réalisée (la *Bibliographie linguistique de la Suisse romande* ; Gauchat Jeanjaquet 1912, 1920). Parallèlement à l'enquête par correspondance, des relevés linguistiques complémentaires permettant de connaître les principales caractéristiques phonétiques des patois romands ont été menés à bien, les *Relevés phonétiques* (Gauchat *et al.* 1899- 1903) puis les *Tableaux phonétiques* (de 1904 à 1914), publiés en 1925 (Gauchat *et al.* 1925). Au moment du classement des matériaux, les types lexicaux récoltés pour un même concept ont été notés avec leur aire de répartition dans les *Résumés des réponses des correspondants.* Deux de ces ouvrages, initialement destinés à la Rédaction, ont été publiés par la suite pour permettre une diffusion scientifique plus large (*Tableaux phonétiques, Bibliographie linguistique*).

6. CONCLUSION

Dans cet article, nous avons analysé le Glossaire avec le prisme des sciences citoyennes contemporaines, en nous demandant en particulier comment nos prédécesseurs, il y a plus de cent ans, avaient conçu la participation des citoyens dans le projet. Cet exercice un brin anachronique nous a permis de plonger dans la riche documentation historique du projet, et a apporté quelques éléments de réponse, que nous synthétisons ici de manière un peu plus critique.

Premièrement, la participation des citoyens à la conservation du dialecte répond, pour les fondateurs du Glossaire, à un impératif pratique : il s'agit de recueillir rapidement, avant leur disparition annoncée, les variétés dialectales parlées sur un vaste territoire en mobilisant un réseau de correspondants qui sont des locuteurs

experts. Toutefois, dans un pays confédéral et plurilingue comme la Suisse, cet impératif pratique s'énonce d'autant plus aisément qu'il rencontre un projet politique : la construction de l'identité patriotique de la Suisse ne se fait pas par réduction et intégration des diversités régionales dans une langue qui s'imposerait normativement à toutes et tous (comme en France, par exemple), mais par la reconnaissance de la diversité des identités régionales et leur équilibre négocié. L'émergence et la pérennité du Glossaire se comprennent donc dans un double contexte scientifique et politique : il s'agit bien, en premier lieu, d'un projet de *science* citoyenne, c'est-à-dire pensé et rendu possible dans un certain paysage scientifique et disciplinaire, en fonction des avancées de la dialectologie à la fin du XIX$^{\text{ème}}$ siècle ; mais aussi d'un projet *politique*, dont la mise en place et la pérennité jusqu'à aujourd'hui ne peuvent se comprendre que parce que le Glossaire des patois de la Suisse Romande co-existe avec les trois autres dictionnaires dédiés aux langues nationales (le Schweizerisches Idiotikon fondé en 1862, le Vocabulario delle Svizzera Italiana fondé en 1904 et le Dizionari rumanch Grischun fondé en 1907), tous quatre étant financés depuis leur fondation (ou depuis 1874 pour le premier) pour une part essentielle par la Confédération. Les liens entre les équipes de recherche de chaque vocabulaire, qui se tissent sous différentes formes (échanges ponctuels, rencontres scientifiques et organisations de colloques, etc.), témoignent des avancées parallèles de ces quatre projets scientifiques au long cours.

Deuxièmement, la participation citoyenne s'impose aux fondateurs par la nature même de l'objet d'études, la langue parlée : avoir accès au dialecte vivant requiert une méthode de collecte qui privilégie la parole spontanée, en contexte, seule à même de rendre la richesse lexicale et phraséologique du dialecte. Cela ne suffirait pas, toutefois, à qualifier le Glossaire de projet participatif. La littérature récente dans le domaine des sciences citoyennes discute précisément de la nature de la participation dans les projets de sciences sociales. Ainsi, Hacklay *et al.* (2020) soulignent :

> Dans certaines disciplines, telles que les sciences médicales et sociales, le passage du statut de sujet de recherche à celui de chercheur actif doit être clairement établi. La nature de ces études fait qu'il est courant que les citoyens eux-mêmes, leurs comportements, leurs défis et leurs problèmes de santé fassent l'objet de l'étude. Mais les citoyens peuvent également jouer un rôle actif dans les activités susmentionnées, voire les initier. Il est possible que les personnes qui prennent part à ces projets soient à la fois des sujets et des participants, en fonction des intentions et du cadre de la recherche (notre traduction).

Bien sûr, l'étude des pratiques langagières (ici à travers les usages des dialectes locaux) pourrait impliquer des chercheurs qui considèrent les participants à leur recherche comme *la source* de leurs données – dans une logique extractive, dans laquelle ceux-ci seraient alors des « sujets de recherche » et non des « chercheurs

actifs » (dans les termes de Hacklay *et al.* 2020). Le Glossaire nous semble toutefois relever d'une logique bien différente, et ceci pour deux raisons.

D'une part, les correspondants ont accès aux protocoles élaborés par les chercheurs, c'est-à-dire aux questionnaires qui leur sont soumis directement. Bien qu'ils puissent parfois les remplir eux-mêmes, en mobilisant leur connaissance propre du dialecte, ils jouent aussi fréquemment un rôle d'enquêteurs locaux en allant chercher l'information là où elle se trouve, chez de plus patoisants qu'eux-mêmes. Ils échangent, pour certains d'entre eux, de nombreuses lettres avec l'équipe de recherche qui coordonne le projet et analyse les données collectées. La transparence du projet quant à ses enjeux et à ses modalités, la formation de ces correspondants à ceux-ci (bien qu'inachevée comme nous l'avons vu), la possibilité d'un dialogue avec les chercheurs en titre, ainsi que la multiplicité des tâches prises en charge par les correspondants, constituent selon nous le premier élément qualifiant le Glossaire comme un authentique projet de sciences citoyennes.

D'autre part, la communication intense autour du projet, que nous avons qualifiée de « péri-structure de communication », pour montrer qu'il s'agit d'une structure complémentaire au cœur du projet scientifique mais indispensable à sa réalisation, offre un retour très riche aux correspondants sur l'avancement du projet. Historiquement, cette communication intense répond au défi, bien anticipé par la Rédaction, de faire tenir le projet dans la durée. Il s'agit de pérenniser la participation de ces citoyens experts, détenteurs d'un savoir unique, pendant toute la phase de collecte de données, qui s'étend dans notre cas sur plus de dix ans. L'engagement des participants expérimentés dans le temps est un enjeu majeur des projets de sciences citoyennes contemporains (voir par exemple Rotman *et al.* 2014 ; Everett & Geoghegan 2016). Parallèlement, il s'agit de s'assurer du soutien continu des institutions qui financent le projet. Les enjeux de gouvernance (et de soutien politique du projet dans le temps) sont donc aussi clairement présents. À ces deux problèmes très pertinents pour les projets de sciences citoyennes contemporaines, la Rédaction répond, nous l'avons vu, par un dispositif complexe de communication : elle rend visibles le processus scientifique et les résultats intermédiaires du projet dans de nombreuses publications et conférences. Les difficultés rencontrées y sont présentées avec transparence. Les contributions des correspondants actifs sont valorisées et, de la même façon, on nomme les correspondants qui ne donnent plus de nouvelles : on peut y voir une façon de les encourager à se manifester en faisant jouer le contrôle social. La même stratégie est utilisée envers les politiques, qui sont explicitement remerciés lorsqu'ils soutiennent le projet ou publiquement désavoués quand ils manquent à leurs promesses. Mais au-delà de ses effets en termes de visibilité du projet pour ces différents destinataires (politiques, pour s'assurer de la continuité de leur soutien et des financements ; citoyens, pour recruter et fidéliser les correspondants ; scientifiques, pour échanger sur le projet en cours et ses premiers résultats), l'architecture de communication

mise en place contribue à la démarche de formation des correspondants. L'importance accordée à la communication du projet *en direction de son réseau de correspondants* nous semble être le deuxième élément qui qualifie le Glossaire comme un projet de sciences citoyennes – et qu'on retrouve, une fois encore, dans des projets de sciences citoyennes contemporains, sous des formes évidemment différentes dans lesquelles les réseaux sociaux ont remplacé les publications papier (voir par exemple Tinati 2017; Veeckman 2019; Rüfenacht *et al.* 2021).

Troisièmement, le Glossaire reflète la tension intrinsèque à l'étude de la langue en usage : l'objet d'étude, qui génère des savoirs scientifiques de plus en plus techniques avec la sophistication des disciplines, est simultanément un objet vécu, porteurs de savoirs quotidiens incorporés. Cette tension entre technicité de l'analyse scientifique, et accessibilité des résultats dans une démarche participative, est peut-être la pierre d'achoppement principale du Glossaire. Malgré sa vocation initiale à être un ouvrage écrit aussi pour les patoisants, le Glossaire devient rapidement un ouvrage pour spécialistes, peu accessible pour ses contributeurs. La publication des résultats échoue à restituer aux citoyens leur langue dans la langue analysée. Cette tension au cœur du projet, reste, 125 ans plus tard, un enjeu pour l'équipe de rédaction actuelle du Glossaire, qui œuvre à restituer les dialectes romands au public, notamment en s'appuyant sur des outils digitaux[10] ou par des conférences destinées au grand public.

L'étude critique du Glossaire sous l'angle des sciences citoyennes met donc en évidence des thématiques et des enjeux très contemporains – de même qu'elle fournit aux sciences sociales et humaines un exemple de projet historique, à la longévité comparable au Christmas Bird Count dans les sciences naturalistes.

---

[10] Glossaire consultable en ligne (https://gaspar.unine.ch), répertoire bibliographique des sources (http://complement-gpsr.unine.ch).

REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES

Desmet, P., Lauwers, P. & Swiggers, P. (2002). « Le développement de la dialectologie française avant et après Gilliéron », in : Lauwers, P., Simoni-Aurembou, M.-R & Swiggers, P. (ed.), *Géographie linguistique et biologie du langage : Autour de Jules Gilliéron,* Leuven-Paris (Peeters), 17-64.

de Vries, M. J., Land-Zandstra, A. M., & Smeets, I. (2019). Citizen scientists' preferences for communication of scientific output: a literature review. *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice*, 4(1), 2.

Everett, G., & Geoghegan, H. (2016). Initiating and continuing participation in citizen science for natural history. *BMC ecology*, 16, 15-22.

Fuhrer, L. (à paraître). *Lire et comprendre le Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande.*

Fuhrer, L. & Nissille, C. (en cours). *Les sources du Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande : étude critique.*

Gauchat, L. (1897). *Projet d'un glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande*, [brochure], Neuchâtel.

Gauchat, L. (1899-1900). *Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande. Chronique.* 2 cahiers manuscrits inédits, Zürich (dépôt au Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande).

Gauchat, L., Jeanjaquet, J. & Tappolet, E. (1899-1903). *Relevés phonétiques de 386 localités de la Suisse romande et des régions limitrophes.* 51 cahiers manuscrits (dépôt au Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande).

Gauchat, L. (1905). « L'unité phonétique dans le patois d'une commune », in : *Aus romanischen Sprachen und Literaturen. Festschrift für Heinrich Morf.* Halle (Niemeyer), 174-232.

Gauchat, L. (1914). « Notice historique », in *Bulletin du Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande* 13, Lausanne: Imprimeries réunies, pp. 3- 30.

Gauchat, L. (1930). « L'école et le Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande ». Manuscrit d'une conférence donnée à Zürich (dépôt au Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande).

Gauchat, L. (1937). « Le Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande ». Manuscrit d'une conférence donnée en Egypte (dépôt au Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande).

Gauchat L., Jeanjaquet J. (1912, 1920). *Bibliographie linguistique de la Suisse romande*, t. 1 et 2, Neuchâtel : Attinger Frères.

Gauchat, L., Jeanjaquet, J., Tappolet, E. (1924). « Introduction », in : Gauchat, L., Jeanjaquet, J., Tappolet, E. et al. (1924-), *Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande,* Neuchâtel/Paris (Attinger), puis Genève (Droz), 5-24.

Gauchat, L., Jeanjaquet, J., Tappolet, E. (1925). *Tableaux phonétiques des patois suisses romands*, Neuchâtel.

Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande. Rapport annuel de la rédaction (1899-), Neuchâtel.

Haas, W. (1981). *Das Wörterbuch der schweizerdeutschen Sprache. Versuch über eine nationale Institution*. Frauenfeld.

Haas, W. (1982). « La Suisse alémanique », in : Schlöpfer, R. (coord. par), *La suisse aux quatre langues*. Genève, Éditions Zoé, 65-124.

Haklay, M., Motion, A., Balázs, B., Kieslinger, B., Greshake Tzovaras, B., Nold, C., Dörler, D., Fraisl, D., Riemenschneider, D., Heigl, F., Brounéus, F., Hager, G., Heuer, K., Wagenknecht, K., Vohland, K., Shanley, L., Deveaux, L., Ceccaroni, L., Weißpflug, M., ... Wehn, U. (2020). *ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science*. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3758668

Haklay, M. M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Manzoni, M., Hecker, S., & Vohland, K. (2021). « What is citizen science? The challenges of definition », in : Vohland, K., Land-Zandstra, A., Ceccaroni, L., Lemmens, R., Perello, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., Wagenknecht, K. (eds). *The Science of Citizen Science*, 13-33.

Knecht, P. (1982). « La Suisse romande », in : Schlöpfer, R. (coord. par), *La suisse aux quatre langues*. Genève, Éditions Zoé, 125-169.

Kristol, A. (2023). *Histoire linguistique de la Suisse romande*, Neuchâtel : Alphil.

Lurati, O. & Stricker, H., éd. (1982). *Les Vocabulaires nationaux suisses : 4e colloque (1979)* [à Neuchâtel] de l'Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales.

Rotman, D., Hammock, J., Preece, J., Hansen, D., Boston, C., Bowser, A., & He, Y. (2014). « Motivations affecting initial and long-term participation in citizen science projects in three countries ». *Conference 2014 Proceedings*.

Rüfenacht, S., Woods, T., Agnello, G., Gold, M., Hummer, P., Land-Zandstra, A., & Sieber, A. (2021). « Communication and dissemination in citizen science ». *The Science of Citizen Science*, 475-494.

Saint-Gérand, J.-P. (1990). « Des cacologies et des curiosités patoisantes en France au XIXe siècle, à la dialectologie », in : Niederehe, H.-J. & Koerner, K. (ed.), *History and Historiography of Linguistics*, Amsterdam-Philadelphia (Benjamins), 701-713.

Tappolet, E. (1923). « Une enquête linguistique en Suisse », *Bibliothèque universelle et revue suisse* 128, 298-308.

Tinati, R., Simperl, E., & Luczak-Roesch, M. (2017, May). « To help or hinder: Real-time chat in citizen science », in : *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*. Vol. 11, n°. 1, pp. 270-279.

Veeckman, C., Talboom, S. Gijsel, L., Devoghel, H. & Duerinckx, A. (2019). Communication in Citizen Science. A practical guide to communication and engagement in citizen science. Leuven: SCIVIL.

Vohland, K., Land-Zandstra, A., Ceccaroni, L., Lemmens, R., Perello, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., Wagenknecht, K. (2021). « Editorial: The Science of Citizen Science evolves », in : Vohland, K., Land-Zandstra, A., Ceccaroni, L., Lemmens, R., Perello, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., Wagenknecht, K. (eds). *The Science of Citizen Science*, 1-12.

ANNEXE

Instructions.

I. Manière de remplir les fiches.

Chaque collaborateur reçoit pour l'inscription des mots demandés par les questionnaires des carnets spéciaux, renfermant chacun 100 feuilles détachables (fiches).

Chaque fiche indiquera :

1º Le *mot patois*, écrit bien lisiblement à l'encre, à 2 centimètres de distance du bord supérieur de la fiche, et souligné. Les adjectifs seront accompagnés de la forme du féminin, les verbes de celle de la 3ᵐᵉ personne du singulier de l'indicatif présent. Indiquer aussi, au moyen des abréviations usuelles des dictionnaires, la nature grammaticale de chaque mot : s. m. (substantif masculin), s. f. (substantif féminin), adj. (adjectif), v. (verbe), adv. (adverbe), etc.,

2º l'*équivalent français*, avec définition et explication s'il y a lieu et l'énumération des diverses acceptions possibles, sens figuré, etc.,

3º des *exemples* propres à illustrer les différentes significations : petites phrases empruntées à la vie de tous les jours, locutions usuelles, proverbes, etc., avec traduction française.

Chaque fiche devra en outre mentionner à l'angle gauche supérieur le numéro d'ordre du questionnaire et celui de la question auxquels se rapporte le mot traité.

Une fiche ne devra être employée que pour *un seul mot patois* et ne sera écrite que d'un côté. Si une fiche ne suffit pas pour un seul mot, on continuera sur les suivantes.

Les *dérivés* seront placés à la suite des mots simples, mais chacun sur une fiche spéciale.

Les fiches ne doivent pas être détachées de leur souche.

II. Transcription des mots patois.

Pour la transcription des mots patois, observer les principes suivants :

1º N'écrire absolument que les lettres qui se prononcent; faire complètement abstraction de l'orthographe traditionnelle du français et se borner à reproduire le plus exactement possible les sons dont se compose chaque mot patois, en se reportant au tableau ci-dessous ;

2º employer toujours la même notation pour le même son et ne l'employer que pour ce son.

Les sons seront représentés de la façon suivante :

A. Voyelles.

$a = a$ français	tel qu'il existe dans		bras (*bra*)[1] rare (*rar*)
$\grave{e} = e$ ouvert	„	„ „	terre (*tèr*) clair (*klèr*) verte (*vèrt*)
$\acute{e} = e$ fermé	„	„ „	pré (*pré*) clef (*klé*) je sautai (*sôté*)
∂ (e renversé $= e$ sourd[2])	„	„ „	brebis (*brəbi*) retenir (*rətnir* ou *rtənir*) je (*jə*)
$i = i$ français	„	„ „	cri (*kri*) île (*il*) nid (*ni*)
$\grave{o} = o$ ouvert	„	„ „	bord (*bòr*) corbeau (*kòrbó*) botte (*bòt*)
$\acute{o} = o$ fermé	„	„ „	peau (*pó*) saut (*só*) gros (*gró*)
$\grave{œ} = œ$ ouvert	„	„ „	beurre (*bœ̀r*) bœuf (*bœ̀f*) feuille (*fœ̀y*)
$\acute{œ} = œ$ fermé	„	„ „	feu (*fœ́*) bœufs (*bœ́*) creuser (*krœ̀zé*)
$u = u$ français	„	„ „	mur (*mur*) bureau (*buró*)
$ou = ou$ français	„	„ „	clou (*klou*) goutte (*gout*) bouquet (*boukè*)
$an = a$ nasalisé	„	„ „	grand (*gran*) temps (*tan*) encore (*ankòr*)

[1] Nous donnons entre parenthèses la forme que prendraient les mots français cités, si on leur appliquait notre système de transcription du patois.

[2] Si l'*e* est complètement muet, comme dans sage (*saj'*), douze (*douz'*), froide (*frouad'*), il ne s'écrit pas, parce qu'il n'existe pas dans la prononciation. Pour faciliter la lecture, on peut cependant le remplacer dans ce cas par une apostrophe.

Spécimens de fiches.

I. (patois fribourgeois, Gruyère)

27,4[1]

2.

bòkon, s. m. = petit morceau.

on bòkon dit moins que on mòchi. balyi-mè onkòra on bòkon dè pan pò fourni ma tsè = donnez-moi encore un petit morceau de pain pour finir ma viande. ama tè bon bòkon = la bonne chère. on bòkon dè mèynadzò = un modeste, petit ménage. on bòkon dè tsanbra (on tsanbrilyon) = une petite chambre. balyi lo bòkon a kòkon = donner le boucon, la gobbe à quelqu'un. on bòkon = un peu; on bòkon grantin = un peu longtemps, etc.

2.

Notes : 1. C'est-à-dire questionnaire No. 27, question No. 4.
2. Espace réservé aux annotations des rédacteurs.

N. B. *Les correspondants sont priés de ne pas employer une écriture aussi serrée que celle que nous avons dû choisir ici pour des raisons typographiques.*

THE PARTICIPATORY ASPECT OF CREATING A COLLECTION ON WWII
COLLECTING EGO-DOCUMENTS FROM LUXEMBOURGISH RECRUITS AND THEIR FAMILIES

NINA JANZ
Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C²DH)
University of Luxembourg
drjanz.nina@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The University of Luxembourg's "WARLUX" project focuses on studying the biographies of young Luxembourgers who were conscripted into German forces during World War II under the Nazi German occupation. Through participatory contributions and crowdsourcing, the research team has created a unique collection that is typically inaccessible through official institutions. This citizen science endeavour emphasises the involvement of families and the public in collecting historical data, reshaping historiography and providing a fresh understanding of the war. The interaction between researchers and contributors, particularly the families, has mutually benefited both parties, amplifying voices and uncovering fascinating personal histories. This collaborative approach contributes to a comprehensive exploration of the war's impact.

KEYWORDS:

Crowdsourcing; family memory; Luxembourg; WWII; ego-documents; digital collection

INTRODUCTION

Over 80 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and the number of eyewitnesses is steadily declining. Despite subsequent conflicts in Europe, the war continues to hold significant historical and emotional weight in Europe, which bore the brunt of Nazi occupation. Luxembourg, which endured nearly four years of Nazi oppression and terror, experienced a dark and complex period in its history. One notable aspect is the forced conscription of its young population into Nazi services. While this impacted only a minority of the population, it remains a highly emotional subject, often depicted as a broad victim narrative encapsulated by the term "eradicating Luxembourgish youth", as stated by the president of the Association of Forced Conscripts (*Fédération des Enrôlés Force*) in January 2020.[1]

---

[1] Armand Hoffmann, '75 Jahre Danach / Gedenken an Die 91 Erschossenen Luxemburger', *Escher Tageblatt*, 31 January 2020, https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/gedenken-an-die-91-erschossenen-luxemburger/.

It is essential to approach the term "eradication" with critical scrutiny, recognising that it primarily refers to the Jewish inhabitants of Luxembourg who were deported to extermination camps because of the Nazis' racial and ethnic ideology. However, the term also encompasses the interpretation of the experiences of those young individuals within German services. To challenge the assigned victim role and explore the experiences of this group from a critical perspective, the WARLUX project was initiated at the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C²DH) at the University of Luxembourg. The project, entitled "WARLUX – Soldiers and their Communities in WWII: The Impact and Legacy of War Experiences in Luxembourg", is funded by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (Fonds National de la Recherche – FNR). Its primary focus is to examine the personal war experiences of forcibly recruited young adults, aiming to gain a "bottom-up" perspective on their individual lived experiences.

In addition to utilising official sources as supplementary material, the research team relies on ego-documents – personal testimonies and writings – to gain deeper insights into the perspectives of individuals involved. However, quantitative ego-documents related to the targeted group within Luxembourg's archives and research institutions are scarce. Consequently, the research team, coordinated by the author, decided to engage citizens and launch a crowdsourcing project to collect personal documents from the affected individuals. This approach places significant emphasis on interaction with the contributors and their families, as the project relies on public participation and engagement.

This article aims to elucidate the intentions and motivations of the researchers, shed light on the motivations of the project participants, and examine the dynamic interaction between participants and researchers. In addition to outlining the project's procedures, challenges and pitfalls, the article will show how participatory engagement within the realm of citizen science enhanced and enriched the study of Luxembourgers' war experiences.

Goals and target group

After the occupation of Luxembourg and the establishment of the occupation administration led by Gauleiter Simon, both male and female Luxembourgers were recruited for various Nazi services. Mandatory labour service, or *Reichsarbeitsdienst* (RAD), was imposed on men and women on 23 May 1941 for those born between 1920 and 1927.[2] Furthermore, men were called up for military service in the German *Wehrmacht* on 30 August 1942. Initially, this policy applied

---

[2] Verordnungsblatt (VBl.) Chef der Zivilverwaltung (CdZ) Luxemburg, Verordnung über die Reichsarbeitsdienstpflicht in Luxemburg, 23 May 1941 (Luxembourg, Regulation on compulsory national labour service in Luxembourg), p. 232.

to individuals born between 1920 and 1924, but it was later expanded to encompass those born prior to 1927.[3]

While the exact numbers are still subject to debate it is estimated that approximately 10,211 young Luxembourgish men complied with the conscription order and joined the Nazi forces.[4] An estimated 2,300 Luxembourgers deserted and 1,200 evaded the draft,[5] and around 1,500 male Luxembourgers probably volunteered for the German military and police forces.[6]

As well as the 10,211 male conscripts from Luxembourg, 3,600 women were also called up for compulsory service in the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* camps.[7] After that the women served in the *Kriegshilfsdienst* (KHD), an auxiliary war service, in munition factories or other war-related industries. In total women had to serve one year. Men served in German uniforms for a longer period than women. After their six months in the *Reichsarbeitsdienst*, they were called up to the *Wehrmacht*; if they survived, they served there until the end of the war, and some then continued to be held as prisoners of war by the Western Allies or the Soviets.

In total, the forced conscription of young Luxembourgers impacted 13,825 men and women, who constituted approximately 4.7% of the country's overall population of 290,000.[8] Although this proportion may appear relatively small, the consequences of this forced conscription had a significant impact on both the affected individuals and the broader population, leaving a lasting legacy.

---

[3] VBl. CdZ Luxemburg, Verordnung über die Wehrpflicht in Luxemburg, 31 August 1942 (Regulation on compulsory military service in Luxembourg), p. 253.

[4] André Hohengarten, *Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation.*, ed. Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, vol. 1, Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF (Luxembourg: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 2010), 13.

[5] Hohengarten, 1:23; Norbert Haase, 'Von "Ons Jongen" und "Malgré-nous" und anderen. Das Schicksal der ausländischen Zwangsrekrutierten im Zweiten Weltkrieg', in *Die anderen Soldaten : Wehrkraftzersetzung, Gehorsamsverweigerung und Fahnenflucht im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1997), 171; Peter M Quadflieg, *'Zwangssoldaten' Und 'Ons Jongen'. Eupen-Malmedy Und Luxemburg Als Rekrutierungsgebiet Der Deutschen Wehrmacht Im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 2008), 115.

[6] In historiography, numbers ranging from 1500 to 2000 volunteers from Luxembourg appear. However, it is important to approach these numbers with caution as they are based on German contemporary sources, see Paul. Dostert, *Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe : Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Volksdeutsche Bewegung 1940-1945* (Luxemburg: Imprimerie Saint-Paul, 1985), 171; Hohengarten, *Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation.*, 1:12.

[7] Andre Hohengarten, "Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht", *Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF* 1 (2010): 13.

[8] Steve Kayser, 'Vorwort', in *Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation.*, ed. Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, vol. 1, Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF (Luxembourg: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 2010), 7.

However, it is essential to highlight that our research premise revolves around the male and female cohort born between 1920 and 1927, regardless of whether they were conscripted or volunteered for *Wehrmacht* and/or the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* and *Kriegshilfsdienst*. This particular cohort was established by the Nazi occupational government and serves as the primary focus and case study for our investigation into forced recruitment. When referring to the affected group or generation in this article, it specifically pertains to this birth cohort. It is worth noting that while our research project also considers the experiences of family members, the primary emphasis remains on the protagonists and the conscription cohort.

In previous research and public discussions, there was a collective focus that grouped together all individuals affected by the war. However, in post-war Luxembourg, there was a lack of effort to explore personal viewpoints and experiences and people's individual lives and contexts. In order to depart from traditional historiography, the WARLUX project used biographical documents, ego-documents, testimonies and witness reports, which represent the "voices from below" that are absent from the dominant national narrative.

Although the official documentation in the Luxembourg and German archives pertaining to conscription and military records provided a baseline, it was deemed insufficient. Additional material beyond the official accounts and victimisation narratives was required to understand individual journeys from conscription to service in German forces. While some individual records could be found, they were predominantly created by the Nazi administration and therefore lacked a perspective that encompassed personal and individual experiences. Ego-documents served as one such avenue to address this gap.

Our primary objective was therefore to collect personal documents, particularly war letters, diaries and photographs, that could illuminate the experiences of individuals during the war. It should be noted that while individual documents such as letters are preserved in institutions like the National Archives or the Literature Archive in Luxembourg, their quantity is limited, and they primarily represent a select few individuals, such as famous writers and journalists, who have already shared their stories or published memoirs.[9] Our aim was to obtain material that had not made its way into archival collections.

We were aware of the limitations of our research contributions, as the passage of time and other factors have resulted in the loss of many ego-documents. Moreover, due to various constraints, such as the inability to collect material from

---

[9] Many memoirs have been published by individuals who were forcibly conscripted, such as Arthur Philippe, ... *an du goung et no Osten : meng Krichserënnerungen*, ... *an du goung et no Osten meng Krichserënnerungen* (Luxembourg: Saint-Paul, 2005); Norbert Bache, *In Den Fängen Der Wehrmacht. Die Erlebnisse Des Zwangsrekutierten Norbert Bac h* (Luxembourg, 2002).

men who voluntarily joined the German forces, we acknowledge that our dataset may not fully represent a comprehensive range of perspectives.[10]

Given the potential unavailability of direct participants from the conscription cohort, particularly because they have already reached an advanced age or passed away, our research team focused on reaching out to their families, particularly their children and grandchildren. To engage as many families and members of the affected group as possible, the WARLUX team initiated a call for contributions in February 2021. To generate awareness and clarify our objectives, we organised a press conference, accompanied by radio interviews and newspaper articles. The national newspapers *Luxemburger Wort* and *Tageblatt* extensively covered our project and the appeal for ego-documents and photos. Choosing these prominent outlets, along with national radio stations like RTL, allowed us to effectively disseminate information about our research and call for contributions.

Furthermore, we complemented the call for contributions with a targeted poster and flyer campaign (see *Figure 1*). These promotional materials were distributed in various locations frequented by the general public, such as supermarkets, bakeries, butchers and even hair salons, with the intention of reaching not only younger individuals but also the elderly population, who represent the birth cohort. Additionally, we strategically placed our flyers in magazines that cater to senior populations and are popular among residents of retirement homes, where many members of the conscription cohort might reside.

WHY CITIZEN SCIENCE? THE POWER OF CROWDSOURCING

This participatory campaign can be classified as a citizen science project in the discipline of the humanities, within the wider field of history. The "conscription cohort" is mostly no longer with us, and interviews are no longer possible, so as historians we have to find and rely on other sources. The citizen science (CS) approach makes it possible to reach out to the public and ask for personal statements and testimonies – in our case, personal documents and stories from direct relatives, which are "second hand" but still valuable, as we will see in this article.

Those from the conscription cohort are often also known for "keeping quiet" about their war experiences. Because of the trauma and pain they suffered, or out

---

[10] There are no exact figures available regarding volunteers, but a publication from the former Research Centre on Forced Recruitment indicates a number of 1,500 for volunteers in the SA, SS, *Wehrmacht* and *Waffen-SS*. André Hohengarten, *Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation.*, ed. Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, vol. 1, Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers du CDREF (Luxembourg: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 2010), 12.

of shame and remorse,[11] children and grandchildren often know nothing of their relatives' wartime history, but they are interested in learning about it. As members of the conscription cohort neared the end of their lives, some came forward and spoke about the war; in other cases, after the death of parents or grandparents, younger family members found diaries and letters in their belongings and started to research the lives of their deceased relatives. The CS project brought together the interests of historians who wanted to gather more information about the conscription cohort, and family members who were in possession of relevant documents and were interested in finding out more about their relatives' lives and experiences.

The creation of data collections is essential for historical research. As well as consulting existing records in state archives and libraries, discovering and compiling documentation about personal views is always a challenge. Building a collection up close and "live" during a research project is a unique and valuable experience for both researchers and participants. Starting to document a sensitive historical topic like the Second World War is especially challenging, but it proved enriching. Studying and collecting personal experiences and individual stories requires a sufficient quantity of data and documents, and this was the goal of creating a collection of ego-documents.

As Bonney et al. suggest,[12] CS projects can differ in the type of citizen involvement they require. The authors distinguish between three types of project: contributive, collaborative and co-created. The WARLUX project falls under the contributive category, but it also touches on the collaborative, as I will show later in this article. Another term that is widely used when describing CS methods is "crowdsourcing". Crowdsourcing as a part of CS aims to use data collection and complementary research to find objects, documents and information that fill gaps in collections, such as those held by cultural heritage institutions, as Aroyo describes.[13] The assumption here is that there is a need for CS to collect and obtain

---

[11] Renée Wagener, "Familial Discussions in the Context of Memory Research on the Second World War: Expectations and Disappointments", *Peripheral Memories*, 2014, https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839421161.69. Other studies, like Welzer, show how the wartime past was dealt with in the family memory; see Harald Welzer and Sabine Moller, *"Opa War Kein Nazi". Nationalsozialismus Und Holocaust Im Familiengedächtnis*, vol. 15515 (Frankfurt a.M., 2002). For more about dealing with parents' past as revealed in letters about WWII: Larson, R B. Secrets and Rivals: Wartime Letters and the Parents I Never Knew. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press, 2015.

[12] Bonney, Rick et al., "Public Participation in Scientific Research: Defining the Field and Assessing Its Potential for Informal Science Education. A CAISE Inquiry Group Report". (Washington, D.C., 2009), 11, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED519688.pdf.

[13] Johan Oomen and Lora Aroyo, "Crowdsourcing in the Cultural Heritage Domain: Opportunities and Challenges", *C&T '11: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Communities and Technologies*, June 2011, 143, https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1145/2103354.2103373.

material – in our case private material – which is not represented in official archives and museums. It is here that citizens, our participants, come in.

As many authors have stated, the definitions in this field are many and varied – as Garcia et al. show.[14] But I would categorise the WARLUX project as a crowdsourcing project within the broader realm of CS. Many authors point out that CS is mostly used in the natural sciences,[15] but the humanities and the field of history have delivered several remarkable projects and ideas in terms of engagement with the public.[16] After all, the basic idea of crowdsourcing is to engage with the public and promote a project;[17] it is undeniably a form of social engagement. According to Holley, crowdsourcing "uses social engagement techniques to help a group of people achieve a shared, usually significant goal by working collaboratively together as a group".[18]

The researchers aimed to compile detailed records about individuals which had not yet been collected or published. Time was, however, of the essence, since the children of World War II soldiers are an invaluable source for detailed information – such as nicknames, eccentricities of personality or quirky facts –, whereas grandchildren tend to have less detailed knowledge of their forebears. Only in rare cases is the conscription cohort still alive, but their children and nieces and nephews might well be, and they may therefore be able to share details and offer essential hints for further research. Engagement and participation were the main concepts in this process.

Collecting and crowdsourcing historical information such as documents and objects "gives researchers access to privileged information or new primary sources".[19] As Ridge et al. write, crowdsourcing is not just about data; it is also about

---

[14] Francisco Sanz García et al., "Finding What You Need: A Guide to Citizen Science Guidelines", in *The Science of Citizen Science*, ed. Katrin Vohland et al. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 15, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_21.

[15] Milena Dobreva and Azzopardi, Daniela, "Citizen Science in the Humanities: A Promise for Creativity", *Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Knowledge, Information and Creativity Support Systems, Limassol, Cyprus, November 6-8, 2014*, 2014, 448.

[16] For an overview and report on the impact of crowdsourcing projects, see Mark Hedges and Stuart E. Dunn, "Crowd-Sourcing Scoping Study: Engaging the Crowd with Humanities Research", 2012, 54, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Crowd-Sourcing-Scoping-Study%3A-Engaging-the-Crowd-Hedges-Dunn/9940b0520332a6b0605559fd7c8c46672b3fb655.

[17] Anna Maria Tammaro et al., "Data Curator's Roles and Responsibilities: An International Perspective", *Libri* 69, no. 2 (2019): 89–104, https://doi.org/10.1515/libri-2018-0090.

[18] Rose Holley, "Crowdsourcing: How and Why Should Libraries Do It?", *D-Lib Magazine* 16, no. 3–4 (2010): 16–17, https://doi.org/10.1045/march2010-holley.

[19] Loreta Tauginienė et al., "Citizen Science in the Social Sciences and Humanities: The Power of Interdisciplinarity", *Palgrave Communications* 6, no. 1 (7 May 2020): 6, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0471-y.

interaction with participants.[20] Approaches like that adopted by WARLUX provide possibilities of gauging perceptions among the population in ways other than merely consulting official collections in archives and memory institutions.[21] The creation of a collection with the public is an active way of preserving sources that are otherwise not accessible via official institutions; it represents a unique approach in contemporary Luxembourg.

THE COLLECTION PROCEDURE

The process of collecting and preserving war experiences in connection with the WARLUX project was driven by research objectives. Conducting research on the cohort comprising eligible men and women for military and labour service is not without challenges. The complexities arise from the fact that these individuals wore German uniforms during the occupation of Luxembourg, worked in munitions factories, or fought alongside the *Wehrmacht* against the Allied forces. But societal and political shifts across generations, coupled with the inquisitiveness of younger historians, have paved the way for the emergence of a project like WARLUX. This has created an opportunity for more unhindered and open contributions and sharing, enabling the analysis and exploration of entirely novel questions.

The involvement of the public, specifically the direct relatives of the affected group and their descendants, presented a unique opportunity for them as active participants. It granted them a "symbolic and emotional link with heritage as well as empowerment or socialization of heritage, including identity formation and community building", as articulated by Tauginienė.[22]

Upon the publication of the call for contributions in February 2021, our team witnessed an immediate surge in interest. Operating with a team of three members, we diligently attended to the influx of telephone calls and incoming emails. The volume of over 200 enquiries overwhelmed us, necessitating a systematic approach. Each incoming call and message was duly recorded, and subsequent follow-up conversations were conducted to engage contributors in detailed discussions regarding their potential contributions. However, it is noteworthy that approximately one-third of the calls did not align with our research objectives, primarily for three reasons. Firstly, some individuals merely sought to share personal stories and seek information about their families during the war,

---

[20] Mia Ridge et al., "5. Designing Cultural Heritage Crowdsourcing Projects", *The Collective Wisdom Handbook: Perspectives on Crowdsourcing in Cultural Heritage – Community Review Version. 1st Ed*, 2021, https://doi.org/10.21428/a5d7554f.1b80974b.

[21] "Crowdsourcing. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen Für Den Einsatz in Archiven. 'DFG-Projekt Digitalisierung Und Entwicklung Neuer Nutzungsmöglichkeiten von Archivalischen Fotobeständen'" (Stuttgart: LANDESARCHIV BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG, 2016), 15.

[22] Tauginienė et al., "Citizen Science in the Social Sciences and Humanities: The Power of Interdisciplinarity", 7.

encompassing diverse categories of wartime experiences, such as imprisonment or deportation, without having any documents to share. Secondly, certain enquiries pertained to different documents, including memoirs of political prisoners, accounts of resistance activities, or narratives focusing on civilians and their encounters during bombing raids. In such cases, we advised these individuals to share their documents with their local archives or with the National Archives, as they could be of interest and suitable for long-term preservation. Lastly, some contacts only offered photographs or official documents, without providing any personal insights or experiences.

During the initial phase of the collection process, we accepted all contributions, even those consisting solely of official documents such as *Soldbücher* (a form of Wehrmacht identification document) and photo albums. However, as the research progressed, we made the decision to decline such submissions as they lacked personal experiential expressions, which are essential for our research objectives. From a research perspective, the value of a single diary surpasses that of an entire series of official documents. Furthermore, other aspects such as conscription, deployments and missions within the *Wehrmacht* can be discerned through existing official documents already housed in state archives.

Document submissions were received through various means. In certain cases, contributors delivered digital scans of the documents directly to the university. Our research team also visited families in their homes, collecting physical documents for subsequent digitisation on campus. Once the digitisation process was completed, the documents were promptly returned to their respective owners.

The majority of documents received by the **WARLUX** team predominantly pertained to male conscripts (164 in number) and soldiers in the Wehrmacht, with only 28 contributions from women. This disparity can be attributed to the fact that a significant portion of those affected by conscription were young men. Specifically, there were 10,211 male conscripts from Luxembourg, while 3,600 women were summoned for compulsory service in the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* camps and *Kriegshilfsdienst*.[23] Consequently, male Luxembourgers served for extended periods, up to four years or more, resulting in a higher number of documents related to their wartime experiences, such as letters.

In order to address this gap, it would be a good idea to consider a second call for contributions in the future, with a specific focus on capturing "female voices".

In total, our efforts yielded 160 distinct collections, creating a substantial corpus of over 5,000 letters and 20 diaries. The content of these collections varied significantly, ranging from a few postcards in some instances to extensive compilations exceeding 500 letters from multiple family members in others. As our research predominantly centred around the conscription cohort, we did not

[23] Andre Hohengarten, "Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht", *Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF* 1 (2010): 13.

systematically record personal details such as the age and profession of the contributors. However, throughout our discussions with these individuals, we diligently noted their relationship to the "protagonists" of the war and their family background.

Copyright and data protection

Each contributor was required to sign an agreement regarding the use of the material for the research project, as well as for any potential future projects at the university. We made a commitment to handle the documents with utmost care and to uphold the privacy of the contributors. In certain cases, we agreed to use the data anonymously or refrain from publishing photographs. The majority of families exhibited a considerable degree of trust in handing over their data to the university. However, some families were more cautious as they felt there may be a risk of the collections containing sensitive material concerning their own families or others. In a small country like Luxembourg, where interpersonal connections are widespread, there was a genuine concern that the research findings could expose compromising information. This apprehension to some extent hindered the progress of the research. This information was documented in the consent form, and the data was handled in accordance with the participants' wishes. In the event of publication, the names have been or will be pseudonymised.

Nevertheless, the families who contacted us expressed a strong desire to share their materials in any capacity and willingly signed the data protection agreements.

Document transfer and selection

In some cases the contributors submitted the documents as digital scans sent directly to the university via email or flash drives, and in others the research team visited the families at their homes and collected the documents for digitisation on campus. Once the digitisation process had been completed, the original documents were returned to the families, and the university did not retain any originals.

During the home visits, we collected war-related letters, including both incoming and outgoing correspondence from the war front. While the correspondence mostly ceased after the soldiers returned home, certain documents such as pre-war letters and diaries were included to provide a more comprehensive understanding of specific stories. Additionally, some collections included "official" documents from the Nazi administration, educational certificates, draft orders, court files, and records related to labour or military service.

Group photographs were generally excluded from the selection process, for several reasons. Firstly, these documents were often contributed by individuals who were not able to provide the names of everyone in the photograph. Secondly, identifying specific individuals depicted in the photographs posed challenges.

Thirdly, obtaining copyright permissions or agreements from each individual, even if presumed deceased, presented difficulties. Our research group was of the view that photos alone did not necessarily convey personal experiences, with the exception of group "activities" such as social gatherings, recreational events and depictions of life on the front line. In the case of photo albums, we did not remove any photographs; instead, we marked the relevant ones to be scanned on campus.

The detailed protocol, including the handling and selection of documents, was meticulously recorded in an Excel spreadsheet and reinforced through the consent agreement. Furthermore, for each collection, detailed notes were provided, indicating the potential existence of additional documents within the family that fell outside the scope of our research, for instance documents from younger family members born after 1927.

THE CONTRIBUTIVE AND COLLABORATIVE ASPECTS

In accordance with Bonney et al., the WARLUX project primarily aligns with the research-driven intent of the Contributory Model. This model, as suggested by Bonney, involves researchers designing a project in which members of the public contribute data – in our case, the material related to the project. Additionally, our project also incorporates elements of the Collaborative Model, although to a lesser extent than the Contributory Model. According to Bonney et al., the Collaborative Model is designed for researchers to work alongside the public in refining project design, analysing data and gaining a deeper understanding of the subject matter.

The first pillar of our project encompasses the collection of data through our call for contributions. This step involved obtaining the necessary material and data for our research. However, it is important to highlight the significance of the interaction with participants, particularly the families who contributed to the project.

In essence, the core of our approach is rooted in the Contributory Model, which relied heavily on engagement and interaction with the families involved in the project.

Interactions with families or the contributory aspect

Interactions with families played a crucial role in our collection process. By establishing personal relationships and allocating sufficient time for visits, we were able to build trust and receive additional information about the material provided. Unsurprisingly, the majority of responses to our call came not from the conscription cohort themselves, but from their children born after 1945. As these family members emptied the houses of elderly parents, either after their death or when they moved to a care facility, they discovered war letters and diaries. This generation, including the children and grandchildren of those directly affected by

conscription, represents one of the last connections to the individuals involved. They possess invaluable knowledge about them and can provide crucial information that is not documented in files or audio recordings. These insights encompass emotions, quirky family stories, love, hate and everything in between.

While these family memories are considered "second-hand" accounts, they nevertheless offer vital supplementary information. Discrepancies naturally arise when comparing the information obtained from families with military archival records. In some cases, the archives provide only factual details such as enlistment dates and unit assignments, leaving gaps that can be filled by ego-documents or discussions with families. However, throughout the collection process, we grappled with the question of how reliable we could consider these sources of information to be.

We remained mindful of the inherent challenges associated with using personal recollections as historical sources. Memories, and even the act of passing down memories, are inherently fallible. They are subject to biases, forgetting and reconstruction over time. The passage of time, individual perspectives and external influences can all contribute to potential inaccuracies or gaps in the information provided. We also encountered instances where families shared "myths" that had been passed down through generations. As historians, we acknowledge that exceptions and discrepancies can arise, and the information and accounts provided by families may not always align with historical facts.

During one visit to see a contributing family, we encountered a recurring narrative about the father's forced conscription. According to his daughter, the father "had" to join the *Wehrmacht* and confidently mentioned a date for his departure to the front, which clearly preceded the conscription order issued by the Nazis in August 1942. Upon further enquiry about the date, the daughter confidently confirmed it. This suggests that her father may have volunteered for service rather than being conscripted like others. However, when we shared this information during our conversation with the family, they strongly asserted that he "had to go" and was indeed forced into service. This case highlights the need for further research and investigation. It demonstrates that family memories and historical facts can sometimes collide or contradict each other.

However, as Tanya Evans highlights, family memories are not solely individual recollections; they are shaped through collective construction.[24] In the context of conscription into the Nazi forces, it is widely accepted that fathers were often coerced into service. However, a more in-depth enquiry is necessary to fully grasp the nuances of their conscription, including the extent to which it was voluntary or forced. It is also essential to consider the information shared by the conscription cohort with their family members upon their return. Through our conversations

---

[24] Tanya Evans, "How Do Family Historians Work with Memory?", *Journal of Family History* 46, no. 1 (January 2021): 101, https://doi.org/10.1177/0363199020967384.

with families, we gained valuable insights into the dynamics of intergenerational communication and the transmission of memories, as they shared their perspectives on what their parents revealed or withheld about their wartime experiences.[25]

Despite these challenges, family memories serve to connect existing historical knowledge about the conscription cohort to individual experiences.[26] Therefore, it was crucial for us to corroborate and cross-reference these second-hand personal accounts with other available sources to establish a more comprehensive and reliable understanding of the historical context. By doing so, we were able to "humanize" history, as proposed by Evans.[27]

The way in which documents are preserved can offer valuable insights into the past, reflecting a diversity of archival practices. Practices ranged from meticulously organising documents and storing them chronologically to more haphazard methods involving envelopes, boxes and suitcases (*see Figure 2*). Such variations in archival practices provide glimpses into how families valued these materials and their historical significance.

During our interactions, we asked participants various questions covering a range of topics. We explored their relationship with the main protagonist, whether they returned, and the circumstances surrounding their return. We enquired about their conscription experience, their life before the war and conscription, their attitudes towards the Germans, the dynamics within their family, and whether other family members were affected by occupation, repression or resistance. We also tried to get a sense of their immediate reactions upon learning about their conscription and investigated the actions they took in response to this news.

Through conversations with contributors, we obtained valuable information about the individuals' backgrounds, their families and some of their correspondence partners. Many letters were addressed to parents and siblings, while others were written to individuals using nicknames such as "Jempi" or "Jängi", making identification challenging. Some contributors helped us identify these individuals or provided their names. However, in many cases, identifying a "Jempi" proved difficult because of the nickname's commonality – it was one of the most popular boys' names in Luxembourg during the 1920s. Nonetheless, some letters included envelopes, which aided in tracing the senders' identities through their last names and status. Many letters were also exchanged among soldiers at the front lines or in training camps.

In one case, limitations in military records led researchers to engage directly with the family. This case involves Ernest Classen, who was serving in the anti-aircraft

---

[25] Wagener, "Familial Discussions in the Context of Memory Research on the Second World War: Expectations and Disappointments", 82. Aleida Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, Lizenzausg (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2007), 98.

[26] Evans, 'How Do Family Historians Work with Memory?', 93.

[27] Evans, 95.

defence (*Flak*) in Luxembourg during the closing stages of the war in late summer 1944. While we have archival records and his correspondence with family documenting his time in the air defence of the *Wehrmacht*, there is a notable absence of details regarding the final phase of his service. The German forces retreated to Germany, leaving Luxembourgers behind. Ernest Classen survived the war and returned home, but the circumstances surrounding his repatriation remain unknown. To address this gap in knowledge, the author diligently engaged with his family. Classen's sister and son clarified that Ernest did not simply return home but went into hiding due to his continued wearing of the German uniform. Given the presence of German soldiers evading capture by US forces in Luxembourg, Ernest risked being mistaken for a German combatant. Unfortunately, this aspect of his homecoming lacks documentary evidence, but the family's testimonial provided crucial insight. This disclosure is of paramount importance: Ernest Classen's service in Luxembourg's anti-aircraft defence, despite limited combat exposure compared to his compatriots on the Eastern Front, takes on greater significance. The revelation enhances our understanding of his personal journey, offering a more nuanced portrayal of his wartime experiences and shedding light on his antipathy towards military duty when he was subsequently conscripted by the Luxembourg army in 1945.[28] We can offer numerous additional examples of the family supplying us with supplementary information and guiding us towards further research avenues. Although our interactions were not conducted following an oral history-based methodology, as our focus was on the protagonists rather than the family narrative, they were instrumental in capturing the personal side of the individuals central to our research.

Although digitised scans were appreciated, personal relationships and direct engagement with families provided us with a better understanding. Despite thorough review, unknown material was still discovered in letters. While variations existed in background stories, the quality of the contributions remained consistent.

The collaborative aspect

The interaction between families and us as historians yielded "synergetic effects of increased knowledge", as Ina-Maria Jansson aptly describes the results of participatory projects.[29]

However, it is important to explore the motivations behind people's participation and how their engagement influenced the existing narrative. In general, we observed a genuine desire among the families to share information and contribute to the research. Some families sought additional information or advice on how to conduct

---

[28] See Collection Classen/Everard, WARUX Collection, University of Luxembourg.

[29] Ina-Maria Jansson, "Creating Value of the Past through Negotiations in the Present: Balancing Professional Authority with Influence of Participants", *Archival Science* 20, no. 4 (December 2020): 327, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10502-020-09339-8.

their own searches or find assistance with transcriptions. Knowing that the project was being carried out at the University of Luxembourg, which enjoys wide recognition and holds an important position in the country, provided reassurance to most families.

For many families, submitting documents and arranging appointments with us was not burdensome. The contributors displayed a sincere interest in our work, and we often spent extended periods of three to four hours at their homes. There was no expectation of financial reward; rather, they expressed gratitude for the attention we paid to them and for listening to their families' stories. Following Jansson's suggestion to give participants opportunities to exert influence,[30] we granted them creative freedom to present the documents and stories they wanted to highlight. We approached the families impartially, requesting only personal documents belonging to conscripts without formulating specific questions beforehand. Our enquiries aimed to be objective, focusing solely on conscripts' experiences and family backgrounds. However, it is possible that the families may have been influenced, either by a national narrative that encouraged them to present only "positive and harmless" stories or by a desire to selectively share the favourable and untroubled parts of their history, such as mentioning a family member's involvement in resistance activities.

Initially, there was a desire among family members to share their stories, and the presence of "experts from the university" made the significance of their narratives more apparent and important. We actively listened to their accounts, which in turn provided a sense of recognition and validation for the role their parents played during the war. The researchers were warmly welcomed, and people expressed gratitude that their fathers, brothers, mothers and sisters were finally receiving acknowledgement and being treated with genuine interest. Some family members proudly emphasised their relatives' resistance efforts, even in the face of challenging circumstances during the occupation. They shared tangible evidence of recognition, such as medals or certificates awarded by the post-war Luxembourg government for their acts of resistance. However, the majority of family members questioned why we were interested in their seemingly ordinary stories. They viewed their family members as "just" workers, maids or individuals without any exceptional qualities. We reassured them that even these seemingly average experiences were precisely what we were seeking to understand and highlight.

Additionally, there was a strong desire among the families to obtain more information about their parents' experiences, as their fathers or mothers often spoke very little about their time during the war, like many from the war generation.[31] The silence surrounding war memories and trauma, as illustrated by Wagener's

---

[30] Jansson, 333.

[31] As studies like Welzer show, see Welzer and Moller, *'Opa War Kein Nazi'. Nationalsozialismus Und Holocaust Im Familiengedächtnis.*

research, was widespread in Luxembourg as well.[32] Many children knew that their parents were forced to serve in the German army or labour service but lacked details about their whereabouts, survival and experiences. As they prepared the documents for our team, many respondents read them for the first time, gaining a new perspective on their parents. This became a therapeutic journey for the contributors, allowing them to delve more deeply into their family history. Additionally, contributors sought advice and information from us, such as military service details, to provide historical context or learn more about burials and grave locations. We assisted them in locating certain places at the former Eastern Front, where their father was deployed or where a relative died. We directed them to databases and online resources for further information or recommended other sources for their research.

It is not surprising that the collection lacks a significant number of documents from women, volunteers who fought for the Germans, and individuals with complex family backgrounds. The contributors who contacted our research team and provided personal documents believed that their family's involvement in the war was largely innocuous and unrelated to their broader family history.

We expressed our gratitude to all the contributors and extended an invitation to our final project event in February 2023, where we would present the preliminary findings derived from the case study of the municipality of Schifflange. Recognising the limitations of time and scope, we carefully selected specific examples of contributions to showcase during the event, acknowledging that it would be impractical to discuss every individual and family in detail. In a relaxed atmosphere, accompanied by Luxembourgish sparkling wine and delectable hors d'oeuvres, we had the opportunity to engage in further conversations with the contributors, fostering additional dialogue and exchange of ideas.[33]

THE EVALUATION IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The data and documents collected and the additional information provided by family members needs to be documented and evaluated. In the subsequent analysis, we must take into account biases, especially for data of private origin. War letters, for example, only contain information the sender wants to communicate to the recipient and do not reflect the whole truth of their situation. Here, contextualisation of the data is urgently needed, as are metadata, attribution and

---

[32] Renée Wagener, "Familial Discussions in the Context of Memory Research on the Second World War: Expectations and Disappointments", *Peripheral Memories*, 2014, 82, https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839421161.69.

[33] Report on the event – https://www.c2dh.uni.lu/forum-z/local-history-close

further curation.[34] In addition, of course, reuse of the data – processing and accessibility after the project – must be carried out in full compliance with the GDPR, especially given the sensitivity of the private information in our case.

The input shared by the families has greatly enriched our research. By combining their information with our own investigations and verification of historical facts and documents, we have gained valuable insights. In some cases, their contributions have led us to explore additional sources, such as archives or other documentation. Moreover, we have discovered connections among the individuals involved, such as family or friendship ties, which have provided important context regarding the community and backgrounds of these individuals.

Engaging with the families has revealed a remarkable depth of personal relationships that extends beyond the data collection phase. Even after the initial collection, the author and other researchers have maintained ongoing contact with the contributors to seek additional information. This continued engagement has proven invaluable in acquiring a deeper understanding of post-war struggles, encompassing challenges such as alcoholism and trauma. While our project was not originally conceived as an oral history endeavour, the profound nature of these personal connections and experiences has surpassed our initial expectations. As historians, we bear an ethical responsibility when faced with discrepancies between a family's understanding of their ancestors' service and historical facts. It is crucial to correct factual inaccuracies while respecting the perspectives held by the family members. The situation becomes more complex when encountering evidence of an individual's involvement in war crimes, although such instances have not arisen within our project. Our role is not to pass moral judgements but to acknowledge suspicions, interpret information and provide contextualisation through the use of other reliable sources.

Decisions regarding the disclosure of the identity of those who volunteered for military service (as opposed to being conscripted) require careful consideration. Family narratives often present stories that require thorough verification and integration into our analysis. Critical evaluation of sources plays a pivotal role in our scholarly pursuit. It is essential to address any suspicions that an individual may have volunteered and to ensure a nuanced understanding of their role in historical events.

Building trust and respecting privacy are fundamental in our research. We were only able to gather information because of the trust placed in us by the individuals involved. Safeguarding their privacy is of utmost importance. If we decide to disclose names, it will be done in accordance with consent forms or by anonymising/pseudonymising identities. Maintaining this trust is vital, as it directly impacts our collaborative partnerships and our commitment to future projects. We

---

[34] Bálint Balázs et al., "Data Quality in Citizen Science", in *The Science of Citizen Science*, ed. Katrin Vohland et al. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 144, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_8.

are also exploring the possibility of a crowdsourcing initiative, contingent on funding, to transcribe the collected letters, further promoting accessibility and engagement.

As academic historians, we uphold the value of critical engagement. This entails conducting meticulous examinations of family narratives and being willing to publish potentially unsettling facts. We strive to maintain scholarly rigour and integrity throughout our research process.

It is important to acknowledge that we did not manage to obtain a representative data set, as some material from volunteers is missing. Considerations regarding inventory management and the manner in which the collection will be made accessible are crucial. Any additional information provided by the families, such as notes and short interviews, is stored in digital collection folders. However, the personal relationships and interpersonal dynamics that were established during the project are not captured in the documentation, and this aspect will fade away over time.

Despite the conclusion of the research project, our work with the collected materials continues to evolve. Three collections which played a central role in our research have provided invaluable insights into the experiences of Luxembourgish conscripts in the *Wehrmacht* and the broader wartime context. Additionally, we have implemented a relational database to store the collected data, serving as a valuable tool for organising and managing the information gathered throughout the project. These collections have not only facilitated our own analysis but also formed the basis for various educational activities. Our team has incorporated them into courses that focus on working with primary sources and digital history, including the use of automated transcription tools like Transkribus for handwritten text recognition (HTR).

Moreover, we have made the letters and documents available to university students, enabling them to embark on independent research endeavours and enhance their academic pursuits. By using these materials in their own theses and projects, students have gained a deeper understanding of the historical period and contributed to the growing body of knowledge.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the WARLUX project exemplifies the dynamic nature of citizen science projects and the diverse ways in which citizens can contribute to scientific research. As Bonney et al. suggest, different projects can involve varying levels of citizen involvement, and the WARLUX project demonstrates a combination of contributive and collaborative approaches. Crowdsourcing projects are an essential part of citizen science. This article emphasised the importance of integrating families and the public in the process of collecting historical data. Such interactions

and participation are shaping the existing historiography, and analysis of this material by historians contributes to a fresh, bottom-up understanding of the war and its innumerable narratives. The interaction between researchers and contributors – the families we were in contact with – was beneficial for both parties: it gave the families a voice, not to mention a platform to share information, while the researchers were provided with fascinating and important details about individuals and their personal histories.

In summary, our project has not only deepened our understanding of the everyday realities of individuals during the war but also fostered a renewed appreciation for the significance of their experiences. We have empowered families to engage with their own history, supported scholarly research, and amplified the voices of those whose stories have long been overshadowed. By expanding the narrative to encompass diverse perspectives, we have enriched our collective understanding of the past and paved the way for a more nuanced and inclusive interpretation of history.

Throughout the process, our engagement with the public revealed the complex relationship we had with the participants and contributors. We recognised our ethical responsibilities in handling and revealing family histories, understanding the sensitivity and potential impact of the information we collected. Our approach was guided by the principles of honesty and trustworthiness, ensuring that we obtained information without passing judgement or imposing moral interpretations.

Creating an environment that fostered openness and active listening was crucial in establishing a foundation of mutual understanding with the participants. As representatives of the university, our expertise and credibility played a significant role in building trust and facilitating meaningful interactions. We made it clear that our goal was to gather information in an unbiased manner, respecting the narratives and experiences shared by the families.

Consent forms played a vital role in ensuring transparency and clarifying the purpose and usage of the collected information. We were diligent in clearly communicating what would be recorded and how it would be used, providing participants with the opportunity to make informed decisions about their involvement. Respecting the legitimacy of the data was paramount, and we emphasised the importance of maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the families involved.

While our ultimate goal was to make the collected information accessible for educational and research purposes, we understood the need to balance accessibility with the privacy rights of the participants. Restrictions on access were carefully considered and aligned with the consent forms, ensuring that the data was used responsibly and in accordance with the terms that had been agreed. It was crucial to convey this intention clearly from the outset, demonstrating our commitment to the responsible use of the collected information.

While the primary focus of our team was on documenting the experiences of conscripts who lived through the war, there are potential avenues for further research that deserve attention. One such area is the examination of how contributors discuss their family members' wartime experiences, as these narratives offer valuable insights into family dynamics and the lasting impact on the affected community. Although the second generation was not our main target, their perspectives could have added another dimension to the project. For instance, recording conversations with family members and analysing them using oral history methods could have provided valuable insights. Unfortunately, owing to various constraints, including limited time and resources, we were unable to pursue this avenue fully.

In conclusion, while there are areas that could have been further explored and limitations that must be acknowledged, the **WARLUX** project has made significant contributions to understanding the experiences of individuals and families during the war. The collection we have amassed, although not complete, provides valuable insights into personal narratives and historical legacies. Moving forward, it is essential to continue finding ways to preserve and analyse these materials, ensuring their accessibility for future research and fostering a deeper understanding of this pivotal period in history.

GRANT INFORMATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Assmann, Aleida. Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik. Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Lizenzausg. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2007.

Bache, Norbert. In Den Fängen Der Wehrmacht. Die Erlebnisse Des Zwangsrekutierten Norbert Bac h. Luxembourg, 2002.

Balázs, Bálint, Peter Mooney, Eva Nováková, Lucy Bastin, and Jamal Jokar Arsanjani. 'Data Quality in Citizen Science'. In The Science of Citizen Science, edited by Katrin Vohland, Anne Land-Zandstra, Luigi Ceccaroni, Rob Lemmens, Josep Perelló, Marisa Ponti, Roeland Samson, and Katherin Wagenknecht, 139–57. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_8.

Bonney, Rick, Ballard, H., Jordan, R., E. McCallie, and T. Phillips. 'Public Participation in Scientific Research: Defining the Field and Assessing Its Potential for Informal Science Education. A CAISE Inquiry Group Report.' Washington, D.C., 2009. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED519688.pdf.

'Crowdsourcing. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen Für Den Einsatz in Archiven. DFG-Projekt „Digitalisierung Und Entwicklung Neuer Nutzungsmöglichkeiten von Archivalischen Fotobeständen"'. Stuttgart: LANDESARCHIV BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG, 2016.

Dobreva, Milena and Azzopardi, Daniela. 'Citizen Science in the Humanities: A Promise for Creativity'. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Knowledge, Information and Creativity Support Systems, Limassol, Cyprus, November 6-8, 2014, 2014, 446–51.

Dostert, Paul. Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe : Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Volksdeutsche Bewegung 1940-1945. Luxemburg: Imprimerie Saint-Paul, 1985.

Evans, Tanya. 'How Do Family Historians Work with Memory?' Journal of Family History 46, no. 1 (January 2021): 92–106. https://doi.org/10.1177/0363199020967384.

García, Francisco Sanz, Maite Pelacho, Tim Woods, Dilek Fraisl, Linda See, Mordechai (Muki) Haklay, and Rosa Arias. 'Finding What You Need: A Guide to Citizen Science Guidelines'. In The Science of Citizen Science, edited by Katrin Vohland, Anne Land-Zandstra, Luigi Ceccaroni, Rob Lemmens, Josep Perelló, Marisa Ponti, Roeland Samson, and Katherin Wagenknecht, 419–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_21.

Haase, Norbert. 'Von "Ons Jongen" und "Malgré-nous" und anderen. Das Schicksal der ausländischen Zwangsrekrutierten im Zweiten Weltkrieg'. In Die anderen Soldaten : Wehrkraftzersetzung, Gehorsamsverweigerung und Fahnenflucht im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 157–73. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1997.

Hedges, Mark, and Stuart E. Dunn. 'Crowd-Sourcing Scoping Study: Engaging the Crowd with Humanities Research', 2012. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Crowd-Sourcing-Scoping-Study%3A-Engaging-the-Crowd-Hedges-Dunn/9940b0520332a6b0605559fd7c8c46672b3fb655.

Hoffmann, Armand. '75 Jahre Danach / Gedenken an Die 91 Erschossenen Luxemburger'. Escher Tageblatt, 31 January 2020. https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/gedenken-an-die-91-erschossenen-luxemburger/.

Hohengarten, André. Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation. Edited by Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé. Vol. 1. Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF. Luxembourg: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 2010.

Holley, Rose. 'Crowdsourcing: How and Why Should Libraries Do It?' D-Lib Magazine 16, no. 3–4 (2010): 16–17. https://doi.org/10.1045/march2010-holley.

Jansson, Ina-Maria. 'Creating Value of the Past through Negotiations in the Present: Balancing Professional Authority with Influence of Participants'. Archival Science 20, no. 4 (December 2020): 327–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10502-020-09339-8.

Kayser, Steve. 'Vorwort'. In Die Zwangsrekrutierung Der Luxemburger in Die Deutsche Wehrmacht. Eine Dokumentation., edited by Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 1:7. Histoire & Mémoire. Les Cahiers Du CDREF. Luxembourg: Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur l'Enrôlement forcé, 2010.

Oomen, Johan, and Lora Aroyo. 'Crowdsourcing in the Cultural Heritage Domain: Opportunities and Challenges'. C&T '11: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Communities and Technologies, June 2011, 138–49. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1145/2103354.2103373.

Philippe, Arthur. ... ... an du goung et no Osten : meng Krichserënnerungen. ... ... an du goung et no Osten meng Krichserënnerungen. Luxembourg: Saint-Paul, 2005.

Quadflieg, Peter M. 'Zwangssoldaten' Und 'Ons Jongen'. Eupen-Malmedy Und Luxemburg Als Rekrutierungsgebiet Der Deutschen Wehrmacht Im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 2008.

Ridge, Mia, Samantha Blickhan, Meghan Ferriter, Austin Mast, Ben Brum, Brendon Wilkins, Daria Cybulska, et al. '5 . Designing Cultural Heritage Crowdsourcing Projects', 2021.

Tammaro, Anna Maria, Krystyna K. Matusiak, Frank Andreas Sposito, and Vittore Casarosa. 'Data Curator's Roles and Responsibilities: An International Perspective'. Libri 69, no. 2 (2019): 89–104. https://doi.org/10.1515/libri-2018-0090.

Tauginienė, Loreta, Eglė Butkevičienė, Katrin Vohland, Barbara Heinisch, Maria Daskolia, Monika Suškevičs, Manuel Portela, Bálint Balázs, and Baiba Prūse. 'Citizen Science in the Social Sciences and Humanities: The Power of Interdisciplinarity'. Palgrave Communications 6, no. 1 (7 May 2020): 89. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0471-y.

Wagener, Renée. 'Familial Discussions in the Context of Memory Research on the Second World War Expectations and Disappointments'. Peripheral Memories, 2014. https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839421161.69.

Welzer, Harald, and Sabine Moller. 'Opa War Kein Nazi'. Nationalsozialismus Und Holocaust Im Familiengedächtnis. Frankfurt a.M., 2002.

FIGURES


Figure 1: Flyer for the call for contributions

Figure 2 (photo by Noëlle Schon, C²DH – University of Luxembourg Ego-Doc Collection, Collection Hirt)

CITIZEN SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC DELIBERATION OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT POLICIES

BAPTISTE BEDESSEM
Institut national de recherche pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (INRAE), Laboratoire interdisciplinaire Sciences, Innovations, Sociétés (LISIS),
baptiste.bedessem@inrae.fr *(corresponding author)*

ANNE SOURDRIL
Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS),
Laboratoire Dynamiques sociales et recomposition des espaces (LADYSS)

VALENTIN BAUMSTARK
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN),
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

LUCIE DOS SANTOS
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN),
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

EMMANUELLE GONZALEZ
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN),
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

CELINE PELLETIER
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN),
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

QUENTIN STEINMAN
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN)
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

LAURA VERLHAC
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN)
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

ROMAIN JULLIARD
Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (MNHN),
Centre d'Écologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO)

ABSTRACT

Broadening citizen participation in scientific knowledge production has become a priority of national and supra-national institutions and research agencies. Out of their interest for scientific research and public learning, citizen science projects are often presented as offering a unique opportunity to involve more directly the public in policy-making. However, despite twenty years of flourishment of participative scientific research, making citizen science a tool to foster participatory democracy remains a challenge. Political outputs of citizen science are indeed often restricted to its role in the production of data to inform policy making processes. In this paper, we propose an innovative theoretical model of democratization through citizen science, in which participative data collection is associated with public online deliberation. Drawing both on online political deliberation research and citizen science literature, we argue that citizens' engagement in contributory science could help create the conditions of good-quality public deliberations. We then present a technical device (an online platform) that put this model into practice in the context of the regulation of public lighting in two French municipalities.

KEYWORDS

Public lighting, deliberation, contributory science, participatory democracy, environment

1. INTRODUCTION

Associating citizens in the production, the discussion and the public use of scientific knowledge has become a major challenge for European democracies. Indeed, on the one hand, European democracies give a central place to scientific knowledge in social innovation and the design of public policies; on the other hand, they promote an active form of citizenship, which would entail a more direct participation of citizens in political life, notably through public deliberation of policy decisions. Despite a large heterogeneity among European political cultures, this last requirement generally faces concrete difficulties linked to the often documented rise of mistrust or indifference from the populations regarding participatory democracy, in its different forms (Rojon and Pilet, 2021). However, at least in principle, the successful articulation of democratic exigency of participation with the central role of scientific knowledge as a governance tool depends on citizens' ability to form sound opinions on the basis of the best available scientific evidence, and to discuss them in the political arena. As a possible solution to this challenge, broadening direct citizen participation in scientific knowledge production has become a priority of national and supra-national institutions and research agencies (European Commission 2013; European Commission 2016; Office of science and technology policy 2019). In particular, "citizen science", as defined as "the non-professional involvement of volunteers in the scientific process", including "data collection (...), quality assurance, data analysis and interpretation, problem definition and the dissemination of results" is growingly seen as "a unique opportunity (...) to involve the public in EU policy-making" (European Commission 2020, p. 6 and p. 2). Citizen science includes a large diversity of practices (Bedessem and Ruphy 2020; Strasser et al. 2019) in many scientific domains, including astronomy (Kasperowski and Hillman 2018), biology (Kelly and

Maddalena 2015), medicine (Den Broeder et al. 2016), and (above all) in environmental sciences (European Commission, 2013; Dillon 2017; Turrini et al. 2018). Besides, participation of citizens in scientific inquiries currently takes a variety of forms (see Schrögel and Kolleck [2019] for a review of the typologies currently available). A classical classification of citizen science initiatives has been proposed by Bonney et al. (2009). The authors distinguish *contributory* science (where citizens are passive or active data-collectors supervised by scientists); *collaborative* science (citizens are engaged in other steps of the research process, such as data analysis or interpretation) ; co-created citizen science, or community-based research (the research program is initiated by citizens who aim at solving a problem that they themselves have identified).

Despite these twenty years of flourishment of participative scientific research, making citizen science a tool to foster democracy remains a challenge (Mirowski 2018). In a practical perspective, Schade et al. (2021) note that despite some citizen science projects that have already fed into local policy implementation (see Owen and Parker 2018 for an example), "the benefits of citizen science remain largely theoretical for most policymakers" (p. 362). They conclude that "more real-life examples are needed to build trust among policymakers in the societal return on investment" of citizen science initiatives (p. 362). These real-life initiatives could take a diversity of forms, depending on how one conceives the role of citizen science in governance (Göbel et al. 2019), and on the type of citizen science (e.g contributory, collaborative, co-created) one considers. This paper proposes an original mode of using citizen science (more precisely, contributory science) for participatory democracy through public deliberation. First, we make more precise the general objectives and scope of the study (section 2).   Second, we define and justify this modality of citizen science for governance (section 3). Then, we present a technical device we developed to illustrate how our theoretical model can be translated into practice (section 4). This technical device was developed in collaboration with two French municipalities which are engaged in a process of reduction of public lightning. This technical device was then conceived as a way to engage citizens in this public policy making through a contributory data collection protocol.   This device was then opened for citizens' participation by the municipalities. Unfortunately, the lack of public participation (due to various factors we discuss in section 4) does not allow further empirical analysis based on those cases. In section 5, we discuss the relevance of our approach with regards to its practical application and we propose some paths for future research aiming at testing our theoretical model.

2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY: SCOPE, OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS

Since this study presents very distinct theoretical, technical and empirical dimensions, it is worth clarifying as a first step its scope, objectives and limitations. Our main aim is to propose and argue for a model of citizen science-based deliberative process at the local scale. To do so, we first explain to what extent the use of citizen science for public deliberation would be innovative and promising both from the perspective of citizen science, and from the perspective of participatory democracy (section 3). In this theoretical framing, we use the concept of participatory democracy as an umbrella concept referring to all forms of direct participation of citizens in the elaboration, implementation or evaluation of public policies. As shown for instance by Lezaune et al. (2017), this participation might take a diversity of forms, among which one can find a variety of public deliberation processes. Once we have presented and defended this theoretical model, we show how it can be translated into practice by presenting a technical device (an online platform) which articulates contributory data collection with a deliberative process (section 4). This technical device was designed in the context of two public policy making processes aiming to regulate public lightning in two French municipalities. The opening of the platform for citizens' participation, under the control and the animation of these municipalities, has finally generated a low participation rate on the behalf of the population. This precludes any future empirical analysis of the relevance of our theoretical model on the basis of this case study. However, let us recall here that the objective of this contribution is primarily to present and defend, both as a theoretical model and as a technical device, a citizen science-based deliberative process. It is a programmatic paper: it does not aim at empirically testing the conditions of success of such an approach to public deliberation. Such a test would need developing a diversity of case studies in different contexts. We nevertheless discuss quickly, on the basis of the semi-structured interviews we led, the possible reasons explaining this low participation rate, and we propose (section 5) some paths for future researches which would aim to empirically study our propositions for citizen science-based deliberative processes.

3. CITIZEN SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC DELIBERATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAME

a. In which senses citizen science may constitute a mode of governance?

In their review of how citizen science feeds into public governance, Göbel et al. (2019) distinguish four modes of citizen science engagement with political processes. First, and maybe most commonly, citizen science can consist of a source of information for policy making. By providing governments with scientific data,

citizen science (mostly contributory science) is or could be used for policy preparation, policymaking, policy implementation or evaluation. Local (e.g municipal) governments offer many examples of citizen science feeding into these different steps of the policy circle (Veeckman et al. 2021).

Second, citizen science can be considered as an object of research policy: as a specific but legitimate way of doing science, citizen science is part of "policies for advancing research, technology, and innovation" (Göbel et al., p. 4). This mode points to collaborative or co-created types of citizen science: for instance, stakeholders may engage in scientific knowledge production in order to solve local issues — typically, natural resources management conflicts (Yamamoto 2012, Pettibone et al. 2018) or air quality assessment (Ottinger 2010).

Third, the role of citizen science in governance can also be examined by interrogating the instrumental reasons that have led to its institutional promotion (Göbel et al. 2019, p. 6). A central topic of discussions here highlights the links between the promotion of citizen science and the new forms of neoliberal governmentality (Peters 2009). For instance, citizen science could be seen as cost-effective ways of producing scientific knowledge (Resnik, Elliott, and Miller 2015).

Fourth, citizen science may feed into governance through the design of technologies that have a "direct impact on the way that the world is structured without being reliant on any explicit policy support" (Göbel et al. 2019, p. 7). This form of governance gathers cases where citizen science generates practical approaches (devices, metrics) to tackle social problems (e.g. urban mobility, environmental pollution) rather than merely producing data or recommendations (see Göbel et al. 2019, p. 7-8 for examples).

While providing a convincing overview of the multiple modes of governance through citizen science, Göbel et al.'s typology does not aim to be exhaustive. In this paper, we would like to describe and illustrate a fifth mode of governance through citizen science. By contrast to the previous ones, this last mode is more prospective: this paper presents, to our knowledge, its first conceptualization; and the case studies we detail in section 3 constitute its first applications. In a nutshell, this mode of governance situates citizen science as a tool to engage citizens in public deliberations regarding those kinds of issues characterized by: 1/a need of scientific data to inform policy preparation, policymaking, policy implementation or evaluation; 2/the existence of a strong political conflictuality which makes relevant the building of public deliberative arenas to reach a socially acceptable compromise. Different kinds of situations may correspond to this description, notably in the landscape of local environment policies and resources management: one can think of the management of green areas to benefit human health and well-being (Wood et al. 2018), the adaptation of urban mobility to diminish air pollution (Pisoni et al. 2019), or the regulation of public lighting to preserve biodiversity (Pauwels et al. 2021). The general idea we would like to defend in this paper is that citizens'

engagement in contributory data collection could help participative democracy by *creating the conditions of good-quality public deliberations* regarding these kinds of issues.

b.   *Deliberative quality within online deliberation platforms*

First coined by some constitutionalist scholars and philosophers of law in the first half of the 1980s, the notion of deliberation found its first theoretical formulations in political theory in the second half of the 1980s (Cohen 2005), followed by the first practical and experimental applications in the early 1990s ("deliberative polling", Fishkin 1991), while finding a mature definition in the works of Habermas (1996) and Rawls (1993). From then onwards deliberative democracy has become an umbrella expression for a plurality of approaches (Floridia 2017; Bächtiger et al. 2018), from "citizen representatives" or "mini-publics" (Urbinati and Warren 2008) to deliberative arenas that complement political representation (e.g the "Convention citoyenne sur le climat" which took place in France in 2019-2020 and the UK citizen's climate assembly started in January 2020). Despite this diversity of real-world experiments in deliberative democracy, the individuals' drivers behind such citizens' participation are still poorly known. Second, it is still an issue to identify the practical conditions of good-quality deliberations: that is, deliberations which comply with classical principles drawn from the rich literature on deliberation, such as respect, reciprocity, rationality or constructiveness (Shin and Rask 2021). Within this political deliberation literature, a growing number of works have focused on the specific case of online deliberation platforms. Indeed, the widely discussed crisis of representative democracy (Tormey 2015) has given rise, since the last decades, to many democratic innovations based on ICTs (information and communication technologies). Among them, online deliberative platforms have been developed and deployed in real environments by city, regional, or national governments (Aragón et al. 2017). While sharing the same commitment to allow discussions among contributors, these platforms are very diverse regarding their grounding principles and their technical features. In some of them, participants are required to post comments whether in support or against a proposal made by the authorities; the positive and negative comments are then sorted by the number of received votes (e.g. *Your Priorities*, Iceland, https://www.yrpri.org/domain/3). The *Cónsul* platform (Spain, https://decide.madrid.es/) allows a free discussion on the proposals. In-between approaches have been developed, such as the *Decidim Barcelona* platform (Aragón et al. 2017, https://www.decidim.barcelona/). Online deliberation research is currently studied along a variety of strands, as highlighted in Friess and Eilders (2015)'s review, including considerations on the design of the process or on its political outcomes. The issue of deliberative quality has given rise to a fecund body of works, at the crossroad between political theories of deliberation — whose

objective is to identify criteria to characterize the quality of a deliberation (e.g Giugni and Nai 2013) — and empirical research aiming to develop and apply deliberation quality index (e.g Steenbergen et al. 2003). Two decades of research have provided convincing criteria to characterize good-quality deliberations — such as rationality, interactivity, equality, civility, common good reference and constructiveness (Friess and Eilders 2015) — as well as many different quantitative indexes to concretely evaluate the quality of online deliberations (see Shin and Rask 2021 for a review). Overall, the main objective of these research efforts is to identify the social, political and technical conditions of good-quality online deliberation, in order to improve existing deliberative systems. Obviously, this task constitutes an ongoing process, which is continuously enriched by the analysis of innovative approaches to deliberation. Our proposition of using contributory science as a tool to foster good-quality deliberation aims to contribute directly to this endeavor.

c.   *The democratic promises of citizen science*

Since a decade, a rich literature has emerged which interrogates the epistemic, social and political impacts of citizen science on participants, along various dimensions: science learning (Phillips et al. 2018, Aristeidou and Herodotou 2020); changes in attitudes towards science (e.g. trust, Vitone et al. 2016); changes in individuals' interests and attitudes towards specific topics, notably biodiversity and the environment (Peter et al. 2019); empowerment of groups of citizens which may play, through citizen science, a role in decision making by supporting social movements (see Ottinger 2010; Landström 2020 for examples). This last dimension interrogates directly the democratic potential of citizen science, which is commonly presented as a tool to foster citizens' participation in democratic decisions (Turrini et al. 2018). However, as convincingly argued by Herzog and Lepenies (2022), the full democratic potential of citizen science remains to be unlocked. In particular, these authors interrogate the possibility, for citizen science, to be part of deliberative systems — in the sense of Mansbridge (2012). In this frame, the authors mainly insist on the need to discuss the inclusivity of citizen science approaches (which subgroups are involved?), and the possibility to really engage citizens not only in data collections, but also in the decisions or reflections about the goals and implications of research. This second point is quite demanding (notably when considering exigencies of inclusivity), since it involves a more intense engagement of citizens in the research process, in all its aspects: formulation of the research questions, design of the protocols, analysis and interpretation of the data, discussions on the applications and implications of the results. It also implies the existence of active grassroots movements, or social, political and cultural conditions for developing them. This perspective on the democratic potential of citizen science is certainly relevant in various situations — as proved by the many examples showing how citizen science has been used to defend some community or group-

based political agenda, see Herzog and Lepenies (2022) for exemples. However, we argue that it might be necessary to propose alternative solutions for developing more broadly citizen science as a tool for deliberative democracy. These solutions should be less demanding for citizens (in order to engage a large number of individuals), but also for governments, in order to encourage them to institutionalize and generalize the use of citizen science as a tool to engage citizens in deliberative democracy — notably, at the local scale. We argue that the mode of governance through citizen science we propose in this paper may constitute one of these alternative solutions.

d. Our proposal: contributory science for promoting good-quality deliberations

The thesis we defend in this paper is the following: contributory science (that is, participative data collection) may be used by governments, and specifically local governments, to foster good-quality public deliberation in the sense defined in section 3-b. More specifically, the approach we propose for discussion is the following. Let us consider a given local government (e.g, a municipality) which aims to engage citizens in a participatory democracy process to prepare, implement or evaluate a public policy regarding one of those issues we define in section 3-a. To collect the necessary data, this local government may collaborate with scientists to build a contributory science project grounded in an online platform. Within this platform, participants share their data by following a rigorous protocol defined by scientists, and *when they have contributed at least once*, they are given access to an online deliberation space. Depending on the cases, this space may allow citizen scientists to make proposals and/or discuss proposals from authorities. The guiding principles justifying this approach are the followings: through engagement in data collection, participants might acquire a better knowledge of the issue at stake; develop a specific interest for it as a political problem that should be solved collectively; reinforce their self-confidence and feeling of legitimacy to engage in a deliberative process. Consequently, participants might increase their ability to enter good-quality online deliberations — that is, deliberations which comply with principles such as rationality, interactivity, equality, civility, common good reference and constructiveness. The credibility of this approach lies in the well-established transformative potential of citizen science regarding individuals' relationships to science and rationality, individuals' interest or engagement towards the specific topic or issues at stake, and citizens' empowerment (see section 3-c). In the following, we present an example of technical implementation of this model of citizen science-based public deliberation at the local scale, under the form of an online platform. We then discuss future research paths in order to study in practice the relevance of this approach to public deliberation.

4. A TECHNICAL DEVICE FOR CITIZEN SCIENCE-BASED DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES: THE SPOT PLATFORM

In this section, we propose an illustration of how our theoretical propositions may be implemented into a technical device (an online platform) supporting a participatory approach. To translate our idea of citizen science-based public deliberations, we took as an application case a project of regulation of public lighting led by two French municipalities: Libourne (Southwest of France, 25000 habitants) and Melesse (Northwest, 6000 habitants). These municipalities, which both aimed to develop a participatory process regarding the regulation of public lighting, were chosen in May 2021 through a call for expression of interest. The aim of this collaboration for the research team was threefold:

- (i) developing a technical device which implements our model of citizen science-based public deliberations. This device is based on the articulation between a contributory science protocol, and a deliberative space. As described more in details later on, the participants are first invited to contribute with their data, and then (in a second step), those who contributed at least once can access the deliberative space — constituted by a function of comments of others' contributed data, a space of interactions with the municipality, and a page for individuals recommendations and collective discussions.

- (ii) testing the success, first in terms of public participation rate, of such an approach;

- (iii) get data (for future research) about the deliberation processes within the platform. As already noticed, the low participation rate precludes the realization of this last objective.

In the following, we present the context of this project as well as our technical device (the SPOT platform), and we discuss the reasons for the low participation rate which was obtained by the municipalities.

a. *Context of the project*

The politics of public lightning is becoming a central issue for local governments (Sanchez-Sutil and Cano-Ortega 2012). Out of the relevance of diminishing night lightning to save energy, it is well documented that light pollution is detrimental both for biodiversity and human health (Navara and Nelson 2007; Pauwels et al. 2021). On the other hand, the regulation of public lighting may also raise security issues, both for driving security (Elvik and Vaa, 2004) and individual security — even if the link between the lack of urban lighting and criminality is unclear (Tompson et al. 2022). Consequently, the regulation of public lighting faces a number of oppositions (Peña-García et al. 2015). Public policies related to public lighting are then

potentially conflictual, as well as (at least ideally) strongly dependent on data from different scientific disciplines — ecology, geography, environment psychology. In particular, this last discipline (which studies the relationships between human behavior and attitudes, and the surrounding environment) is crucial as it may contribute to exploring our relations to darkness, in terms of feelings, perceptions and attitudes. Whatever the way it is performed (through citizen science or through traditional approaches), environmental psychology research usefully feeds in public policy making, since it helps understand the obstacles and levers for the regulation of public lightning.

The municipalities of Libourne and Melesse, which are both engaged in a policy of regulation of public lightning for which they want to develop a participatory democracy approach, present contrasted situations, as shown by official data (see https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1405599?geo=COM-33243, the data presented here are from 2020). Libourne (25000 habitants) has relative socio-economic difficulties, with a rate of unemployment of 19.3% (against 8% at the national level), and 20% of its population is under the poverty line (14.6% at the national level). In comparison, Melesse (600 habitants) presents a lower unemployment rate (7.4%), and a relatively low rate of poverty (5%). In terms of political participation in electoral processes, the rate of abstention for the 2nd turn of the last presidential election is quite similar (28.65% for Libourne and 17.52% for Melesse, against 28.0%1 at the national level). Regarding political participation in general, both cities have an elected representative dedicated to "participation", who is in charge of animating or supporting public consultations, local committees, and public meetings between citizens and the local executives. That said, let us note that we will not insist more on Libourne's and Melesse's socio-political features since the study of the dynamics of participation in the SPOT project is out of the scope of this paper.

b.   *General scope and organization of the SPOT project*

The SPOT project was constructed in coordination with Melesse's and Libourne's municipalities, and in particular with the elected representatives and civil servants responsible for "political participation". This collaboration was conceived and organized as follows. The research team (led by the MOSAIC team unit from the MNHN, which is specialized in building online platforms for citizen science) was in charge of designing an online platform which articulates contributory data collection and public deliberation. The description of the content and architecture of this platform (SPOT) is one of the central contributions of this paper. The platform (described in detail in the following sections) was opened from April to June 2022. Its content was intensively discussed with the local representatives. For this pilot device, we chose to design our citizen science protocole as an environmental psychology study. That means that the collected data are susceptible

to be used as a research material for studying individuals' perceptions and relationships to obscurity. In theory, those data may then prove to be useful in themself (that is, independently of citizens' participation in the decision process) to guide public policy decisions. However, the important point here is that out of its interest for scientific research and for policy-related expertise, this data collection process is politically relevant since it may drive individual self-reflections about one's relationships to urban darkness, and then possibly enrich future (online) deliberations.

The municipalities were in charge of the political dimensions of the project, which uncovers two aspects. The first aspect is the animation of the device itself, that is, the advertisement of the platform and the recruitment of participants. From February to June 2022, they communicated about the project through public announcements, public meetings, and articles in local newspapers. The second aspect is the choice of the mode of decision regarding the regulation of public lightning — a particular issue being the weight to be given to the outcomes of online deliberations. It is important to note that we decided not to manage these two aspects of municipal activities (communicating about the platform and choosing a mode of decision), in order not to interfere with the democratic process in itself. However, we (as the research team) insisted on two points when communicating with the municipalities : (i) the ethical and political duty of taking into account public participation in the final decision; (ii) the need to express clearly, when advertising the project, that participation in contributory data collection gives the possibility to participate in a public deliberation regarding public lightning.

c. Technical description of the SPOT platform (1): access to the platform

The so-labeled SPOT contributory science platform ("*Science participative, obscurité et territoires*"— citizen science, obscurity and territory) was launched on the first of April 2022, and closed on the 30th of June 2022. The homepage of the platform (figure 1) gives a small description of the project, which indicates that inhabitants are invited to participate in a "citizen science program" dedicated to ones' relationships with night. Potential participants are also told that by contributing to data collection, they will be given the possibility to participate in the policy making process regarding public lightning. At this stage, they have the possibility to open a page labeled "Why should I participate?", which gives them access to a 30 lines text explaining more in detail the aim of the project and the architecture of the platform, and notably the modalities of their participation in the policy-making process (as presented in the next section). In particular, this text states clearly that the local executives are engaged towards the "execution" of the final recommendations made by the inhabitants (without specifying the way the expressed preferences will be weighted), "in the limits of their technical and financial feasibility, and of municipalities' engagement towards energy consumption". If they wish to

participate, inhabitants then create an account, and they are clearly told the ethical rules which apply regarding their data, in particular : data are totally anonymized (participants create a pseudo and there is no possibility to identify them behind their contribution); data are stored during 5 years exclusively by the research team; participants can delete their registration at any time; and they can give their consent for being contacted by e-mail by members of the research team. They are also told that anyone (municipality, inhabitants who did not participate...), anytime, can access all participants' contributions (childhood memories, observations, questions, comments, and recommendations) under their pseudonymized or anonymized format.

Figure 1. Homepage of the SPOT online platform for Libourne.

Figure 2. Citizen science protocol, as presented to the participants in the platform.

Figure 3. Structure of the modulus designed to share and comments questions to the municipality

d. *Technical description of the SPOT platform (2): from contributory science to online deliberation*

The architecture of the platform aims to articulate contributory science and online deliberation. To do so, participants access sequentially the contributory science part of the platform, and then, the deliberative space. More precisely, in a first step, participants are invited to follow the protocol presented to them as in figure 2. They then enter a five steps process. First, they can share a childhood memory linked with darkness (this step is not mandatory). Second, they apply a

citizen science protocol which consists in 1/going outside under specific environment conditions to be chosen by the participants; 2/ remaining at the same place for 3 to 5 minutes, and 3/ at home, reporting online notable observations (natural or artificial elements) and filling a form to describe individual perceptions and feelings, as well as photos and recordings. Participants are invited to repeat this experience as many times as they want, under different conditions. They are also invited to synthesize these different observations by qualifying their general experience of darkness.

Once they have contributed at least once, participants can access the deliberative space of the platform. This deliberative space is constituted by three different functions:

- Participants can comment on others' contributions, that is, the data they collected by applying the procole;

- Participants can ask questions to the municipality, or vote to support other participants' questions. They can also comment on others' questions. Every month, the question with most support is selected and answered by local authorities during public webinars. This process is represented in figure 3.

- They can formulate recommendations (and change them at any time) regarding the different dimensions of the regulation of public lighting: places where extinction should apply, seasonality and timeframe of extinction. Participants have also access to the consolidated data from the whole community. Importantly, they can comment and discuss on others' recommendations.

e. Field research

Out of the design and the launch of the platform, we also led two 2 months-field research campaigns in both cities. The first campaigns were led from April to June (before the launch of the platform), and the second ones from July to September (after the beginning of the program). These campaigns were designed to answer three families of questions: 1/What are local governments' motivations to enter this citizen science-based deliberation process? (first campaigns); 2/What are the inhabitants' perceptions of darkness and public lighting? (first campaigns); 3/What are the drivers and obstacles of inhabitants' participation in the SPOT platform? (second campaigns). During the first campaign, we led 36 1h-semi-structured interviews in Melesse, with 8 elected representatives, 5 municipal civil servants, and 22 inhabitants. In Libourne, we conducted 30 semi-structured interviews, with 3 elected representatives, 4 municipal civil servants, and 14 inhabitants from the city. During the second campaign in Melesse, we conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with SPOT's participants, and a questionnaire was circulated among the population, from which we got 155 answers. In Libourne, we conducted 17 semi-

structured interviews with SPOT's participants, and 10 interviews with inhabitants that did not participate in the program.

f.   *Some elements about the lack of participation in the SPOT project*

At the end of the 3-months experiments, SPOT got only 22 participants (that is, inhabitants that have contributed at least once) in Melesse and 22 participants in Libourne. Participation is well balanced in gender (49,1% of men in Melesse, and 41,8% in Libourne), and most of the participants are between 30 and 59 years old (71% in Melesse and 81% in Libourne). To date, the decision-making process is still ongoing, and it is unclear how the municipalities will mobilize citizens' contributions.   We will discuss in section 5 the significance of this low participation rate to assess the relevance of our citizen science-based approach on public deliberation. Before that, let us give some elements we may deduce from our qualitative and quantitative data to explain this relatively low level of habitants' engagement in SPOT.

The first dimension we found out is common to most of the participatory approaches, which often face a form of mistrust or indifference from the populations, as shown by Rojon and Pilet (2021) in their comparative analysis of four mini-public initiatives in Europe which were organized to inform decision making on different environmental issues. Furthermore, these authors show that engaged citizens are often part of these sub-groups of the population which are already more concerned about the environment. The data we got from our field studies in Libourne and Melesse confirm this finding. The survey circulated in Melesse after the start of the project (second campaign) shows a significant positive correlation between the participation in SPOT and a pre-existing interest towards the issue of public lighting, measured by the familiarity with the ecological concept of "light pollution" (p-value after Chi2 test=0.001) and "black corridor" (p-value after Chi2 test=0.045). Similarly, participants associate less than non-participants the regulation of public lighting to security issues (p-value=0.002), which suggest that they value its ecological dimension more. Consistently with this last result, participants feel significantly more in security outside at night than non-participants (p-value=0.02). The results from semi-structured interviews also confirm that a certain mistrust towards the initiative and its political outputs might have played a role: "the trust of citizens in democracy is over, mostly for working classes" (*inhabitant of Melesse, 29/06/2022)* ; "[citizen participation] is made for pretending citizens' opinions are considered whereas the decision is already made" (*inhabitant of Melesse, 28/06/2022)*.

"[Citizen participation] is good because we can say what we have to say, but at the end we do not have nothing, nothing" (*inhabitant of Libourne, 04/05/2022)*. The lack of time was also evoked: "the reason is the lack of time in our societies (...). Democratic activities are not a priority for people" (*inhabitant of Melesse,*

20/06/2022); "I do not have enough time to engage really" (*inhabitant of Libourne, 26/04/2022*).

The second dimension concerns the topic itself — the regulation of public lighting. It appears from the semi-interviews we conducted with inhabitants from Libourne and Melesse (first and second campaign) that public lighting was not yet an important topic for most of the population. In other words, it seems that inhabitants do not consider, at first glance, public lightning as a priority for public policy making. By contrast, inhabitants appear to feel more concerned by the issue of private lightning, for which they have strong pre-existing opinions: "Bank, estate agencies, illuminated at nights, that should not exist"; "I am clearly more bothered by private lightings from shops that by public lighting" (*inhabitants of Melesse, 03/03/2022*); "When I see this shopping center illuminated at night, I get crazy" (*inhabitant of Libourne, 11/04/2022*). The issue of public lighting does not raise such emotion-driven reactions. As expressed by an inhabitant from Melesse, "I do think that for many people [public lighting] is not a matter for debate. Maybe it is the reason why your project is not working a lot" (*28/06/2022*). It is out of the scope of this paper to propose explanations for this relative lack of interest, but two hypotheses can be formulated. First, if the topic of public lighting is not perceived as an important issue by the population as seen as a whole, it is possible that some specific groups feel more concerned — for instance, citizens who may be particularly affected by the security issues linked to darkness, such as women. Second, it is worth noting that the apparent lack of interest for public light regulation is in contradiction with the strong reactions from citizens in case of public lights dysfunctions, as reported by the elected representatives and civil servants from Melesse and Libourne (data from the semi-structured interviews conducted during the first campaign). This remark suggests that the observed disengagement from the topic may be linked to the difficulty of seeing it as a global issue, which goes further than individuals' focus on public lighting at the scale of the street they live in.

The last notable dimension which came out from our field works points to the specific difficulties raised by the use of online tools. First, it is well known (see e.g Bélanger and Carter 2009) that the use of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) may exclude this part of the population who sometimes define itself as "computer-illiterate" (*inhabitant of Libourne, 25/04/2022*): "Internet is catastrophic for me, I am not interested in using it" (*inhabitant of Melesse*); "It is needed to be friends with computers, and it is very hard for me" (*inhabitant of Libourne, 25/04/2022*). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that people under 30, which are deemed to be more familiar with ICTs, were underrepresented within the participants, which undermines the role of the digital divide as an explanatory factor of the low participation level. Either way, these elements point to the coupling

between the development of online participation tools and the physical presence of municipal agents dedicated to the guidance of the population towards the platforms. Data from semi-structured interviews clearly suggest a need for physical meetings to motivate citizens' participation. As expressed by an inhabitant from Libourne, "this kind of thing should be verbal, people need to talk with a human being" (*04/05/2022*). Yet, field animations with researchers or municipal employees were not planned by the municipal agents. It would have been relevant to organize workshops where the inhabitants could test the protocol in presence of the researchers, and be told about the expected political outputs of the project.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The main objective of this contribution was twofold: defending, in a theoretical manner, the potential role of contributory science (that is, the participatory collect of data guided by a scientific protocol) to foster good-quality deliberation at the local scale; and proposing a concrete implementation of this model into a technical device. This second aspect was realized by collaborating with two municipalities which aimed to implicate citizens in policy-making regarding the regulation of public lightning. The main objective of this collaboration, for the research team, was to illustrate in a concrete case how citizen science-based deliberative processes could be technically implemented. Consequently, the policy aspect of the project (that is, the concrete use of the device to construct public policy and make a decision) was entirely left to the municipalities. Despite this clear task sharing, the low participation rate obtained by the local executive might nevertheless be considered as a potential threat to our approach in itself. However, this interpretation is not supported by the empirical data we obtained from the qualitative and quantitative field work. Indeed, these data point to very classical obstacles, well documented in literature on participation (e.g Rojon and Pilet 2021, Gherghina and Geissel 2019, Bélanger and Carter 2009): the mistrust of indifference from the population; the (ir)relevance of the chosen topics as a matter for public deliberation; and the proper difficulties of using digital tools. It also has to be noted that contributory science, as a method for collecting data, is a robust and well-known method which has proven to be able to attract a lot of participants (Fraisl et al. 2022). In other words, the grounding principles of our approach (the use of citizen science as a support for public deliberation) does not seem to be in itself a reason for the low participation rate. The challenges seem to be rather situated in the choice of a well-suited public policy problem, and in the practical modalities of motivating citizens' participation — in particular, the coupling between the online platform and physical animations. That said, let us note that in the case of SPOT, the specificity of the protocol itself could also explain the relatively weak rate of citizens' engagement. SPOT was designed as a citizen science project in environmental psychology. Consequently, it

was mostly dedicated to the collection of one's feelings and perceptions, rather than objective facts — contrary, for instance, to programs aiming to monitor biodiversity. In our interviews, this required expression of individuals' emotions appears to be quite confusing for some inhabitants of Melesse and Libourne. Citizens might indeed tend to associate science for policy to the collection of precisely measured data from the external world, and do not see the value of individuals' emotions for policy-making. In other words, a citizen science protocol drawing on ecological sciences might have mobilized a larger group of inhabitants[1]. This issue interrogates the role of social sciences for public policies, the way this role is perceived by citizens, and citizens' (lack of) familiarity with the aims and methods of social sciences and humanities research.

Finally, our study calls for more practical implementations of our theoretical and technical propositions, in various contexts, in order to test its background assumption — that is, the hypothesis that engagement in contributory data collection might foster good-quality public deliberations. To do so, it would be possible to treat the data from participants' interactions and recommendations made within a SPOT-like platform (in a case where participation would be important enough) along at least three dimensions. First, it would be interesting to analyze the comments on each others' contributions or recommendations by considering them as online discussion data. It would then be relevant to lead a content analysis and to apply a quality deliberation index, by considering the intensity of individual participation in contributory science (e.g the number of individuals' contributions to data collection) as a relevant explanatory variable for deliberation characteristics. Second, the questions-answers function may provide researchers with important data about the relationships between participation and the raise of a specific interest towards the object of the public policy at stake. Third, the analysis of the recommendations could provide the researchers with data about the degree of polarization of inhabitants' opinions as a function of the intensity of their contributions. Finally, depending on the local executives' political choices, the opening of physical arenas of deliberation could allow interesting comparison between participants and non-participants in contributory data collection in their ability to mobilize deliberation skills. We hope our contribution will motivate the design of such experiments in participation aiming to mobilize citizen science not only as a data collection method, but also as a way to foster public deliberations of policy decisions at the local scale.

---

[1] We can refer here to an interesting citizen science approach to study the effect of public lightning on biodiversity in various german cities: https://www.tatort-strassenbeleuchtung.de/beteiligte-projektgebiete/

REFERENCES

Aristeidou, Maria, and Christothea Herodotou. 2020. "Online Citizen Science: A Systematic Review of Effects on Learning and Scientific Literacy." Citizen Science: Theory and Practice 5 (1): 11. https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.224.

Aragón, Pablo, Andreas Kaltenbrunner, Antonio Calleja-López, Andrés Pereira, Arnau Monterde, Xabier E. Barandiaran, and Vicenç Gómez. 2017. "Deliberative Platform Design: The Case Study of the Online Discussions in Decidim Barcelona." In International Conference on Social Informatics, 277–287. Springer.

Bächtiger, André, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark E. Warren. 2018. The Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bedessem, Baptiste and Stéphanie Ruphy. 2020. "Citizen Science and Scientific Objectivity: Mapping Out Epistemic Risks and Benefits". Perspectives on Science 28(5): 630-54.

Bélanger, France, and Lemuria Carter. 2009. "The Impact of the Digital Divide on E-Government Use". Communications of the ACM 52 (4): 132–35.

Bonney, Rick, Heidi Ballard, Rebecca Jordan, Ellen McCallie, Tina Phillips, Jennifer Shirk and Candie C. Wilderman. 2009. "Public Participation in Scientific Research: Defining the Field and Assessing Its Potential for Informal Science Education. A CAISE Inquiry Group Report". ED519688

Cohen, Joshua. 2005. *Deliberation and democratic legitimacy.* Milton Park: Routledge.

Danielsen, Finn, Noor Johnson, Olivia Lee, Maryann Fidel, Lisbeth Iversen, Michael K. Poulsen, Hajo Eicken, Ania Albin, Simone G. Hansen, and Peter L. Pulsifer. 2021. Community-Based Monitoring in the Arctic. University of Alaska Press.

Den Broeder, Lea, Jeroen Devilee, Hans Van Oers, A. Jantine Schuit and Annemarie Wagemakers. 2016. "Citizen Science for public health". Health promotion international 33 (3): 505-14.

Dillon, Justin, Robert B. Stevenson, Erjen E.J. Wals. 2017. "Introduction to the Special Section Moving from Citizen to Civic Science to Address Wicked Conservation Problems". Conservation Biology 31 (1): 239-239.

Elvik, R. and Vaa, T. 2004. *Handbook of Road Safety Measures.* 2004. Oxford:Elsevier

European Commission. 2013. *IN-DEPTH REPORT: Environmental Citizen Science.*

European Commission. 2016. *Trust. European Research. Co-creating resilient societies.*

European Commission. 2020. *COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Best Practices in Citizen Science for Environmental Monitoring*

Fishkin, James S. 1991. Democracy and deliberation: New directions for democratic reform. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Floridia, Antonio. 2017. From participation to deliberation: A critical genealogy of deliberative democracy. ECPR press.

Fraisl, D. et al. 2022. "Citizen science in environmental and ecological sciences". 2022. *Nature Reviews Methods Primers*, 2(64).

Friess, D.; Eilders, C. "A Systematic Review of Online Deliberation Research". Policy Internet 2015,7, 319–339.

Gherghina, Sergiu, and Brigitte Geissel. 2019. "An alternative to representation: Explaining preferences for citizens as political decision-makers". Political Stud. Rev. 17: 224–238.

Giugni, Marco, and Alessandro Nai. 2013. "Quality of Deliberation: A Multilevel Analysis." In Meeting Democracy: Power and Deliberation in Global Justice Movements, 152–178. Cambridge University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2015. *The lure of technocracy.* Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

Hampton, Keith N., Inyoung Shin, and Weixu Lu. 2017. "Social Media and Political Discussion: When Online Presence Silences Offline Conversation." Information, Communication & Society 20 (7): 1090–1107.

Herzog, Lisa, and Robert Lepenies. 2022. "Citizen Science in Deliberative Systems: Participation, Epistemic Injustice, and Civic Empowerment." Minerva, 1–20

Kasperowski, Dick and Thomas Hillman. 2018. "The epistemic culture in an online citizen science project: Programs, antiprograms and epistemic subjects". Social studies of science 48 (4): 564-88.

Keahey, Jennifer. 2021. "Sustainable Development and Participatory Action Research: A Systematic Review." Systemic Practice and Action Research 34 (3): 291–306.

Kelly, Ashley Rose and Kate Maddalena. 2015. "Harnessing agency for efficacy:"Foldit" and citizen science". Poroi 11 (1): 1-20.

Landström, Catharina. 2020. Environmental Participation. Practices Engaging the Public with Science and Governance. Cham et al.: Springer

Lezaun, Javier, Noortje Marres and Manuel Tironi. 2017. Experiments in Participation. In *The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*, eds. U. Felt, R. Fouché, C. A. Miller, L. Smith-Doerr, 195-222. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press

Mansbridge, Jane, et al. 2012. A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy. In *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*, eds. J. Parkinson and J. Mansbridge, 1–26. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press

Mahr, Dana et al. 2018. Watching or Being Watched. Enhancing Productive Discussions Between the Citizen Sciences, The Social Sciences and the Humanities. In *Citizen Science. Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy*, eds. S. Hacker et al., 99–109. London: UCL Press

Mirowski, Philip. 2018. "The future (s) of open science". Social studies of science 48 (2): 171-203.

Navara, K.J. and R. J. Nelson. 2007. "The dark side of light at night: physiological, epidemiological, and ecological consequences". Journal of Pineal Research, 43 : 215-224

Office of science and technology policy. 2019. *Implementation of federal prize and citizen science authority: fiscal years 2017-2018.*

Ottinger, Gwen. 2010. "Buckets of Resistance: Standards and the Effectiveness of Citizen Science." Science, Technology, & Human Values 35 (2): 244–270.

Owen, Roger P. and Alison J. Parker. 2018. "Citizen science in environmental protection agencies". In : Hecker, S., Haklay, M., Bowser, A., Makuch, Z., Vogel, J. & Bonn, A. (Eds). Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy. London: UCL Press. p. 284-300.

Pauwels, Julie, Isabelle Le Viol, Yves Bas, Nicolas Valet, and Christian Kerbiriou. 2021. "Adapting Street Lighting to Limit Light Pollution's Impacts on Bats." Global Ecology and Conservation 28: e01648.

Peña-García, A., A. Hurtado, and M. C. Aguilar-Luzón. 2015. "Impact of Public Lighting on Pedestrians' Perception of Safety and Well-Being." Safety Science 78: 142–148.

Peters, Michael A. 2009. "Neoliberal Governmentality: Foucault on the Birth of Biopolitics." In Governmentality Studies in Education, 95–107. Brill.

Peter, Maria, Tim Diekötter, and Kerstin Kremer. 2019. "Participant Outcomes of Biodiversity Citizen Science Projects: A Systematic Literature Review." Sustainability 11 (10): 2780.

Pettibone, L, Blättel-Mink, B, Balázs, B, Di Giulio, A, Göbel, C, Heubach, K, Hummel, D, Lundershausen, J, Lux, A, Potthast, T, Vohland, K and Wyborn, C. 2018. Transdisciplinary Sustainability Research and Citizen Science: Options for Mutual Learning. GAIA – Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 27(2): 222–225. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14512/gaia.27.2.9

Phillips, Tina, Norman Porticella, Mark Constas, and Rick Bonney. 2018. "A Framework for Articulating and Measuring Individual Learning Outcomes from Participation in Citizen Science." Citizen Science: Theory and Practice 3 (2).

Pisoni, E., P. Christidis, P. Thunis, and M. Trombetti. 2019. "Evaluating the Impact of 'Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans' on Urban Background Air Quality." Journal of Environmental Management 231: 249–255.

Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Resnik, David B., Kevin C. Elliott, and Aubrey K. Miller. 2015. "A Framework for Addressing Ethical Issues in Citizen Science." Environmental Science & Policy 54 (December): 475–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.05.008.

Rojon, Sebastien, and Jean-Benoit Pilet. 2021. "Engaged, Indifferent, Skeptical or Critical? Disentangling Attitudes towards Local Deliberative Mini-Publics in Four Western European Democracies". Sustainability 13 (19): 10518.

Sanchez-Sutil, F., and A. Cano-Ortega. 2021. "Smart Regulation and Efficiency Energy System for Street Lighting with LoRa LPWAN." Sustainable Cities and Society 70: 102912.

Schade, Sven, Maite Pelacho, Toos CGE van Noordwijk, Katrin Vohland, Susanne Hecker and Marina Manzoni. 2021. "Citizen science and policy". In: Vohland, Katrin, Land-zandstra, Anne, Ceccaroni, Luigi, Lemmens, Rob,Perelló, Josep, Ponti, Marisa,Samson, Roeland, Wagenknecht, Katherin (Eds). The Science of Citizen Science. Berlin: Springer. p. 351-71

Schrögel, Philipp, and Alma Kolleck. 2019. 'The Many Faces of Participation in Science: Literature Review and Proposal for a Three-Dimensional Framework.' *Science & Technology Studies* 32 (2).

Shin, Bokyong, and Mikko Rask. 2021. "Assessment of Online Deliberative Quality: New Indicators Using Network Analysis and Time-Series Analysis." Sustainability 13 (3): 1187.

Shortall, Ruth, Anatol Itten, Michiel van der Meer, Pradeep Murukannaiah, and Catholijn Jonker. 2022. "Reason against the Machine? Future Directions for Mass Online Deliberation." Frontiers in Political Science.

Steenbergen M, Bachtiger A, Sporndli M, Steiner J. 2003. " Measuring political deliberation: A discourse quality index. Comparative European Politics".1(1):21–48.

Strasser, Bruno J., Jérôme Baudry, Dana Mahr, Gabriela Sanchez and Elise Tancoigne. 2019. ""Citizen Science"? Rethinking Science and Public Participation". *Science & Technology Studies* 32(2) : 52-76.

Tompson, Lisa, Rebecca Steinbach, Shane D. Johnson, Chun Siong Teh, Chloe Perkins, Phil Edwards, and Benedict Armstrong. 2022. "Absence of Street Lighting May Prevent Vehicle Crime, but Spatial and Temporal Displacement Remains a Concern." Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1–21.

Tormey, Simon. 2015. The End of Representative Politics. John Wiley & Sons

Turrini, Tabea, Daniel Dörler, Anett Richter, Florian Heigl and Aletta Bonn. 2018. "The threefold potential of environmental citizen science - Generating knowledge, creating learning opportunities and enabling civic participation". Biological Conservation 225: 176-86.

Urbinati, Nadia and Mark E. Warren. 2008. "The concept of representation in contemporary democratic theory". Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11: 387-412.

Veeckman, C., Van Herck, B., Carpentier, M., Van Laer, J. & Sterken, M. (2021). Citizen Science Roadmap for Local Government. A hands-on manual for citizen science, by and for cities and towns. SCIVIL, Leuven, Belgium.

Vitone, Tyler, Kathryn Stofer, M. Sedonia Steininger, Jiri Hulcr, Robert Dunn and Andrea Lucky. 2016. "School of Ants Goes to College: Integrating Citizen Science into the General Education Classroom Increases Engagement with Science". Journal of Science Communication 15(01): A03

Wood, Emma, Alice Harsant, Martin Dallimer, Anna Cronin de Chavez, Rosemary RC McEachan, and Christopher Hassall. 2018. "Not All Green Space Is Created Equal: Biodiversity Predicts Psychological Restorative Benefits from Urban Green Space." Frontiers in Psychology 9: 2320.

Yamamoto, Yuri T. 2012. "Values, Objectivity and Credibility of Scientists in a Contentious Natural Resource Debate." Public Understanding of Science (Bristol, England) 21 (1): 101–25.

PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION AND CITIZEN SOCIAL SCIENCE
LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW ETHICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES

PATRICIA CANTO FARACHALA
Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness
University of Deusto
pcanto@orkestra.deusto.es (Corresponding author)
Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9194-1583

INGAR BRATTBAKK
Work Research Institute
Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet)
brin@oslomet.no
Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1633-7690

PAULINA BUDRYTĖ
Kaunas Institute of Technology
paulina.budryte@ktu.lt
Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8208-2334

REIDUN NORVOLL
Work Research Institute,
Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet)
nore@oslomet.no
Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6973-5174

ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the discussion around the epistemic foundations of citizen social science (CSS) by drawing from participatory communication. We argue that the latter's long history reflecting on the ethical and political challenges that emerge from its dialogical perspective to empowerment and social change, could enhance the nascent CSS concept. In establishing that relation we also explore how CSS can further develop participatory communication. To that end we look into YouCount, an ongoing CSS project that, from its inception, has understood dialogical communication as inextricably linked to the research process. Our main findings are that: (i) old challenges related to the instrumental use of participatory communication are relevant

to CSS; (ii) CSS offers a space to transcend entrenched narratives around knowledge production and communication that hindered the participatory communication paradigm; and, (iii) CSS has the potential to expand participatory communication's scope through its use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) but faces important challenges related to research control of personal data and disclosure.

KEYWORDS
Citizen social science; participatory communication, science communication, ethics, ICT's, YouCount Projec

1. INTRODUCTION

Citizen participation in scientific activities is not new and has in fact gone under different names that depend on the academic discipline, geopolitics, culture and modes of engagement (Eitzel et al., 2017). While the term 'citizen science' was coined in 1989 in an article published in the MIT Technology Review (Hacklay et al., 2021) the number of scientific articles using the 'citizen science' label have experienced a notable increase over the past 20 or so years particularly those presenting results from data collection and classification based on digital platforms and pertaining to the natural sciences (Kullenberg & Kasperowski, 2016). Indeed, the digital revolution has made it possible for citizens to contribute observations at a scale that would have been unthinkable before digital tools became widely available[1]. However, participation in scientific activities is not restricted to data-gathering activities, with citizen scientists increasingly involved in other stages of the research process (Resnik, et al., 2015) and the focus on participatory and co-creative methods has increased in recent years (Senabre et al., 2021). This has created new channels for communication between science and society which is why citizen science can be thought of as a form of science communication (Wagenknecht et al., 2021).

Citizen science has developed from different traditions, which are not mutually exclusive and can actually coexist for different purposes as is shown in this article. One such approach is based on the work developed by Bonney (1996) in the context of their work on ornithology. Here citizen science is a research method that enables large scale studies by engaging citizen scientists in mapping and monitoring activities. A different approach developed from the work of Irwin (1995) in the context of their studies on sustainable development. This tradition understands citizen science as a way of democratising social science through dialogue to serve the needs of society and empower citizens. A more recent approach sees citizen science as a form of activism, particularly around environmental issues (Kasperowski et al. 2023).

---

[1] Typical examples are bird watching for natural conservation or classifying galaxies. See Galaxy Zoo: https://www.zooniverse.org/projects/zookeepfor

While citizen science has received wide attention and is well established in the natural sciences (Ballard et al., 2017; Frigeiro et al., 2021; McKinley et al., 2017; Merenlender et al., 2016; Sauermann et al., 2020), the numbers of studies are substantially less in social sciences, and there is little evidence of how citizen science in social science research might work in practice (Heiss & Matthes, 2017; Tauginienė et al., 2020). This may be due to the fact that social sciences already have a rich participatory tradition (Albert et al., 2021). Nevertheless, over the past years, citizen social science (CSS) has made its way into the academic discussion in Europe in part due to the availability of funding from the European Union (EU) to projects that explore citizen science in social sciences and the humanities (SSH). Funding often stems from the Science with and for Society Program (SwafS), which recognizes a heightened policy interest in engaging society, embraces ideal high-level aims of a participatory democracy and recognizes the need to assess the societal, democratic and economic costs and benefits of engagement (EC, 2016).

This paper builds on Albert et al. (2021) who explore the ways in which the roles of citizens and researchers play out in social sciences and identify Participatory Action Research (PAR) among the epistemic foundations of citizen social science. We add to what has already been said about the legacy of participatory approaches to CSS by drawing from a school that contributes a communication perspective: Participatory Communication (PC). This school of thought has its roots in the work of Latin American communication scholars and, like PAR, was influenced by Paulo Freire's notions of dialogic communication and praxis (Freire, 1996).

The difference between PAR and PC is that while the former emphasizes collaborative participation of trained researchers and local communities in producing knowledge directly relevant to the stakeholder community (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014), the latter understands participation as dialogue (Dagron, 2008) and focuses on how participants in collaborative research processes express and communicate their own knowledge (Cornish & Dunn, 2009). In other words in PC, communication, through dialogue is inextricably linked to the research process itself. PAR and PC are not opposites and share the values of promoting participation, empowerment, and social change and like Irwin's dialogical and democratic approach to citizen science draw from the participatory tradition that emerged in the Global South, and internationally, during the 1970's.

However, we suggest that the legacy of PC is understudied in the literature on the emerging CSS concept and that the former's history reflecting on the ethical and political challenges that emerge from its dialogic perspective to empowerment and social change could enhance the latter. Moreover, if as mentioned earlier, citizen science can be thought of as a form of science communication (Wagenknecht et al., 2021) then CSS with its aim of empowering participants and producing social change can be thought of as a form of participatory communication. In suggesting this relation, we also aim to understand how CSS can further develop PC.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the PC concept through its core epistemology highlighting its similarities with CSS and how the former can enhance the latter. The section also identifies the ethical and political challenges that have emerged from the practice of PC that can be relevant to CSS. Second, we present an ongoing citizen social science project: "YouCount - Empowering youth and co-creating social innovations and policymaking through youth-focused citizen social science". The authors of this paper participate in the project which is an interesting case to reflect on the link between PC and CSS because it reflects current trends in EU science policy and, because from its inception, participation in the project has been understood as dialogue. In a third section we discuss the YouCount project in the light of PC's ethical and political challenges and identify new ones, specific to CSS. In the fifth section we present our main conclusions, highlighting the need for systemic change in the research ecosystems in which CSS develops in order for it to bring into play its full potential, for citizen empowerment and social change.

2. PARTICIPATORY COMMUNICATION

The participatory paradigm is closely linked to the work developed by Brazilian pedagogue Paolo Freire in the 1970's (Huesca, 2008; Jacobson, 1993; Morris, 2003; Roman, 2005). Drawing from his experience with adult education programmes, Freire highlighted the power of education as a political tool for stimulating the consciousness of oppressed people's situation and for organizing action to improve it. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1996[2]) Freire develops two key notions that underpin PC: Dialogical communication and praxis.

The notion of dialogical communication captures Freire's criticism of the narrative character of teacher-student relationships in which students are treated as empty containers to be filled with information deposited by teachers: "...in the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing...[it] negates education and knowledge as a process of inquiry" (Freire, 1996, p. 53). Instead the Brazilian pedagogue called for a problem-posing education in which students become critical co-researchers in dialogue with teachers and are jointly responsible for a process in which all learn.

Freire (1996) attaches great importance to how educators approach dialogue arguing that educational or political plans fail because those who design them only consider their own reality without asking themselves if it connects with the reality of those who those plans are designed for. In his words: "It is not our role to speak to people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to impose our view on

[2] The book was published in Portuguese in 1968 and in English in 1970. The 1996 edition was published by Penguin.

them, but rather to dialogue with people about their view and ours" (Freire, 1996, p. 77). Finally, for Freire (1996), dialogical communication results in transformation through the notion of praxis, based on what he identifies as the two parts of a word: reflection and action.

Freire's work was published in the context of Cold War propaganda and the prevalence of quantitative, positivist social science, both of which permeated mass communication research and practice (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). Indeed, mass communication in that period was closely tied to the idea of 'development' and "assigned the role of disseminating the 'right' knowledge" (Waisbord, 2005, p. 83). The approach was based on a knowledge-deficit assumption addressed by massive injections of information (Dagron & Tufte, 2006). The mass media were seen as "magic multipliers able to accelerate and magnify the benefits of development" (Fair & Shah, 1997, p. 4); communication was sender and media centric and attached great importance to communication technology, using general marketing techniques (Servaes & Lie, 2014). Indeed, mass media campaigns were very often designed by advertising firms with no knowledge of health, agriculture or development problems in general (Dagron, 2011). Overall it was seen to impose the interests of dominant elites contributing to reinforce the status quo (Huesca, 2008).

Freire's dialogical approach had an enormous influence on communication scholars from Latin America, where PC practices can be traced back to the early 20th Century but had not developed conceptually (Barranquero, 2017). The Latin American perspective turned away early on from positivist notions of objectivity and neutrality acknowledging that researchers' values permeated their inquiry (Beltran, 1976, p. 125) and stressed the uniqueness of each community, arguing that while development processes may have universal characteristics, the solutions would always be local (Rifkin, 1996). The rejection of a communication model based on information transfer suggested that "human understanding was forged through intersubjective co-activity" (Dervin & Huesca, 1999, p. 174) that transformed both individual and common understanding and resulted in a re-constructed reality (Beltran, 1976). Communication was therefore the "permanent process in which people discover, elaborate reinvent and make knowledge theirs" (Kaplún, 1998, p. 50).

From this perspective, PC can be understood as a methodology, defined by Coghlan & Gaya (2014) as the philosophical approach to how knowledge is produced. Indeed, PC helped to include previously excluded knowledge in knowledge production and diffusion processes traditionally reserved for academics and universities, thereby setting the basis for integrating academia more directly with practice (Barranquero, 2011). It also outlined the intersection between communication and participatory methodologies, recognizing the importance of politics around knowledge production (Lewin & Patterson, 2012). This approach

sees a role for researchers as political actors, facilitators and communicators working in placed-based development processes that lead to change (Roman, 2005). Scholars working with PC understand communication as a process and as an end, where the end is community building (Dagron, 2011; Kaplún, 1998; Waisbord, 2015) and use information dissemination as tools or methods that are always part of a wider dialogue (Barranquero, 2006; Dagron, 2008; Dagron, 2011; Servaes, 2008; Servaes & Lie, 2014). The participative approach to communication has been analysed as a way to advance democratic participation (Deetz, 1999).

In sum, PC in research means that "research participants, local citizens, or those traditionally referred to as 'the researched' are able to participate in creating and expressing their own knowledge and, in so doing, empower themselves to effect social, political, economic, and cultural change that is appropriate to them" (Cornish & Dunn, 2009, p. 666). This shows a connection with the democratic tradition in citizen science developed form the work of Irwin. It also fits with the broad definition of citizen social science as an approach using participatory methods to address social concerns (Albert, 2021). Moreover, PC's understanding of dialogue as a process where reality is transformed through inter-subjectivity is particularly relevant for citizen social science's aim of producing social change. In contrast with citizen science approaches that have reflected on the roles played by citizen scientists (Eitzel et al., 2017) PC problematizes the role of researchers in dialogical process (facilitators, communicators, translators...); their positionality in the research process and their relation to non-academic participants (i.e. Freire's teacher-student relationships). Moreover, PC's pedagogical essence connects with the science education component of CSS projects.

Over the years, scholars working with PC approaches have captured important ethical and political challenges that, for the purpose of this paper, we group around three sub-headings: (i) instrumental uses of PC; (ii) beyond entrenched narratives; and (iii) the challenge of scope.

(i) Instrumental uses of PC

When PC is used in too instrumental terms its ultimate objective of empowerment and social change is lost and can tarnish the expectations created among participants when they realise that there is a gap between discourse and practice. This happens when certain concepts are used in policy without facilitating their implementation. From the 1980's onward, international organisations like the World Bank and many governments had incorporated participation and dialogue into their language and agendas without a change in practice. When PC was institutionalised, it became just a set of techniques (Leal, 2007) divested of its philosophical approach to knowledge creation and communication. This challenge around the politics of knowledge production is nicely captured by Rogers (2005) when he argues that when PC is used as a mere technique without considering its

epistemological and ontological assumptions, contradictions emerge leading to "participatory diffusion" or semantic confusion.

Indeed, despite the rhetoric, in practice governments and funding organisations were not really supportive of participatory approaches since a true commitment to civic participation would have meant a serious reconsideration of the way funding was organised, how bureaucracies' function and their distrust and impatience with participatory approaches (Waisbord, 2005). This because by PC is, by definition, a slow process that often does not have predetermined outcomes but rather goals that are negotiated in dialogue with stakeholders continuously (Lennie & Tachi, 2013). PC is about long-term processes that need time to build trust among participants and are at odds with the results-oriented approaches required by funding bodies where researchers need to evidence impact within the project's time frame (Cornish & Dunn, 2009; Lewin & Patterson, 2012). Furthermore, success in participatory communication is likely to be in the subjective intentional order since it will more often be judged by the protagonists of the research process itself (White, 1999).

(ii) Beyond entrenched narratives

The historical context in which PC emerged, namely the Cold War era and the use of the mass media to impose the interests and world view of the United States in Latin America (Huesca, 2008; Servaes, 1999), led to the development of entrenched narratives where mass communication was related to the powerful and participatory communication to the powerless; the former the evil, the latter the good (Barranquero, 2015). Clemencia Rodriguez (2001) moved beyond the entrenched narrative drawing from radical democracy theory to coin the 'citizens media' concept. Citizens media redirects the focus of analysis from a comparison between community or alternative media with the mass media, to the more complex cultural and social processes behind citizen's re-appropriation of the media that tell the stories about and shape their local communities. This approach, that breaks the passive acceptance of identities (the powerless) imposed by others (the powerful) has important ethical implications in that it recognizes agency in the 'powerless' and offers a more nuanced understanding of power relations. Indeed Rodriguez (2009) describes them as not monolithic but constantly shifting and changing at the community and individual levels.

In terms of research approaches, a study of projects funded by the World Bank (Inagaki, 2007), found that the epistemological assumptions of researchers tend to spill over to the methodological approach used, with a clear association between quantitative methods and mass communication strategies and qualitative methods and dialogical communication strategies. Hence, Lennie & Tacchi (2013) highlighted the need for an appropriate combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, complementary approaches and triangulation, and above all, recognition that different approaches are suitable for different issues and purposes.

(iii) The challenge of scope

The explosion of smartphones and the social media signalled a new momentum for PC, through large scale movements using them for dissent like the Arab Spring or the Yosoy132 movement in Mexico (Barranquero, 2015; Hemer & Tufte, 2016) and raising new questions around what the blurring of boundaries between small and mass media mean for PC's traditionally narrower scope (Waisbord, 2005). Indeed, the Internet and social media have broken the confines of the physical space for engaging in dialogical communication. Virtual communities offer a new space for participant-driven production and communication of research (Thompson, 2008) and can lead to new knowledge co-creation (Canto-Farachala & Larrea, 2022). They have been shown to host reflection processes (Kantanen, Manninen, & Kontkanen, 2014); create social capital (Daniel et al., 2003) and provoke social change (Fernández-Sanchez & Valverde-Berrocoso, 2014). Moreover, when combined with in-person communication they can bring research communities working in different contexts closer (Canto-Farachala & Estensoro, 2020). On the downside dialogical communication in virtual environments needs to be facilitated (Canto-Farachala, 2021); ICT's have become a gold mine for researchers looking for big data (Rodriguez et al.,2014) and that they can perpetuate exclusion through the digital divide (Cullen, 2001).

3. THE YOUCOUNT PROJECT

The YouCount project (hereinafter also referred to as YouCount) is funded under the Horizon 2020 SwafS programme and runs from 2021 to 2023. It involves 11 partners across 9 European countries working on 10 different case studies that include young people (aged 13-29 years) as young citizen scientists (YCS), some of whom are experiencing situations that put them at risk of social exclusion.

YouCount's objective is to generate new knowledge and innovations that empower and increase social inclusion of youth across Europe through youth citizen social science (Y-CSS). The project includes four main interlinked sub-studies that have the following aims: (i) to develop a conceptual and methodological framework for Y-CSS; (ii) try out this framework through a multiple case study consisting of ten local case projects in nine countries across Europe; (iii) use the multiple case study to evaluate the process and outcomes of Y-CSS and to assess the costs, benefits and impact of the Y-CSS activities; and (v) maximise social and scientific impact through widespread scaling up and continuity. In order to develop new knowledge and innovations, each sub- study comprises a convergent parallel design, utilising a mixed- methods design (see Figure 1).

Multiple Case Study

Figure 1. YouCount: Multiple Case Study Design. Source: Adapted from YouCount's Document of Action.

In the project, 'social inclusion' is considered as a broad, multi-dimensional and multi-level concept, and as both a process and goal. Overall, social inclusion refers to "citizens' chances to access the same opportunities and resources to participate in economic, social, political, and cultural life within a given society'" (Butkevičienė et al., 2021, p12). The 10 cases highlight three dimensions of social inclusion: (i) social participation (including employability); (ii) social belonging and connectedness; and (iii) citizenship and civic participation. YouCount seeks to explore meanings of 'social inclusion' and its positive drivers from young people's perspectives by working co-creatively with them (Ridley et al., 2022). As mentioned earlier, while the project addresses the circumstances of youths who are most at risk of social exclusion, it also engages a broad range of young people from local areas and university settings. This is meant to avoid stigmatising particular groups by labelling them as 'disadvantaged youths' and to stimulate dialogue and social networking across groups of young people. In doing so, the project acknowledges that young people are a diverse group of citizens, and many possess important social resources for peer support and local innovation and development.

The project is currently in its last phase of the implementation period and has started the data analysis (broadly understood) together with dissemination activities. To what extent and how the project manages to realise its aspirations is yet to be analysed and will be described in future scientific publications. We will hereby thus

focus on the project's visions and design to illustrate how it integrates principles of participatory communication even if under the CSS name.

YouCount reflects the policy turn in the EU mentioned earlier, that sees CS as a pathway to democratise science and a potential promising scientific approach for involving citizens to develop new knowledge and new or improved solutions to increase social inclusion (Reiersen, 2022). PC is reflected in the project's vision[3] "to strengthen the transformative and participatory aspects of citizen science and social science, by enabling citizen participation in all facets, reaching out for a more egalitarian way of conducting science..." YouCount also incorporates the principles of Open Science and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) aiming for scientific practices that are open to the world, diverse, inclusive, flexible, and reflexive (EC, 2016). This brings participatory communication forward from the start of the project through Responsible Research Communication (RRC), a dialogical approach that combines RRI and PC principles (Canto-Farachala, 2019). Moreover, PC is also reflected in the societal vision of the project that aims to "contribute to create inclusive and innovative societies for European youths and to empower them in promoting active citizenship and a just and equitable future, particularly for youths with disadvantages."

Furthermore, YouCount incorporates a participatory approach to science communication by defining co-creative Y-CSS as: "...a form of participatory social research that involves youths as citizens working together with social scientists creating and communicating new knowledge...it means striving for youth participation and involvement in all aspects of the research design, data collection, data analysis, writing up and scientific communication". Yet, the project also combines several participation levels (Hakley, 2018; Richardson, 2014) where this co-creative approach is combined with lower levels of participation, where a larger group of youths in the community or targeted organisations participate in local dialogue forums and/or in YouCount App study, which we will elaborate on below. An important implication of this approach is that the project does not include a moral view on participation where co- creation is inevitably regarded as the highest standard.

This approach is visible in YouCount's communication plan (DEC Plan) where dialogical communication is conceived of as an inextricable part of the research process and its outcomes (Canto-Farachala et al., 2021). Three spaces are identified: a micro space where dialogical communication develops in the local cases; a meso space where dialogical communication gains scale through hybrid approaches supported by ITCs; and a mass space where only one-way communication is possible. Potential indicators are shown in the column on the right (Figure 2).

---

[3] Quotes in this section are from See https://www.youcountproject.eu/about-the-project/about-the-youcount-project/concept-and-methodology

The Overall Approach to Maximising Impact in YouCount

Figure 2. YouCount: Communication Approach. Source: Adapted from Canto-Farachala et al. (2021)

The case studies work in a flexible way at the local level with youths and stakeholders in so-called living labs, defined as dialogical agoras where democratic dialogue is connected to practice that can be changed through dialogue (Gustavsen, 2008). The dialogical agoras use different kinds of qualitative methods such as ethnography, interviews and creative methods and also aim to engage youths that are further away from science in dialogue to gather rich, in-depth knowledge about social inclusion experiences from young people's perspectives (Ridley et al., 2022).These dialogical agoras or living labs are pragmatically used as an umbrella term for innovation forums, using data and insights provided by the participating young citizen scientists to co-create policymaking and innovations that lead to social change.

Young citizen scientists are involved in both the design and use of qualitative and quantitative methods, for example surveys and in developing creative methods for sharing and communicating the project with local stakeholders They have also been involved in the development, pilot, use and evaluation of an application for smartphones and computer (PC) – named the YouCount App Toolkit (hereinafter the YouCount App or the App). Their participation is an important aspect of the dialogical processes integrated in the research process. Although the App is but one among other methods and tools actively involving young citizen scientists, in this paper we focus our attention on the process of obtaining its approval by the ethics

committees and data protection authorities. This because of its relevance to the overall discussion around old and new ethical and political challenges, namely the potential that CSS offers to expand the scope of participation -understood as dialogue- through ICTs.

Indeed, the piloting of the App was approved by the supervisory authorities as part of co-design process with a smaller group of young citizen scientists in the research teams. Yet, when the time came to launch the App to young people in general, the supervisory authorities in Norway requested a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). The App includes data collection opportunities of relevance for the ethics and policy discussion below: GIS data (place based – interactive map); Quantitative (spots, survey data); Qualitative (commentary text fields); Images (e.g., pictures); Actions (own /others, e.g., participation in activities); and Interactions (e.g., comments/reactions to each other/networking. Participants were informed that their home address should not be spotted. The App differs from ordinary social media platforms by not allowing hidden personal messages or use of negative emojis (only hearts). The App has been used locally in the cases since June 2021 and will be running until the project ends (Ridley., et al., 2022).

In practice, the supervisory ethics committees, and data protection authorities relatively easily accepted the use of the qualitative and quantitative methods as these are common research practices. However, the use of the App created many challenges in the institutional domains of data protection and ethics. These challenges were to a large extent related to the ambitions of open CSS which challenged the traditional supervisory institutions' interpretation and practices with respect to General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) and research ethics. The approval process was also complicated and delayed by lack of competence and guidelines on local and national levels concerning CS and the use of such open digital tools, and enforced by the researcher team's struggles to provide sufficient and targeted information that suited the logic and needs of the supervisory institutions due to the novelty of such research.

The request for a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) [4], unveiled the challenges related to open CSS due to its research focus and more personal character. For instance, the Norwegian supervisory authorities assessed that "the planned processing of personal data will involve a relatively high risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects". The concerns were related to: Processing special categories of personal data (sensitive information), or information of a more personal character; Processing of personal data on a large scale, both in terms of sample size, amount of information (variables), duration and regularity; Combining data sets (e.g., different purposes and/or different data controllers) in a way that exceeds the data subject's reasonable expectations; Processing of personal data about vulnerable individuals, and partly minors.

---

[4] General Data Protection Regulation art. 35 nr. 1.

The DPIA was approved after two months with the following consequences for the project: (i) a long, formal, and extensive written consent form integrated in the app; (ii), limitation in the use of the App to local case participants; (iii), a system for parental consent for minors or exclusion of opportunities to participate for those under 16/18 years when parental consent was too difficult to achieve (iv) extended guidelines to require use of pseudonyms, no identifiable pictures of self or others and (v) procedures for safe data transfer/storage and use of an App moderator group to prevent possible personal or improper content (already planned for, but more underlined).

While the DPIA to some extent contributed to strengthen data protection considerations and technical/organisations measures to safeguard participants, the consequences described above resulted in the tendency of excluding the youngest participants from the study, and to reduced possibilities for open personal engagement in science through digital tools, compared to CS in natural sciences. Moreover, the GDPR assessment process displayed that several data related to youths' observations of social inclusion opportunities were 'automatically' considered as sensitive data (for example, spots or comments related to religious meeting places as important for social belonging). Social data was thus often regarded as more personal and riskier, especially the open commentary fields in the app and the interactive functions. The need for control and disclosure curtailed its use for open dialogical communication. The innovative purposes of the project were also regarded as out of the scope for the formal assessments, keeping a strict distinction between research and innovation, which conflicts with EU science policy and funding for the YouCount project

Another tension was between the ideal of citizen- generated data in CSS and the project's focus on young citizen scientists as equal partners or contributions/active agents in co- creative processes versus the traditional focus on participants as 'objects for science' and request for high research control of the data from the researchers. More overarching policy and ethical considerations concerning the underlining understanding of youth, sensitive data or vulnerability as more nuanced individual traits or power relations, were regarded as outside the scope for the DPIA assessment because the university contract with the supervisory authorities only included legal data protection issues and not ethical considerations. This institutional separation of data protection and ethics approval assessments, especially related to CSS (as social sciences and not health research) hampered the possibility of finding a good balance between the needs for disclosure and risk mitigation strategies with current policy aiming to provide youth and marginalised citizens to have a say in policy and science.

The challenges of more nuanced considerations of responsible citizen engagement were also enforced by a tendency to "automatically" frame youths as 'children' (and not adolescents) or as 'vulnerable' instead of being adult participants.

While the researchers found the written consent letter as too long and bureaucratic for the participating youth groups, this could not be changed as they required some standard formalities concerning GDPR. Broader and common ethics concerns and considerations were thus disconnected from GDPR, and the ethical epistemology behind GDPR legislation was left out. This GDPR logic also seemed to reinforce a paternalistic ethics where the user- involvement perspectives were downplayed to a larger extent than before. The many different and multi-level actors following the new GDPR in combination with the novelty of the App tool, also complicated the process, increased workload and delayed the processes which reduced the possibilities of using the App during the implementation period.

4. DISCUSSION

The experiences in the YouCount project reflect both old challenges in participatory communication and new ones, given its novel character and its combination of different traditions and approaches to citizen science. In what follows we discuss two sets of ethical and political challenges that resonate with the challenges faced by participatory communication (the science policy environment and integrating different methodological approaches) and highlight one that we identify as emerging specifically in CSS (the use if open ICTs to expand the participation scope).

The science policy environment

If the discourse around CSS is not accompanied by a change in practice, CSS runs the risk of being used in instrumental terms like participatory communication before it, without delivering social change or empowering those who agree to contribute their time, efforts and hopes to engage in co-creative processes aimed at addressing a social challenge that directly affects them. Indeed, citizen science has been launched in a specific science policy context by research funding institutions (i.e. of EU or national research councils) as an important open science strategy and as a way to support participatory democracy and enhance science- society collaboration in research and innovation. These trends are reflected in the frequent use of the terms "co-creative research", citizen or user-involved or generated science, "inclusive science" or "participatory research" as positive research and innovation qualities.

However, the conditions that are necessary for CSS to develop are still not fully incorporated in institutional structures and cultures in research funding organisations. Indeed, building trusting relationships that enable co- creative practices takes time and resources. An important message from the participating youths in the YouCount project is that trust and safety are core elements for

inclusive science and real participatory or co- creative research and innovation (Norvoll, Plassnig & Brattbakk, 2022). However, the time needed to build safe spaces does not often fit with the timing of traditional funding approaches nor are the resources necessary to adequately facilitate communication with different publics at different levels and in different spaces fully recognized in the budget.

Moreover, we can see from the first experiences in YouCount that facilitating inclusive science and co- creation and participation on European/project level with youth with disadvantages can be challenging due to language barriers and more. Even if this does not apply to all youths, participation doesn't come easy for those often further away from science and for those with most social participation challenges. To succeed with the ambition of inclusive science, there is a need among others: for extra resources to organise and facilitate meetings, follow up and support the youths in finding a social voice for their experiences and more. There is also a need to secure a budget for travel and participation in meetings as well as safety needs. In sum, CSS needs to be planned and allocated enough resources to succeed. If CSS is to contribute to strengthen participatory democracy, the aforementioned considerations need to be recognised, structured and funded adequately by policymakers and research funding institutions.

Finally, while the EU is promoting the need for more inclusive science and finding ways to involve a broader scope of citizens in science and innovations, the possibilities, and necessary rewards or regulations for this kind of research, are not sufficiently reflected in current legal regulations. While the risks of open science and use of open ICT tools must be acknowledged and safeguarded, there are nonetheless many bureaucratic obstacles that make it easier for researchers to leave out social groups further away from science to avoid work overload and challenges with progression in time- restricted projects. Indeed, there is a one- sided focus on vulnerability that runs counter to the voices for underrepresented groups who ger left out of emancipatory /democratic representation. The challenge of CSS being used in instrument terms like participatory communication before it remains relevant.

Integrating different methodological approaches

As discussed in the previous section, YouCount uses a mixed- methods design in the case studies in line with Lennie & Tacchi (2013) who call for an appropriate combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques in communication projects stressing that different approaches are suitable for different issues and purposes in development. Moreover, while participatory processes are meant to draw from the practical expertise of non-academic participants, professional researchers may also have scientific or topic expertise that is of interest or can benefit them. These different epistemological worlds or knowledge bases do not necessarily need to conflict (even if they may) or serve as instrumental communication. They can

combine in a positive way in CSS. Similarly, enhancing knowledge and learning from the researchers' expertise is not necessarily enforcing negative power balances. This connects with the finding by Rodriguez (2021) that power relations are not monolithic but fluid and changing.

Indeed, an important prerequisite for participation as described by the youth citizen scientists in the YouCount project is for example to receive sufficient information about the project and to be given enough time to learn about the topic. This is crucial for being able to participate in meaningful and empowering ways. Instead of thinking that professional researchers are there to fill a knowledge gap, more nuanced and interactive approaches to democratic processes can be possible. While trying to avoid instrumental approaches, there is a need to acknowledge that knowledge exchange unfolds in mutual and complex ways. This complexity should also be integrated in CSS. While avoiding the knowledge deficit approach prevalent in traditional science communication and citizen science, the overarching ambitions of science contributing to society through its scientific and expert knowledge may also be integrated and used in and CSS to a greater extent without trading its democratic ideals.

The use of ICTs to expand the participation scope

ICTs are an important tool in citizen science and in CSS they offer the potential of expanding the traditional scope of participatory approaches by enabling large-scale studies of social phenomena like social inclusion. YouCount pursued the development of an App to be used by YCS for three main reasons: (i) as a way of gaining more knowledge of young peoples' s' views and experiences with social inclusion through their mapping and monitoring of their social world; (ii) to develop more knowledge of suitable and inclusive ICT tools and how to use them in data collection with youths with disadvantages and from multicultural backgrounds; and (iii) to explore the possibilities of expanding the scope of participatory approaches that normally take place in small groups or use so-called small media providing opportunities for new knowledge creation through its interactive function. The first point is related to the CS tradition that uses digital tools for mapping and monitoring purposes (Bonney, 1996); the second addresses the challenge of increasing the digital divide (Cullen, 2001) and the third one follows Heiss & Matthes (2017) who highlight the potential for knowledge production by working collaboratively with citizens to enable access to both large-scale data and "hidden" data collected in situ.

The full experience with the App is yet to be analysed and described. However, the development and approval process show that collecting data in the natural sciences and collecting data in the social sciences has different implications. Indeed, the authorization processes with the supervisory data protection authorities show that the use of an open CSS app is experienced as riskier compared to traditional research and more unpredictable since the researchers are less in control of the data

collection process and the data are openly visible for others. It reveals limited and insufficient legislation and ethical guidelines for this kind of open interactive CSS research. Therefore a key institutional barrier for the use of ITC's in CSS emerges, calling for further development of data protection legislation and research ethics, and a stronger integration of data protection and ethics assessments on institutional level.

While digital technologies can offer new possibilities for social sciences, their use and design may be more difficult due to the complexity of recording social observations and ethical issues, not least when it comes to studies of vulnerable populations. Overall, more knowledge is needed to explore the actual risks/danger by using such open devices for sharing of comments and interactions. These challenges became evident in the approval processes of the YouCount App which demonstrate the need for more competence, guidelines and institutional changes in policy and supervisory institutions concerning CSS and use of open digital tools as elaborated on in the next section.

While recognising the variety and complexity of these issues, the DPIA processes revealed some interesting challenges related to open Y-CSS and communication. Indeed, more knowledge is needed to explore the actual risks/danger by using such open devices for sharing of comments and interactions and on how to facilitate safe and trusting dialogues about social challenges in app devices. This seems also to be enforced by the new GDPR and ethical approval structures. First, the processes displayed the challenges of finding a good balance in practise between the EU open science policy of "as open as possible and as closed as necessary" in CSS, and tensions between the EU policy of open science and GDPR, not at least concerning young people.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This paper builds on Albert et al., 2021) who identify **PAR** among the epistemic foundations of CSS by drawing from PC, an understudied approach in CSS's emerging literature. Our aim was to identify lessons on ethical and political challenges and identify new ones. To that end we analysed YouCount, an ongoing CSS project funded by the Horizon 2020 programme that, from its design draws from participatory communication to incorporate a dialogical approach to research.

From our analysis we find that some key ethical and political challenges identified by scholars working in participatory communication are still relevant and others are new. For instance, the ideal high level aims of participatory democracy without a change in practice, can end up providing nothing really valuable or meaningful for participants and can even encourage situations of exploitation. In this context, the clash between the needs of a truly participatory citizen social science project and the conditions attached to funding in terms of budget and time frames that do not allow

enough time for building trust or safe spaces for participating citizens needs to be addressed. Without this, CSS is prey to instrumental uses like participatory communication before it with negative consequences for the high ideals of a strengthened participatory democracy.

In terms of the entrenched narratives that characterised the history of participatory communication, we find through YouCount that while this challenge remains true, CSS can actually integrate and combine different approaches in all stages of the research process to address a societal challenge that is jointly perceived as important for researchers, funding institutions, public administrations and citizens themselves. However, since the project is still ongoing it is difficult to determine whether it will lead to significant changes in terms of social inclusion for the young citizen scientists involved.

However, one dimension that does emerge as a novel challenge is the use of ICT devices to expand the scope of participation due to their implications for research control of personal data and disclosure. Indeed, traditional institutions like the supervisory data protection authorities and ethics committees experience these devices as more risky which unveils a gap between the science policy environment and institutional structures, cultures and competences and raises the question of how to balance the principle of "as open as possible and disclosed as necessary" in open CSS promoted by the EU. There is a need to strengthen citizen based and inclusive science through a stronger institutional integration of data protection and ethics, and more competence and guidelines for the use of such CSS devices. More research in this regard is necessary and many questions remain unanswered like: Is it possible to facilitate open communication about social issues with the public in an open interactive app in a safe, dialogical and meaningful way? Does a strong focus on technological devices downplay broader dialogical processes and relationships? Are ICT tools really able to foster engagement, science- society relations and emancipatory processes? How can this be done and combined with other methods in the best ways?

DISCLAIMER

REFERENCES

Albert, A. (2021). The rise of citizen social science raises more questions about social science than it answers. *British Politics and Policy at LSE.*

Albert, A., Balázs, B., Butkevičienė, E., Mayer, K., & Perelló, J. (2021). Citizen social science: New and established approaches to participation in social research. *Chapter 7. In: Vohland K. et Al.(Eds). 2021. The Science of Citizen Science. Springer. Https://Doi. Org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4. Pp: 119-138.*

Ballard, H. L., Robinson, L. D., Young, A. N., Pauly, G. B., Higgins, L. M., Johnson, R. F., & Tweddle, J. C. (2017). Contributions to conservation outcomes by natural history museum-led citizen science: Examining evidence and next steps. *Biological Conservation, 208*, 87–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.BIOCON.2016.08.040

Barranquero, A. (2006). Reclamando voces. Contribución latinoamericana a la comunicación para el cambio social. *Redes. Com: Revista de Estudios Para El Desarrollo Social de La Comunicación, 3*, 243–262.

Barranquero, A. (2011). El espejismo de la comunicación para el cambio social, radiografía de un concepto insostenible. *Comunicación, Desarrollo y Cambio Social*, 81.

Barranquero, A. (2015). Trayectorias, cruces y diálogos entre la tradición latinoamericana y anglosajona en comunicación comunitaria y ciudadana. *Revista Internacional de Comunicación y Desarrollo (RICD), 1*(1), 19–22.

Barranquero, A. (2017). Rediscovering the Latin American roots of participatory communication for social change. *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 8*(1).

Beltran, L. R. (1976). Alien premises, objects, and methods in Latin American communication research. *Communication Research, 3*(2), 107–134.

Bonney, R. (1996). Citizen science: A lab tradition. *Living Bird, 15*(4), 7–15.

Butkevičienė, Egle, Pučėtaitė, Raminta, Vaičiūnienė, Jolanta, Norvoll, Reidun, Canto, Patricia, Lorenz, Usue, Juricek, Sarah, Freiling, Isabelle, Matthes, Jörg, Jørgensen, Michael S., Pataki, Gyôrgy, Czeglédi, Alexandra, Gatti, Flora, & Procentese, Fortuna. (2021). *D1.2 Report on the conceptual, innovative, evaluation and ethical framework for youth citizen social science* (Version 1). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6089150

Canto-Farachala, P. (2019). *Research institutes as change agents in territorial development: An analytical framework on responsible research communication responsible research communication.* PhD Dissertation. Universidad de Deusto. Retrieved from: https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/en/publications-search/publications/doctoral-theses/1795-research-institutes-change-agents-territorial-development-responsible-research-communication

Canto-Farachala, P. & Estensoro, M. (2020). Bridging between Action Research Communities: A Pathway to Connectivity. *IJAR–International Journal of Action Research, 16*(1), 5–6.

Canto-Farachala, P. (2021). Responsible Research Communication as an experimental approach to third person inquiry in ARTD. In Miren Larrea (ed.) *Roots and Wings of Action Research for Territorial Development*, pp:259-272, Bilbao: Deusto University Press

Canto-Farachala, P., & Larrea, M. (2022). Rethinking the communication of action research: Can we make it dialogic?. *Action Research*, 20(2), 199-218.

Canto-Farachala, P.; Lorenz, U.; Franco, S.; Bronéus, F.; Norvoll, R.; Philipp H. (2021). *YouCount D5.7 Continuous updated DEC and stakeholder engagement plan, and report on DEC activities.* https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4812107

Coghlan, D., & Brydon-Miller, M. (2014). *The SAGE encyclopedia of action research.* Sage.

Coghlan, D., & Gaya. 2014. Dissertation Writing" In *Action Research,* D. Coghlanand M. Brydon-Miller (ed.) 280–283. Los Angeles:Sage

Cornish, L., & Dunn, A. (2009). Creating knowledge for action: the case for participatory communication in research. *Development in Practice, 19*(4–5), 665–677.

Cullen, R. (2001). Addressing the digital divide. *Online Information Review, 25*(5), 311–320.

Dagron, A. (2008). Vertical minds versus horizontal cultures: An overview of participatory process and experiences. *Communication for Development and Social Change,* 68.

Dagron, A. (2011). Comunicación para el cambio social: clave del desarrollo participativo. *Signo y Pensamiento, 30*(58), 26–39.

Dagron, A. G., & Tufte, T. (2006). *Communication for social change anthology: Historical and contemporary readings.* CFSC Consortium, Inc.

Daniel, B., Schwier, R., & McCalla, G. (2003). Social capital in virtual learning communities and distributed communities of practice. *Canadian Journal of Learning and Technology/La Revue Canadienne de l'apprentissage et de La Technologie, 29*(3).

Deetz, S. (1999). Participatory democracy as a normative foundation for communication studies. *Theoretical Approaches to Participatory Communication,* 131–167.

Dervin, B., & Huesca, R. (1999). *The participatory communication for development narrative: An examination of meta-theoretic assumptions and their impacts.*

EC. (2016). *Science with and for Society.* https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/science-and-society

Eitzel, M. V, Cappadonna, J. L., Santos-Lang, C., Duerr, R. E., Virapongse, A., West, S. E., Kyba, C. C. M., Bowser, A., Cooper, C. B., Sforzi, A., Metcalfe, A. N., Harris, E. S., Thiel, M., Haklay, M., Ponciano, L., Roche, J., Ceccaroni, L., Shilling, F. M., Dörler, D., ... Jiang, Q. (2017). Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key Terms. *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 2*(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.5334/CSTP.96

Fair, J. E., & Shah, H. (1997). Continuities and discontinuities in communication and development research since 1958. *Journal of International Communication, 4*(2), 3–23.

Fernández-Sánchez, M. R., & Valverde-Berrocoso, J. (2014). A Community of Practice: An Intervention Model based on Computer Supported Collaborative Learning. Comunidades de práctica: un modelo de intervención desde el aprendizaje colaborativo en entornos virtuales. *Comunicar, 21*(42), 97–105.

Freire, P. (1996). Pedagogy of the oppressed (revised). *New York: Continuum, 356,* 357–358.

Frigerio, D., Richter, A., Per, E., Pruse, B., & Vohland, K. (2021). Citizen science in the natural sciences. *The Science of Citizen Science,* 79–96.

Gustavsen, B. (2008). Action research, practical challenges and the formation of theory. *Action Research, 6*(4), 421–437.

Haklay, M. (2018). Participatory citizen science. *Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy*, 52–62.

Haklay, M. M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Manzoni, M., Hecker, S., & Vohland, K. (2021). What is citizen science? The challenges of definition. *The Science of Citizen Science, 13*.

Heiss, R., & Matthes, J. (2017). Citizen science in the social sciences: A call for more evidence. *GAIA-Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society, 26*(1), 22–26.

Hemer, O., & Tufte, T. (2016). *Introduction: Why voice and matter matter.*

Huesca, R. (2008). Tracing the history of participatory communication approaches to development: A critical appraisal. *Communication for Development and Social Change, 180.*

Inagaki, N. (2007). *Communicating the impact of communication for development: Recent trends in empirical research.*

Irwin, A. (1995). *Citizen science: A Study of People, Expertise, and Sustainable Development.* Routledge: London.

Jacobson, T. L. (1993). A pragmatist account of participatory communication research for national development. *Communication Theory, 3*(3), 214–230.

Kantanen, H., Manninen, J., & Kontkanen, J. (2014). Emergent dialogue as a prerequisite of learning and innovation in professional virtual communities. *International Journal of Web Based Communities*, 10(2), 211-231.

Kaplún, M. (1998). Una pedagogía de la comunicación. Ediciones de la Torre. *Madrid. Pág, 69.*

Kasperowski, D., Suman, A. B., Chen, S.-L., & Kullenberg, C. (2023). Where Environmental Citizen Science Meets the Law. *Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 8*(1).

Kullenberg, C., & Kasperowski, D. (2016). What is citizen science? - A scientometric meta-analysis. *PLoS ONE, 11*(1). https://doi.org/10.1371/JOURNAL.PONE.0147152

Leal, A. P. (2007). Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era. *Development in Practice, 17*(4–5), 539–548.

Lennie, J., & Tacchi, J. (2013). *Evaluating communication for development: A framework for social change.*

Lewin, T., & Patterson, Z. (2012). Approaches to development research communication. *IDS Bulletin, 43*(5), 38–44.

McKinley, D. C., Miller-Rushing, A. J., Ballard, H. L., Bonney, R., Brown, H., Cook-Patton, S. C., Evans, D. M., French, R. A., Parrish, J. K., Phillips, T. B., Ryan, S. F., Shanley, L. A., Shirk, J. L., Stepenuck, K. F., Weltzin, J. F., Wiggins, A., Boyle, O. D., Briggs, R. D., Chapin, S. F., ... Soukup, M. A. (2017). Citizen science can improve conservation science, natural resource management, and environmental protection. *Biological Conservation, 208*, 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.BIOCON.2016.05.015

Merenlender, A. M., Crall, A. W., Drill, S., Prysby, M., & Ballard, H. (2016). Evaluating environmental education, citizen science, and stewardship through naturalist

programs. *Conservation Biology, 30*(6), 1255–1265. https://doi.org/10.1111/COBI.12737

Morris, N. (2003). A comparative analysis of the diffusion and participatory models in development communication. *Communication Theory, 13*(2), 225–248.

Norvoll, R. Plassnig, S., & Brattbakk, I. (2022). D2.2 *Open data concerning social inclusion provided on the project homepage – Emerging finding*s. (Version 1) [Data set]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6677557

Reiersen, F. A. (2022). From Youth Participation to Social Innovation and Policy Change, Masters Dissertation, Oslo Metropolitan University.

Resnik, D. B., Elliott, K. C., & Miller, A. K. (2015). A framework for addressing ethical issues in citizen science. *Environmental Science & Policy, 54,* 475–481.

Richardson, L. (2014). Engaging the public in policy research: are community researchers the answer? *Politics and Governance, 2*(1), 32–44.

Ridley, J., Brattbakk, I., Pataki, G, Czegledi, A., Procentese, F., Gatti, F., & Norvoll. R. (2022). *Methodological Framework for Data Collection and Analysis.* 10.5281/zenodo.6303118

Rifkin, S. B. (1996). Paradigms lost: toward a new understanding of community participation in health programmes. *Acta Tropica, 61*(2), 79–92.

Rodriguez, C. (2001). Fissures in the mediascape. Cresskill. *NJ: Hampton Press. Rojas Blanco, L.(2003). A Propsito Del Voseo: Su Historia, Su Morfologa y Su Situacin En Costa Rica. Revista Educacin, 27*(2), 143–163.

Rodríguez, C. (2009). De medios alternativos a medios ciudadanos: trayectoria teórica de un término. *Folios, Revista de La Facultad de Comunicaciones, 21–22,* 13–25.

Rodríguez, C., Ferron, B., & Shamas, K. (2014). Four challenges in the field of alternative, radical and citizens' media research. *Media, culture & society, 36*(2), 150-166.

Rogers, A. (2005). Participatory diffusion or semantic confusion. *Media Matters. Perspectives on Advancing Governance & Development from the Global Forum for Media Development,* 179–187.

Roman, R. (2005). The place of theory in development communication: retrospect and prospects. *Annals of the International Communication Association, 29*(1), 311–332.

Sauermann, H., Vohland, K., Antoniou, V., Balázs, B., Göbel, C., Karatzas, K., Mooney, P., Perelló, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., & Winter, S. (2020). Citizen science and sustainability transitions. *Research Policy, 49*(5), 103978. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2020.103978

Senabre Hidalgo, E., Perelló, J., Becker, F., Bonhoure, I., Legris, M., & Cigarini, A. (2021). Participation and co-creation in citizen science. *Chapter 11. In: Vohland K. et al.(Eds). 2021. The Science of Citizen Science. Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4. pp: 199-218.*

Servaes, J. (1999). *Communication for development. One world, multiple cultures.* Hampton Press; Creskill.

Servaes, J. (2008). Confusion about MDGs and Participatory Diffusion. *Communication for Development and Social Change, 2*(3).

Servaes, J., & Lie, R. (2014). *Future imperatives of communication for sustainable development and social change. A policy-intent report.* United Nations Development Group (UNDG).

Tauginienė, L., Butkevičienė, E., Vohland, K., Heinisch, B., Daskolia, M., Suškevičs, M., ... & Prūse, B. (2020). Citizen science in the social sciences and humanities: the power of interdisciplinarity. *Palgrave Communications, 6*(1), 1-11.

Thompson, M. (2008). ICT and development studies: Towards development 2.0. *Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association, 20*(6), 821–835.

Wagenknecht, K., Woods, T., Nold, C., Rüfenacht, S., Voight-Heucke, S., Caplan, A., Hecker, S., & Vohland, K. (2021). A question of dialogue? Reflections on how citizen science can enhance communication between science and society. *Journal of Science Communication, 20*(3).

Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2013). *Mediated citizenship.* Routledge.

Waisbord, S. (2005). Five key ideas: coincidences and challenges in development communication. *Media and Glocal Change. Rethinking Communication for Development,* 77–90.

Waisbord, S. (2015). Three challenges for communication and global social change. *Communication Theory, 25*(2), 144–165.

White, R. (1999). The need for new strategies of research on the democratization of communication. *Theoretical Approaches to Participatory Communication,* 128–211.

FILOSOFIA PUBBLICA E CITIZEN SCIENCE: VERSO UNA *CITIZEN PHILOSOPHY*?

LUCIA ZIGLIOLI
FilosoficamenteLab.
info@filosoficamentelab.com

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the phenomenon known as citizen science, that shows citizens collaborating side by side with experts in the process of producing scientific knowledge, has exploded in various forms. Born mainly in the field of natural sciences, it rapidly expanded to social sciences and humanities: today we also speak of citizen humanities. However, what about philosophy? Lately, public philosophy, that is a philosophy *for* and *with* everyone, has redefined the role of philosophy in society and the relationship between professionals and citizens. Public philosophy brings the discipline everywhere and to anyone who is willing to welcome it. The object of this contribution is to understand if, and possibly under which conditions, public philosophy produces an advancement for the discipline itself, thereby becoming a form of citizen science, or, as I suggest calling it, a form of *citizen philosophy*. To understand this, it will first be necessary to clarify the respective definitions of citizen science and public philosophy. I will discuss whether, and possibly in what terms or under what conditions, the scientific statute of philosophy opens up to citizen science practices and what challenges this poses to the philosophical community.

KEYWORDS

Citizen science, public philosophy, citizen philosophy, metaphilosophy, epistemic injustice

1. CITIZEN SCIENCE E FILOSOFIA

La *citizen science* è un fenomeno in rapida espansione, che trova oggi diverse forme di espressione e riguarda sempre più discipline. Il termine "citizen science" ha un'origine recente[1], sebbene il fenomeno possa essere in realtà molto antico, e non trova ancora una definizione unanimemente condivisa nella letteratura di riferimento[2]. Tuttavia, una prima, molto ampia, descrizione di *citizen science* può

---

[1] La prima occorrenza registrata pare essere nell'articolo di R. Kerson. 1989. «Lab for the environment». *Technology Review*, 92 (1), 11-12.

[2] Per una discussione della definizione di "Citizen science", oltre agli altri contributi di questo volume, rinvio a Haklay, M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Manzoni, M., Hecker, S., Vohland, K. 2021. «What Is Citizen Science? The Challenges of Definition». In Vohland, K. *et al. The Science of Citizen Science*. Springer, Cham.

essere data nei termini di pratica che vede la collaborazione o il coinvolgimento, a vario modo e misura, dei cittadini nel processo di ricerca scientifica. È un coinvolgimento generalmente guidato o quantomeno monitorato nei suoi risultati da scienziati professionisti o istituzioni scientifiche. La maggior parte delle definizioni di *citizen science* proposte dalla letteratura, infatti, riconosce una qualche forma di collaborazione tra la comunità scientifica e i cittadini, se non fosse anche solo nei termini di impiego da parte di questi ultimi di metodologie e pratiche scientifiche riconosciute come tali dalla comunità scientifica di riferimento[3] – diverrebbe davvero difficile altrimenti parlare di "scienza".

Inizialmente coniato nell'ambito delle scienze naturali per indicare quelle iniziative in cui i cittadini partecipavano alla ricerca scientifica tramite la raccolta di dati, ora con *citizen science* si fa riferimento più in generale a qualsiasi collaborazione tra cittadini ed esperti. Anche l'accezione di "science" si è ampliata ad includere le scienze sociali e la ricerca umanistica. Si parla oggi di "citizen humanities"[4] per indicare la collaborazione tra cittadini ed esperti in discipline come l'archeologia, la storia, la linguistica, l'arte, e naturalmente anche la filosofia.

È proprio la filosofia, come possibile caso di *citizen science*, l'oggetto di esame di questo contributo. Ci si chiede se il rapido diffondersi di iniziative di *citizen science* abbia coinvolto anche la filosofia, e, se sì, in che modo. Quali sono le forme di collaborazione scientifica dei cittadini, dei non professionisti, con i filosofi? Che risultati producono queste collaborazioni? In quanto segue, proverò a rispondere a queste domande. Lo farò facendo riferimento a un fenomeno che, pur avendo radici lontane, sta caratterizzando la filosofia negli ultimi anni, finendo per trasformare radicalmente il rapporto della disciplina con il grande pubblico e obbligando i filosofi a una riflessione sulla natura stessa del fare filosofia. Mi riferisco alla filosofia pubblica o *public philosophy*[5].

La filosofia pubblica è una pratica filosofica che esce dalle aule accademiche e scolastiche per coinvolgere la popolazione tutta, dai bambini agli adulti, dai

---

[3] Si veda, ad esempio, la seguente definizione in cui la citizen science è descritta in termini generalissimi come l'impiego da parte dei cittadini di metodologie scientifiche: «Citizen science is the use of scientific methods by the general public to ask and answer questions about the world and solve problems of concern» (Chari, R., Blumenthal, M.S., Matthews. L.J. 2019. *Community Citizen Science: From Promise to Action*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2763.html).

[4] Heinisch, B., Oswald, K., Weißpflug, M., Shuttleworth, S., Belknap, G. 2021. «Citizen Humanities». In *The Science of Citizen Science*. Cit.

[5] La discussione filosofica sulla natura della *public philosophy* è vivace almeno quanto l'evoluzione del fenomeno. Per potersi orientare nel dibattito, può essere utile prendere avvio dalle due principali raccolte di saggi ad oggi dedicate alla *public philosophy*: Weinstein J.R. (ed.) 2014. «Essays in Philosophy». Volume 15, Issue 1 *Public Philosophy*. https://commons.pacificu.edu/collection/e5886f19-9ed2-4925-8b8b-44fd8d6e8cda?volume=15&issue=1; McIntyre, L., McHugh. N., and Olasov, I. (Eds.). 2022. *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

professionisti a pensionati, entrando nelle piazze, nei caffè, persino nelle carceri. È generalmente intesa come *filosofia per tutti*, ed è un genere nato per rispondere alla sempre crescente domanda di filosofia da parte del grande pubblico. Negli ultimi anni, la *public philosophy* è diventata un vero e proprio fenomeno culturale, prima, e un'interessante questione metafilosofica, poi. Visto il coinvolgimento da parte di filosofi professionisti di un pubblico di "non addetti ai lavori", ci si può chiedere se la *public philosophy* possa essere a tutti gli effetti considerata una forma di *citizen science*, la forma di *citizen science* propria della filosofia, che suggerisco qui di chiamare *citizen philosophy*.

Per rispondere a questa domanda, è necessario, tuttavia, chiarire meglio la natura di entrambe la *citizen science* e la *public philosophy*, al fine anche di comprenderne appieno specificità ed eventuali punti in comune.

Posto nei termini, generalissimi, di una collaborazione tra esperti e cittadini, il concetto di *citizen science* diventa ampio abbastanza da includere ogni forma di interazione tra disciplina e pubblico. Ma questa definizione, da me offerta in apertura, ci dice forse ancora troppo poco del fenomeno, che, descritto in questo modo, si faticherebbe a distinguere da qualsiasi forma di didattica o divulgazione scientifica. Ritengo, invece, che con "citizen science" si voglia generalmente far riferimento a qualcosa di differente dalla divulgazione, o, forse sarebbe meglio dire, di più specifico, perché più specifico è il fine che la muove. Nella divulgazione scientifica, obbiettivo dell'interazione esperti-pubblico è quello di promuovere e diffondere la conoscenza scientifica nella società. Anche nella *citizen science* può essere presente un fine formativo o didattico, ma è l'obbiettivo epistemico, ossia la produzione di nuovo sapere scientifico, a caratterizzare e distinguere la *citizen science* da altre forme di interazione esperti-cittadini[6]. Una definizione più puntuale di *citizen science* (comunque inclusiva delle moltissime forme e metodologie adottate) fa proprio riferimento al suo obbiettivo epistemico: «La Citizen science coinvolge attivamente il pubblico nella ricerca scientifica *che genera nuova conoscenza o comprensione*»[7]. Naturalmente il fine della cooperazione determina anche il tipo di relazione che si instaura tra professionisti e cittadini: se l'obbiettivo è divulgativo, i cittadini vengono coinvolti come destinatari di un'operazione

---

[6] La natura epistemica, più che solamente didattica, del coinvolgimento dei cittadini in qualche fase del processo di ricerca scientifica è del resto registrata in tutte le 34 definizioni di "citizen science" raccolte in Haklay, M. *et al.* 2021. Nella maggior parte di esse si cita infatti la partecipazione dei cittadini al processo di *ricerca scientifica*, in alcuni casi si fa esplicito riferimento alla «produzione di nuovo sapere scientifico», o a «l'avanzamento della ricerca scientifica». Gli autori concludono pertanto che la definizione di *citizen science* include un aspetto strumentale, perchè deve riflettere le finalità dei protagonisti, ma anche il tipo di partecipazione dei cittadini nei vari processi che generano conoscenza scientifica («It is clear that a definition of citizen science includes an instrumental side: it must reflect the objectives of the actors and the extend of the engagement of citizen in the different processes generating scientific knowledge». Haklay, M. *et al.* 2021. «What Is Citizen Science? The Challenges of Definition». In *The Science of Citizen Science.* Cit., p. 14).

[7] https://eu-citizen.science/ (mio corsivo).

formativa o didattica tutta a carico dell'esperto. Si tratta generalmente di un intervento trasmissivo, di tipo unidirezionale o top-down, che dall'esperto viene rivolto al pubblico discente. Se, invece, il fine è epistemico, i cittadini vengono coinvolti come veri e propri collaboratori ("partner") del processo di ricerca scientifica, come coprotagonisti[8]. A caratterizzare un'iniziativa di *citizen science* rispetto alla didattica o divulgazione di sapere scientifico vi è quindi anche il rapporto di cooperazione tra le parti coinvolte: pur nel riconoscimento delle diverse competenze e conoscenze, i cittadini svolgono un ruolo attivo, partecipando attivamente al processo di costruzione del sapere.

Si apre ora la questione interna alle singole discipline di come possano cittadini non professionisti contribuire all'avanzamento del sapere scientifico. Lo possono fare in diversi modi, che implicano gradi di complessità, esperienza, e di consapevolezza della questione in esame anche molto diversi fra loro. A seconda dell'ambito scientifico o disciplinare in questione e, naturalmente, del singolo progetto, i cittadini possono essere chiamati a dare un contributo principalmente quantitativo alla ricerca, ad esempio fornendo aiuto nella raccolta di dati o nell'osservazione di fenomeni, o possono fornire un contributo più qualitativo, venendo coinvolti nella sperimentazione di tecnologie, sino, addirittura, nell'individuazione di nuovi problemi e nella formulazione di ipotesi teoriche[9].

Nel chiedermi se la *public philosophy* possa essere considerata una forma di *citizen science* o meno, è a questo significato più stretto, definito dall'obbiettivo epistemico della cooperazione tra cittadini ed esperti, che faccio riferimento. Si tratta quindi di capire se la pratica della filosofia pubblica, che ora andrò a descrivere, produca o meno un progresso nella conoscenza filosofica, e se sì, in che modo. Per farlo, occorrerà partire da una definizione di filosofia pubblica e da una presentazione del suo operare. La questione non è di poco conto, e chiama in causa lo statuto stesso della disciplina. Se infatti viene generalmente riconosciuto che la filosofia pubblica possa avere ricadute formative sul pubblico – il dibattito se mai è su quali –, più difficile è comprendere se, ed eventualmente come, il coinvolgimento di non esperti possa avere ricadute sulla disciplina in generale. Può un non esperto, se non in maniera fortuita o contingente, contribuire al progresso del sapere disciplinare? Una risposta affermativa alla domanda implica la rinuncia

---

[8] Sulla distinzione tra divulgazione scientifica e *citizen science* si veda anche Simone Rüfenacht e colleghi, che descrivono la divulgazione come comunicazione a senso unico, top-down, dall'esperto al pubblico. Nella citizen science, in cui l'attiva partecipazione dei cittadini al processo scientifico è fondamentale, si segna il passaggio dal monologo al dialogo bidirezionale (Rüfenacht, S. *et al.* 2021. «Communication and Dissemination in Citizen Science». In *The Science of Citizen Science*. Cit. pp. 475-494).

[9] Per una definizione delle caratteristiche principali della *citizen science* si veda: Haklay, M., et all. 2020. *ECSA's Characteristics of Citizen Science.* Zenodo. Per una panoramica dell'enorme varietà di progetti di *citizen science* oggi realizzati rinvio al portale: https://eu-citizen.science/projects.

alla professionalità del mestiere del filosofo, al suo bagaglio di competenze e conoscenze tecniche, specialistiche?

Ad avviso di chi scrive, vi sono situazioni e condizioni in cui la filosofia pubblica diviene a tutti gli effetti una forma di *citizen science*, nel senso che realizza l'obbiettivo di produrre un contributo per l'avanzamento stesso della disciplina. Si potrebbe, quindi, in questi casi parlare di una "citizen philosophy". Quali siano queste situazioni e in quali condizioni ciò si verifichi è quanto andrò a specificare (§3) dopo aver presentato natura e funzione della filosofia pubblica (§2).

2. CHE COS'È LA PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

Una prima descrizione di filosofia pubblica potrebbe essere quella di pratica della filosofia che esce dalle aule accademiche per tornare nelle piazze, nelle strade, incontrare i concittadini, senza aspettare che siano questi a salire le scale della torre d'avorio. La filosofia, da sapere per pochi, diviene pratica *di e per tutti*. Come quello di *citizen science*, anche il concetto di *public philosophy* è un termine di famiglia, una nozione a ombrello usata per indicare una grande varietà di pratiche filosofiche. Sono innumerevoli le iniziative che possiamo annoverare come esempi di filosofia fatta per e con il pubblico, di natura anche molto diversa tra loro: da riviste specializzate, a laboratori filosofici, a prodotti "pop", quali opere di filosofia a fumetti o canali Youtube. L'elenco sarebbe molto più lungo e, vista anche la rapidità dell'evoluzione di questo mondo, sarebbe destinato a rimanere inevitabilmente incompleto e già superato al momento dell'uscita di questo contributo[10].

Più utile di qualsiasi elenco, può essere invece proporre una possibile griglia interpretativa che tenti di mettere ordine in un fenomeno così complesso e in continua evoluzione. Sulla base del tipo di relazione che l'esperto, il filosofo, instaura con il pubblico, possiamo infatti distinguere tre tipologie principali di filosofia pubblica. Abbiamo iniziative di filosofia 1) *in* o *al* pubblico; 2) *per* il pubblico; e 3) *con* il pubblico.

    1. Nel primo ambito, quello che ho chiamato di filosofia "*in* o *al* pubblico", rientrano tutte quelle operazioni nelle quali l'esperto, il filosofo professionista, mette il proprio sapere a disposizione del pubblico non specialista. È un'operazione tutt'altro che semplice, che si fa non banalizzando contenuti o semplificando il linguaggio specialistico della disciplina, ma spiegando i concetti, non dandoli per scontati: ossia,

---

[10] Sarebbe anche molto interessante ricostruire la storia della *public philosophy*, dall'antichità ai giorni nostri, e vedere come è cambiato il rapporto cittadini-esperti nel corso del tempo. Lo stesso concetto di "filosofo professionista" è evoluto dai tempi di Socrate a quelli odierni, e di conseguenza è cambiata l'accezione di 'pubblico'. Non potendo approfondire questi aspetti nello spazio di questo contributo, rimando al lavoro di Adam Briggle: «The Professionalization of Philosophy: From Athens to the APA and Beyond». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit, pp. 9-25.

fornendo anche a chi non è addetto ai lavori, gli strumenti per comprendere una data questione o problema filosofico. Intesa in questo modo, la filosofia pubblica trova spazio in riviste e giornali ad essa dedicati[11], o in eventi aperti al grande pubblico, dall'incontro con l'esperto, al grande festival di filosofia che riempie le piazze delle città[12]. Al fine di raggiungere, interessare, coinvolgere varie fasce di pubblico, la filosofia può farsi più o meno "pop", non tradendo i fini del proprio operare, ma cercando forme diverse di farlo. È così che la filosofia incontra e si fonde con altri linguaggi, come quello dei fumetti, del cinema, o dell'arte. O trova oggi nei nuovi media altre strade e strumenti per arrivare al pubblico: dai podcast[13], alle serie Tv[14], ai social – vi sono sperimentazioni di comunicazione filosofica persino in forma di meme[15].

2. Nell'ambito di quelle che ho definito filosofia *per* il pubblico rientrano tutte quelle iniziative in cui il filosofo mette a disposizione la propria esperienza di ricerca e costruzione di un sapere filosofico per farne fare esercizio ad altri. In questi casi il pubblico non è semplice fruitore di un messaggio, spettatore di una pratica, ma è parte integrante del processo di costruzione del lavoro filosofico, che l'esperto facilita o modera. Non tradizionali seminari o lezioni di filosofia, ma laboratori di pensiero, incontri di discussione e dialogo filosofico in cui l'esperto guida i partecipanti nell'esercizio del fare filosofia insieme. In questo senso, rientrano nella grande famiglia della *public philosophy* le iniziative di filosofia per e con i bambini (*Philosophy for Children*), gli adulti, gli anziani, i detenuti (*Prison Philosophy*), e, in generale, tutti quei momenti di filosofia per e con la comunità (*Philosophy for Community*). Tra le proposte più note e diffuse vi sono quella dei Café Filò[16], riproposti anche

---

[11] Solo per fare qualche esempio vengono in mente il *The Public Philosophy Journal* (https://publicphilosophyjournal.org/), *The Point Magazine* (https://thepointmag.com/about/), Aeon (https://aeon.co/), e in Italia *La Chiave di Sophia* (http://www.lachiavedisophia.com/).

[12] Negli ultimi anni i festival di filosofia hanno avuto grande successo di pubblico. Sono eventi in cui la filosofia accademica incontra la collettività portando il proprio sapere e i propri strumenti al grande pubblico.

[13] I podcast sono oggi una delle sedi privilegiate del discorso filosofico. L'esperienza più celebre è quella di *PhilosophyBites*, a cura di David Edmonds e Nigel Warburton, che vanta al momento in cui scrivo circa 46 milioni di download.

[14] Adamson, P. 2022. «Philosophy Podcasting». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit. pp. 259-265.

[15] Evnine, S.J. 2022. «Philosophy Through Memes». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit, pp. 311-324.

[16] Portati in auge negli anni '90 in Francia dal filosofo Marc Sautet (1947-1998) con l'obiettivo di riproporre la tradizione settecentesca del salotto culturale e offrire alle persone l'occasione di discutere idee e fare filosofia in un ambiente pubblico e amichevole, la formula dei caffè o salotti filosofici si è diffusa ben oltre i confini nazionali francesi diventando una consolidata realtà in molti paesi.

all'aperto con le iniziative di filosofia in natura o passeggiate filosofiche[17], e oggi inevitabilmente anche online.

3. Infine, vi è un terzo modo di intendere e praticare la filosofia pubblica, quello che ho chiamato "con il pubblico". In questo caso il filosofo lavora insieme ai cittadini, a loro fianco, per il perseguimento di obbiettivi comuni. Penso, ad esempio, a tutte quelle forme di attivismo che vedono coinvolti i filosofi accanto ai cittadini nel lavoro di ridefinizione di categorie, denuncia di stereotipi e proposta di nuove narrazioni[18]; o a quelle iniziative di deliberazione collettiva in cui gruppi di cittadini vengono chiamati a valutare una politica in atto o a promuovere o difendere azioni e interventi nella propria comunità[19].

La grande varietà di iniziative e proposte che si richiamano alla nozione di filosofia pubblica può complicare il tentativo di definizione di questo fenomeno. Una sfida di definizione, tuttavia, alla quale la ricerca filosofica è oggi interessata a rispondere, e lo fa provando a ragionare sullo statuto scientifico-filosofico di tali pratiche e a definire la cornice entro la quale la filosofia pubblica trova la propria legittimazione, i propri obbiettivi, le proprie metodologie[20]. Ci si chiede che cosa abbiano in comune queste varie proposte, e se si possano legittimamente ascrivere tutte ad una specifica pratica del fare filosofia. Soprattutto, ci si interroga sulla loro effettiva natura *filosofica*: mettono in pratica uno specifico tipo di azione filosofica o sono piuttosto da considerarsi divulgazione della filosofia accademica? La questione è anzitutto filosofica, o, meglio, metafilosofica: a tema vi è l'idea stessa di filosofia, del suo oggetto, delle sue metodologie, e, soprattutto, della sua finalità.

La filosofia pubblica, si dice in diversi tentativi di definizione, è quella filosofia che si rivolge a (o viene fatta *per* e *con*) un pubblico di non addetti ai lavori, di non filosofi professionisti[21]. Sembra, pertanto, che a contraddistinguere la filosofia

---

[17] Christelle, A. 2022. «Philosophy in Nature as a Kind of Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 280-289.

[18] Jose Mèdina parla di "attivismo epistemico" per definire questo specifico contributo del filosofo professionista (e attivista) alle cause politiche o sociali del proprio tempo: Medina, J. 2022. «Philosophy of Protest and Epistemic Activism». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 123-133.

[19] Mcafee, N. 2022. «Public Philosophy and Deliberative Practices». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 134-142. Bramall, S. 2020. «Understanding Philosophy in Communities: The Spaces, People, Politics and Philosophy of Community Philosophy». In A. Fulford, G. Lockrobin & R. Smith (Eds.) (2020). *Philosophy and Community: Theories, Practices and Possibilities*. Bloomsbury, pp. 3-14.

[20] Il più recente tentativo di raccogliere le moltissime proposte oggi presenti di filosofia pubblica ha prodotto un compendio di più di 400 pagine con 42 contributi che, da prospettive e impostazioni differenti, analizzano l'operato della *public philosophy* (*A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit).

[21] «In contrasto con la filosofia simpliciter, la filosofia pubblica denota l'atto di filosofi professionisti che si impegnano con non professionisti, in un contesto non accademico, con gli obiettivi specifici di esplorare le questioni filosoficamente» («In contrast to philosophy *simpliciter*, public philosophy denotes the act of professional philosophers engaging with non-professionals, in a non-academic

pubblica da altri esercizi filosofici sia proprio quell'aggettivo, "pubblica", che facciamo seguire al termine "filosofia". Questo tipo di definizione ha certamente il pregio di riuscire ad essere inclusiva di tutte le varie tipologie di proposte che si richiamano all'universo della *public philosophy*, e tuttavia ci dice forse ancora troppo poco della pratica. Come ho già sostenuto altrove[22], ritengo sia possibile circoscrivere maggiormente il concetto di filosofia pubblica e distinguerla da più tradizionali forme di divulgazione filosofica, da un lato, e dalla filosofia accademica, dall'altro. Lo si può fare andando a considerare l'intento formativo con le quali le iniziative vengono proposte.

La filosofia pubblica, infatti, sembra caratterizzarsi per voler essere, non solamente un mezzo di diffusione del sapere filosofico, ma, più precisamente, *un invito alla cittadinanza a fare filosofia assieme ai filosofi di professione*. Proponendo una filosofia pubblica si vuole introdurre e familiarizzare il pubblico all'esercizio filosofico in quanto tale, alla problematizzazione, alla critica e analisi di una questione, della discussione ragionata e del confronto dialettico. Per il filosofo diventa allora importante mostrare e esplicitare con il pubblico le procedure o strategie operative adottate dal pensiero filosofico, oltre che i risultati prodotti. Mi piace citare quanto scrive Jack Russell Weinstein a proposito del suo ruolo come filosofo pubblico, ruolo che interpreta mostrando e non raccontando, prendendo attivamente parte al processo di ricerca filosofica per far sì che le persone si uniscano a lui in una ricerca comune: «La mia prima regola di filosofia pubblica allora è "lascia che ti vedano pensare"»[23]. Questo intento può orientare e valere per incontri *con* e *per* il pubblico (tipologie 2 e 3 sopra descritte), ma anche per iniziative rivolte *al* pubblico, come articoli, podcast o video (tipologia 1). A prescindere dallo strumento scelto o dalla metodologia adottata, a discriminare

---

setting, with the specific goals of exploring issues philosophically» Weinstein, J. R. 2014. «What Does Public Philosophy Do? (Hint: It Does Not Make Better Citizens)». *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 4, p. 38). Dello stesso tipo è la definizione proposta da Christopher Meyers: «Definisco "filosofia pubblica" come qualsiasi lavoro eseguito da filosofi qualificati per il quale il pubblico previsto è chiunque diverso da (o in aggiunta a) i propri colleghi disciplinari o studenti universitari» («I define "public philosophy" as any work performed by trained philosophers in which the intended audience is anyone other than (or in addition to) one's disciplinary colleagues or college students» (Meyers, C. 2014. «Public Philosophy and Tenure/Promotion: Rethinking "Teaching, Scholarship and Service"». In *Essays in Philosophy*: Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 5, nota 5, p. 75). Si distingue, pertanto, questa accezione di "filosofia pubblica" da quella che nel dibattito italiano aveva introdotto Salvatore Veca, intesa come «resoconto razionale delle implicazioni filosofiche delle nostre questioni pubbliche» (Veca, S. 1986. *Una filosofia pubblica*. Feltrinelli).

[22] Ziglioli, L.2022. «*What Public Philosophy is, and why we need it more than ever*». In "*Psyche.co*", Aeon. https://psyche.co/ideas/what-public-philosophy-is-and-why-we-need-it-more-than-ever .

[23] «I have to show, not tell, and to commit myself to the project to make people want to join with me. [...] My first rule of public philosophy then, is "let them see you think."» (Weinstein, J.R. 2014. «What Does Public Philosophy Do? (Hint: It Does Not Make Better Citizens)». Cit. p. 47).

un'iniziativa di filosofia pubblica da altre pratiche filosofiche è il fine, e il fine è quello di *provocare il pubblico a pensare filosoficamente.*

Ci si potrebbe chiedere perché il filosofo pubblico si impegna a fare tutto questo? Qui si apre una questione etica, più che disciplinare. Credo che il filosofo pubblico si impegni a portare il lavoro filosofico fra i suoi concittadini, non solo perché ritiene che questo sia parte del suo compito di filosofo professionista, ma soprattutto perché pensa che l'esercizio filosofico sia di valore, per l'individuo e la società tutta. La questione da metafilosofica – riguardante ossia la natura e lo statuto della disciplina filosofia – diventa etico-politica[24]. Vi è l'assunto che la filosofia possa offrire strumenti preziosi per lo sviluppo della consapevolezza delle persone e della loro autonomia morale. Acquisire e migliorare la nostra capacità di analisi di un dato, di problematizzazione e critica dell'informazione, alimentare il desiderio di comprensione di una questione complessa, e promuovere l'esercizio, a volte faticoso, del confronto con l'altro sapendo discriminare buoni da cattivi argomenti, e tanto altro ancora, è parte fondamentale del processo di formazione di un individuo consapevole, critico, riflessivo[25]. Sono tutte risorse importanti – sebbene non sempre sufficienti – anche per l'esercizio di una cittadinanza attiva. Così facendo, il filosofo riscopre l'utilità *pubblica* del fare filosofia.

La mia definizione ha il pregio, credo, di essere abbastanza inclusiva delle tante forme di *public philosophy* oggi presenti, e allo stesso tempo di essere in grado di tracciare un contorno che delimiti questa pratica da altre forme di azione filosofica. Insistere sull'obbiettivo pedagogico-formativo del pubblico aiuta, infatti, anche a distinguere la filosofia pubblica dalla filosofia accademica o ricerca filosofica. Quest'ultima ha un fine epistemico-conoscitivo: il lavoro del filosofo che fa ricerca è quello di produrre un avanzamento del sapere filosofico. Mentre obbiettivo del filosofo pubblico è quello di produrre *nel pubblico* una migliore comprensione della questione in esame. Ho richiamato altrove[26] la metafora platonica del mito della caverna per spiegare il rapporto tra le due: se la filosofia accademica assume principalmente, sebbene non esclusivamente, il compito di far avanzare il sapere della comunità scientifica (il filosofo che esce dalla caverna e conosce il mondo reale), la filosofia pubblica può essere intesa come il ritorno del filosofo nella caverna allo scopo di liberare i compagni dalle loro false credenze e ripercorrere

---

[24] Ziglioli, L.2022. «*What Public Philosophy is, and why we need it more than ever*». Cit. e Ziglioli, L. 2023. «Outlines of a Critique of Public Philosophy». In *Metodo* (forthcoming).

[25] Non ho modo di approfondire qui questo punto, ma ritengo che la filosofia pubblica sia profondamente legata ad una certa concezione della pedagogia, intesa come formazione dell'individuo. Una critica della *public philosophy* dovrebbe quindi tener conto non solo di una certa concezione della filosofia (metafilosofia), ma anche di una filosofia dell'educazione. Sul fatto che troppo raramente i filosofi si occupino di educazione ha recentemente richiamato l'attenzione Bakhurst, D. 2023. «Philosophy's blindspot». https://aeon.co/essays/education-should-matter-to-philosophy-what-took-so-long.

[26] Ziglioli, L. 2023. «Outlines of a Critique of Public Philosophy». In *Metodo* (forthcoming).

insieme la via verso il sapere. Filosofia accademica e filosofia pubblica non sono pertanto in competizione tra loro, ma trovano entrambe giustificazione all'interno di una più generale idea della disciplina.

Ora, pur riconoscendo che l'obbiettivo principale della filosofia pubblica sia formativo, prima che epistemico, possiamo comunque considerare la filosofia pubblica come una forma di *citizen science*? Lo si può fare, ritengo, se nell'interazione esperto-cittadini realizzata dalla filosofia pubblica, i cittadini contribuiscono in qualche modo al progresso della disciplina. La letteratura sulla *public philosophy* sembra riconoscerlo[27]. Vediamo come.

3. QUALE IDEA DI FILOSOFIA E QUALE CONTRIBUTO DEI CITTADINI

Ho proposto una definizione della filosofia pubblica come invito alla cittadinanza – di qualsiasi età, formazione pregressa, condizione di vita – a fare filosofia. Vi è un importante principio metodologico e didattico condiviso dalla maggior parte dei filosofi pubblici, ed è quello che la filosofia sia una pratica e, come tale, la si apprenda esercitandola. Apprendere la filosofia significa apprendere a pensare *filosoficamente*. È nell'esercizio del pensiero filosofico, delle sue diverse strategie operative, che lo studente impara a filosofare[28]. Tale concezione di didattica della filosofia è rilevante dal punto di vista metodologico, poiché discrimina pratiche di filosofia pubblica così intesa da altre pratiche filosofiche, ma è, prima di tutto, una questione metafilosofica: alla base, lo si è detto, vi è una concezione di filosofia come esercizio di comprensione e di costruzione di senso che si realizza anzitutto nel confronto, nell'analisi critica e nel lavoro di ricerca svolto insieme. Si chiama in causa la natura stessa del sapere filosofico e le condizioni del suo prodursi. Secondo una concezione dell'insegnamento filosofico come operazione maieutica, il filosofo professionista lavora per "tirar fuori" il sapere – proprio e altrui –, far emergere opinioni irriflesse, intuizioni, domande o anche bisogni di nuova comprensione.

Ecco allora che, in un'iniziativa di filosofia pubblica, il pubblico non è spettatore, ma è parte attiva del processo di indagine filosofica: è considerato «come un

---

[27] Si vedano, ad esempio, Pigliucci, M., Finkelman, L. 2014. «The Value of Public Philosophy to Philosophers». *Essays in Philosophy*. Vol. 15. Iss. 1, Article 7; Brister, E. 2022. «The Value of Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit.; McHugh, N. 2022. «The Future of Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit.

[28] Non possono non venire alla mente qui le celebri parole di Kant sulla didattica della filosofia: «Non si può imparare alcuna filosofia; perché dove è essa, chi l'ha in possesso, e dove essa può conoscersi? Si può imparare soltanto a filosofare, cioè ad esercitare il talento della ragione nell'applicazione dei suoi principi generali a certi tentativi che ci sono, ma sempre con la riserva del diritto della ragione di cercare questi principi stessi alle loro sorgenti e di confermarli o rifiutarli» (Kant. I. 2000 [1781]. *Critica della ragion pura*. Trad. di G. Gentile e G. Lombardo Radice, riveduta da V. Mathieu, Laterza Bari, p. 513 [KrV, A 837-8/ B 865-6]).

collaboratore nel capire le cose»[29]. È un aspetto, questo, riconosciuto da molti di coloro che si occupano di filosofia pubblica e che ha conseguenze importanti per la natura di questa pratica: in un'iniziativa pubblica, il lavoro filosofico lo si fa *insieme*. Lo si fa insieme anche quando sembra condurlo interamente il filosofo, nel senso che obbiettivo del professionista è sempre quello fornire l'input per stimolare una riflessione, aprire un confronto (con il filosofo, o con se stessi e le proprie opinioni irriflesse): «iniziare una conversazione» (anche se a distanza e in differita)[30]. Caratteristica rilevante della filosofia pubblica è che pubblico e filosofo sono co-protagonisti dell'esercizio filosofico messo in opera[31].

Succede, quindi, in questo lavoro di ricerca fatto insieme, che lo stesso filosofo professionista sia parte di una formazione, faccia esperienza di un apprendimento. Pur partendo da conoscenze o abilità pregresse differenti, pubblico e professionista sono entrambi coinvolti nello stesso processo di ricerca di significati e di comprensione. Ma in che modo l'esercizio della filosofia pubblica può produrre un avanzamento per la stessa disciplina? Quale contributo può dare un pubblico di non addetti ai lavori alla ricerca?

Anzitutto, il pubblico è sempre portatore di domande e urgenze, di un certo "bisogno di filosofia", ossia di bisogno di comprensione razionale, di spiegazione del proprio reale. Ogni cultura, ma anche ogni individuo partecipa del bisogno di comprendere il proprio reale e se stesso, e lo farà in modo diverso perché diversi sono i mondi di significati che abita. La prospettiva di un bambino è necessariamente diversa da quella di un adulto, così come lo è quella di una persona anziana; il mondo di un detenuto è diverso da quello di una persona libera, così come lo può essere il mondo di un malato rispetto a chi non si sente tale, e così via.

---

[29] Irwin, W. 2022. «Public Philosophy and Popular Culture». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., p. 242.

[30] «As Rima Basu put it (on Twitter), public philosophy is about beginning a conversation» (Nguyen C. Thi. 2014. *Manifesto for Public Philosophy*: https://dailynous.com/2019/07/01/manifesto-public-philosophy-guest-post-c-thi-nguyen/). Ritengo che questo criterio possa essere utile a distinguere la filosofia pubblica da altre operazioni di divulgazione: anche quando avviene in differita (tramite articoli di giornale, podcast, o video) un'operazione di filosofia pubblica non ambisce tanto a informare o a portare i risultati della ricerca filosofica al grande pubblico, quanto a stimolare nel pubblico una riflessione, una domanda, o il bisogno di capire oltre. La filosofia pubblica si pone come provocazione di pensiero.

[31] «The more collaborative and egalitarian the relationship, the better for us all. I think this is important to keep in mind when surveying the kind of projects that today's public philosophers are embarking upon. To count as a truly *public* philosophy, they should treat those engaged as co-equal participants in projects of reflection, inquiry, action, and world-building – not people who need to be edified» (McAfee, N. 2022. «Public Philosophy and Deliberative Practices». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., p. 141). Si veda anche quanto scrive Jack Russell Weinstein: «There is a difference between accessible professional work disseminated to the public – Martha Nussbaum's later books come to mind – and investigations done with the general public as equal partners in a robust community setting. The latter, I would suggest, is a necessary condition of public philosophy.» («The Case Against Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., p. 29).

Insomma, la nostra specifica condizione di vita, lungi dall'essere indifferente rispetto al modo in cui interpretiamo il mondo e gli diamo valore, influisce sulla nostra interrogazione e comprensione del reale, influisce sul nostro fare filosofia[32]. Ecco allora che nel confronto con l'altro ciascuno può farsi portatore di una propria particolare prospettiva epistemica e valoriale, aiutando l'altro, filosofo professionista incluso, a comprendere il proprio mondo e a vedere le cose da una prospettiva differente. Il pubblico, anche se non esperto della disciplina, può porre domande, mostrare incongruenze, contraddizioni nel proprio reale che richiedono di venir risolte, può aiutare il filosofo a "vedere" problemi filosofici, questioni che meritano attenzione[33].

«La filosofia è il proprio tempo appreso con il pensiero», diceva Hegel[34]; ma per pensare il *proprio* tempo occorre riconoscerlo, occorre vederne peculiarità e problemi, anche nel confronto e nel contrasto con *altri* tempi. Il confronto intergenerazionale, ad esempio, può dare un contributo fondamentale. Fare dialoghi filosofici con adolescenti o con persone della quarta età offre al filosofo professionista uno sguardo che altrimenti glie/le resterebbe precluso su ciò che è o non è il proprio tempo: di quali problemi è carico, a quali urgenze e bisogni deve rispondere, e quali, invece, hanno perso di importanza o significato.

Mary Midgley, in un suo celebre contributo sul senso e valore del fare filosofia, ha proposto la metafora della filosofia come lavoro idraulico (*plumbing*)[35]: il nostro pensiero è sostenuto da una complessa struttura logico concettuale che, come un impianto idraulico, resta in gran parte inosservata, fino a quando qualcosa non va storto. Schemi di pensiero trascurati, o inefficienti, o inadatti a rispondere alle sempre nuove esigenze poste dall'evolversi del reale e della nostra condizione umana possono minare l'integrità dell'intero sistema. È qui che il filosofo, come l'idraulico professionista, viene chiamato a riaggiustare categorie, rivederle, o elaborarne di nuove. Ma da chi è chiamato il filosofo se non dalla realtà della vita, dalle persone che percepiscono i problemi, che sentono che il loro "impianto"

[32] Mi trovo d'accordo con quanto sostengono Lacey J. Davidson e Melissa D. Gruver, che sottolineano come l'esperienza particolare di ognuno di noi abbia un effetto sul modo in cui comprendiamo il mondo e sul modo in cui, conseguentemente, teorizziamo su di esso. («We think that the experiences a person has as they walk through the world, in virtue of the social identities they embody, shape their understandings of the world and in turn shape their theorizing and actions, as well as how their theorizing and actions are received by the public». Lacey J. Davidson, Melissa D. Gruver. 2022. «Public Philosophy and Fat Activism». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy.* Cit., p. 155).

[33] Si veda al riguardo quanto sostenuto anche da Evelyn Brister, secondo la quale fare filosofia pubblica porta valore alla disciplina stessa in quanto risorsa preziosa di materiale di vita e di problemi che il pubblico porta all'attenzione del filosofo (Brister, E. 2022. «The Value of Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy.* Cit., p. 155).

[34] Hegel, G.W.F. 1965 [1831]. *Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto.* Trad. di G. Marini. Laterza, Bari, pp. 14-17.

[35] Midgley, M. 1992. «Philosophical Plumbing». *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 33*, 139-151.

concettuale necessita di manutenzione? Cittadini, di qualsiasi età, formazione e storia di vita, possono quindi dare un importante contributo epistemico alla ricerca scientifica filosofica, fosse anche solo nel mostrare al filosofo problemi che meritano di venir risolti.

Un contributo, il loro, che assume anche valore etico-politico. Un aspetto rilevante, riconosciuto e segnalato da parte di chi se ne occupa, è il ruolo giocato dalla filosofia pubblica nel contrastare forme di ingiustizia epistemica. Con "ingiustizia epistemica" ci si riferisce all'esclusione di alcuni punti di vista dal processo di costruzione del significato e di narrazione. Ad essere esclusi, sono spesso i punti di vista di chi è marginalizzato o espressione di minoranze (di qualsiasi tipo, culturali, di genere, di aspetto fisico o condizione di vita), o, semplicemente, di chi non ha generalmente voce nel discorso pubblico (si pensi ai bambini). L'operazione del filosofo professionista di uscire dalle aule accademiche per dare voce – e poi ascolto – a chi altrimenti non l'avrebbe, diventa fondamentale. Cito, a titolo di esempio, i casi presentati da Wildcat (2022) di filosofia con indigeni, o da Ivy e George (2022) su filosofia e attivismo trans[36]. In questi esempi, comunità di cittadini, generalmente escluse dalla narrazione dominante e dal discorso pubblico, hanno chiamato la filosofia ad occuparsi di determinati problemi, a riconoscere categorie, o a elaborarne di nuove, o a produrre, insieme, concezioni del mondo e dell'uomo più inclusive, meglio adatte a rendere ragione di quello che queste persone stanno vivendo. Dando parola a queste persone, soprattutto dando loro gli strumenti per esprimere il proprio pensiero e dare nome ai propri bisogni, la filosofia pubblica è un mezzo potente per contrastare miopia e ingiustizia epistemica. È un mezzo per accogliere altre voci nella ricerca di significati e rendere la narrazione più consapevole e inclusiva. Con tutte le conseguenze politiche e sociali, oltre che strettamente filosofiche, che ne possono derivare.

Ma il contributo che i cittadini non esperti possono apportare alla disciplina non è solamente quello di mostrare problemi e il loro bisogno di "manutenzione concettuale" per il quale serve l'intervento esperto del professionista. Se donati degli strumenti, se resi a loro volta abili nel mestiere di manutenzione concettuale, i cittadini possono affiancare i filosofi professionisti nell'opera stessa di revisione della loro teoria sul mondo. Questo è quanto auspicato, ad esempio, da Michael Ray, un filosofo che al momento in cui scrive è anche un detenuto[37]. Ray sostiene che proprio la filosofia in carcere, come forma di filosofia pubblica, possa servire a contrastare una narrazione miope e distorta, imposta da chi ha strumenti epistemici a chi non li possiede. Non lo fa limitandosi ad accogliere l'esperienza riportata dai

[36] Wildcat, D.R. 2022. «Earth – A Place for Indigenous Solutions». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 95-105; Ivy V., George, B.R . 2022. «Public Philosophy and Trans Activism». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 186-200.

[37] Ray, M. 2022. «Philosophy in Prison». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., pp. 337-346.

detenuti e tenendo per sé onere e onore della teorizzazione, della spiegazione razionale: così facendo il filosofo non farebbe altro che perpetuare la dinamica di prevaricazione narrativa sugli oppressi. I professionisti, argomenta Ray, hanno invece la responsabilità di affiancare gli oppressi insegnando loro come interpretare e teorizzare la loro stessa esperienza. Quando questo accade, ecco che la filosofia pubblica sembra rispondere ad una delle "promesse" più ambiziose della *citizen science*: quella di fornire i mezzi ai cittadini per aggiungere la loro prospettiva al dibattito pubblico e scientifico[38].

Tornando alla domanda che ha mosso questa indagine, possiamo quindi affermare che sì, la filosofia pubblica può diventare una forma di *citizen science*, di *citizen philosophy*, perché – pur non avendo necessariamente questo come suo obbiettivo – l'interazione esperto-pubblico può produrre un avanzamento della stessa ricerca scientifica. Come chi la pratica sa bene, fare filosofia pubblica significa per il professionista impegnarsi in *un'educazione alla ragione*, che si traduce, in ultima analisi, in un *apprendimento collaborativo*, in un percorso di *educazione reciproca* tra le parti coinvolte. Si apprende gli uni con gli altri (anche quando gli altri non sono esperti della disciplina o hanno meno esperienza filosofica di noi). Naturalmente ci saranno situazioni nelle quali questo meccanismo di educazione reciproca non si realizza appieno, ma quando ciò avviene, quando il pubblico riesce ad acquisire strumenti e risorse e a partecipare al processo di costruzione di un sapere filosofico, la filosofia pubblica assume forma di *citizen philosophy*. Se, pertanto, il termine *public philosophy* si applica a tutte quelle iniziative che invitano cittadini non professionisti alla pratica del filosofare, con *citizen philosophy* possiamo indicare un fenomeno più specifico, che vede il pubblico di non specialisti dare il proprio contributo epistemico all'avanzamento della disciplina.

4. LE SFIDE PER UNA *CITIZEN PHILOSOPHY*

Di *citizen science* filosofica, o come ho proposto di chiamarla di "citizen philosophy", mi pare non si parli ancora nella comunità filosofica. La stessa *public philosophy*, del resto, è giunta recentemente a maturità, diventando solo negli ultimi anni oggetto di attenzione da parte della stessa riflessione filosofica[39]. Come per la *public philosophy* è servito un processo – tutt'ora in corso – di riflessione sulla natura e funzione della pratica. Allo stesso modo, nel caso di una *citizen*

---

[38] «Community citizen science may provide the means of allowing citizens to add their own perspectives to scientific and policy conversations, fill perceived credibility gaps in scientific expertise, and change the language and direction of policy debates to include a greater range of considerations» (Chari, R., Matthews, L.J., Blumenthal, M.S., Edelman, A.F., Jones. T.M. 2017. *The Promise of Community Citizen Science*. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE256.html).

[39] «The mark of maturity in philosophy is the introduction of a metatheoretical discourse» (Weinstein, J.K. 2022. «The Case Against Public Philosophy». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., p. 26).

philosophy, non basta che vi sia una forma di collaborazione tra cittadini e filosofi professionisti perché si possa parlare di "scienza o filosofia fatta dai e con i cittadini": occorre che questo contributo venga riconosciuto e acquisito dalla disciplina. Serve, in altri termini, che la comunità filosofica apra una discussione su questi fenomeni. Ragionare di *citizen philosophy*, della sua stessa possibilità, natura, e dei risultati prodotti, come si è solo iniziato a fare qui, è, quindi, ritengo la prima condizione per il suo stesso sviluppo. La prima sfida da cogliere per la comunità scientifica è aprire una riflessione su tali pratiche, impegnarsi in una filosofia della *citizen philosophy*.

Accettare o meno che vi sia o sia possibile una filosofia fatta anche grazie al contributo di non esperti è, infatti, anzitutto un problema metafilosofico, che chiama in causa l'idea stessa della disciplina e il suo statuto scientifico. Io ho sostenuto che la pratica del fare filosofia con un pubblico di non esperti trova giustificazione e fondamento in una certa idea di filosofia. Secondo questa idea di filosofia, compito del filosofo non è esclusivamente quello di produrre nuova, migliore, comprensione del reale (il filosofo che faticosamente si libera dalle catene dell'errore e intraprende un percorso che lo porterà al vero sapere), ma è anche quello di invitare i propri concittadini a seguirlo in questo percorso (il filosofo che rientra nella caverna e invita i compagni a seguirlo nella ricerca). Ho sostenuto che, mentre il primo fine è principalmente perseguito dalla filosofia accademica, la filosofia pubblica si dedica al secondo. Lavorando *per* e *con* il pubblico, la filosofia pubblica vuole aiutare le persone a dare un senso al loro mondo[40].

Ora, aprire alla possibilità che la filosofia pubblica possa realizzare una forma di *citizen science* significa riconoscere ai non esperti un ruolo all'interno del processo stesso di ricerca ed elaborazione del sapere scientifico. Sarebbe come a dire che, nel percorso di uscita dalla caverna, non è solo lo schiavo ad apprendere dal filosofo, ma filosofo e neofiti insieme intraprendono un percorso di acquisizione del sapere, aiutandosi l'un l'altro, dando ciascuno un contributo diverso e di varia natura, ma collaborando tutti alla formazione di una migliore comprensione del mondo.

Ho cercato di mostrare come ciò possa avvenire. Ho sostenuto che il pubblico – anche di bambini, anche di persone che non hanno avuto una formazione pregressa regolare – può dare il proprio attivo contributo alla ricerca filosofica fornendo al filosofo accesso alla propria prospettiva sul mondo, avanzando le proprie istanze di riconoscimento, o il proprio bisogno di comprensione. Gruppi di cittadini possono aiutare a indirizzare la ricerca filosofica verso strade trascurate dalla comunità scientifica, o richiamare la sua attenzione a questioni e problemi che la ricerca scientifica non era stata in grado di rilevare. È un contributo, si è sostenuto,

---

[40] «In short, done well, practical or public philosophy helps people *make sense* of the world and its problems» (Meyers, C. 2014. «Public Philosophy and Tenure/Promotion: Rethinking "Teaching, Scholarship and Service"». Cit, p. 59).

dall'importante risvolto etico, oltre che epistemico, poiché volto a rendere la narrazione e la comprensione del reale più inclusiva delle tante, diverse, prospettive presenti. Intraprendere una seria riflessione metafilosofica su questi aspetti, qui inevitabilmente solo accennati, è fondamentale per comprendere appieno le potenzialità, ma anche i limiti, dell'interazione tra professionisti e amatori, e per inserire la pratica all'interno di una cornice condivisa di fondamenti, procedure e metodologie.

Accanto a riflessioni strettamente disciplinari, vi sono naturalmente anche tutta una serie di questioni trasversali alle varie discipline, non meno importanti. Si pensi alla questione dei diritti dei cittadini-scienziati coinvolti nel processo di ricerca: diritti positivi, intesi come diritto all'accesso e alla partecipazione alla scienza[41]; ma anche diritti negativi, intesi come tutela per loro (si pensi alla questione giuridica del diritto d'autore, della proprietà intellettuale del prodotto, o della privacy dei partecipanti)[42].

Vi è poi l'enorme sfida posta dalla questione della valutazione, sfida che attende la *citizen science* in generale, a prescindere dalla specifica disciplina di riferimento. Una sfida, tuttavia, particolarmente ostica per le discipline umanistiche e per la filosofia, in particolare. Il tema della valutazione in filosofia è, difatti, da sempre problematico: come misurare le competenze strettamente filosofiche di problematizzazione del dato, argomentazione della propria tesi, esame critico di una questione, analisi concettuale, ecc.? Sono abilità complesse che sfuggono una misura prettamente quantitativa: come poter valutare l'impatto di una nostra pratica filosofica? Quanta formazione ha prodotto, e di che natura? Sono tutte questioni che chiamano da sempre in causa chiunque si occupi di didattica della filosofia, a scuola e al di fuori[43], e che destano l'attenzione di chi oggi si occupa di filosofia pubblica[44]. Una sfida, quella della valutazione, che inevitabilmente riguarderà anche le pratiche di *citizen philosophy*, dove ad essere in qualche misura valutato dovrà essere il guadagno epistemico prodotto dall'interazione esperti-cittadini. Concludo questo contributo, pertanto, riproponendo una domanda che Lee McIntyre pone per la *public philosophy*: «È ragionevole aspettarsi, tuttavia, che se vale la pena fare

---

[41] Vayena, E., Tasioulas, J. 2015. «"We the Scientists": a Human Right to Citizen Science». *Philos. Technol.* 28, 479–485.

[42] Tauginienė, L., Hummer, P., Albert, A., Cigarini, A., Vohland, K. (2021). «Ethical Challenges and Dynamic Informed Consent». In *The Science of Citizen Science*. Cit.

[43] La *Philosophy for Children* è tra le pratiche di formazione filosofica più attenta alla questione della valutazione del proprio operato. Per una prima ricognizione della questione rinvio a: Cosentino, A. 2012. «Evaluation in and on P4C: An epistemological Point of View». In Santi M., Oliverio, S. (Eds.). *Educating for Complex Thinking through Philosophical Inquiry*. Liguori, Napoli: https://filosofodistrada.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/icpic_paper_ingl_pubblicaz.pdf .

[44] Sulla questione della valutazione della filosofia pubblica ho scritto altrove: Ziglioli. L. 2022. «Filosofia pubblica e questione valutativa. L'analisi delle ricadute formative attraverso l'autovalutazione e la percezione di apprendimento». In *Informazione filosofica*, n°6, pp. 132-152; Ziglioli, L. 2023. «Outlines of a Critique of Public Philosophy». In Metodo (forthcoming).

filosofia pubblica, dovremmo avere un modo per misurarne l'impatto?»[45]. La questione merita di venir posta anche per la *citizen philosophy*. Se ammettiamo che vi sia un contributo possibile da parte dei cittadini al progresso della conoscenza filosofica, e se riteniamo che questo contributo sia prezioso per le ragioni epistemiche e etiche prima menzionate, non dovremmo allora lavorare a trovare un modo per misurare questo contributo? Sarebbe certamente il compito di future ricerche.

---

[45] «Is it reasonable to expect, though, that if public philosophy is worth doing, we should have some way of measuring its impact?» (Mcintyre, L. 2022. «What Is Public Philosophy?». In *A Companion to Public Philosophy*. Cit., p. 6).

MIND THE RELATIONSHIP: A MULTI-LAYERED ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CITIZEN SCIENCE IN HEALTH

GASTON REMMERS
DesignLab
Faculty of Behavioural, Management, and Social Sciences,
University of Twente (Enschede)
Foundation Mijn Data Onze Gezondheid (Amsterdam)
g.remmers@mdog.nl (corresponding author)

JULIA HERMANN
Department of Technology, Politics and Society (Philosophy Section)
Faculty of Behavioural, Management, and Social Sciences
University of Twente (Enschede)

EGBERT SIEBRAND
Research Group Ethics and Technology,
Saxion University of Applied Sciences (Deventer)

CATHARINA M. VAN LEERSUM
Department of Technology, Policy, and Society
Faculty of Behavioural, Management, and Social Sciences
University of Twente (Enschede)

ABSTRACT
There is a heated debate about what citizen science is and is not. We argue that instead of aiming at a definition of citizen science, we should reflect upon its ethical starting points. Based on our practical experiences with citizen science initiatives, we come up with an ethical framework that consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). The desiderata reflect ethically problematic practices, such as the use of citizens by academic scientists as mere sensors, and biases in the existing literature, such as labelling the projects that are initiated and led by citizens as "extreme". The desiderata are supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach. The aim of our ethical framework is to stimulate and facilitate reflection upon what needs to be considered when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. Fundamentally, citizen science ought to be a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities of humans. The ethical framework is meant to help reflect on this endeavour.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past years, numerous overviews have been produced that define and explore the breadth and width of citizen science (Vohland et al., 2021) The *European Citizen Science Association* (ECSA) describes citizen science as a concept which is flexible and could be adapted and applied within diverse situations and disciplines (Robinson et al., 2018). The flexibility is reflected in descriptions of citizen science, such as "any form of active and non-professional participation in science that goes beyond human subject research conducted by professional researchers" (Vayena & Tasioulas, 2015). Eitzel et al. (2017) assert that citizen science is intended to broaden participation in science, and the inclusion of the public in different aspects of research. A common denominator of citizen science is the involvement of researchers and citizens who join efforts to produce knowledge.

To provide some guidance for citizen science projects, ECSA published ten principles of citizen science, which express key principles that underlie good practice in citizen science (Robinson et al., 2018). In the context of the rising popularity of citizen science, the potential misuse of the term and the need of funders and policy makers for more clarity concerning citizen science' conceptual boundaries, Heigl et al. (2019) came up with a set of more precise criteria. Their effort was immediately counteracted by the citizen science community, which claimed that any effort to provide a precise definition of citizen science would do injustice to the inherent heterogeneity of citizen science practice (Auerbach et al., 2020). Strasser et al. (2019) propose to understand citizen science as a collection of epistemic practices, thereby giving space to the diversity of ways in which knowledge may be produced and the world may be explored and understood, while at the same time avoiding hierarchical classifications of citizen science as in more or less participation of citizens.

Given the diversity of citizen science activities, the debate will no doubt continue to evolve. Hence, we agree with Eitzel et al. (2017) that "the boundaries of citizen science are ethical boundaries", which need to be explored. Ficorilli (2020) argues that "we are witnessing the transition from an ethics of protection of 'research subjects' to an ethics of empowerment of the 'citizen scientists'". This transition took place in reaction to the Bioethics Revolution, in which the concept research participant replaced that of research subject (Baker, 2019, p.77). Empowerment of citizen scientists requires researchers to be transparent during the entire project, and specifically about the reason for collaboration between professional scientists and citizens. One such reason is that citizens are thought to have types of knowledge that professional scientists lack, e.g., experiential' knowledge, which is knowledge gained through lived experience, for instance through coping with a health

condition or disability In this paper we propose an ethical framework to facilitate reflection on what needs to be considered, from an ethical point of view, when co-creating or assessing a citizen science initiative. We hope that the ethical framework makes it easier to form equal, respectful, and collaborative relationships between professional and citizen scientists, allowing for a diversity of valuable citizen science projects to emerge.

It is difficult to formulate labels for the key-players in citizen science that cover all meanings; Eitzel et al. (2017) have provided a profound account of the complex and sometimes conflicting connotations of each label. For this paper, we chose to use the labels 'professional scientist' and 'citizen scientist' as the main denominators, with the intent to encompass notions such as formal and informal scientists, paid and volunteer scientists, expert and amateur scientists, experts and lay persons.

The proposed framework is built on the ethical concerns of citizens and patients engaging in health research, in particular those connected to the Dutch patient driven ZelfOnderzoek Netwerk Nederland (ZONN, translated 'Self Research Network Netherlands') for citizen science on health, and finds support in two ethical theories. The heart of our ethical framework consists of five desiderata. We understand desiderata as general guidelines that connect values to specific issues. In our framework, the values respect and justice are connected to issues like differences between persons, capacities, methods, goals, and benefits. We chose to use the term desiderata rather than norms and principles to stress that our concern is with what is desirable rather than what is mandatory or required.

The first draft of the ethical desiderata emerged from the experiences of the patients in the ZONN-network. These were described and this draft was discussed with the researchers from the TOPFIT Citizenlab and the members of the ZONN-network. These discussions initially helped to demarcate the desiderata from the fundamental qualities. In later stages, the authors of the paper recognized that the desiderata responded to two core values. This gradual process of reflection and interaction gave rise to the conceptualization of the ethical framework we present in this paper.

In section 2, we lay out why there is a need for such an ethical framework by providing a brief literature review on ethics in citizen science and a description of the hands-on experiences of the authors in the design and delivery of citizen science projects in health. Subsequently, in section 3, the framework is presented. In section 4, we summarise the main points, reflect on limitations of our framework, and make suggestions for further research.

2. WHY THIS ETHICAL FRAMEWORK?

Several authors have explored ethics in relation to citizen science. Kasperowski et al. (2021) explored the concept of ethical boundary work in relation to citizen science. Boundary work is a concept introduced by Gieryn (1999) to understand the ways in which researchers collectively defend and demarcate their intellectual territories. It entails "the discursive attribution of selected qualities to scientists, scientific methods and scientific claims for the purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and some less authoritative residual 'non-science'" (Gieryn, 1999, pp. 4-5). Kasperowski et al. (2021) conclude that ethical boundary work in citizen science considers management of ambiguities without drawn boundaries between the unethical and ethical. This leads towards difficult to resolve paradoxes. This confirms the statement by Eitzel et al. (2017) that the boundaries of citizen science are ethical, hard to draw and enacted and negotiated in the interaction between stakeholders.

Other authors have identified different domains in which ethical issues in citizen science emerge and should be dealt with, e.g., in the special issue on citizen science ethics in the SCTP journal (Rasmussen & Cooper, 2019). Resnik et al. (2015) distinguish four domains: dilemmas of data quality and integrity, data sharing and intellectual property, conflict of interest, and exploitation. Vayena (2016) explored issues relating to ethical oversight in the context of patient-led research. Goodwin and Roberts (2019) discuss the relevance of developing ethics within communities of citizen scientists and suggest 'conversation as a procedure' to come to agreements with formal bodies of oversight. Cooper et al. (2019) suggest different modes of ethical oversight for citizen science.

Banks and colleagues (ICPHR, 2022) take an approach in pursuit of generic ethical principles from the perspective of participatory health research. They generate the following principles: (1) mutual respect; (2) equality and inclusion; (3) democratic participation; (4) active learning; (5) making a difference; (6) collective action; (7) personal integrity. The ICPHR principles are valid and grounded primarily in the experiences with participatory health research. They do reflect less the experiences of patients in the biomedical realm, notably their ambition to also be included in the heart of methodological and ontological discussions.

Groot and Abma (2022) argue that "despite the guidance of principles, researchers must work daily on ethical tensions to deal with the particular issue at that moment, in that specific context, taking into account the moral responsibilities to continue the research project from a commitment to epistemic justice". Epistemic justice is understood as 'the active inclusion of the voices of those whose issues are at stake, and who have formerly been wronged in their capacity of knowing (...), and whose voice did not count as relevant in a certain context'

(Fricker, 2007). Consequently, they develop an ethical framework for researchers, which builds on the concept of ethics work, defined by Banks et al. (2016, p. 36) as "the effort people (...) put into seeing ethically salient aspects of situations, developing themselves as good practitioners, working out the right course of action and justifying who they are and what they have done". They are using the term 'work' as a description of the psychological and bodily processes to perform research tasks which ask for noticing, attending, thinking, interacting ad performing (Banks et al. 2016, p. 36).

Hence, literature provides us with inventories of ethical issues, generic ethical principles, and a framework to guide everyday ethical practice. The ethical framework we present in this paper does not intend to replace them. However, the current literature on ethics and citizen science can be more strongly connected to the wider ethical literature. The framework proposed in this article is supported by two ethical theories: care ethics and the capabilities approach. Additionally, based on our practical experiences, there is a need for a simpler overview of the core issues at stake when constructing a relationship between a professional and a citizen scientist, in which the efforts required not only bear on the professional, but also on the citizen. This is not to downplay the relevance of power asymmetries often implicit in those relationships, but instead emphasizes citizen scientists as responsible and accountable human beings at the same level as professional scientists. What matters in the end is the capacity of all actors involved to reflect on their relationship and each other's position in it. This has led us to take the practical experiences of both professional and citizen scientists as a point of departure for our framework.

The proposed framework is based on experiences of researchers and citizens in two projects/networks: the professional-driven TOPFIT Citizenlab and the patient-driven ZONN network for Citizen Science on Health. TOPFIT Citizenlab is situated in the Twente region, a part of the province of Overijssel in the Netherlands. It started in January 2020, and intends to mature into a regional hub for citizen science. It has involved a great diversity of stakeholders in a top-down attempt to improve the development and implementation of technologies with the help of citizens. The citizen science perspective forced it to question the set-up of the different projects and the role of co-creation and research. It provoked significant uncertainty and self-questioning among the researchers involved, while at the same time there seemed to be nothing wrong with the willingness and the intentions to engage with citizens in innovative ways. The researchers connected to TOPFIT Citizenlab recognized the need for an instrument that valued both the researcher's intentions and interests, while at the same time paving the way for sincere interaction with citizens, in a way that would cater for the emergence of a diversity of citizen science projects. To that extent, a series of workshops was held,

in which a draft of the five desiderata was discussed with the members of TOPFIT Citizenlab. They approved the desiderata, which they perceived as capturing the ethical core of citizen science collaborations and as providing a useful tool for setting up such collaborations in an ethical manner.

The second source is the hands-on experience of several patient-driven communities engaged in a diversity of self-research practices on health, united in the Dutch ZONN network [1] (Remmers & Spijker, 2020). ZONN operates as a patient-driven national platform for citizen science on health of about 15 communities of patients and citizens organizing and conducting some form of health research by themselves. They represent a wide range of diseases (like cardiac failures, cancer, migraine, rare disease, diabetes, kidney failure), and about 10.000 individuals engaged in self-observations. There are bimonthly meetings, in which early drafts of the ethical framework and its desiderata were discussed and approved by the participants. The ZONN-network emerged out of the personal experiences of those involved in the network. They accumulate experiential knowledge of what it means to be a 'citizen scientist' and have acquired a clear view on the difficulties that emerge when, as a patient, one wants to contribute to one's own recovery. The realm of possible interventions a patient explores and considers is often different from protocols of the medical professionals. They often sense a fundamental denial of their capacity to co-create their own health. The members of the ZONN network realize that they build on a large tradition in the health domain of patients claiming their identity as humans and as potent collaborators to their own and other's health (Remen, 1980; Smit & De Knecht, 2015; van den Bovenkamp et al., 2020; Borkman, 1976; Abma & Broerse, 2007; Frank, 2013; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Elwyn et al., 2012). This tradition has long battled its way to gain a stronger patients' voice in the definition of research issues and the health care process in general. Since 2015, the concept of citizen science has been embraced in The Netherlands to accommodate a diversity of patient-driven research.

3. A MULTI-LAYERED ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CITIZEN SCIENCE IN HEALTH

Our ethical framework is grounded in two ethical theories (care ethics and capabilities approach). It has three components: two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms), and two fundamental

---

[1] https://mdog.nl/wat-is-burgerwetenschap/zelfonderzoek-netwerk-nederland/

qualities (symmetry and transparency) to support the desiderata when they are used in practice, see figure 1.

| Respect & Justice		*Core Values*
• Relationship between equals • Recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge and agency • Reciprocity	• Openness for different goals • Openness for different research methods and paradigms	*Ethical desiderata*
Symmetry & Transparancy		*Fundamental qualities*

Figure 1 Ethical Framework for Citizen Science in Health

3.1. Grounding the ethical framework

Our ethical desiderata find support in the traditions of care ethics and the capabilities approach. Care ethicists emphasise the interdependence and vulnerability of human beings. In contrast to the idea of the autonomous rational agent, which is at the centre of the two most prominent ethical theories in the Western tradition (deontology and utilitarianism), care ethics sees human agents as vulnerable beings who stand in multiple relationships and are in need of care.[2] While some care ethicists conceive of care as specifically related to women or the mother-child relationship (Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1989), others, such as Joan Tronto (1993), emphasise that care is an essential element of human life as such: all human beings depend on others and need care: 'An ethic of care is an approach to personal, social, moral, and political life that starts from the reality that all human beings need and receive care and give care to others. The care relationships among humans are part of what mark us as human beings. We are always interdependent beings' (Tronto, 2009). This interdependence is not limited to humans. It is an

---

[2] Utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of actions. Whether an action is morally right or wrong depends on the quality of its consequences. The classical Utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill held that one ought to bring about "the greatest amount of good for the greatest number" (Driver 2022). Moral agents should aim at maximising happiness, whereby it is allowed to violate the rights of some people. Utilitarians apply a cost-benefit analysis to determine which action would be the right one to take. Deontology, by contrast, puts emphasis on the rights and duties of individuals and on moral rules. The moral quality of an action is not determined by its consequences, but by the intention of the agent. The most famous deontologist in the Western history of philosophy is the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (Larry & Moore 2021).

"interdependence between the human, non-human, and more-than-human worlds" (Moriggi et al., 2020). Caring practices include "everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web" (Tronto, 2013, p. 19).

The ethical framework proposed in this paper has the relationship between professional and citizen scientist at its core. Like so many of the relationships that humans find themselves in, this relationship is asymmetrical. It is characterised by differences in power, stemming from the institutional embeddedness of the scientist and their formal education. From the perspective of care ethics, ethicists concerned with citizen science should play close attention to the relationships between the participants of citizen science projects. They should ask questions like "What is the quality of these relationships?", "Are the needs of the participants recognised?", "Is care being given where needed, and is the care that is given good care?"

For Tronto, care should be understood as a practice as opposed to a virtue or attitude. While virtues, attitudes, skills and activities are a part of care, they do not exhaust it. Tronto (1993, pp. 105-137) distinguishes four phases of caring and four corresponding moral elements. In the first phase ("caring about"), those who give care recognise that others are in need and what their needs are (attentiveness). In the second phase ("taking care of"), those giving care take responsibility for meeting those needs (responsibility). In the third phase ("caregiving"), they perform an action to fulfil those needs (competence). In the fourth phase ("care-receiving"), those giving care recognise that the care-receivers respond to the care given (responsiveness). Tronto (2013) adds a fifth phase ("caring with"). This phase concerns the distribution of care in society and here the corresponding moral elements are solidarity and trust. Our framework, if applied, could lead to citizen science projects involving practices of caring.

Another ethical theory that supports our ethical framework is the capabilities approach, which has been introduced by Amartya Sen in the 1980s (Sen 1985a, 1985b) and further developed by Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2011). It has been used in a variety of fields, including welfare economics, political philosophy, and ethics of technology. The core question of this approach is "What is a person able to do and be?" From the perspective of this approach, it is not sufficient to look at the available resources, since people might not actually be able to make use of these resources. For instance, in a society where girls are not allowed to go to school, the existence of schools does not by itself enable them to go to school and receive education. Similarly, a person who has a broken leg is not able to ride a bike, even if they are in the possession of a bike. Capabilities, which are 'the real opportunities for a person to do and be what he/she has reason to value' (Oosterlaken, 2013, p. 80), are distinguished from functioning, which are realised capabilities. For instance,

the functioning that corresponds to the capability to have good health is actually being in good health. According to Nussbaum (2011), states have the task to secure for their citizens a threshold of what she takes to be the ten central capabilities. It is not the state's task to secure people's functioning, as that would restrict their freedom illegitimately. The capabilities approach is a liberal theory with the value of freedom at its core. Its notion of freedom is that of effective freedom, as opposed to mere formal freedom. Whether a particular capability can be turned into a functioning depends on what are called conversion factors. There are personal conversion factors such as genetic diseases or character traits, environmental conversion factors such as features of the built environment, and social conversion factors, such as social conventions, and widely shared prejudices.

One of Nussbaum's central capabilities is health. Other capabilities from her list that seem clearly relevant for citizen science are "senses, imagination and thought", "control over one's material and political environment", and "social affiliations that are meaningful and respectful" (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 33). Citizen science activities can potentially help enhance these capabilities. From the perspective of the capabilities approach, citizen science projects should be set up in a way that enhances relevant capabilities not only of those who participate in these projects but ideally also of other citizens. When assessing a citizen science initiative, we should ask questions like 'Does this collaboration enhance the participating citizens' ability to use their senses, imagination and thought?', 'Does the project potentially contribute to a society in which people's capability for living in good health can be realised?', or 'Does participation in this project enhance citizens' ability to have control over their political environment?' When setting up a citizen science project we should, e.g., reflect upon how the activities that will be carried out by the participants could strengthen the capability "senses, imagination and thought", thereby considering the more concrete capabilities that fall under this general capability, such as abilities for critical and analytic thinking, for systematic analysis, and for the interpretation of data.

3.2. Two core values

Our first-hand experience with citizen science initiatives and the concerns voiced by citizen scientists as pointed out in section 2, confirmed that citizen science is not just about generating knowledge but is also a social practice. In this social practise, different stakeholders have differences in social background, profession, motivations and relation with the problem. These differences allude to tensions that need to be addressed and were hence expressed in five desiderata. They were voiced by the participants in the ZONN-network and recognized by the researchers in the TOPFIT Citizenlab.

Congruent with the idea of citizen science as a social practice is that all desiderata concern the relationships between stakeholders. Our first-hand experience teaches us that the willingness to live up to the desiderata is of paramount importance. We recognized that this willingness builds on two fundamental values: justice and respect. It means that the desiderata do not constitute a practical checklist, but appeal to a moral position to bridge differences.

The first core value is respect and concerns the relationship between professional and citizen scientists and what this means in social practice. In this context the value respect comes close to what Feinberg (1975) calls "observantia": respect gives moral consideration towards citizens in their own right, regardless of their abilities and social positions. This means not considering citizens as less valuable in virtue of not being professional scientists or lacking specific knowledge.

The second core value, justice, concerns how efforts, endeavours and benefits are divided between professional and citizen scientists. It is a matter of injustice when labour or effort are unequally shared or when benefits, outcomes or credits are disproportionate with the effort or labour. Another aspect that we regard as unjust is a bias in valuing outcomes only for certain groups, such as professional scientists. We elaborate this point as openness for different goals and in a critical reflection on indirect effects on society.

Next to intrinsic value, a social practise based on respect and justice also has instrumental or practical value. If citizen science is a fair practise for all stakeholders, there is, amongst others, fairness in knowledge distribution or a system of reciprocity, the motivation of citizens will be higher and citizens are more likely to stay involved for the full duration of the research project in contrast, if the relationships are not based on these values, this might result in less successful citizen science initiatives and premature termination.

3.3 Desiderata

The desiderata (see figure 1) we propose are general guidelines that connect respect and justice to specific issues in citizen science. In this section, we present the five ethical desiderata and argue subsequently that they should respond to two fundamental qualities. While the first three desiderata that we discuss concern the quality of the relationship between the participants in citizen science projects, the fourth and fifth desideratum concern a desirable openness of the participants. All five desiderata are interrelated, and though it is useful to distinguish them analytically, their interrelatedness in practice should be acknowledged.

3.3.1 Relationship between equals

The first desideratum holds that citizen scientists and professional scientists must recognise each other as equal collaboration partners. As Fiske et al. (2019, p. 618) point out, "[p]articipatory processes are fraught with power imbalances between researchers and participants". This holds for instance for "medical research projects that uncritically promote public or patient 'engagement'" (Fiske et al., 2019). According to the authors, these projects have "failed to create reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships" (Fiske et al., 2019). Failures of this kind give rise to our first ethical desideratum. This desideratum gains support from the care ethics tradition, which emphasises the asymmetrical nature of many relationships.

The citizens involved in citizen science are not an object or instrument of study, but subjects with whom professional researchers enter a relationship, in which all participants should respect each other. In the context of citizen science, we must go beyond ethical codes for research with human subjects, in which respect for persons is one of the main ethical principles (Belmont Report). In citizen science, participants are not subjects of research, but partners with equal standing. Therefore, in addition to respecting them as a person, scientists should treat them as equally capable of carrying out research. Following the premise of symmetry, citizens should not instrumentalize scientists either, e.g., for proving their opinions. This is particularly relevant when research outcomes are not confirming expectations. Just like industries, citizens should not interfere with the integrity of scientists and refrain from influencing possibly unwelcome study results. The balance, however, is delicate. A critical dialogue must remain possible, especially given the power imbalances present. A claim on independence and integrity by researchers should not mean that they may avoid debate about, e.g., adequate methodology. It is precisely this area that is one of great concern for citizens, which is the reason why we included desideratum 4.

A relationship between equals requires that citizens and scientists trust one another. Trust, however, needs to be built up through repeated interactions, in which everyone involved shows to be trustworthy. Neither trust nor a relationship between equals is prior to the interactions between scientists and citizens.

'More human, less patient'

To be seen as a human person first and then as a patient, is a matter of great concern to patients (Remen, 1980). The Dutch Federation of Patient Organisations adopted the slogan 'Meer mens, minder patient' (more human, less patient) (Patientenfederatie, 2018) as a leading motto for their activities. Patients

want to be seen as more than an interesting biophysiological system that should be 'fixed'. Citizens are no instruments to address shortages of research means or used as sensors. The adoption of a human approach demands more time in the medical realm, and this is the same in citizen science. While the interest is rising in so-called Real-World Data and Citizen Generated Data, in order to facilitate Big Data analysis and new forms of health service provision, there is a risk that citizens and patients are again considered as mere data-providers, handed over to the benevolence of industry and academia. An equal relationship in those cases cannot be reached only by improved communication and a humanistic worldview but needs to be addressed at a systemic level, too, involving the strengthening of citizen-centered data governance models and legal arrangements (Lancet, 2021; Remmers et al., 2021).

3.3.2 Recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency

The second desideratum is closely related to the first and says that citizen scientists and professional scientists contribute different insight and abilities, which are of equal worth and complement one another. This recognition enables a relationship between equals, in which everyone respects everybody else, recognising their capacities, knowledge and agency.

Why should academic scientists seek collaboration with lay people? Part of the answer is that lay people have different knowledge/insights and other sorts of capacities than professional researchers. In the area of health, patients have insights into their own condition that nobody else can have, simply because they experience their body in a way that cannot be replaced by any kind of knowledge others have about it. Moreover, patients can integrate experiments in their daily life, for instance related to nutrition, which can lead to useful insights. As Petersen et al. (2019, p. 4) point out, in citizen science endeavours, "everyone comes to the table with different abilities and perspectives". Citizen science aims to integrate all valuable abilities and perspectives.

The second desideratum must be seen in the context of the process of professionalisation of research in the 19th century, where the kitchen table was once the forerunner of what would become the laboratory (Strasser et al., 2019). As with the emergence of the laboratory people came to be excluded from the production of knowledge about the world, we could interpret the citizen science movement as a way of reversing this development to some extent: of cautiously opening the scientific ivory tower and allowing citizens to play a role again in the production of knowledge. The citizen science movement might transform the current scientific

hierarchy in knowledge production and bears the potential of more democratic and inclusive research (Fiske et al., 2019, p. 617).

From the perspective of the capabilities approach, the citizen science movement moreover provides the opportunity to further develop certain capabilities in the first place. Participation in a citizen science project can, depending on the way the project is designed, not only enable citizens to use the abilities and skills they already have, but also to further develop those skills or develop new ones.

Different people, different roles

Within TOPFIT Citizenlab, we collaborated with informal caregivers, people with a migration background, rheumatoid patients, older adults, and diabetes patients. Recognition of capacities, knowledge, and agency does not merely involve utilizing the knowledge, skills, and attitudes these people have. On several occasions, collaboration was also about deciding together which role each preferred in research projects and what knowledge or skills they would like to use to contribute. In one case, we used clustering and association methods. This resulted in fruitful conversations, new starting points for further collaboration and new roles, activities and tasks.

3.3.3 Reciprocity

The relationships in citizen science projects should be reciprocal, which is our third desideratum. As mentioned above (first desideratum), many medical research projects "failed to create reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships" (Fiske et al., 2019, p. 618). Therefore, we must ask ourselves: What do the people involved (citizen scientists as well as professional scientists) gain from this collaborative endeavour? We can conceive of the relationships between professional researchers and citizen researchers as relationships of care. For such relationships, reciprocity is important. There should be a "mutually beneficial relationship made possible by an attitude of attentiveness, respect, and solidarity" (Moriggi et el., 2021, p. 4). Care receivers should be recognised as "active agents in the caring process" (ibid.), who can communicate to those who give care if their needs have been interpreted correctly and if they have been met adequately. In the context of citizen science projects, this means that everyone involved in the collaboration should play an active role and signal to the others what their needs are and if they are being met. A critical reflection on needs begins with a conceptualization of the power differentials (Fiske et al., 2019, p. 618). Understanding the disparities in position,

access, experiences or resources helps to arrive at explicit codes of conduct on which stakeholders can agree. To assist the professional scientists, citizens should receive training (Petersen et al., 2019, p. 5). We can also imagine trainings for scientists provided by citizens. Furthermore, effort is needed to create an environment in which citizen scientists find their professional scientist partners (Petersen et al., 2019).

Common concerns among citizens who do research include a lack of recognition of their knowledge and capacities (second desideratum) and a scepticism on the part of the professional scientists towards less rigorous research methods. Scientists seek collaboration with citizens because they expect this to enrich their research, but often they do not give them full recognition for their contributions, for instance by not mentioning them in their academic publications or by not compensating them appropriately for their efforts. Careful reflection is required to understand how each stakeholder could benefit from the collaboration. A relationship between equals (first desideratum) does not by itself ensure the realisation of reciprocity. Some forms of reciprocity may even induce reverse effects. Prainsack and Forgó (2022) argue that paying people for their data might exacerbate inequities and enlarge dependencies. It might also reduce altruïsm since people who expect to get paid are unlikely to give their data away for free.

Valuable outcomes

TOPFIT Citizenlab projects used vouchers as a token of gratitude. This was often appreciated, but not all participants saw it as a necessary condition for participation. More important were other forms of benefits and outcomes experienced by citizens. We found both indirect and direct benefits and outcomes. The most frequently mentioned long-term and indirect outcomes were a desired change, expected societal impact, improvement of their own health and that of others.

Participants also mentioned direct benefits that are more intrinsic and related to positive health like being appreciated, having a purpose, doing something meaningful, and being part of a community. These benefits exist regardless of the outcome of the citizen science project. One participant declared that he experienced joy and that his participation in the project provided a new purpose in his live.

3.3.4 Openness for different goals

The fourth desideratum holds that there should be an openness towards different kinds of goals that participants might be pursuing. Arriving at generalisable knowledge is not the only legitimate goal of such an enterprise. Ficorilli (2019, p. 125) describes the collaboration between researchers and citizens as a "bi-directional interaction, in the course of which researchers and citizens actively contribute to defining the goals of a research".

The second principle of citizen science states that citizen science projects "have a genuine science outcome" (Robinson et al., 2018). The following examples are then given to answer a research question or inform conservation actions, manage decision-making or environmental policy (ibid.). It is not clear from this principle what counts as a genuine science outcome. Does a genuine science outcome necessarily involve generalisable knowledge? Our take, as authors, is that in the context of citizen science, the generation of knowledge at an individual level is valuable and that citizen science projects do not have to strive for generalisable knowledge, at least not in the first instance. Research projects that aim at knowledge relevant for one individual are worthwhile, provided that the knowledge gained can be used to generate knowledge that is relevant for others as well. In times of personalised medicine, it is important to take research at the individual level seriously (Suman et al, 2023). Here, new labels such as Personal Science (Wolf & Groot, 2020) and Personal Health Science (Heyen & Dickel, 2019) emerge. Acquiring general knowledge and translating it into practice occurs through acknowledging the worthiness of results at the individual level. In health care settings, for example, knowing the difference in outcome of a certain treatment could eventually change the advice professionals give to individuals.

Beyond the production of knowledge, there are many other goals that citizens and scientists might pursue with a research project. For a citizen this is often solving a certain problem regarding health, safety or environmental conditions. Not only knowledge, but also education, political influence, or a social network are goals that a participant pursues. Both parties should be transparent about their goals, as it will influence the set-up of the project, and might prevent disappointments or conflicts.

Jointly defining research goals

On several occasions, researchers of TOPFIT Citizenlab worked with a group of people with diabetes type 2 and a group of people with rheumatoid arthritis. We used several co-creation sessions to define research goals, topics, and questions. All expressed the goals to solve specific problems they experience in their daily lives. They argued that these problems are personal as well as general for people

---

with similar conditions. More specifically, a goal for patients with diabetes type 2 was to make technology broadly accepted, and for patients with rheumatoid arthritis to cope with fatigue.

Pursuing these goals resulted in relevant research, since these people knew from experience what questions they deemed relevant. We noticed a strong attachment towards research goals when these goals are defined in collaboration between citizens and researchers. There are some limits to what the research goals can be though. For example, in the project on rheumatoid arthritis, researchers set boundaries regarding feasibility and safety. For instance, no research was conducted to change medicine dosages, since without supervision and cooperation of attending physicians, this would be ethically irresponsible.

3.3.5 Openness for different research methods and paradigms

The fifth desideratum pleads for an openness for the use of different methods and for   different paradigms. We believe in methodological pluralism. There is a wide range of methods that can lead to valuable insights and knowledge, including methods used by citizens that stand in sharp contrast with more traditional scientific methods.

Citizen science is a paradigm example of transdisciplinary research. More specifically, citizen science projects exemplify "participative transdisciplinary", which "is aimed at collaboration between the real world with experiential knowledge of citizens and other stakeholders, and researchers from academic disciplines" (van der Bijl-Brouwer, 2022, p. 6). The contextualised and experiential knowledge necessary for transdisciplinary work is at odds with "the generalising, decontextualising and reductionist tendencies of disciplinary inquiry" (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004, p. 445). This does not mean that these forms of disciplinary inquiry cannot be used within citizen science; it only means they cannot claim dominance over other ways of inquiry, like forms of narrative inquiry (Bovenkamp et al., 2020). It is for this reason that Strasser et al. (2019) discuss epistemic practices, which can be regarded as various styles of knowledge acquisition. There is a multitude of forms of research and knowledge gathering. All forms are of potential value for citizen science; even forms of knowledge acquisition that are not so high on the methodological ladder should be taken seriously.

A typical way of going about for patients who want to find out more about their disease and what can help them is to adjust several things at the same time within a dynamic and complex life. For instance, a patient who wants to find out how to change behaviour or lifestyle in order to suffer less from a certain illness might

decide to try out several things at the same time (adjusting diet, going to bed earlier, taking a certain supplement). This contrasts with the scientific approach of changing only one thing at a time in an experimental setting in order to isolate the effects of a particular intervention. Within citizen science we need to strive for methods that are sufficiently flexible so that citizens are able to fit them into their daily routines and at the same time sufficiently robust to qualify as a scientific method (in the broad sense). Ficorilli (2019, p. 124) ascribes a "*bottom-up*, non-academic and non-institutional approach" to citizen science. The citizen scientist and professional scientist ought to collaborate and decide on the most suitable method to answer their research questions.

The differences in perspective on what good research is and what not, may differ wildly. Scientists are often flabbergasted about the way their patients tend to draw conclusions about the efficacy of a self-employed treatment. Often there is no placebo involved, and there is an apparent lack of relevant data; confounding and changing contextual aspects are not factored in. Yet, the solution to this cannot be, as is often the reflex, that patients conduct mini randomized controlled trials on themselves, including a formalized placebo condition and preferably with a wash-out period. Instead, it would be more valuable to check with patients for the existence of natural placebo conditions. A case in point are people who suffer from a chronic condition, like fatigue. These patients have often tried numerous things in a trial-and-error mode. When these have provided no result, and the next thing they try out does prove beneficial, there is at least a likeliness that there is an effect. So, these patients provide a hypothesis, which can be further tested. Likewise, from the patient's point of view, it is unethical to demand to include a wash-out period and hence to stop a certain treatment to check whether the effect withers, while it has proven beneficial. Instead, a more open attitude of scientists could be to acknowledge the result and develop additional research, possibly with other patients, to confirm the hypothesis. This is no easy terrain (see textbox).

Battling over methods

The Dutch MyOwnResearch project was a 2.6 million Euro award winning project, with a dual lead of a medical academic institution (Amsterdam UMC) and a patient organisation (Foundation Mijn Data Onze Gezondheid). Together with nine other partners they developed an approach honouring both research demands and possibilities of patients and researchers. They co-created a novel research flow connecting n-of-1 research of patients with chronic fatigue and intestinal problems, with pattern analysis on accumulated data to identify homogeneous subgroups, to conclude with a formal randomized controlled trial (RCT) to confirm the results on one of the identified subgroups. One of the

innovations was to limit the number of products patients would choose from to conduct their n-of-1 research. The main aim of this innovation was to increase the likeliness that a product might work, while decreasing the possibility of adverse effects and thereby enhancing safety. The final choice was made by the patients. At its inception in 2018, MyOwnResearch was heralded by both reviewing patient organizations, researchers, and funders. The proposal, however, was not granted permission by the Medical Ethical Review board, on the grounds that the methodology employed would not lead to knowledge that would be of value to other patients. The alternative offered was to either opt for a fully observational study, allowing patients to choose from all products on the market, or a RCT, testing only two products on a very heterogenous population. The research consortium considered this impossible to reconcile with its objective and unethical vis-a-vis participating self-researching patients, and the project was aborted early 2020 (Iske & Ruyssenaars, 2022; Remmers, 2022).

Likewise, diverging views on what is considered to contribute to health exist between professional scientist and citizen scientists. Citizens, and especially patients, may pursue research on topics or issues that are completely out of scope of the dominant medical paradigm. Their urge to find a solution to what matters to them drives them to explore health paradigms that are unorthodox, like bacteriophage therapy, electromagnetic hypersensitivity or a vegan diet to control auto-immune disease. For patients, it is not so much the health paradigm that matters, but the results it produces. They are open to different ontologies of health. Their views contribute to epistemic justice (Fricker, 2007), and may accelerate research and good health practices. This desideratum demands that we should remain open to the possibility that people benefit from certain unusual approaches. The simple act of documenting these cases, and assisting patient-researchers in making adequate observations, might accelerate the discovery of valuable and eventually generalizable options for treatments or promising innovations.

3.4. Two fundamental qualities

Desiderata govern the quality of citizen science. Making these desiderata work is not a matter of checking a box. It is a joint practice of professional scientists and citizens scientists alike, in which efforts and benefits are distributed equally and in full disclosure. They all carry responsibility. We argue that the use of the desiderata should respond to two fundamental qualities: transparency and symmetry. Therefore, these qualities function on a meta-level, meaning that the fundamental qualities do not govern the quality of citizen science itself but rather the quality of how the desiderata are applied in practise.

Both these qualities should therefore also be understood as moral principles when applying the desiderata. Stakeholders in a citizen science project are open and show integrity to their ethical position and actions they undertake. Being transparent about the ins and outs of a citizen science project, and especially about the desiderata, is primordial for the desiderata to be used in any way; transparency, so to say, enables or by lack of transparency impairs the desiderata to function (cf Turilli & Floridi, 2009). At the same time, it demands that our desiderata can be made transparent. It should be possible to give words and meaning to the desiderata.

The concept of symmetry demands that the ethical desiderata should be able to be approached and viewed both from the perspective of a researcher and from a citizen in similar terms. In other words: the employment of the desiderata should be neutral to either researcher or citizen. The principle of symmetry was first formulated by Bloor (1976). It was later introduced an important notion within Actor-Network Theory (Callon, 1986; Law, 1993; Latour, 1996). It is used within the so-called SCOT-approach (Social Construction of Technology) and has gained firm ground within Science and Technology Studies (STS) worldwide (Law & Lin, 2017). In this paper, we won't delve into the sociological-theoretical aspects of the concept of symmetry but use it to provide a context within which the ethical desiderata can be explored in ways that do justice to the perspectives of both the 'citizen' and the 'scientist' in citizen science projects.

We argue that symmetry in recognition of capabilities entails citizen scientists recognizing capabilities of professional scientists and vice versa. In the literature on citizen science, projects are often initiated and led by professional scientists. Research activities initiated and led by citizens have been labelled "extreme" (Haklay, 2012). These labels are problematic because they convey the impression that professional scientists should lead a citizen science project. There is no reason why a citizen science project should not be led by citizen scientists. The initiative to investigate a particular issue in the form of a cooperation between citizens and professional scientists can as well come from citizens. Some authors use the term 'passive citizen science', to describe research activities that analyse photos and observations of e.g.wildlife, uploaded by citizens on the internet, without interference of any intentional citizen science campaign. (Edwards et al, 2021). While the term 'passive' is understandable from the point of view of the professional researcher, it does not honour the curiosity and observational qualities of the individuals collecting the data.

On the other end, while the desideratum of 'openness to different methods and paradigms' demands that scientists are open to other methods and paradigms than those they are used to, the principle of symmetry demands that citizen scientists appreciate that to draw conclusions, specific procedures need to be put in place.

Citizens should be willing to reflect on the processes and methodology that is needed to arrive at solid observations and conclusions. The symmetry concept is in no way meant to re-invoke the 'science wars' reminiscent of the heated debates in the 80-90 ties and cannot be understood as a freeway for post-modern relativism and 'anything goes'. The concept is essentially an invitation to respect the intricacy and complexities involved in processes of knowledge generation (Sismondo, 2017), be it knowledge upholding a claim for generalizability or only valid in individual or very specific circumstances. When taken seriously, the concept of symmetry has the potential to connect perspectives of professional and citizen scientists in what Harambam (2021) calls 'deliberative citizen knowledge platforms'.

4. CONCLUSION

At the onset of this paper, we observed that definitions of citizen science are inherently problematic, and that its boundaries are ultimately ethical. Based on field experiences of both researchers and citizens engaged in citizen science in the healthcare domain, we have developed an ethical framework to enable a multitude of citizen science projects that honour demands of professional researchers and citizens. The framework consists of two core values (respect and justice), five ethical desiderata (relationship between equals; recognition of each other's capacities, knowledge, and agency; reciprocity; openness for different goals; and openness for different research methods and paradigms) and two fundamental qualities (symmetry and transparency). It is meant to complement existing frameworks, such as the ICPHR framework for participatory health research, addressing concerns of citizen scientists active in the field of bio-medical research. We posit that when taking these desiderata seriously, citizen science can claim to be, at its core, a humanizing endeavour unlocking the investigative capacities in people.

A theoretical framework does not by itself ensure ethical practice. There must be provisions in place to make ethical concerns practical and actionable. The formulation of these provisions is beyond the scope of this paper, and is something that should be explored in future research.

The ethical framework discussed in this paper does not cover all ethical issues related to citizen science. For instance, a government could decide to make medical treatment and care dependent on participation in health-related citizen science projects. Participation could thus become quasi-mandatory. Such a development would be highly problematic, as not everyone has the capacities and means to participate in such research activities, and as there can be good reasons to refuse participation even if one has the capacities and means for participating. Considerations of justice require that access to treatment and care not be dependent

on participation in citizen science projects. We believe that possible indirect effects on society should be explored further.

We have formulated our framework using first-hand experience in the healthcare domain. However, both desiderata and fundamental qualities are formulated in a generic way such that we see no reason why the framework would not apply beyond the domain of health. We would welcome it if other practitioners were to apply and test the framework in other domains.

Further research could moreover aim at developing an ethical code for citizen science, akin to ethical codes for research with human subjects. Our ethical framework could function as a basis for such a code. Like this framework, such a code should be based on the concerns of practitioners in the field.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

FUNDING

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

All authors contributed to the design and preparation of the study. GR provided input based on his experience as a patient and citizen scientist and came up with a preliminary list and text of desiderata. He wrote the first draft of sections 2, 3.4, and the conclusion, and the text box in section 3.3.5. JH wrote the first draft of sections 1, 3.1 and 3.3, excluding the text boxes. She contributed significantly to the conclusion. CvL and ES provided input on the basis of their involvement in TOPFIT Citizenlab. CvL contributed significantly to section 1 and made sure that all sections were aligned and coherent. ES wrote the first draft of section 3.2 and the text boxes with examples from TOPFIT

Citizenlab. He contributed significantly to section 3.4. All authors approved the latest version of the manuscript.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY

All relevant data are in the manuscript.

5. REFERENCES

Abma, T., & Broerse, J. E. W. (2007). Zeggenschap in wetenschap: patientenparticipatie in onderzoek. Lemma.

Auerbach, J., Barthelmess, E. L., Cavalier, D., Cooper, C. B., Fenyk, H., Haklay, M., Hulbert, J. M., Kyba, C. C. M., Larson, L. R., Lewandowski, E., & Shanley, L. (2019). The problem with delineating narrow criteria for citizen science. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 116(31), 15336-15337. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1909278116

Baker, R. (2019). The structure of moral revolutions: studies of changes in the morality of abortion, death, and the bioethics revolution. Mit Press.

Banks, S. (2016). Everyday ethics in professional life: Social work as ethics work. Ethics and social welfare, 10(1), 35-52.

Banks, S., Cook, T., Springett, J., Unger, H., & Wright, M. (2013). Participatory health research: a guide to ethical principles and practice.

Beauchamp, T. L. (2008). The belmont report. The Oxford textbook of clinical research ethics, 149-155.

Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and social imaginary. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bonney, R. (1996). Citizen science: A lab tradition. Living Bird, 15(4), 7-15.

Borkman, T. (1976). Experiential knowledge: A new concept for the analysis of self-help groups. Social service review, 50(3), 445-456.

Callon, M. (1984). Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. The sociological review, 32(1_suppl), 196-233.

Driver, Julia (2022). The history of utilitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

Edwards, T., Jones, C. B., Perkins, S. E., & Corcoran, P. (2021). Passive citizen science: The role of social media in wildlife observations. PLoS One, 16(8). https://doi.org/ARTN e025541610.1371/journal.pone.0255416

Eitzel, M. V., Cappadonna, J. L., Santos-Lang, C., Duerr, R. E., Virapongse, A., West, S. E., Kyba, C. C. M., Bowser, A., Cooper, C. B., Sforzi, A., Metcalfe, A. N., Harris, E. S., Thiel, M., Haklay, M., Ponciano, L., Roche, J., Ceccaroni, L., Shilling, F. M., Dörler, D., Heigl, F., Kiessling, T., Davis, B. Y., & Jiang, Q. (2017). Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key Terms. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 2, 1-20.

Elwyn, G., Frosch, D., Thomson, R., Joseph-Williams, N., Lloyd, A., Kinnersley, P., Cording, E., Tomson, D., Dodd, C., Rollnick, S., Edwards, A., & Barry, M. (2012). Shared decision making: a model for clinical practice. J Gen Intern Med, 27(10), 1361-1367. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-012-2077-6

Emanuel, E. J., & Emanuel, L. L. (1992). Four models of the physician-patient relationship. JAMA, 267(16), 2221-2226. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1556799

Feinberg, J. (1975). Some conjectures about the concept of respect. Journal of Social Philosophy, 4(2).

Ficorilli, A. (2019). What ethics for citizen science? Epidemiologia & Prevenzione, 43(2-3), 124-125. https://doi.org/10.19191/Ep19.2-3.P124.048

Fiske, A., Prainsack, B., & Buyx, A. (2019). Meeting the needs of underserved populations: setting the agenda for more inclusive citizen science of medicine. Journal of Medical Ethics, 45(9), 617-622. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-105253

Frank, A. W. (2013). The wounded storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics. University of Chicago Press.

Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press.

Gieryn, T. F. (1999). Cultural boundaries of science: Credibility on the line. University of Chicago Press.

Goodwin, J., & Roberts, L. (2019). Citizen Science Ethics: It's a Community Thing. Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, 9(1), 35-40.

Groot, B., & Abma, T. (2022). Ethics framework for citizen science and public and patient participation in research. BMC Medical Ethics, 23(1), 1-9.

Haklay, M. (2013). Citizen Science and Volunteered Geographic Information: Overview and Typology of Participation. Springer.

Harambam, J. (2021). Against modernist illusions: why we need more democratic and constructivist alternatives to debunking conspiracy theories. Journal for Cultural Research, 25(1), 104-122.

Heigl, F., Kieslinger, B., Paul, K. T., Uhlik, J., & Dorler, D. (2019). Opinion: Toward an international definition of citizen science. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 116(17), 8089-8092. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1903393116

Heyen, N. B., & Dickel, S. (2019). Was ist Personal Health Science? Springer.

Horlick-Jones, T., & Sime, J. (2004). Living on the border: knowledge, risk and transdisciplinarity. Futures, 36(4), 441-456. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2003.10.006

ICPHR. (2022). Position Paper 2: Participatory Health Research A Guide to Ethical Principles and Practice. Baltimore, USA: International Collaboration for Participatory Health Research, second(July).

Iske, P., & Ruyssenaars, B. (2022). Casus 4: De wrijving tussen klassiek en innovatief onderzoek: zelfonderzoek, innovatie, patientenvertegenwoordiging. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Briljante Mislukkingen, Zorg(5), 46-55.

Kasperowski, D., Hagen, N., & Rohden, F. (2022). Ethical boundary work in citizen science: Themes of insufficiency. Nordic Journal of Science and Technology Studies.

Kullenberg, C., & Kasperowski, D. (2016). What Is Citizen Science?--A Scientometric Meta-Analysis. PLoS One, 11(1), e0147152. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147152

Lancet, T. (2021). Can digital technologies improve health? Lancet (London, England), 398(10312), 1663.

Larry, A. & Moore, M. (2021). Deontological Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Latour, B. (1996). On actor-network theory: A few clarifications. Soziale welt, 369-381.

Law, J. (1993). Organising modernity: Social ordering and social theory. John Wiley & Sons.

Law, J., & Lin, W. (2017). Provincializing STS: Postcoloniality, symmetry, and method. East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, 11(2), 211-227.

Moriggi, A., et al. (2020). Caring in, for, and with Nature: An Integrative Framework to Understand Green Care Practices. Sustainability 12, 3361; doi:10.3390/su12083361.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2009). Creating capabilities: The human development approach and its implementation. Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The human development approach. Belknap Press of Harvard.

Oosterlaken, E. T. (2013). Taking a capability approach to technology and its design: A philosophical exploration TU Delft]. Delft.

Patientenfederatie. (2018). Meer mens, minder patient! Onze visie voor 2030 in 5 toekomstbeelden.

Prainsack, B. & Forgó, N. (2022). Why paying individual people for their health data is a bad idea. Nature Medicine, 28, 1989–1991. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-022-01955-4

Petersen, C., Austin, R. R., Backonja, U., Campos, H., Chung, A. E., Hekler, E. B., Hsueh, P. Y. S., Kim, K. K., Pho, A., Salmi, L., Solomonides, A., & Valdez, R. S. (2020).

Citizen science to further precision medicine: from vision to implementation. Jamia Open, 3(1), 2-8. https://doi.org/10.1093/jamiaopen/ooz060

Rasmussen, L. J. H., Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Danese, A., Eugen-Olsen, J., Fisher, H. L., Harrington, H., Houts, R., Matthews, T., & Sugden, K. (2020). Association of adverse experiences and exposure to violence in childhood and adolescence with inflammatory burden in young people. JAMA pediatrics, 174(1), 38-47.

Remen, N. (1980). The human patient. Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Remmers, G. G. A., Boorsma, A., Duinkerken, H., & van Lieshout, M. (2021). Gezond AKKOORD: coöperatief beheer van je gezondheidsgegevens. Position paper. MD|OG, TNO, HHDC. https://mdog.nl/gezond-akkoord/

Remmers, G. G. A., (2022) Citizen Science voor Gezondheid: leren van MyOwnResearch. Symposium report. DesignLab University Twente, Amsterdam Public Health, MD|OG. https://mdog.nl/mijn-eigen-onderzoek/

Rendlemann, J., & Rendleman, J. (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. The Personalist Forum,

Robinson, L. D., Cawthray, J. L., West, S. E., Bonn, A., & Ansine, J. (2018). Ten principles of citizen science. In Citizen science: Innovation in open science, society and policy (pp. 27-40). UCL Press.

Ruddick, S. (1989). Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace. Beacon Press.

Sen, A. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. North Holland Lectures in Economy.

Sen, A. (1985). Rights and capabilities. Routledge.

Serrano, F. (2013). Engaging citizens in science for research excellence. Science Node.

Sismondo, S. (2017). Post-truth? Social Studies of Science, 47(1), 3–6 https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312717692076

Smit, C., & Knecht-van Eekelen, A. (2015). De macht van de patiënt: baas over je eigen ziekte. Sanquin Bloedvoorziening.

Strasser, B., Baudry, J., Mahr, D., Sanchez, G., & Tancoigne, E. (2019). " Citizen science"? Rethinking science and public participation. Science & Technology Studies, 32(ARTICLE), 52-76.

Suman, A. B., Heyen, N. B., & Micheli, M. (2023). Reimagining health services provision for neglected groups: The "personalization from below" phenomenon. Frontiers in sociology, 8, 1052215.

Tronto, J. C. (1993). Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (T. Kaufman-Osborn, N. J. Hirschmann, D. Engster, F. Robinson, N. Yeates, & J. C. Tronto, Eds. Vol. 14). Routledge.

Tronto, J. C. (2013). Caring democracy: markets, equality, and justice. New York University Press.

Tronto, J. C. (2015). Democratic caring and global care responsibilities. In Ethics of Care (pp. 21-30). Policy Press.

Turilli, M., & Floridi, L. (2009). The ethics of information transparency. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(2), 105-112.

van de Bovenkamp, H. M., Platenkamp, C., & Bal, R. (2020). Understanding patient experiences: The powerful source of written patient stories. Health Expectations, 23(3), 717-718. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13053

van der Bijl-Brouwer, M. (2022). Design, one piece of the puzzle: A conceptual and practical perspective on transdisciplinary design.

Vayena, E., & Tasioulas, J. (2015). "We the scientists": A human right to citizen science. Philosophy & Technology, 28(3), 479-485.

Vohland, K., Land-Zandstra, A., Ceccaroni, L., Lemmens, R., Perelló, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., & Wagenknecht, K. (2021). The science of citizen science. Springer Nature.

Wolf, G. I., & De Groot, M. (2020). A conceptual framework for personal science. Frontiers in Computer Science, 2, 21.

TALKING METADATA. UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF VOLUNTEER CONTRIBUTIONS IN CITIZEN SCIENCE PROJECTS

GEFION THUERMER
King's College London
gefion.thuermer@kcl.ac.uk

LAURA KOESTEN
University of Vienna
laura.koesten@univie.ac.at

ELENA SIMPERL
King's College London
elena.simperl@kcl.ac.uk

ABSTRACT
Citizen science (CS) projects typically have citizen scientists with different levels of expertise and agency contributing data or knowledge. Every contribution leaves traces of their involvement, including metadata such as locations or emails. Through four case studies this paper explores the generation, use, and publication practices of CS projects' metadata. We use a mixed-method approach combining document reviews, interviews, and an online survey, to generate insights into current metadata practices and perceptions of project contributors and organisers. We identify several weaknesses in CS projects' data collection practices: Participants have only limited awareness of the metadata they contribute, and the privacy implications it can have. Matching expectations between project contributors and organisers regarding acknowledgement is crucial - and metadata play a key role. Projects need data processes and documentation aligned with open science principles, and clear communication to contributors about the data they collect and use. Finally, projects need to consider the mental models of contributors in relation to personal data and associated risks. We derive key considerations that data-intensive CS projects should make in their initial design phase, to generate consistent metadata in line with their participants' expectations, which in turn increases transparency and thus can increase data reuse.

KEYWORDS
Metadata, citizen science, mixed methods, licensing, privacy

INTRODUCTION - THE ROLE OF CITIZEN SCIENCE IN SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

In citizen science (CS) projects, volunteers collect and share data with the project staff, other volunteers, and the public. The European Commission defined citizen science as the "general public engagement in scientific research activities when citizens actively contribute to science either with their intellectual effort or surrounding knowledge or with their tools and resources" (2014, p. 6). CS encompasses diverse types of projects and data, and is reliant on public participation. Citizens in CS projects can be engaged in many different ways, and ideally, should be considered throughout the entire research lifecycle (Thuermer et al., 2022). This not only provides for actual rather than simulated participation (Arnstein, 1969) in the project and with the data itself (White, 1996), and more inclusion and representation in projects (Cooper et al. 2021), but also increases justice in the management and use of citizen generated data (Christine & Thinane, 2021). If science becomes more inclusive and open by adopting citizen and open science principles, it will be better able to respond to the needs of the communities it aims to serve. CS can advance science, contribute to innovation processes, and people in the scientific discourse (Bonney et al., 2009), and contribute to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (Fraisl et a., 2020).

CS projects commonly collect data for various purposes, and 'data' in this context should be understood as pieces of information, whether these are images, observations, descriptions, categorisations, physical samples, audio files, or other data types. Collections of data are defined as datasets and might be published as the result of a CS project. Such datasets need to be described, to contextualise them, both for human as well as machine consumption. Any such description (which can be more or less structured) is understood to be metadata in the context of this work, as it constitutes "data about data". Here we investigate how CS projects collect and process metadata in practice and how formalised these work practices are.

Data in CS projects has mostly been discussed from the perspective of data quality, and how to make the datasets resulting from CS projects more fit for scientific reuse (Riesch & Potter, 2014), and little focus has been given to metadata. Data quality has been identified as a consistent issue (Ponti & Craglia, 2020), especially where data is meant for the use of academic research. Understanding and improving the data practices of CS projects can help mitigate the known issues of distrust in data and metadata quality, and in transparency of CS projects (e.g. Hunter et al., 2013, Ottinger 2010). Burgess et al. (2017) recommend that metadata on the collection protocols of data should be included in CS datasets to this end.

If citizen scientists are to be attributed for contributions that are subsequently used in publications, metadata about the contributors is required to enable this; so metadata can include personal data. Others have investigated potential privacy implications in the context of CS contributions, e.g., through location data

embedded in submissions (e.g. Bowser et al., 2014; Xia et al., 2017). Here we expand this focus by looking at contributors' awareness and expectations, not only regarding the protection of their privacy and their intellectual property rights, but also public attribution for their contributions.

Using a mixed methods approach we studied the contributors' awareness of metadata, its implications and potential risks. We conducted an analysis of project documentation, interviews with project organisers and contributors, and a survey with contributors, to triangulate different perspectives on the topic. We asked coordinators and contributors about the metadata that they provide - which may implicitly or explicitly include personal data. Furthermore, we investigate expectations on attribution in the projects' contexts, both for direct participation as well as for eventual future outputs (e.g., scientific publications, success stories, etc.) and how this is communicated as part of the projects' documentation. We do this by investigating four CS projects, all funded through the EC ACTION (Participatory science toolkit against pollution) project.[1]

Our findings point to several weaknesses in data collection practices, due to limited considerations of metadata, privacy risks and contributor acknowledgements. For instance, they show that participants have only limited awareness of the metadata they contribute and the privacy implications this metadata has. We argue that a thorough documentation of metadata would be useful to help participants understand exactly what data and metadata they contribute and what implications these data have, to make their contributions both more valuable for data users, and more ethical for participants, who would be fully aware of what data they contribute and to which end. We further find that expectations with regards to acknowledgement differ both between and within projects, and that appropriate communication strategies can pre-empt many of those risk factors. Lastly, we find that awareness of privacy implications and risks among project organisers can successfully be conveyed to participants through appropriate communication strategies.

BACKGROUND - WHY CITIZEN SCIENCE AND ITS DATA MATTER

Citizen science projects

Citizen science projects actively involve lay people in one or more aspects of research. This may include research design, data collection, recruitment, data analysis as well as interpretation of results, or publications (Riesch & Potter, 2014). CS projects may occur at small, local scale, or as international collaborative ventures, collecting hundreds of thousands of data points. One example of a large-scale CS project is eBird, which boasts 150,000 participants and contributes data for scientific

---

[1] https://actionproject.eu/

research in ornithology. Making the data usable for scientific research requires a consistent level of data quality, which is supported through a combination of an intuitive user interface for data entry, with automated filters that support participants' categorisations, and expert reviews of the data entries (Lagoze, 2014). Feedback and rewards have been shown to be effective tools to motivate citizen scientists to engage, and to enhance the quality of the contributed data (Reeves et al., 2017). CS has huge potential to support policy development (Hecker et al., 2019) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, but to realise this potential, their output data quality has to become more consistent and reliable (Fraisl et al., 2020).

Citizen science is often conflated with data collection by citizens; in an ideal scenario, citizens should not only be contributing or collecting data, but be involved in the project in a broader sense. The European Citizen Science Association (ECSA) has developed ten guiding principles for CS, to ensure it is conducted responsibly, and achieves impact. These principles include the active involvement of citizens, genuine science outcomes as a goal, collaboration between scientists and citizens across project stages, and data made publicly available (Robinson et al., 2018). However, the principles also assume the projects to be led by professional scientists, which is not always the case - there are numerous bottom-up CS projects that are driven and implemented primarily by citizens (Miyashita et al., 2021; Oudheusden & Abe, 2021). Despite the crucial role of data and its contributors in CS, there is no overarching best practice for data use and attribution.

Metadata in CS projects

In CS projects, data can be many things, and there is no one definition. While traditional definitions commonly include the word "fact" (e.g. numerical facts, collected together for reference or information (OED)), critical discussions convene on a more representational view of data, emphasising data context and focusing on the "making of data" opposed to a positivist notion of data (Bokulich & Parker 2021, Leonelli 2020). Following this viewpoint there are definitions that also include relational properties of data (Borgman 2012) which take interactions around data as a part of context into account (Neff et al., 2017). This highlights the importance of metadata as an instrument for capturing context.

In this work, we understand data from the viewpoint of the citizen scientists, namely the pieces of information collected by citizen scientists for the purpose of generating insight for the CS project. Depending on the project, data could consist of images, observations, descriptions, categorisations, physical samples, audio files, or a variety of other details. For example, in the eBird project, contributors record observations, images and sounds of birds, all of which are entered into an online platform; in ACTION's Water Sentinels projects, participants collected water samples along with metadata, such as location and date/time.

Metadata is data about a dataset (or about data in a dataset). It describes properties of a dataset, such as its title and description, contributors, etc. Different metadata

schemes are developed for research data within and across disciplines, to make data interoperable and discoverable by machines (DataCite Metadata Working Group, 2019). The adoption of unified metadata practices improves data exchange possibilities and scientific transparency. Examples for general purpose metadata vocabularies are the Data Catalogue Vocabulary (DCAT[2]) or Schema.org[3]. There are many other, domain specific approaches aimed at improving and standardising metadata entries. Metadata often uses specific vocabularies and technical formats, which means its understanding can be challenging (Mayernik, 2011; Edwards et al., 2011).

Contributors to CS datasets supply a certain amount of metadata about themselves, depending on the project setup and structure (e.g. whether data is collected manually or online). Hence, the nature of the data type and format contributed in CS projects can lead to specific metadata challenges regarding privacy, data quality, and ownership, for example if location data is shared by participants unaware of potential privacy exposures (e.g. Bowser et al., 2017), or contribute data without awareness of the plans for its ownership and publication (Resnik et al., 2015). Access to data can be allowed at different levels, as researchers weigh which data to make open, when, for whom (Levin & Leonelli, 2017), and how sensitive data can be made available without posing privacy risks to contributors. Wong et al. (2022) suggest that involving data subjects in the co-creation of data protection regimes can enhance their effectiveness and alleviate potential power imbalances between stakeholders.

In the context of reusability of CS data for scientific research it has been pointed out that metadata should include details about data collection and analysis, to ensure scientists have sufficient confidence in data to actually use it for their research (Burgess et al., 2017). Projects such as CitSci.org have developed metadata documentation features that support different standards and community-driven metadata fields, and developed award schemes to incentivise people to supply comprehensive metadata (Wang et al., 2015). The US-based Citizen Science Association has recently developed a metadata standard for Public Participation in Scientific Research projects: PPSR Core[4]. While using these schemas could address issues such as insufficient documentation of the research design, implementation, or quality control, the application of schemata still requires expertise. We argue that while the meaningful use of metadata standards can be challenging even for experts (Attig et al. 2004; Koesten et al. 2020), they can present particular barriers to involving citizens in knowledge generation as they require expertise not necessarily available to bottom-up CS project teams and their contributors. In CS projects, decisions of what to capture, publish and report are often made without concrete guidelines on the potential risks and implications (Thuermer et al., 2023), which

---

[2] https://www.w3.org/TR/vocab-dcat-2/
[3] https://schema.org/Dataset
[4] https://core.citizenscience.org/

means that citizen scientists contribute without full awareness of what will happen with their contribution - and unable to question or fully consent to this use. The nature of the contribution of a specific project can lead to the collection of metadata that the contributors might or might not be aware of. This includes for instance the submission of geolocation data as part of data collection efforts in the real world, which has been pointed out as a risk for privacy (Bowser et al., 2017). Some projects explicitly require the contribution of personal data, including the contributors' identity, which mirrors the role of a "data publisher" in traditional metadata schemata (e.g. DCAT).

Aside from data about people, questions of intellectual property rights, such as copyright on contributed images, have also been discussed in the context of CS projects. This points to the fact that while rights vary with the contributed data type, it is essential to consider data ownership in advance, to avoid later issues with dissemination and use of research datasets that contain copyright-protected contributions without authorization (Scassa & Chung 2015; Resnik et al., 2015). Riesch & Potter (2014) raise the question whether contributors should be authors on outputs, which would in turn have implications for their privacy: if the licensing of their contributions requires acknowledgement, then their names (or pseudonyms) need to be collected and potentially published as metadata. All these issues culminate in questions of how CS projects collect and process both data and metadata, which we will explore in more depth in the following sections.

Methods

This study was conducted in the context of the ACTION project, which supported and co-designed tools with 16 CS pilot projects. Case studies were selected from the nine pilots that were active at the time of data collection (October 2020). We excluded pilots who worked with minors, as this kind of data has a different set of implications, or those that only collected data anonymously, as it would not have yielded insight on the privacy or acknowledgement issues we were interested in. Four pilots were selected for inquiry, which collected six types of data in total: i) images and contextual information of streetlights, ii) pictures of the night sky, iii) neighbourhood sound samples, iv) counts of dragonflies and butterflies, v) water samples, and vi) images of water bodies. Three of the projects were led by public authorities or professional scientists and primarily engaged contributors in data gathering, while one project was conceived and its design heavily informed by citizens. The projects' data is used to support policy decisions (such as environmental protection or traffic management), as well as research into different forms of pollution.

To understand the projects' metadata practices, we conducted an analysis of project documentation, interviews with project organisers, and a survey with contributors, to triangulate different perspectives on the topic. We used a mixed methods approach to gain insights into how data and metadata was conceptualised.

The documentation analysis gives us a non-intrusive way to learn about the projects' data practices which we could then expand on during the interviews. We used the survey to gain quantitative insight into the perspectives of a larger sample of contributors, to add more breadth to our inquiry.

For all projects, we conducted a document analysis (Bowen, 2009) on all relevant documentation that the projects shared with their participants. A list of all documents is provided in the appendix. This analysis aimed to understand, in as much detail as possible, how the projects conduct their data collection, what and how data and metadata is collected, what role participants play, and how they are informed about their role, contributions and attribution.

Based on these insights, we conducted semi-structured interviews with the project organisers, which allowed us to go into more depth around data and metadata collection, and considerations they made in the planning of these processes. Specific foci were privacy implications of data collection for the participants and any other risks inherent to the data, and the ownership and use of the research data.

Building on findings from both document analysis and interviews, as well as literature on CS, we designed a survey for project participants to explore how they perceive their engagement and the data and metadata they contribute. The survey was administered via MS forms, and available in three languages: English, Spanish, and Dutch[5]. It was structured in two sections: Participants' engagement and motivations, the data and metadata contributions they make, what role they believe metadata plays, the risks they associate with their activities, and how they expect their contributions to be used and acknowledged; and socio-demographic information, including age, gender, education, and country of residence. An overview of the whole survey can be found in appendix 2. Questions were a combination of Likert scales (for awareness / relevance), scales for motivations and risk perception, and single and multiple choice, with the option to add additional categories. Participants were also given the opportunity to volunteer for a short follow-up interview, and to add supplementary comments.

The survey was sent to all 334 participants associated with the three organisations engaging in the citizen science projects: UCM (Azotea and Street Spectra), DBC (butterfly and dragonfly monitoring; BDM), and BitLab (Noise Maps) (all described in the 'Findings' section below). While DBC has significantly more participants engaged in butterfly and dragonfly monitoring, the survey was only sent to those who also engaged in the water sample collection.

18 survey respondents volunteered for an interview. All of them were contacted, and three interviews were conducted. They were analysed together with the interviews with project organisers, but not included in this paper, as they only confirmed the insights from the survey.

---

[5] Translations from English were completed by project organisers who are native speakers in those languages.

Table 1: Overview of survey responses

	Sent	Recipients	Responses	Response rate
Street Spectra[6]	18-Sep-20	54	8	15%
Azotea[7]	02-Jul-21	13	11	85%
Noise Maps	10-Sep-20	12	5	42%
BDM	18-Sep-20	255	84	32%
TOTAL		**334**	**108**	**32%**

The survey results were analysed using descriptive statistics to identify differences between the views of project organisers and contributors, and chi-square tests to identify relevant correlations between participants' projects, views, and characteristics.

The study was approved by the institutional Research Ethics Office at King's College London, under reference MRA-19/20-20327. Informed consent was given by the participants through the survey as well as prior to the interviews.

FINDINGS - FOUR CASE STUDIES OF CITIZEN SCIENCE PROJECTS AND THEIR PARTICIPANTS

We spoke to four projects, **Street Spectra[8]**, **Azotea[9]**, **Noise Maps[10] and BDM[11]**, hosted by three organisations, which we describe here in conjunction with the results of our analysis. **Street Spectra**, hosted by *Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)*, engages a wide group of citizen scientists, who take photos of light spectra with their smartphone camera, and upload them to an open online database. The goal is to collect data on light pollution through streetlights over time. Contributors require a smartphone and a low budget handheld device, which the project provides them with, to participate. Contributors' main point of interaction is an app, which runs on the epicollect platform[12]. This helps to ensure consistency of contributions. Contributors can add, change or remove data. They are authenticated through

---

[6] Since it is impossible to reach out to Street Spectra participants directly, UCM sent the survey to astronomy clubs they told about the project to recruit citizen scientists; we do not have exact numbers of their members, or the proportion of members who engage in Street Spectra.

[7] As we only received one response to the survey from Azotea participants during the initial data collection phase, we decided to redistribute the survey during revisions of the paper.

[8] https://streetspectra.actionproject.eu/

[9] https://guaix.ucm.es/azoteaproject

[10] http://www.bitlab.cat/projectes/noise-maps

[11] https://www.vlinderstichting.nl/english/

[12] https://five.epicollect.net/

Google[13], so the platform itself does not process their personal details. It also provides detailed guides for participants, explaining how to collect and submit contributions, navigate the app, create new projects etc., and hosts the submitted data on a publicly accessible database.

The project provides an in-depth tutorial on how to take pictures of light spectra, and how to categorise them and identify the type of lamp that creates them. The goals of the project, as well as the data it collects, were well explained in the documentation. However, guidance of the app was limited to documentation from the app developers (which is independent of the project), and there was no specification of what would happen with the data, aside from it being published in a publicly available database. The privacy policy of the app suggests that all data is owned by the project, while users grant the project a licence to their contributions - which is contradictory in itself, and could not be clarified in our investigation.

The use of a project-external app means limited control over what data is collected in practice. This became clear when we attempted to distribute our participant survey, and UCM was unable to reach out to their participants directly, because they had no structured data, such as names or email addresses, about them. In the long-term, the project aims to develop their own app, which will also allow participants to identify the relevant light spectra on the photo, and categorise the lamp based on it. While the platform and project documentation both discuss different aspects of data collection and submission processes, as well as some of the metadata, they do not specify the use or ownership of the data, or privacy implications for participants. Combined with the above-mentioned contradiction in the platform policy, this may lead to licensing and/or privacy issues in practice.

One reason for a lack of privacy considerations became apparent when interviewing the project organisers: The use of the phones' geolocation could be a privacy risk, but since participants are expected to submit photos of *street*lights, this location should not be their home, and thus should not make personal information public. However, the public data shows that participants have uploaded geotagged photos of indoor lighting. Moreover, the geolocation submitted via the app is the one where the phone is located at the point of submission, which is not necessarily the same where the photo was taken. Three of the seven respondents to our survey who participated in Street Spectra also stated that they do provide their home address as part of their metadata. As one project organiser illustrated:

"What I have been doing is, at the moment that you take the picture, I just upload it to the server. I have not tested a use case where you go home and then upload the image.[...] Our interest is for public lampposts, not for indoor illumination [...] I have not seen it [images of indoor lighting], maybe this is for cosmetic reasons or someone wants to upload something, but it is not really our target. [...] I'll have to check that" (Project organiser, UCM)

---

[13] https://developers.google.com/identity

Azotea, also hosted by *UCM,* engages with hobby astronomers who set up their personal cameras to take regular pictures of the night sky throughout and beyond the lockdown period in Madrid in spring 2020. Their goal is to measure the effect of the lockdown on light pollution. The documentation of the project was not well developed, not least owing to its newness at the time. Azotea provides a guide for contributors that explains how to set up their camera and collect the image data, which also outlines the goal of the project, but gives no indication of what metadata would be collected. Contributors in this project have a close personal relationship with the research team and are heavily involved in the entire project, including the academic publication process. Hence a lot of information, while not part of the documentation, is passed on via direct email or conversations. This makes documentation less necessary, but simultaneously more vague and out of sync with the actual processes in the project. For example, the documentation was clearly written before the project launched, suggesting the processes were still being developed, even though the project had been actively collecting data for months at the time of our analysis.

Contributors provide their personal details, such as name and email address, which is also used for publications. All contributors submit photos from their home (but no location data), and upload the photos to a central server. They all have full read and write access to the entire dataset. A first academic publication is in progress, and the citizen scientists will be named on it. The close involvement in the project lifecycle also means that organisers set different expectations for contributions and acknowledgement:

"It is also a matter of science for us in Azotea. In the beginning it was really targeted at dedicated amateur astronomers, we have had more or less 15 of them. Maybe now about 5 are active. So there is a scientific paper coming out of this, and we want to give credit to these people with real names. [...] We knew from the beginning that this would be targeted at very few." (Project organiser, UCM)

Noise Maps is hosted by the Spanish NGO *BitLab,* and engages with citizens in Barcelona to record and map the soundscape of two local neighbourhoods. Sound sensors are installed in participants' homes, collecting regular sound samples. Participants can also record audio samples during walk-workshops, passing by pre-selected points of interest throughout the city. The sound samples are then processed automatically to generate insight into the types of sounds that are audible at different times and days, such as traffic, construction, people, or wildlife. This data can help maintain local cultural heritage, but could also be used in policy discussions about noise pollution.

The project was initiated and conceived by a local community, who then approached BitLab for support. Participants discussed the project and their contribution at a workshop, at which the goals of the project, its data collection and processing were explained, and privacy and security considerations discussed. The entire data collection and analysis protocol was co-created with the participants.

Further guidance is provided to contributors in the projects' documentation, and when sound sensors are set up at their homes. Noise Maps has extensive documentation about the project, its data collection and usage. They also have detailed information and a protocol for contributor consent. The project is very clear that potentially sensitive personal data will be collected in sound recordings, from both contributors and unrelated bystanders, and that this data is subject to special protection in raw form, and therefore undergoes anonymisation before it is published: "There is no way around putting some signposts, letting bystanders know that sound is being recorded." (BitLab)

All data is made publicly available; however not in its raw form. As recordings may include conversations of potentially sensitive nature, all human voices are distorted. As a further safety measure, sound sensors are set up such that the participants who collect the data do not have access to the raw sound files. This was a conscious decision by project organisers and contributors, in order to protect the privacy of those who may be unwittingly recorded. Since contributors cannot access the files, they cannot retract them directly; however, the project organisers would delete any data if this was requested. All these measures bring home the point to contributors that the data is sensitive and a potential privacy risk; if not to them, then to the people they record. Unsurprisingly, awareness for this risk among Noise Maps participants - the project that co-created the entire data collection and analysis protocol and specifically discussed these risks - was highest among our survey participants.

The **butterfly and dragonfly monitoring project (BDM)** hosted by the *Dutch Butterfly Conservation (DBC)* keeps track of the butterfly and dragonfly populations in the Netherlands. Contributors walk specified sectioned routes and count species they encounter, which they then enter into a central database. They are set up with a login to this platform when they start collecting data, and can use this to submit or amend their observations. Submissions can be made through an app or a website. The collected data is used by Statistics Netherlands (the national statistics office) to measure and predict butterfly and dragonfly populations, and inform environmental policy-making. As part of **ACTION**, BDM investigates the relationship between the occurrence of dragonflies and pesticides in local waters on some of their existing routes. In addition to species counts, contributors in this part of the study also collect water samples and photographs, which are analysed to understand the effect of pesticides on dragonfly populations. The data is published only in aggregated form, with no recognisable links to individual observations, as outlined by one of the organisers:

"We don't publish the data as is. The data is included in the national database for flora and fauna. But you can't recognise it as being from monitoring transects. [...] If you have an account, so someone who does one of these transects, and in there is a code, and from that you can look up who that is, the address and all that stuff." (Project organiser, DBC)

The monitoring has a thirty-year-long history, and BDM makes a large amount of guidance documentation for participants available, explaining how they can get involved, how to count the insects, and how to submit their data. Guidance we reviewed included tutorials for the count of dragonflies, the collection of water samples, and the submission system for counts. All documentation was clear on which data would be collected and how it would be used, but less clear about metadata. Our interviews showed that metadata was mainly limited to user access, which was linked to a database of contributors - however, in practice this personal data was used for authentication, but not linked to data submissions by those contributors. Our interviews with both the project coordinator and several participants showed that participants who join the project are on-boarded with a visit from DBC staff to help them set a personalised route, and create a login to the online platform which they then use to submit their observations. Interviews with participants of BDM showed that they were very aware of the data they supplied, such as insect counts. However, they did not consider personal information they provided to enable their participation in the first place, and that the organisation held about them irrespective of their individual data contributions. A participants account on their personal data:

"It is a set place, you always walk the same route, because if it is in another place you cannot compare [....] but yeah they know where the route is, they know exactly within 50 metres where I saw the butterfly. [...] They know who I am, they know how to reach me, they know my email address, my telephone number, my address, I think they know my age ... But you only give that once." (Participant, DBC)

In summary, our document analysis showed that all projects provided documentation of data collection processes to contributors, though in varying levels of detail. Our interviews showed that while the documentation may be extensive, three of the projects involved additional, equally extensive personal interactions to help contributors set up their equipment or route, or communicate details about the project. Thus, these contributors had more information about their engagement than the documentation suggests. However, this may also mean that contributors had different levels of knowledge and awareness, depending on their individual interactions with the projects. Furthermore, a requirement for personal interactions does not allow projects to scale up easily. Table 2 below summarises the different types of metadata that each project collected, according to the document analysis and interviews.

Table 2: Metadata collected by project

	Street Spectra	Azotea	Noise Maps	BDM
Contributor name		x		x
Nickname / ID	x		x	x
Date / Time of contribution	x	x	x	x
(GPS) Location of contribution	x	x	x	x

Measurement specifications (e.g. type of sensor / camera)	x	x	x	x

Following our document analysis and interviews with project organisers, we sent a survey to the projects' citizen scientists. It received 112 responses, with 108 related to the target projects, and had a cumulative response rate of 32% (see Table 1). The majority (76%) of respondents are engaged in butterfly and dragonfly monitoring, which is expected, due to it being the oldest and most established of the projects, with the largest pool of contributors. While the other projects have significantly less contributors, we have received responses from a sufficient proportion of their contributors to make comparisons viable. The average age of participants is between 56 and 60. 72% of participants identified as men and 74% of participants hold a university degree. While the education distribution reflects general trends in citizen science (e.g. Domhnaill et al., 2020), the gender balance among participants in our sample was more male than is typical for such projects (Paleco et al., 2021). The gender distribution was stable across projects, with 60-71 % identifying as men; the education distribution differed for NoiseMaps, where 40% of respondents held vocational degrees.

The survey showed that the data participants state to contribute is well aligned with what the project expects (see Figure 1 below): Primarily observations and images for BDM, images for Azotea and Street Spectra, and sound files for Noise Maps - although only a small proportion of BDM participants noted the physical (water) samples.

The picture is not so clear-cut for the metadata. While Noise Maps participants agree on exactly what metadata they contribute (timestamps, locations and specifications), there is some variation in Azotea and Street Spectra. Part of this can be explained by participants entering different details into the Street Spectra app, with date/time and location being required - and automatically collected - from all of them. The amount of metadata BDM holds about participants however is not consistently recognised by its' contributors: they report to submit observations, often combined with a location and other factors such as weather conditions; but 15% also say they do not contribute their name - which is associated with the account they use to submit observations. Similarly, participants in Azotea may not re-share their location data for each submission, with this data being on file with the project organisers already. Interviews with participants of BDM indicate that while contributors are aware this data is held by the organisers, they do not consider it part of their observation recordings, even though in practice they are linked.

Figure 1: Survey result: What is your data contribution to the project? What metadata do you contribute to the project? (% of respondents by project, n=104)

Most participants (60%) do not expect to be acknowledged for their contribution, and acknowledgement is not important to them (54%). BDM participants show a surprising variety of acknowledgement expectations: 70% do not expect to be acknowledged, but only 58% say that acknowledgement is not important to them. None of the respondents contributing to NoiseMaps state that acknowledgement is important to them, and only one participant of Street Spectra has this expectation. However, some of these participants still expect to be acknowledged personally. Contributors can only be acknowledged personally for their contribution if the projects collect metadata on who made which contributions. We found a significant, though little surprising, correlation between participants' expectation of being acknowledged, and the relevance acknowledgement held for them (χ^2 (2) = 32.3, p < 0.000). Participants who identified as men had a significantly higher expectation of being acknowledged for their contribution than those who did not (χ^2 (1) = 8.9, p = 0.003).

Figure 2: Do you expect your contribution to be acknowledged in project outputs? (Binary; n=94)

Figure 3: How important is it to you that your contribution is acknowledged? (Likert, n=94)

Figure 4: How do you expect to be acknowledged? (n=94)

We further found a significant correlation with participants' expectations and metadata: Those who expected their contribution to be acknowledged in publications cared more about what would happen with the metadata they contributed ($\chi2$ (2) = 7.9, p = 0.019). This makes sense, given the above-mentioned necessity to record who contributed what in order to enable acknowledgement. We also found that participants who contributed images ($\chi2$ (1) = 6.208, p = 0.013) and

observations ($\chi 2$ (1) = 11.708, p = 0.001) were significantly more likely to expect their contributions to be acknowledged in reports. Participants who provided measurement specifications as part of their metadata placed more value on being acknowledged for their contribution ($\chi 2$ (2) = 7.984, p = 0.018). There was no correlation between the motivations for participants to engage in CS projects and their expectations of acknowledgement.

Asked about perceived risks of their engagement, the primary risk participants acknowledged to even a small degree was with regards to privacy; both their own (16%) and others' (8%) (see Figure 5 below). BDM participants were least concerned about privacy, while participants in Noise Maps were mostly concerned about other people's privacy and reputation. This is likely due to the type of data collected in this project, as well as the intensive discussions within the project, and the coordinators' focus on this concern. Participants who recorded data at their home were significantly more concerned about their own privacy than those who did not ($\chi 2$ (1) = 4.654, p = 0.031).

Figure 5: Do you feel your contribution poses a potential risk to…? (n=108)

DISCUSSION - ETHICAL ISSUES WITH CITIZEN SCIENCE AND METADATA

Data- and risk-awareness

Our findings show that participants' awareness of the metadata they contribute varied widely. All the projects collect similar metadata for contributions, but the data that the projects objectively collect does not align well with participants' varied responses when being asked what metadata they contribute.

This difference was especially obvious in the case of the BDM project, where participants recognised the metadata they recorded, such as weather conditions or locations, very consistently. At the same time they did not consistently acknowledge that the login they use to submit observations is linked to their personal information. This personal metadata is not used or published, and our interviews showed that participants *are* aware that the organisation holds their personal details. While they did not acknowledge that the data was linked to contributions, they also did not mind this link when it was pointed out. Their awareness of risks on the other hand was a lot lower, although there are some risks related to the project's data collection practices. One such risk was reaching areas in which butterflies are common outside public pathways, which can require the use of a permit, lack of which might carry penalties.

The awareness of participants in BDM contrasts clearly with the contributions to Street Spectra, where participants and project organisers seemed to occasionally misunderstand one-another with regards to not only the metadata, but the contributed *data* itself. The project asks contributors to submit images of spectra of streetlights, but participants took this as an invitation to submit images of *any* light spectra, including living room lamps. This is problematic, as contributors submit photos from their home, which are then published in a public database without review or quality assessment, including their geolocation. This poses a major privacy concern: contributors may unwittingly broadcast their home location along with their nickname or even their full name. This is in line with Wang et al. (2015) who point out that many CS projects do not fully consider the procedures required to move from data collection to making data publicly available for reuse by others. Alongside the obvious privacy risk, these errant contributions also make the dataset less reliable: the locations of the source of light pollution may be incorrect; and images of light sources that do not meet the requirements become part of the dataset.

Yet another different perspective on risks is added by the Noise Maps project. Participants in this project contribute sound recordings, not of themselves but of their environment, which potentially includes bystanders' conversations. This is further exacerbated by the location of some of the sensors, in a neighbourhood associated with the local red-light district, which meant that the potential content of unwittingly recorded conversations could be highly sensitive. Specific risks the project had to consider included the privacy and reputation of both participants and

bystanders, and the security of their participants in case bystanders were unhappy about the sensors. The project organisers were very aware of these potential issues, and have taken steps from their set-up to mitigate any risks to contributors or bystanders. This included briefings on the risks and issues, signs informing about the nature of recursings, limiting access to the data, and developing mechanisms to anonymise the recordings, so they could be published openly without endangering sensitive personal information. This awareness of the project organisers has translated into processes for data collection, and recognition of the associated issues by contributors. Potential risks to both contributors and bystanders' privacy is summarised by one of the project organisers:

"This neighbourhood has had certain problems (...), for example drug sales or prostitution (...) Some of the volunteers that we have live in streets that are at the core of these problems (...) It is quite likely that we might inadvertently record conversations that people might not want to have recorded. (...) We have to discuss [this problem] with our volunteers: We have our own protocol that we developed [with an ethical review board] (...) with respect to the privacy of not only the active participants but also the passive volunteers." (Project organiser, BitLab)

Noise Maps show that awareness of privacy implications and risks among project organisers can successfully be conveyed to participants, if it is included in project documentation and processes, and communicated in a way that makes sense to the citizen scientists. CS projects rely on participation of non-expert volunteers, hence they are particularly vulnerable to concerns of rigour and reliability (Roman et al., 2020). In that context it is paramount to also consider implicit contributions that take place without contributors being aware, due to the project setup or the technology used, as well as contributions that happen by misunderstandings of the projects' goals, as was the case for Street Spectra. These unexpected and unwanted contributions and associated risks could be mitigated through clearer communication about what the project requires (spectra of outdoor lighting, with accurate locations) and what data is submitted (geolocation at upload time).

While the project organisers mostly stated that they would not use personal data about their participants they also did not have procedures in place to delete unnecessary metadata about their contributors. Clear processes documenting the expected activities to be carried out to gather, prepare and validate data before publishing it are needed to avoid unintended violations of ideals of ethical science. The projects' onboarding activities, some of which happen verbally through tutorials, conversations, and having contributors embedded in a personal network, served this purpose. However, these do not replace the need for formal processes to ensure consistency and transparency across the projects, and to other users of the data.

Overall, this means that more thorough documentation of both data and metadata collection, as well as associated risks, combined with participant introductions or training, serve not only to create better data and more transparency of the project to scientists, but also helps participants understand exactly what they

contribute, and conduct their own risk assessment and mitigation. This can be seen as the prerequisite of informed consent in such settings and is therefore a key element of a successful project to avoid exploitation, as mentioned by Resnik et al. (2015). Co-creation of data protection frameworks, such as suggested by Wong et al. (2022) could help address this issue.

While standards for CS metadata such as PPSR Core are being developed, and have been adopted by some of the large platforms, they may not be sufficiently accessible to smaller projects, especially those that are developed bottom-up and have limited or no dedicated technical expertise and resources. In order to be inclusive of *all* CS projects and citizen scientists, such solutions need to be made understandable *and usable* for lay people. Else such projects run a risk of conducting a form of data colonialism (Thatcher et al., 2016), where contributors contribute data that they are ultimately unable to understand or use themselves.

Moreover, CS projects, and those supporting or encouraging CS, should consider communication strategies that explain goals and requirements and why they matter to different stakeholders - especially citizen scientists - in clear and accessible language, to ensure that new projects, whether they be set up by experienced researchers or bottom-up by citizens, follow best practice and create datasets that are useful for the research they want to support. Confusion could be further mitigated through use of visuals elements (Erwig et al., 2017), indicating to contributors in an easily understandable format what data is required.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT EXPECTATIONS

We find that expectations of acknowledgement differ both between and within projects. Acknowledgement is only possible in relation to the metadata that is captured: only where project organisers know who made individual contributions can they attribute individual participants. Only one project - Azotea - consistently captured participants' details with the intention to do so. It is clear from our survey results that participants heard this message loud and clear, and consequently submit the necessary metadata and expect to be acknowledged.

Street Spectra offers participants the opportunity to enter a name or nickname when they submit data, but it is not a requirement. In practice, that means that acknowledgement may be possible in some cases, however, not in a consistent manner. This becomes more complicated when considering the type of data: contributors submit not just observations, but also images. It is not clear exactly how submitting them affects the ownership of those images, though documentation suggests the images are owned by the individual users and licensed to the project. This information is only listed in the privacy policy of the app, which is independent of the project. Combined with the above mentioned contradiction in the platform policy, this may lead to licensing and/or privacy issues in practice: If researchers wanted to use images in publications (as opposed to analysis), they would *have* to

name the contributor, but their data would not allow for that: The Street Spectra team do not know the names, and if they did, they would have no way to get consent from contributors. Our survey results suggest that only half of participants submit these details. A look at the public database[14] suggests that 21% of contributions come with identifiable names, 72% are made under pseudonyms, and only 7% are made completely anonymous.

Two out of eight of the survey respondents of Street Spectra expected to be acknowledged by name - a sizable proportion for a project that does not advertise this opportunity. Being named as the licence holder of an image, even if it were the right approach for the use of the licence, might still make the contributors who neither expect nor want to be acknowledged uncomfortable. This limits potential reuse of the contributed data considerably, especially given that our survey results suggest that the majority of participants are motivated by their support of the goal and contribution to the research, and not as interested in acknowledgement as professional scientists might be.

While the BDM team does know which observations are contributed by which volunteer, the data only become valuable in aggregate and so individual contributions are rarely highlighted. Participants have individual routes for their observations, but they all make the same *type* of observations. And yet a surprising proportion of participants expect to be acknowledged personally.

What this means for projects overall is that they need to be clear about their intention to acknowledge volunteers, and how they enable this in practice through data collection and licensing. This should, as a minimum, include a detailed privacy policy, outlining to contributors what data is collected, why, when, and what for, who owns the contributed data, and on which level of detail attribution will be given. One aspect of this discussion concerns the dynamic nature of CS datasets, which might be used or cited while still evolving; a problem related to the duration of projects, some of which run over several years, which Hunter & Hsu (2015) have discussed.

LIMITATIONS

Although we report on several case studies, the projects we present are limited in diversity, hence generalisability may be limited. While the four projects we analysed covered a wide range of topics and data types, and are broadly representative of many of the common activities in citizen science, they cannot represent the whole breadth and variety of citizen science engagement. We also only focused on projects with non-anonymous data collection, and projects with anonymous data collection are likely to face a different set of complications and challenges. Similar studies with other project types and in other scientific domains would be an interesting avenue

---

[14] https://five.epicollect.net/project/action-street-spectra/data

for future work. We also plan future work on the perspective of CS data users, rather than contributors and organisers.

Regarding our methodology, as with every survey, there is a self-selection bias, which excludes information about non-respondents. However, we received a high response rate and additionally triangulated our findings by using a mixed-methods approach. Nevertheless, we found that the interpretation of project documentation can be challenging, which we mitigate by conducting interviews with project organisers to clarify open questions from the document analysis.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

Through the context of the ACTION project and its CS pilots, we explored the generation, use, and publication practices of CS project's metadata. We used a mixed-method approach combining insights from structured reviews of documentation, online surveys with contributors, and interviews with organisers and participants of CS projects, to generate insights into their metadata practices and perceptions. Our findings point to several weaknesses because of limited considerations of metadata, privacy risks and contributor acknowledgements. Our findings further show the importance of matching expectations between project contributors and project organisers regarding acknowledgement. They emphasise the importance of clear data processes and documentation in line with open science principles, to enhance transparency and facilitate data reuse (e.g. Burgess et al., 2017). Beyond this the findings also highlight the need to consider the expectations and mental models of users for their contributions; their internal explanations of how the project works and what their contribution is used for. This is relevant in relation to personal data and associated risks, for explicit and implicit contributions submitted by citizen scientists. This has so far been often overlooked in CS projects focused on the final data, rather than the process of creating the dataset.

We infer the following key considerations from our findings as recommendations for CS projects:

(i)   explicit data and metadata contribution and associated risks;

Only if CS projects make their data and metadata collection procedures explicit, and flag potential harm to participants or others, can their contributors make informed decisions about how they contribute. This includes careful considerations of the platforms they use to collect data, and the implications these may have for their data and contributors.

(ii)   implicit contributions and associated risks;

As CS projects collect data in different forms, they must highlight implicit, collateral metadata that is collected potentially without contributors being fully

aware, and flag any potential harm. This will allow citizen scientists to adapt their behaviour.

(iii)   data licensing and acknowledgement schemes.

Projects need to lay out to their contributors from the very beginning how contributions they make are licensed, and what implications this has, for example with regards to CC-BY licences, requiring researchers to name contributors, vs. CC-0 licences that can be used without acknowledgement. Ideally, projects should give contributors different options of attribution, depending on preference and project output types.

All these concerns need to be considered at the project design stage rather than retrospectively, as they influence choice of tools or task setup, as well as how citizen scientists engage, and the long-term (re-)usability of the data the projects collect. CS projects, and those wanting to create or support such projects, should especially consider different expertise among their target groups - from professional researchers, through administrative staff, to inexperienced enthusiasts - and identify suitable formats and ways to communicate these details to all of them. If we want to use citizen science as a way to make science more accessible to all of society - including marginalised groups - and establish it as a research methodology, we need strategies to enable all of society to implement such projects and still deliver ethical and good quality data.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF DOCUMENTS

All documents have been collected on 5th August 2020; we cannot account for later changes to these documents.

STREET SPECTRA

Manual https://guaix.ucm.es/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/StreetSpectra_manual.pdf

What is Epicollect5 - Epicollect5 Data Collection User Guide https://docs.epicollect.net/

Add an entry - Epicollect5 Data Collection User Guide https://docs.epicollect.net/web-application/adding-data

Upload entries - Epicollect5 Data Collection User Guide https://docs.epicollect.net/mobile-application/upload-entries

Privacy Policy - Epicollect5 Data Collection User Guide https://docs.epicollect.net/about/privacy-policy

AZOTEA

Project website https://guaix.ucm.es/azoteaproject

English Manual (v2) https://zenodo.org/record/4680191

NOISE MAPS

Project Website (Spanish; analysed with Google Translate) http://www.bitlab.cat/projectes/noise-maps

Protocol for citizen science experiment_v1 (not public)

Project guide for participants (Spanish; analysed with Google Translate; not public)

Workshop slides (Spanish; analysed with Google Translate; not public)

BDM

App guide 2020_03 (Dutch; analysed with Google Translate) https://assets.vlinderstichting.nl/docs/f59bf0e9-ba74-441a-b60b-4763da820aa8.pdf

Manual online import Guide (Dutch; analysed with Google Translate) http://www.vlindernet.nl/doc/Handleiding_meetnetten.pdf

ACTION D2.3 Making a tutorial for water sampling dragonflies https://zenodo.org/record/4980410

ACTION D2.3 Tutorial for Water Sampling and Transect Selection https://zenodo.org/record/3885721

APPENDIX 2: SURVEY

About your engagement

1. Which citizen science project are you engaged in?

   AZOTEA

   Dutch Butterfly Conservation (Vlinderstichting)

   NoiseMaps

   Street Spectra

   Other

2. What motivates you to take part in the project?

I support the goals of the project

I am interested in the research

I want to contribute to the research

I am interested in what I contribute specifically

I have a personal relationship to the project / team

I enjoy the competition with other participants

I am rewarded for my contributions

    Not at all   Somewhat   Very much

3. What is your data contribution to the project?

Images

Observations

Sound files

Physical samples (e.g. specimen)

Comments

Analysis or interpretation

Other

4. What metadata do you contribute to the project?

Your name

Nickname / ID

Date / Time of contribution

(GPS) Location of contribution

Measurement specifications (e.g. type of sensor / camera)

Other

5. Is the location your home for any of your contributions?

    Yes   No   I do not provide location data

6. Are you aware of what is done with the metadata you contribute?

    1 (Not at all aware)   2   3   4   5 (Very much aware)

7. How important is it to you to know what is done with the metadata?

    1 (Not at all important)   2   3   4   5 (Very important)

8. Do you feel your contribution poses a potential risk to

Your privacy

Other people's privacy

Your personal safety

Other people's safety

Your reputation

Other people's reputation

Other

    Not at all   Somewhat   Very much

9. What is your expectation about what will happen with your contribution / the data you contribute?

Will be used for analysis

Will be used for (academic) publications

Will be used to influence policy

Will be used for campaigns (e.g. on social media)

Data will be published

Metadata will be published

Other

10. Do you expect your contribution to be acknowledged in project outputs (e.g. reports)?

Yes   No

11. How do you expect to be acknowledged?

As an author

By name, as a contributor

By pseudonym, as a contributor

As a volunteer in general (without explicit mention of yourself)

Other

12. How important is it to you that your contribution is acknowledged?

1 (Not at all important)   2   3   4   5 (Very important)

13. Do you expect to be notified of project outputs or results?

Yes   No

About you

14. How old are you?

<18   18-25   26-30   31-35   36-40   41-45   46-50   51-55   56-60   61-65   66-70   70+

15. What is your gender?

Female Male   Non-binary   Prefer not to say   Other

16. What is your country of residence?

Germany   Netherlands   Spain   Other

17. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree received.

Primary education (School)

High school graduate, diploma or equivalent

Trade/technical/vocational training

Bachelor's degree

Master's degree

Doctorate

18. Is there anything you would like to let us know?

* free text *

REFERENCES

Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A Ladder Of Citizen Participation, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4): 216–224. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01944366908977225.

Attig, J., Copeland, A. and Pelikan, M., 2004. Context and meaning: The challenges of metadata for a digital image library within the university. College & Research Libraries, 65(3), pp.251-261.

Bonney, R., Cooper, C. B., Dickinson, J., Kelling, S., Phillips, T., Rosenberg, K. V., and Shirk, J. (2009). Citizen Science: A Developing Tool for Expanding Science Knowledge and Scientific Literacy. BioScience, 59(11), 977–984. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2009.59.11.9

Borgman, C. L. (2012). The conundrum of sharing research data. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 63(6), 1059-1078.

Bowser, A., and Shanley, L. (2013). *New Visions in Citizen Science*. Woodrow Wilson Center.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, 9(2), 27–40. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027

Bowser, A., Wiggins, A., Shanley, L., Preece, J., and Henderson, S. (2014). Sharing data while protecting privacy in citizen science. Interactions, 21(1), 70–73. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1145/2540032

Bowser, A., Shilton, K., Preece, J. and Warrick, E. (2017). February. Accounting for privacy in citizen science: Ethical research in a context of openness. In *Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing* (pp. 2124-2136).

Bokulich, A., & Parker, W. (2021). Data models, representation and adequacy-for-purpose. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11, 1-26.

Burgess, H. K., DeBey, L. B., Froehlich, H. E., Schmidt, N., Theobald, E. J., Ettinger, A. K., HilleRisLambers, J., Tewksbury, J., Parrish, J. K. (2017). The science of citizen science: Exploring barriers to use as a primary research tool. Biological Conservation, 208, 113–120. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2016.05.014

Christine, D.I. and Thinyane, M., 2021. Citizen science as a data-based practice: A consideration of data justice, Patterns, 2(4): 100224. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2021.100224.

Cooper, C.B., Hawn, C.L., Larson, L.R., Parrish, J.K., Bowser, G., Cavalier, D., Dunn, R.R., Haklay, M. (Muki), Gupta, K.K., Jelks, N.O., Johnson, V.A., Katti, M., Leggett, Z., Wilson, O.R. and Wilson, S., 2021. Inclusion in citizen science: The conundrum of rebranding, Science, 372(6549): 1386–1388. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abi6487.

DataCite Metadata Working Group. (2019). DataCite Metadata Schema documentation for the publication and citation of research data v4.3 [Application/pdf]. 73 pages. https://doi.org/10.14454/7XQ3-ZF69

Domhnaill, C.M., Lyons, S. and Nolan, A., 2020. The Citizens in Citizen Science: Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Health Characteristics of Biodiversity Recorders in Ireland, Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 5(1): 16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.283.

Erwig, M., Smeltzer, K., and Wang, X. (2017). What is a visual language? *Journal of Visual Languages & Computing*, 38, 9–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvlc.2016.10.005

Edwards, P. N., Mayernik, M. S., Batcheller, A. L., Bowker, G. C., and Borgman, C. L. (2011). Science friction: Data, metadata, and collaboration. Social Studies of Science, 41(5):667–690.

European Commission. (2014). Green Paper on Citizen Science. Citizen Science for Europe [Green Paper]. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/green-paper-citizen-science-europe-towards-society-empowered-citizens-and-enhanced-research

Fraisl, D., Campbell, J., See, L., Wehn, U., Wardlaw, J., Gold, M., and Fritz, S. (2020). Mapping citizen science contributions to the UN sustainable development goals. Sustainability Science. Retrieved 9 September 2020 from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00833-7

Hecker, S., Wicke, N., Haklay, M., and Bonn, A. (2019). How Does Policy Conceptualise Citizen Science? A Qualitative Content Analysis of International Policy Documents. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 4(1), 32. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.230

Hunter, J., Alabri, A. and van Ingen, C. (2013). Assessing the quality and trustworthiness of citizen science data. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 25(4), pp.454-466.

Hunter, J. and Hsu, C.H. (2015). December. Formal acknowledgement of citizen scientists' contributions via dynamic data citations. In International Conference on Asian Digital Libraries (pp. 64-75). Springer, Cham.

Koesten, L., Simperl, E., Blount, T., Kacprzak, E. and Tennison, J., 2020. Everything you always wanted to know about a dataset: Studies in data summarisation. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 135, p.102367.

Lagoze, C. (2014). eBird: Curating Citizen Science Data for Use by Diverse Communities. International Journal of Digital Curation, 9(1), 71–82. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2218/ijdc.v9i1.302

Levin, N., and Leonelli, S. (2017). How does one "open" science? Questions of value in biological research. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 42(2), 280-305. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243916672071

Leonelli, S. (2020). Scientific research and big data. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Mayernik, M. (2011). Metadata realities for cyberinfrastructure: Data authors as metadata creators.

Miyashita, E.-F., Pernat, N., and König, H. J. (2021). Citizen science as a bottom-up approach to address human–wildlife conflicts: From theories and methods to practical implications. Conservation Science and Practice, 3(3), e385. https://doi.org/10.1111/csp2.385

Neff, G., Tanweer, A., Fiore-Gartland, B., & Osburn, L. (2017). Critique and contribute: A practice-based framework for improving critical data studies and data science. Big data, 5(2), 85-97.

OED Oxford English Dictionary, second edition (1989). Oxford University Press 1989. Retrieved June 2023 from https://www.oed.com/oed2/00057804;jsessionid=F1B19E9B19C4EA7FB6B0CE2A68B04E4B

Oudheusden, M. V., and Abe, Y. (2021). Beyond the Grassroots: Two Trajectories of "Citizen Sciencization" in Environmental Governance. Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 6(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.377

Ottinger, G. (2010). Buckets of resistance: Standards and the effectiveness of citizen science. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35(2), pp.244-270.

Paleco, C., García Peter, S., Salas Seoane, N., Kaufmann, J. and Argyri, P., 2021. Inclusiveness and Diversity in Citizen Science. In: Vohland, K., Land-Zandstra, A., Ceccaroni, L., Lemmens, R., Perelló, J., Ponti, M., Samson, R., and Wagenknecht, K. (eds.) The Science of Citizen Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 261–281. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58278-4_14.

Ponti, M., and Craglia, M. (2020). *Citizen-generated data for public policy. A brief review of European citizen-generated data projects.*

Reeves, N., Tinati, R., Zerr, S., Van Kleek, M. G., and Simperl, E. (2017). From Crowd to Community: A Survey of Online Community Features in Citizen Science Projects. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, 2137–2152. https://doi.org/10.1145/2998181.2998302

Resnik, D.B., Elliott, K.C. and Miller, A.K. (2015). A framework for addressing ethical issues in citizen science. Environmental Science & Policy, 54, pp.475-481.

Riesch, H., and Potter, C. (2014). Citizen science as seen by scientists: Methodological, epistemological and ethical dimensions. Public Understanding of Science, 23(1), 107–120. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662513497324

Robinson, L. D., Cawthray, jade L., West, S. E., Bonn, A., and Ansine, J. (2018). Ten principles of citizen science. In Citizen Science: Innovation in Open Science, Society and Policy. UCL Press. Retrieved 3 March 2020 from https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv550cf2

Roman, D., Reeves, N., Gonzalez E., Celino I., Abd El Kader, S., Turk, P., Soylu, A., Corcho, O., Cedazo, R., Gloria Re Calegari, Damiano Scandolari, Elena Simperl (2020). Preprint: An analysis of pollution citizen science projects from the perspective of data science and open science. *Submitted to: Citizen Science: Theory and Practice*

Scassa, T., and Chung, H. (2015). Typology of citizen science projects from an intellectual property perspective: Invention and Authorship Between Researchers and Participants (Policy Memo Series).

Thatcher, J., O'Sullivan, D., and Mahmoudi, D. (2016). Data colonialism through accumulation by dispossession: New metaphors for daily data. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 34(6), 990–1006. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775816633195

Thuermer, G., Reeves, N., Baroni, I., Scandolari, D., Scrocca, M., van Grunsven, R., Maddalena, E., Simperl, E., Austen, K., Hoelker, F., Schroer, S., Grossberndt, S., Roman, D., Passani, A., Firus, K., Gonzalez Fuentetaja, R., González Guardia, E. and Corcho, O., 2022. Participatory Science Toolkit Against Pollution. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6491235.

Thuermer, G., Guardia, E.G., Reeves, N., Corcho, O. and Simperl, E., 2023. Data Management Documentation in Citizen Science Projects: Bringing Formalisation and Transparency Together, Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 8(1): 25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/cstp.538.

Wang, Y., Kaplan, N., Newman, G. and Scarpino, R. (2015). CitSci. org: A new model for managing, documenting, and sharing citizen science data. PLoS Biol, 13(10), p.e1002280.

White, S.C., 1996. Depoliticising development: The uses and abuses of participation, Development in Practice, 6(1): 6–15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0961452961000157564.

Wong, J., Henderson, T., & Ball, K. (2022). Data protection for the common good: Developing a framework for a data protection-focused data commons. *Data & Policy, 4.* https://doi.org/10.1017/dap.2021.40

Xia, H., Wang, Y., Huang, Y., and Shah, A. (2017). 'Our Privacy Needs to be Protected at All Costs': Crowd Workers' Privacy Experiences on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 1(CSCW), 1–22. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1145/3134748

Symposium

Paula Biglieri, Luciana Cadahia, *Seven Essays on Populism: For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Polity Press, Cambridge UK 2021

ESSAYS ON THE SEVEN ESSAYS: POPULISM, ONTOLOGY, FEMINISM AND MORE
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

SAMUELE MAZZOLINI
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali
Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
samuele.mazzolini@unive.it

ABSTRACT
The paper provides a succinct introduction to the special issue of *Ethics and Politics* dedicated to the book *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical perspective* written by the Argentine duo Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia. To this purpose, it firstly outlines the growing scholarly tendency to conceptualise populism as an ontological phenomenon. Secondly, it provides some basic information about the scope of the text under analysis. Finally, it introduces two of the most discussed issues of the book, ie. the choice to consider populism as being inherently emancipatory based on a different way to conceive ontology and the connection between populism and feminism, with a brief overview of the contributors' positions involved in this critical exchange.

KEYWORDS
Populism, ontology, feminism, Ernesto Laclau

Populism studies is a thriving field of in-depth analyses on a contemporary phenomenon that, despite some recent ups and downs, seems to be here to stay. The vitality of such studies would thus appear to be secured by the persistent character of their object of inquiry as well as by the polemical talk and fuss it engenders on a number of levels within our societies. However, populism studies harbour much more than strictly empirical examinations of the antagonistic rhetoric of some political leaders and the unsettling electoral successes of once unlikely contenders of the status quo. In fact, some of the existing approaches are ever more inclined to relate populism to the working of the political as such, that is to regard it as an ontological category. The Essex-school tradition inaugurated by Ernesto Laclau has been at the forefront of such efforts. As he famously stated, if populism is about providing a radical societal alternative, it cannot but become synonymous with politics. While such an equivalence may sound strained to some, it nevertheless throws light on the far-reaching implications that populism carries in thinking about a number of vital political questions, such as democracy, antagonism and hegemony, just

to name a few. Not a fringe phenomenon whose heightened relevance today will eventually give way to a return to politics as usual tomorrow, but something that permeates politics through and through.

Convinced that the notion at stake has something very important to say about politics both conjuncturally and ontologically, and operating in the wake of Ernesto Laclau's thought although, as we shall see, with some important departures, Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia have written a book that adds much to the comprehension, interpretation and potential applications of populism. Throughout seven essay – enshrined in the very title of the book in honour of the most notable work of the Marxist Peruvian thinker and politician José Carlos Mariategui – the authors perform a number of bold and innovative moves that are likely to generate much discussion for the years to come and which this special issue of *Ethics and Politics* intends to initiate and trigger. The very premise on which the book is founded, ie. the situatedness of the authors' intervention along with their attempt to seize what is universalisable from their own experience by shaping it into theory rather than passively receiving and applying Anglo-Saxon theoretical canons, is either implicitly or explicitly praised by all the texts gathered here. As Biglieri and Cadahia reiterate in their concluding remarks of this symposium, the politics behind the book is indeed predicated upon the militant engagement of the two as well as upon the regional (ie. Latin American) situation that they witness and experience on a daily basis. But if the politics that the authors defend and promote is by and large upheld by all the contributors of this exchange, the same cannot be said insofar as their philosophical insights are concerned. This makes the present collection of reviews all the more promising for furthering the investigation on the theoretical entanglements of populism.

But, to begin with, what are the theoretical operations that Biglieri and Cadahia perform in *Seven Essays on Populism*? Even though this is not the place for an exhaustive recap, it will be useful, in the guise of an introduction to the critical exchange, to mention in passing the two main contentious points that have been raised, either in form of praise or problematisation, by the various contributors and which arguably point at the nitty gritty of the book under analysis. The first issue regards the ontological character of populism, as constitutive of the political. It is only thanks to the stimuli of Marchart, Barros & Martínez Prado, and Bosteels that their position on ontology is fully spelled out in their final text of this critical exchange. The twist that the authors of *Seven Essays* operate to the position of Laclau is notable. Following in Jorge Alemán's footsteps, they hold dear ontology, but rather than having it as a meta-historical and meta-political tool, they prefer, not unlike Hegel and Foucault, to tie it to actual history and politics, and in this sense they deem Bosteels' criticism as directed towards a Heideggerian version of ontology that they themselves fully repudiate. In so doing, that of the Argentine duo becomes a theory of populism that offers an ontology of the people founded upon an

articulation of differences, attentive to the fundamental heterogeneity of the social, that cannot be confused with their suppression, as in the case of fascism. The consequences are momentous: it follows that populism can no longer be distinguished between its left and right variants, but can only be emancipatory in character. The question of how to conceive antagonism surfaces here as of utmost importance: while according to Marchart it can present itself in different guises, Biglieri and Cadahia hold that right-wing politics cannot be populist because it distorts the basic antagonism, which they identify in the people/dominant bloc opposition. According to Barros & Martínez Prado however, the risk here is that, by taking up a normative character, populism slips into the ontic register and comes to occupy the semantic terrain of notions such as equality and inclusion. Surely, this point is likely to generate further heated discussions and analyses within the Essex-school camp and beyond.

The second issue is the audacious connection that the authors draw between populism and feminism. Albeit it is fair to suppose that this move will attract much critical attention from those sectors of feminism, such as the autonomist one, that Biglieri and Cadahia take issue with in the book, the contributors of this exchange find themselves on the whole in agreement with the predicaments of the two Argentine authors, although with different nuances. Marchart, for example, while finding their proposal particularly valuable, highlights that such an association has so far found little echo in concrete political subjects. Barros & Martínez Prado centre almost their entire piece on the issue. They question that Biglieri and Cadahia retain the centrality of the notion of care in that, despite unquestionably being a rallying notion of many contemporary feminisms, it reinforces a certain position of women in the labour force – an objection to which the authors of *Seven Essays* respond by stating that their choice was dictated by practical and strategic reasons. More in general, the take of Barros & Martínez Prado is that, by foregrounding heterogeneity and indeterminacy, feminism provides an important de-totalising antidote against all essentialisms and binarisms. Yet, they nurture reservations on the actual compatibility between feminism, characterised by horizontality and open-endedness, and populism, insofar as the latter tends to involve a moment of closure and fullness. The possibility that they work in tandem seems to be feasible only if one accepts – but they do not seem well disposed in this sense – that populism, divested of its possible authoritarian and fascist drifts and invested with an emancipatory elan, is supportive of the constitutive heterogeneity of differences within the people. A similar line of friendly criticism is elaborated by Gunnarsson Payne who, after recounting the mutually reinforcing effects between right-wing populism and anti-gender movements, and the de-politicising repercussions of neoliberal feminism, warns against the risks of subsumption of feminism by some 'more important struggle' in the context of articulation with other differences. Her disagreement is stronger on the question of the leader. She prefers to locate the status of the leader at an ontic-

empirical level, and not at an ontological one. Accordingly, the presence of a leader is not considered to be essential in order to constitute a people as in the account of Biglieri and Cadahia. Even more fundamentally, for Gunnarsson Payne the figure of the leader is strictly tied to patriarchy and, as such, considered to be an obstacle for a happy marriage between intersectional and transversal feminism and populism.

But there are many more issues that Biglieri and Cadahia's book raises and that in all likelihood will spark much debate in a variety of scholarly (and possibly also not-scholarly) literatures. These include, among the others, the proposition of a republican populism that forges novel institutions out of the conflict-ridden character of society, the reflections on how to build an ethic of populist militancy, the compatibility of populism with a transnational project and the critical analysis of the reluctance of other strands of the left to fully embrace populism. The task of this special issue is then only that of providing a preliminary approximation to the richness of arguments contained in *Seven Essays* that we anticipate will orientate the theoretical conversation on populism in the foreseeable future.

IMAGINING POPULISM DIFFERENTLY. NOTES ON THE PROPOSAL OF A FEMINIST, INTERNATIONALIST, REPUBLICAN POPULISM[1]

OLIVER MARCHART
Department of Political Science
University of Vienna
oliver.marchart@univie.ac.at

ABSTRACT
In the article I briefly discuss four important interventions from Biglieri and Cadahia's *Seven Essays on Populism*: (a) against anti-institutionalist readings of populism, they make a plea for a 'populist institutionality'; (b) they defend a plebeian version of republicanism; (c) they seek to rehabilitate the nation-form while, at the same time, arguing for a transnational populism, and (d) they argue in favour of the feminization of populism and an 'antagonism of care'. However, while it is argued in the article that their main intervention, i.e., their ontological claim about the intrinsically emancipatory nature of all populism, remains ultimately unconvincing, it could be interpreted as a productive political incantation to make use of the human faculty of imagination and start imagining populism differently.

KEYWORDS
Populism, post-foundationalism, antagonism, imagination

In their *Seven Essays on Populism,* Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia present a staunch defense of populism. Of populism *as such*, to be sure, not merely of left-wing or progressive variants of it. Starting from a critique of the widespread mediatic and scientific vilification of populism within the liberal consensual matrix, they make the convincing case that what is behind the pejorative denouncement of populism is a post-political understanding of democracy as a largely procedural affair within a minimalist institutional framework. From such a perspective, populism can

only be seen as a deviation from the salutary path of liberalism. In contrast to the liberal critique of populism, Biglieri and Cadahia's book provides a perspective much needed in a discussion dominated by scholars from the Anglosphere and Western Europe. They make very clear that other parts of the world have undergone quite different historical experiences of populism. The Latin American experience in particular proves key if one wants to dissociate oneself from the Eurocentric equation between populism and fascism. In many Latin American countries – similar to the forgotten, or repressed, history of the populist party in the US –, populism has been experienced as a largely emancipatory phenomenon: as an anti-oligarchic, egalitarian project geared at integrating the impoverished masses into the political system. Biglieri and Cadahia thus engage in an effort of epistemic decolonization without falling into the trap of an extreme standpoint epistemology that would leave no room for articulation between different epistemic experiences. Rather, they 'attempt to grasp what is universalizable – in the sense of a situated universalism – in the problems, challenges, and responses offered by a locus of enunciation like Latin America within the emancipatory production of knowledge in the Global South and Global North' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: xxiii). And what they seek to contribute from their perspective is an unapologetic view of populism as an intrinsically emancipatory endeavor.

This view is rather controversial as it conflicts not only with the typical denunciations of populism by the liberal mainstream. It also conflicts with the views of some of their fellow travelers from the Essex school of discourse analysis tradition – Mouffe, Stavrakakis, and myself are mentioned – who would insist on the ideologically undefined character of populism. From the latter perspective, which relies as much on Ernesto Laclau's seminal theory of populism as Biglieri and Cadahia do (Laclau 2005), populism only acquires ideological meaning through the articulation of its elements into a 'chain of equivalence' so that all kinds of right, left or even liberal – one may only think of Macron's first election campaign – variants of populism are possible. While remaining hesitant, for reasons developed at the end of this article, concerning this main volte-face proposed in the book, I do think that many highly important points are contributed to the populism debate by Biglieri and Cadahia. In fact, the authors' project seems to consist of a point-by-point refutation of the fatuous charges typically leveled against populism in all its variants. By bringing in the perspective of the Global South, they disturb the Euro- or Anglocentric tunnel vision that can only see in populism a 'pathology' or dangerous excess of democratic claims destined to endanger the smooth workings of the institutional machine of liberalism. In contrast, Biglieri and Cadahia's alternative vision allows for an idea of populism that would be emancipatory, plural, internationalist, plebeian-republican, and feminist. I fully subscribe to this political program, even as it is not entirely clear to me whether, or to which degree, their account is meant to be mainly descriptive or mainly normative. Is it a wishing list, in the sense that we all

would want an internationalist or feminist populism, knowing at the same time that it barely exists yet? Is it a normative claim in the sense that populism can only be called emancipatory if it is plural, plebeian, internationalist, and feminist? And would the latter claim not conflict with Biglieri and Cadahia's main wager that populism *eo ipso* is emancipatory? Before tackling these questions, I will first outline where I think the main achievement of the book lies: Biglieri and Cadahia, from a Latin American perspective of feminist militants and scholars, manage to bring into view the progressive aspects of populism and, on top of it, open space for imagining a populism that integrates hitherto unconnected political positions into a new chain of equivalence.

What allows them to build such a new chain of equivalence is their politico-theoretical perspective that clearly falls into the post-foundational camp (Marchart 2007; Marchart 2018). Against liberal or autonomist approaches, which would best be described as *anti*-foundational, the authors assume that, despite the absence of an ultimate ground, *some* ground needs to be politically instituted. Populism is a political attempt to construct a provisional ground of the social by way of an antagonistic division of society between the people, in the plebeian sense of the term, and an order dominated by an oligarchic elite. The people is therefore not understood to be a pre-existent assemblage of individual wills, as in liberalism or autonomism. Rather, in Gramscian terms, a 'collective will' needs to be constructed through a strategy of antagonization. Biglieri and Cadahia do not go as far as explicitly making the following claim, but, in my view, 'the people' are established by populism precisely as the contingent ground of society. The fact that this ground is contingent (as every ground), that, in other words, it is a groundless ground, must not detract from the fact that it still *is* a ground. It is not merely a legal fiction, as in liberal constitutionalism, nor is it an unarticulated multitude, as in autonomist approaches. The people is the political subject which, from a populist perspective, is supposed to ground, shape, and order the social in the 'popular' interest, thus serving as society's political foundation. As soon as such a perspective, which I think is integral to Biglieri and Cadahia's project, is adopted with all its consequences, we arrive at an entirely different view of populism as a truly political project that dares to fundamentally reshape society. And it is at this point where some of their most significant contributions to the debate can be found. I will briefly discuss four of these interventions.

First, if populism is an attempt at grounding the social, we must abandon the anti-institutional penchant of many descriptions of populism. Biglieri and Cadahia do a great job at refuting the useless dichotomy between populist mobilization on one side and institutions, including state institutions, on the other. Against anti-institutionalist readings of populism, they make a plea for a 'populist institutionality' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 51) which, of course, cannot be congruent with the proceduralist liberal take on institutions. The state theoretical thrust of the argument is

clear and has been spelled out before by Marxist state theorists from Nicos Poulantzas to Bob Jessop: the state is not a monolithic bloc detached from struggles in civil society; the state is itself a relational terrain of struggles that cut across the state/civil society division. It follows that popular struggles, even when suppressed by coercive state apparatuses, can and must penetrate state institutions. A merely 'abolitionist' perspective, based on the sweeping anarchist injunction to get rid of the state altogether, is not only intellectually unsatisfying, given its simplistic nature, but it is also politically unpromising. The point is, in again Gramscian parlance, 'to become state'. It is from their Latin American position that Biglieri and Cadahia contribute a particularly salient dimension to the debate. While the state in the Latin American countries belongs to the legacy of colonialism and until today can be described as 'oligarchic state', this does not preclude the possibility of wresting state institutions from the hands of the wealthy few: 'It was the oligarchy that made the state the property of the few, so why not think that it might be the act of popular desecration that transforms institutions into a space for the nobodies to express their antagonisms' (51). The greatest innovation of populism, they continue, is 'to risk building a state-form that can account for the irruption of the people into politics' (51), since 'populism takes the risk of "working with" the antagonism that this irruption implies' (51). State institutions, from a populist perspective, need to be envisaged as a terrain that 'incorporates the contentious dimension of equivalential logic to compete with those on top for these same (oligarchic or popular) state forms. In other words, the state (and institutions) become another antagonistic space in the dispute between those on the bottom and those on top' (67). In this sense, state institutions, as soon as they are partially conquered by a populist project, may become an instrument that helps interrupt oligarchic domination.

The Latin American experience, to which the authors refer, is a case in point. The Kirchner governments in Argentina, the populist governments of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, of Lula da Silva in Brazil, Evo Morales in Bolivia, of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, or Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, have managed – in different ways, and with varying success – to establish for some time a ruptural institutionality by linking popular demands with state institutions, thus strengthening the egalitarian dimension of the state (67). These projects proved that 'it is possible to process political demands constructed at the popular level through the state', whereby, the state is 'not reduced to a mere manager of market health, but, instead, by embracing the inherently political dimension of the state's role, populism tries to keep alive democratic imaginaries of social justice, equality, and political freedom' (60-1). What is hardly conceivable from a liberal, Eurocentric perspective makes perfect sense within the Latin American realm of experience. What populism does, in short, is bring antagonism to the state, by using its conquered institutions to address popular demands and repress oligarchic domination. The fact that other state institutions may strike back, as the authors illustrate with the many

attempts at getting rid of populist leaders through judicial means and the newly discovered instrument of the 'legal coup', does not disprove their point. As long as state institutions exist, they remain a key terrain of popular struggle.

Second, the authors locate their institutionalist theory within a rich discussion that is developing in the Spanish-speaking world around a plebeian version of republicanism. While most republicanism in history was oligarchic or, as I would prefer calling it, senatorial, the popular or democratic variants of republicanism seem to belong to a submerged and half-forgotten past with very few authors defending them, most notably Machiavelli and arguably Spinoza (McCormick 2011; Negri 2004). Given the relatively scarce number of texts or passages to which one usually refers, I must confess that, from an intellectual history point of view, I remain sceptical about the actual historical importance of this tradition – if it is a tradition. The overwhelming majority of republics was far from democratic. Rather, republicanism – very much like liberal democracy – was the name for a political order meant to co-opt the populace into as marginal institutional places as possible in order to avoid social uprisings – *tumulti,* as the Italian authors would say – and protect the property of the wealthy casts. Biglieri and Cadahia are of course well aware of this. But again, the Latin American perspective brings an important and politically up-to-date aspect to the debate. As the authors claim, following Eduardo Rinesi, 'Latin American populism is the form through which republicanism has developed in Latin America' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 72). Populism and republicanism, they claim, need to be thought of jointly.[2] One reason for thinking populism and republicanism together is structural and lies in the fact that republicanism, in its democratic variant, allows for the productive integration of conflict in the institutional setting (a point repeatedly made by Claude Lefort regarding Machiavelli's two conflicting *umori* of the people and the nobles) – which neatly matches the idea of a 'ruptural institutionality'. But another reason is historical: viewed against the larger background of the democratic revolutions in Latin America and the Caribbean, beginning with the Haitian revolution, a history of 'plebeian republicanism' unfolds 'that runs parallel to the official story of the oligarchic and exclusionary nation-states inherited from colonial rule. As if Latin American and Caribbean independence secretly inaugurated two forms of institutionality and citizenship, two ways of thinking about the role of the state and the law, two competing historical forces split between the construction of an unequal and elitist society and an egalitarian popular society'. The black Haitian slaves assumed 'that it was their responsibility to universalize the secret of plebeian republics: that there can be no truly republican freedom if it is not possible to build equality' (74). It is this tradition of plebeian Jacobinism that lives

---

[2] This is why we need to 'begin speaking in terms of a republican populism as the antithesis of neoliberalism, as a way of naming one of the ways that plebeian republicanism has been taking shape in Latin America' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 73).

on in today's democratic understanding of republicanism. However, as I will argue in my concluding remarks, I do think that this 'universalist' understanding is a particularly modern feature of republicanism and can hardly be found in the antique or medieval republics. It only comes to life with the democratic revolution.

Third, and presumably to the distress of many, Biglieri and Cadahia seek to rehabilitate the nation-form while, at the very same time, arguing for a transnational populism. Here again, the historical experience from the Global South of an emancipatory nationalism – just think of the many national liberation projects that accompanied the process of decolonization – is key to understanding the argument. And again, they direct our attention to the ambivalent, if not split tradition of nation-building from below and nation-building from above. There is not one idea of the nation, there are two ideas:

> The first of these is built 'from above' by Latin American oligarchies. While coinciding with the emergence of independent republics, this idea of the nation internalizes all of the culturalist remnants of colonialism, promoting - despite its avowed cosmopolitan liberalism - the separation and isolation of peoples. This is, therefore, an idea of the nation that tends to invisibilize and impede the cultural and political production by oppressed subjects, reproducing the framework of colonial contempt for and the exclusion of the people from the construction of the national ethos. The second, on the other hand, is the idea of a nation constructed 'from below,' by those subjects historically excluded from the other national narrative. This idea inherits the entire imaginary of popular struggles and transformations that have unfolded from the conquest to the present day. (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 89-90)

The oligarchic idea of the nation is associated by the authors with the name nationalism. The other idea has been called in the work of Gramsci and in the Latin American discussion that leads back to the eminent Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui 'the national-popular'. Now, the important point to understand, according to Biglieri and Cadahia, is that the national-popular has nothing to do with a self-enclosed, identitarian, and jingoistic nationalism but, rather, is intrinsically open and internationalist. The popular idea of a nation stems from an experience of injustice and exclusion, thus carrying 'within itself the secret of an openness toward the other, an openness that tends toward the inclusion of the excluded' (93). And as they point out with reference to Mariátegui: 'National-popular projects did not exclude the possibility of constituting internationalist solidarity among oppressed subjects' (91), for local struggles have a vested interest in building networks of solidarity across the borders of a given nation-state. This consideration leads the authors to expand the argument to the case of populism. Confronted with a severe lack of research on the trans- and international dimension of populism, they boldly claim that a populist project can only be successful when combining a national-popular dimension with an internationalist one. On the one hand, the mobilizing success of a populist project depends to a significant degree on the national-popular heritage which cannot simply be ignored or dismissed by an enlightened elite as the nationalistic ideology

of the ignorant masses. The failed attempt at constructing a pan-European populist (or quasi-populist) movement with DiEM25 by Yannis Varoufakis attests to the fact that 'a people', in this case, a European people, while of course always resulting from a political construction, cannot be forged at will. Preceding moments of national-popular forms of identification need to be taken into account. On the other hand, a populist project that would deliberately restrict its political scope to a single country would clearly damage its chances. What Biglieri and Cadahia propose, in Laclauian terminology, is a chain of equivalence among different national populist projects. On a regional or sub-continental level, such articulatory effort came to light with the rejection of George W. Bush's plans for establishing the FTAA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the subsequent alliance of nations, led at the time by populist governments, that constructed a progressive alternative with the Mercosur Parliament in 2005 and the Union of South American Nations in 2008 (97-98). Transnational populism is not a fancy dream, one can conclude; it does exist in the form of networks, mutual support, and collaboration, and even in the form of transnational counter-institutions.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Biglieri and Cadahia investigate the missed encounter between feminism and populism to explore what link could be forged between the feminine and the plebeian. In fact, the encounter is blocked on both sides of the equation. From the feminist side, populism is, as a rule, identified with a masculinist form of politics. Several approaches – autonomist, communitarian and Spinozist feminisms are mentioned in the case of Latin America, 'difference feminism' (a habitual misnomer for a feminist current whose adequate name should be identitarian feminism) is mentioned in the case of Europe – reject the idea of antagonism or negativity as constitutive for the political (117). This produces a problem, because a feminist populism, to the extent that it *is* populist, will have to be consistent with the main tenets of populism, most fundamentally with a politics of antagonization. Thus, the authors point out, correctly in my view, the danger inherent in the 'feminization of politics into an ethics of care that, by politicizing what has historically been called "domestic," runs the risk of turning the "domestic" – the sphere of reproduction of social life – into the only possible horizon of the political'. For such a move would not only ignore the importance of more traditional terrains and organizations of struggle (such as political parties, labor unions, etc.), it would also result in over-emphasizing 'a non-conflictual form of politics, as if conflict and rupture fall on the masculine side, and reconciliation and closure of antagonisms fall broadly on the feminine side' (120) – an assumption that would perpetuate an existing binarism, only that the latter is now inversely evaluated.

On the populist side, the encounter between feminism and populism is blocked due to an unwillingness to theorize 'the feminization of the popular and the role of the political category of care in the construction of the people' (117). The only way out of this dilemma – between the expulsion of antagonism on the feminist side and

the expulsion of the feminine and the category of care on the populist side – lies in the articulation of a link between populism and care, resulting in what the authors provocatively call the 'antagonism of care'. Obviously, they are far from having a blueprint solution to the quandary of articulating populism and feminism, but they do provide a few hints by illustrating the antagonistic politicization of feminist issues, as a necessary step, with the case of the 'Not One Less' (*Ni una menos*) movement against femicide that started in Argentina and spread over Latin America. Also, the ensuing 8M International Women's strike of 2020 managed to politicize the 'International Women's Day' of March 8. These examples, however, are not entirely convincing. While feminist issues were publicly articulated in a forceful antagonistic way, these examples fall under the category of social movement mobilization without reaching the point of populist articulation. For instance, the figure of a popular leader – a necessary prerequisite for populist movements according to Laclau and according to Biglieri and Cadahia themselves – is oftentimes not present, or is even discarded in the case of social movement mobilization. The step into the field of representational politics, a step taken by Podemos for instance, is not always dared or wanted.[3]

So, what could the 'antagonism of care' contribute to a feminist radicalization of populism? Far from rejecting the category of care, they propose 'to reflect on the political role of care through a different matrix that takes antagonism as its starting point' (122). Recognizing that the strict dichotomy between the feminine and the masculine is itself a masculine construct, they try to subvert this construct by resorting to a left-Lacanian 'ethics of the not-all' (122) encapsulated in a revamped notion of love. The latter, as a stand-in for care, is not portrayed in the romantic mode of a supposed fusion between the sexes, but, rather, as a vector of de-totalization: 'the ethics of the not-all is the possibility of thinking about feminism as a disruption of the logic of the totality, short-circuiting the biologization of the feminine and masculine as man and woman' (125). If it is the dominant masculine logic that produces the totalizing fantasy of two mutually complementing biological sexes – a totalizing logic that would remain intact if one wanted only to invert it or eliminate one of its two sides –, then a post-foundational feminism would perceive of the feminine and the masculine as two mutually contaminated positions neither of which coincides with itself. They are two 'modes of naming the antagonism that constitutes us as subjects' (126). To engage in an antagonistic ethics of care, or 'love', is then to accept the incomplete and failed nature of one's own identity and to engage in the effort 'of building a collective we (self) through the other of the self' (130): 'The emancipatory structure of populism's logic of articulation (…) proposes a different self-

---

[3] On the other hand, political parties or labor unions are often dominated by men, but Biglieri and Cadahia insist that these organizations are not exclusively masculinist but have been used in the past as platforms for the promotion of feminist demands as well.

relation, a different labor of the self, a different way of working through opposition. We would even dare to say that it is affirmed through a care for the self as the other of the self' (130). And yet, the moment of antagonism remains present. More than that, the process of care necessitates a constant effort at 'working through' negativity and antagonism, at embracing 'the other of the self as that *polemos* that must be cared for in order for things to flourish' (131).

As they present it, antagonism seems to appear in a double role in this account. There is the Lacanian 'antagonism' of psychoanalysis that cuts through both the feminine and the masculine, thus making impossible any neat fit between the sexes. But there is also the populist antagonism, i.e. the line drawn vis-à-vis the political enemy, an oppressive oligarchy for instance, and, by extension, vis-à-vis any homogenizing discourse. If the first antagonism requires an ethics of care, in order to work through negativity rather than disavowing it, the latter requires a clearly oppositional, if not destructive stance:

> Opposition is therefore not against the other, but against that form of identity that seeks to destroy the irreducible (or heterogeneous) through the configuration of inequality and exclusion. It is not about destroying the other but about destroying a position that prevents the existence of the other (the heterogeneous), what is to come. It antagonizes that power that seeks to assert itself as domination of the self. Emancipatory populism opposes and seeks to destroy the position that tries to eliminate what – from the totalizing point of view – is considered other, i.e. peasants, indigenous people, women, LGBTI+ people, etc. (131)

Now, this passage is of interest for many reasons, but one reason is the quite revealing conjunction 'emancipatory populism'. Were we not told that all populism is emancipatory? Why the need at the very end of the book to once more specifying it? Before tackling the question as to whether the main thesis of a constitutively emancipatory populism is sustainable or not, I would like to register some minor points of skepticism. But I want to insist up front that I'm in full agreement with the general aim of rehabilitating populism and with all the features of an emancipatory populism as described by Biglieri and Cadahia.

As regards the authors' discussion of plebeian republicanism, I suspect that much more historical work needs to be done, or presented, to prove that it actually existed as a remotely relevant political ideology in the past. A line of heritage that enlists, in a quote approvingly cited by the authors, Ephialtes, Pericles, or Protagoras, would hardly do the trick as we know next to nothing about Ephialtes, and Protagoras' pro-democratic position is mainly passed on via the potentially distorting account of a Platonic dialogue. More importantly, one needs to specify, in my view, that an understanding of (republican) freedom as a principle in need to be *universalized* is entirely modern, despite its perhaps Christian roots, and cannot be

found in the ancient or traditional republics.[4] As in the case of the particularly despicable Venetian republic, run by an aristocracy, these regimes were built – admittedly or secretly – on a caste system, regardless of the apparently equal distribution of citizenship among their members. I thus disagree with Biglieri and Cadahia when they assume that 'if we are all equal, there is no way to justify inequality within a republic, and, similarly, the law and institutions cannot be understood as the property and privilege of the few, but as mechanisms for expanding the rights of the majority' (71). The passage insinuates that there is something like an institutional automatism for the egalitarian expansion of freedom in republics. There are of course cases of revolts, the Florentine Ciompi revolt being the most prominent one, but what these revolts lack is an idea of the potentially limitless universalization of liberty and equality. Only the modern democratic revolution, which of course includes the Caribbean revolution, installs a horizon of freedom, equality, and solidarity that can be expanded well over the boundaries of the republic (hence the boundary problem in today's political science) and may potentially encompass noncitizens as well. Only within the 'symbolic dispositive' of modern democracy – against what I would call the *democratic horizon* – are we all equal; not so in traditional republics. For this reason, the republicanism of the modern revolutions is, in fact, a democratism.

This is far from having historical relevance only. The question reappears on a systematic level when the emancipatory nature of populism is to be evaluated. For Biglieri and Cadahia, populism is intrinsically emancipatory, implying that it is inclusive and respects plurality and heterogeneity. To start with, I am wondering whether fighting *against one's own exclusion* necessarily implies fighting *for the inclusion of others*. I'm not convinced that the latter fight is a direct consequence of the former. (We can easily imagine a populist mobilization aimed against the exclusion of the plebeian masses that does not really care about the inclusion of other excluded groups). It can indeed be discursively constructed as a direct consequence, but this involves a political effort that can hardly be read into the logic of populist mobilization per se. For this reason, I would take care to distinguish between populism and democracy, even though an intrinsic relation exists. Populism is an intrinsic feature of democracy for at least two reasons: (a) 'the people' as the sovereign ground of a democratic order will always be invoked by political actors in one or the other way, and an antagonistic – i.e., populist – construction of the people remains an ever-present possibility. And (b), democracy is the only truly political regime, because only in democracy a hegemonic struggle over the incarnation of the universal by particular actors takes place; and therefore antagonism, as a name for the political, will be an intrinsic feature of a democratic polity. But this does not

---

[4] I am using the attribute 'modern' for lack of a better word and to point out the seismic historical shift instigated by the democratic revolutions.

imply that every antagonism will be constructed democratically or that every popu-list project will have democratic goals. So, while populism is an intrinsic feature of democracy, not every populism is democratic.

This is the reason why I remain unconvinced by Biglieri and Cadahia's attempt at identifying populism and democracy. While I do not wish to deny that there is an intrinsic relation, it does not work both ways. Populism follows democracy like a shadow, to use Canovan's metaphor, but this shadow could be frighteningly un-democratic. For this very reason we are forced – and Biglieri and Cadahia are forced as well – to add further criteria to determine the democratic credentials of a given political project. Merely invoking the people does not make a project democratic, as Biglieri and Cadahia would agree, who add criteria such as respect for plurality and the heterogeneous and an idea of tendentially universal inclusion. This is what they describe, in a left-Lacanian vein, as an ethics of the non-all. Yet, it is hard to see how such an ethics can be an intrinsic part of any antagonistic politics, as it sits uneasily with the political aim of expanding a given hegemony (or chain of equiva-lence) by means of antagonization. There is nothing in the logic of antagonism, or equivalence, that could be read as a predisposition to an ethics of democracy.[5]

In fact, the position I would be prepared to defend differs from Biglieri and Ca-dahia's as much as from Mouffe's position. 'In the case of Mouffe, Marchart, and Stavrakakis,' they observe, 'it seems that two types of people can be built through populism: one authoritarian and exclusionary, the other emancipatory and egalitar-ian' (35-6). Well, I would think that many more types of people can be built through populism. The range of political options is not exhausted with a choice between either authoritarianism or emancipation, either exclusion or egalitarianism. An equivalential chain can be built in many more than only two ways. Likewise, the range of political positions is not exhausted with a binary choice between left and right. Other than Mouffe (2018) I think 'left populism' remains too unspecific for a recommendable project because one can easily imagine a left populism that is au-thoritarian and exclusionary. As if the tradition of the left had never seen authori-tarian currents. Of course, what can be done is, through a definitional operation, to define these currents out of an idealized picture of the left or populism. While sym-pathizing with the political aim of rehabilitating populism, such a nominalistic dec-laration of populism as emancipatory strikes me as symmetrically inverse to Jan

---

[5] There is a tendency in Biglieri and Cadahia's argumentation to shift, with a sleight of hand, between the logics of equivalence and the politics of egalitarianism, but the latter does not follow from the former because the expansion of an anti-egalitarian hegemonic formation would also have to proceed by building chains of equivalence. I'm wondering, by the way, whether Biglieri and Cadahia's ethical description of populism would equally fit with what in Laclau and Mouffe's earlier work *He-gemony and Social Strategy* was described as 'radical and plural democracy' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Doesn't Biglieri and Cadahia's description of an intrinsically democratic populism remind very much of 'radical and plural democracy'? And if yes, why not call it so? Why not speak, for instance, about a radical democratic populism? Wouldn't such a move solve, in one strike, all the problems?

Werner Müller's nominalistic fallacy in his book on populism. Where Müller decrees that inclusive cases (such as Podemos or Syriza) do not fall under the category of populism, because they don't fit his description of populism as intrinsically evil, Biglieri and Cadahia decree that authoritarian cases have nothing to do with populism because they don't fit their description of populism as intrinsically good.[6]

The problem reappears with the authors' reading of their main inspirational source: Laclau's theory of populism. Very interestingly they make out a difference between Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau, they observe, 'never claimed that this orientation (of a given populism) should be based on the left/right distinction, nor did he establish the fundamental features for establishing a binary distinction in these terms. Mouffe, by contrast, when determining the content of her distinction, favors an ontic classification of populism' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 22). But, if this is correct, Laclau's agnosticism about the particular ideological orientation of populism can be read in two ways. Biglieri and Cadahia suggest that, given his Latin American experience, Laclau does not take the left/right distinction as the main axis of analysis (22) – which may very well be the case. But to conclude from this that populism was for Laclau an emancipatory phenomenon would only be partially true. Perhaps one could say that it was *and it wasn't*. The particular experience of a militant of the left wing of Peronism opened his eyes to the emancipatory side of populism, but at the same time Laclau, the theorist, ascribed to populism an ontological character that goes far beyond the Latin American experience. No doubt, compared to European or Anglophone scholars, he was much more aware of the emancipatory potentials of populism, and yet he would abstain from attributing any intrinsic content to populism. On many occasions he even claimed that, given the 'open' nature of a populist logic of articulation, fascism was a form of populism. So, when Biglieri and Cadahia accuse Mouffe of filling left-wing populism with an ontic content such as equality and social justice, couldn't the same charge be held against Biglieri and Cadahia? Are they not themselves smuggling an ontic content (emancipation) into an ontological category (populism)?

Hence, the status of their argument remains somewhat unclear. There are several options. It could be a normative injunction: 'this is how populism should be!' But there is little indication that would warrant such a reading. Secondly, it could be a merely descriptive account (all populist phenomena can be described as emancipatory), but then one would need to first nominalistically purge undesirable variants from the concept of populism. A third option is to retreat to a standpoint epistemology: 'If the left/right distinction seems unavoidable in the case of Europe, we need to ask why this is not the case for Latin America. Or perhaps to ask ourselves whether we can offer reflections on populism from the Latin American locus of

---

[6] They thus propose to re-baptize them, i.e. to speak of neoliberal fascism rather than authoritarian populism.

enunciation that might disrupt some of those arguments constructed from Europe' (24). This is certainly the more convincing option because a certain standpoint allows you to see things – in this case: emancipatory variants of populism – which would be ignored from a different, Euro-parochial standpoint. Yet their claim as to the intrinsically emancipatory nature of populism *eo ipso* is much broader than that and can only lead to further problems: If it is an ontological claim, does it hold for Latin America only? If yes, it cannot be a truly ontological claim because such a claim must hold for populism in all possible worlds. If no, i.e., if it does hold for all possible worlds, how to account for the European experience of right-wing populisms – described by the authors themselves as 'unavoidable in the case of Europe' –, which flies in the face of any emancipatory ontology of populism.

So the argument in the book continuously shifts between a rather bold ontological claim and the much more modest aim to bring to the debate a Latin American perspective. While I think the ontological claim, which amounts to an emancipatory apriorism, is difficult to sustain, the latter goal to 'disrupt' the Eurocentric view on populism, should be welcomed as a much-needed intervention. But maybe I'm wrong and, perhaps, it is precisely the irritating aspect of the ontological claim that is meant to increase the disruptive quality of the intervention. Perhaps the ontological claim has the status of a provocation; perhaps it should be read as an injunction to turn the negative image of populism on its head and provocatively present liberal Eurocentric scholars of populism with a mirror-image of their own one-sidedness. For in place of an entirely negative assessment of populism we are confronted with an entirely positive one.

Now, there is a fourth option to which I now turn by way of ending these notes on Biglieri and Cadahia's *Seven Essays on Populism*. It is not fully elaborated, though, or only elaborated in Chapter 7 with respect to a feminist populism. Let me call it the 'imaginative option'. Biglieri and Cadahia take their start from the widespread feeling that the very idea of a (better) future has been canceled or rendered unimaginable. The neoliberal matrix leaves us 'trapped in a total immobility that forecloses on any idea of the future. Isn't the most spontaneous and paradoxically durable image of our present precisely the absence of a future?' (115). We are desperately confronted with a 'lack of imagination' (115). Worse than that, in the co-optative process that Gramsci would have called transformism or 'passive revolution', 'the reactionary powers of the present have managed to recycle those same emancipatory images, turning them into affective pastiches and mobilizing popular sectors toward their own reactionary ends' (115-6). Hence, we are in dire need 'to connect differently to our canceled futures' (116); and the two figures of the popular and the feminine 'can give us clues for imagining that which does not yet exist' (116). It appears that in these lines, which open the Chapter on feminist populism, a fourth option takes shape. Their argument, one can be sure, is neither normative nor descriptive; and their standpoint epistemology cannot fully account for the ontological

valence of their claims. So what if their book should be read as a political incantation to make use of the human faculty of imagination and start *imagining the popular differently*? But how to do this? How to engage in the labor of political imagination?

Biglieri and Cadahia approach this problem by revisiting Carlo Ginzburg's micro-historical method and what they describe as his 'evidential paradigm'. For Ginzburg, historical cases of knowledge production associated, for instance, with the plebeian and the feminine, proceed through the conjectural combination of clues, very much like Sherlock Holmes or Sigmund Freud proceeded. When, in an eastern fable, three brothers (re-)assemble the image of a camel, an animal they have never seen, through a number of clues, they exercise 'sensibility and intelligence to put imagination to work' (118). Such a method resembles the symptomatic reading strategy proposed by Lacan and Althusser:

> Unlike the positivist paradigm, which assumes that things are what they are and each object coincides with itself in a game of truth by correspondence, the evidential paradigm seems to suggest that things are not what they are since the thing cannot coincide with itself. (...) We can only refer to the thing through its effects: its symptoms, evidence, and footprints. Recall that this paradigm functions as a way of knowing from the place of not-knowing, from conjectural knowledge. In other words, it is experienced through clues that allow for the articulation of affects and intelligence in the very production of knowledge. (118-9)

While the evidential paradigm is meant to help the authors imagine the *coincidentia oppositorum* of an 'antagonism of care', it is also of relevance for their very object of research. Populism, it could be said, is not what it seems to be. It definitely is not what is described in the positivist paradigm by mainstream liberal scholars of 'populism research'. Precisely because it does not coincide with itself, because it is nothing that could be grasped in its positive presence, it is an object whose footprints need to be followed. This might explain why, even in mainstream populism research, this object has typically been described as fuzzy and hard to grasp. It is as if even the most hard-boiled empiricists felt a peculiar absence at the heart of their object of research. Following Biglieri and Cadahia, populism, precisely because there is no such thing as *the* typical case of populism, needs to be reassembled in a symptomatological way – which leaves space for re-imagining populism differently. This may explain the very nature of the authors' political wager: they present us with an image of how populism *could* be: i.e., with an alternative, not yet fully articulated image of an intrinsically emancipatory populism. Yet, their labor of re-claiming populism should not be mistaken for a purely 'mental' or theoretical activity, for a form of abstract speculation, disconnected from the world of actual politics. It is political through and through. For to re-imagine populism differently, as Biglieri and Cadahia do in their *Seven Essays on Populism,* is nothing short of a highly needed political intervention in the post-political matrix of liberalism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Biglieri, P. and Cadahia, L. (2021) *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Laclau, E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso

Marchart, O. (2007) *Postfoundational Political Thought. Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marchart, O. (2018) *Thinking Antagonism: Political Ontology after Laclau*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

McCormick, J.P. (2011) *Machiavellian Democracy,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mouffe, C. (2018) *For a Left Populism*, London: Verso.

Negri, A. (2004) *Subversive Spinoza. (Un)Contemporary Variations*, Manchester : Manchester University Press.

FEMINISM AND POPULISM WITH NO GUARANTEE

MERCEDES BARROS
Instituto de Investigaciones en
Diversidad Cultural y Procesos de Cambio
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas
Universidad Nacional de Río Negro (Argentina)
barros.mercedes@conicet.gov.ar

NATALIA MARTÍNEZ PRADO
Instituto de Humanidades
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas
Centro de Investigaciones "María Saleme de
Burnichón" de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentina)
natalia.martinez@unc.edu.ar

ABSTRACT
From different latitudes across the globe, the study of the link between feminism and populism has been entangled in approaches that not only mistrust the possibility of the relationship itself, but also constantly reveal incompatibilities in their findings that shadow the reflection on their productive coexistence. Against this background, Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia's book, *Seven essays on populism*, represents a breath of fresh air. The joint work of these Latin American political theorists opens up a line of research which proposes a new form of theorizing populism alongside feminism. In the following sections we focus on this dismantling process that underpins Biglieri and Cadahia's effort to open up and imagine a possible articulation between these phenomena, but alongside this analysis, we will also polemicize with their ideas, by bringing out the temptation of closure that eventually lurks in their analytical endeavours.

KEYWORDS
Populism, feminism, care, militancy

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the relationship between populism and feminism has rarely been the subject of academic reflection. However, this situation has been changing rapidly, not only because of the unexpected relevance of feminisms today, but also as

a result of the rise of the 'populist moment' which, according to different readings, we are currently experiencing in various parts of the world (Mouffe, 2018; Brubaker, 2017; Villacañas, 2015).

The truth is that, while acknowledging the possibility of this crossover, several of these approaches' initial assumptions, as well as the conclusions they reach, tend to underestimate or even dismiss the implications and importance of the reflection on this linkage. To begin with, there seems to be an almost inevitable need to reflect on both contemporary and growing phenomena, but at the same time, there is also a sense that this reflection is somewhat odd, or at best, improper (Kroes, 2018). In fact, several of these readings suggest that the populist understanding of 'the people' leads to an eventual indistinguishability of gender. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser point out, populism falls short of having 'a specific relationship to gender; indeed, [they argue] gender differences, like all other differences within the 'people', are considered secondary, if not irrelevant, to populist politics' (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015: 16). From other points of view, the thinking of the populism and feminism's link is directly considered to be inadequate because the two constitute opposite poles on the political spectrum (Roth, 2020; Kroes, 2018). As it is often pointed out, the most recent versions of right-wing populism are notoriously misogynist and sexist, opposing same-sex marriage, abortion and even gender studies (Gwiazda, 2021; Korolczuk, Graff, 2018; Askola, 2017). But in addition, even in left-wing populisms there would prevail aspects that place them in opposition to the feminist tradition: mainly their homogenising and anti-pluralist tendency and their confrontational and antagonistic rhetoric between two blocs – the elites and the underprivileged. As argued, while feminisms also tend to refer to male domination in antagonistic terms, the populist way of politics would obstruct last wave feminisms' intersectional political practices (Roth, 2020; Emejulu, 2011). Likewise, the centrality of the charismatic and paternalistic male leader in populisms is another aspect that would definitively separate it from feminism. As it is well known, feminist political practices insist on horizontality and question hierarchical and representative politics, since these aspects characterise precisely the male hegemony of politics (Kantola and Lombardo, 2020).

From different latitudes across the globe then, the study of the link between feminism and populism has been entangled in approaches that not only mistrust the possibility of the relationship itself, but also constantly reveal incompatibilities in their findings – to a greater extent regarding right-wing populisms – that shadow the reflection on their productive coexistence. Against this background, Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia's book represents a breath of fresh air. The joint work of these Latin American political theorists, *Seven essays on populism*, opens up a line of research which, while seeking to overcome the advance of the right and the paralysing perplexity of the left, proposes a new form of theorising populism alongside

feminism[1]. By mapping a new emancipatory horizon for our time, Biglieri and Cadahia's intervention brings to the fore a necessary interpretative challenge that enables discussions that had not been truly opened before and which raises a thought-provoking question: how can we be feminist and populist without having to apologise for it?

Biglieri and Cadahia's argumentative path begins by clearly stating a political position: they recognise themselves, first and foremost, as women/theorists/*militants* of the global South. This positioning implies situating themselves in the Latin American context, and from there, theorising about another global social order's possibilities as well as new strategic alliances to achieve it. In this sense, they aim to recover political experiences *from* and *about* the global South, but not from a privileged epistemic perspective, nor from subalternity, but rather as an intervention which situates itself in the proximity of what is widely known to them. In effect, their intervention attempts to disrupt the usual preconception that undervalues theory from the South, or that directly uses the South only as a case study for a theory from the North. Their commitment is to capture what is universalisable in the region's experiences, convinced that understanding local problems requires a global perspective as well as a questioning of the usual hierarchy of nation-state borders. Indeed, with this intrepid book they claim that transformative ideas can only emerge within the construction of egalitarian academic spaces of debate framed in our condition as political subjects of knowledge.

Now, from this specific position, they propose a risky and provocative approach that rejects the apparent inadequacy of populism and feminism's link. As post-Marxist theorists and activists who are aware of the articulations and antagonisms of our time, and above all, of exceptional dislocating events, they believe that it is crucial to theorise, imagine and promote the articulation of these two political traditions. That is why their book ends with a clear wager: if it is the feminist struggles of the South that today shake everything up, revealing the limits of the social and restructuring the symbolic register of the popular camp, why should we doubt that an emancipatory populist politics can go in that direction? That said, their approach neither simply assumes feminist nor populist affiliations, but rather it attempts to dismantle and displace the positions generally taken as given within each of these traditions. Because, as argued, 'the basis of the missed encounter [between populism and feminism] can be found in feminist claims that block antagonism (and negativity), and populist proposals that deny the role of care and the feminisation of politics' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 119).

---

[1]   Much of this proposal can be found in the last essay of the book, entitled: 'We Populists are Feminists', which is why throughout this text we will particularly focus on this chapter, although we will not neglect the general proposal of the book in the rest of the chapters.

In the following sections we will focus mainly on this dismantling process that underpins Biglieri and Cadahia's effort to open up and imagine a possible articulation between these phenomena. But alongside this analysis, we will also polemicise with their ideas, by bringing out the temptation of closure that eventually lurks in their analytical endeavours. In their persistent attempt to forge communication channels between feminism and populism, the authors run the risk of *making* a narrative that ends up preventing the oddness of populist politics and, above all, undermining the frontiers' contingency, arbitrariness and power which politics itself brings into being and that populism *par excellence* foregrounds. But let us first look at the operation of openness which is at the heart of Biglieri and Cadahia work and which makes it extremely interesting and conducive.

1.   FEMINISATION OF POLITICS? CAREFUL WITH CARE POLITICS

One of the authors' first and boldest steps to imagine the link between feminism and populism is to take up a discussion on the possibility of distinguishing and defining feminist praxis on the basis of a notion of 'care' linked to the 'feminisation of politics'[2]. They embark on this path not with the intention of recovering *women's* politics – in a cis-heterosexist sense – but as an interpretative wager that seeks to conjugate the popular configuration that populism brings, as an always 'failed image of the people', to the social problems that feminisms address today (127). By these means, the authors privilege the notion of *care* as a signifier that ties together historical feminist approaches – socialist, Marxist and post-Marxist feminisms – as well as a political practice of *sorority* that would make this 'feminisation of politics' possible under the broad principle of *caring for each other*.

Now, in taking up this debate and these categories, Biglieri and Cadahia also seek to dissociate themselves from the 'autonomist current' that, according to them, has prevailed in certain traditions of thought and militancy, particularly in the Latin American context. These have been related to communitarian feminisms and to left feminist perspectives, close to the immanentist thought. Questioning this autonomous current throughout the book, but particularly with regard to feminist politics, the authors insist that these approaches risk transforming the horizon of the feminisation of politics into a non-conflicting and reconciling 'ethic of care' that eventually obscures the inherent antagonistic dimension in all politics. The risk is due to the way in which, from these approaches, the political dynamic becomes entangled in 'an unconfessed gender dichotomy' (121). Such division ends up constituting two separate and totalised camps: on the one hand, the masculine position, as the

---

[2]   Cadahia and Biglieri focus on the idea of 'the crisis of care' proposed by Nancy Fraser, Cinzia Arruzza and Tithi Bhattacharya in their Manifesto: *Feminism for the 99 Percent* (Fraser, Arruzza and Bhattacharya, 2019).

disintegrating element through the perpetuation of antagonism, power and the hierarchy of the social, which is materialised in the state, representative politics, political parties, male leaders and antagonism, thus embodying patriarchy and its universalising politics. On the other hand, the feminine side stands out as the locus of the possibility of communal living through care, or through the affective and expansive gathering of bodies, where corporeality and affects arise as the opposite of power. All of which translates into the horizontal, collective and assembly organisational form of feminisms. It is at this clear-cut dichotomy where Biglieri and Cadahia, rather than finding the sources of feminist potentiality, find its limits: basically, on the failure to recognise how political articulations for feminist struggle are produced – as any other political struggle, which always involves conflict and is intertwined with power relations – and on the risks that this type of position has when it comes to generating links of solidarity and political imagination towards other instances of political struggle.

In contrast to these approaches, the authors boldly argue that the feminisation of politics and the politics of care should not be divorced from their antagonistic dimension and, drawing on two valuable theoretical contributions with a psychoanalytical imprint, they take seriously the possibility of reconnecting the two. The first of these inputs is the notion of *perseverance*, as developed by Joan Copjec in her book *Imagine There's No Woman* (2002). There, Copjec explores the distinction between the fixation drive and the perseverance drive through her analysis of Sophocles' Greek tragedy *Antigone*. As Biglieri and Cadahia argue, this distinction proves to be very enriching when it comes to conceiving social antagonism. For, unlike an antagonist action guided by a drive of fixation – that is nourished by the belief that there is a good to follow which is built on an idea of the law (Creon's masculine behaviour) – the perseverance drive allows to conceive a mode of antagonism constructed on the need for a loving bond – coming from desire – which preserves the irreducible in all idealisation and in all law (Antigona's action). That is to say, the drive to perseverance antagonises the law, the state and institutions by denouncing what cannot be replaced by them and preserving the irreducible, making possible a way of constructing the common through that which is irreplaceable[3]. For the authors, then, it is this way of thinking about antagonism that opens the door to conceiving the feminisation of politics as linked to the construction of an antagonism

---

[3] It is interesting here to mention Judith Butler's reading of Sophocles' play Antigone (Butler, 2002). According to her, Antigone's action is "partially" outside the law, as her disobedience of Creon's rule involves both rejection and assimilation of the authority of the law. In this sense, Antigone does not act in language by placing herself outside of the law which Creon invokes; on the contrary, she anchors her language in that same law and by appropriating it, she appropriates the authority wielded by Creon. What is interesting about this other reading is that it underlines how the antagonistic action also implies a moment of appropriation/identification with the law it opposes, and that it is precisely from there that its subversive effects take place.

through a de-totalising loving bond. And it is at this point in the argument that a second theoretical figure is invoked: the ethics of the not-all of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a way of thinking about the possibility of imagining feminism as a rupture with the masculine logic of totality. A totality that – in Luce Irigaray's terms – has characterised, not flesh and blood males, but the male phallogocentric position of the All and the One (Irigaray, 1985). Precisely, by embracing the indeterminacy of reality, this logic assumes the non-existence of previously constituted identities, contradicting the gender binarisms that seem to reappear in the feminisation of autonomist-rooted politics and thus paving the way to radical heterogeneity.

In our view, this critical displacement of the autonomist framework from which the feminisation of politics and the politics of care are usually approached – and whose implications are barely noticed – is crucial to address the problematic and confrontational development of feminist articulations today. However, it seems to us that the authors do not fully grasp the radical implications of these shifts in their own argumentation. To start with, what we have our doubts about regarding Biglieri and Cadahia' strategy, are the reasons and criteria by which the centrality of the category of 'care' should be kept as defining feminist politics. In effect, we recognise that the politisation of care has been central to articulate various feminist demands linked to the recognition and valorisation of unpaid domestic and care work mainly carried out by cis women[4]. And we also see that, as fundamental for the reproduction of the labour force, it has been the category that best synthesises the political strategy of socialist and Marxist feminism today, opening for this political tradition the greatest possibilities for the articulation of feminisms with the popular camp: with class, racial, indigenous, postcolonial, and environmental struggles.

But it is because of the aforementioned that we consider that Biglieri and Cadahia's effort does not fully undermine the restrictive and structural approach that still privileges the emancipatory character of relative positioning within the labour force. In other words, by what criteria can care be understood as a common ground between feminisms and as a starting point for their radicalisation? Raising this question does not mean that care has not been an overarching demand at a certain point in time, or in some specific circumstances, but can we establish in advance that this category has a crucial (inherent) political role? Why holding on to this category and giving it the political role of bringing together the feminist struggles?[5]. Or even, is this the category that can be universalised from the South and then be the main attribute from which to radicalise populism? According to Nancy Fraser, and her

---

[4]   The category has been broadened by feminist economics and activisms to include not only domestic work and care for dependents but also care for all people, for interdependent relationships and also, in its broadest version, care for nature.

[5]   Regarding this point, the *Ni Una Menos* movement in Argentina, unlike articulating and popularising its struggles around care or abortion right – as other interpretations usually dismiss – expanded through the demand against women´s violence. See Martínez Prado, 2018.

collective proposal of a *Feminism for the 99%*, there is indeed a structural connection between social reproduction and gender asymmetry. But do Biglieri and Cadahia also assume this? Sometimes it seems that the authors are not particularly concerned with releasing this category from its structural economistic roots, for if this were the case, *care* would no longer have to be privileged as a category of emancipation and political analysis. In other words, their remarkable effort to link the feminisation of politics with antagonism, understood no longer as an oppositional relationship guided by an ideal – which would generate the illusion that at some point such antagonism could disappear – but as an opposition faithful to irreducibility, would not seem to open the way to an uncertain scenario of indeterminate and unknown political categories, demands and struggles.

In addition, we find it polemical, but at the same time extremely interesting, to think of the feminisation of the political as a disruption of the logic of totality and as an introduction of radical indeterminacy, which is nothing other than the manifestation of the logic of the not-all in psychoanalytical terms. Indeed, for Biglieri and Cadahia, the feminine position performs 'a double operation: from the ontic perspective, it is the materially existing force that allows us to short-circuit from within the master's totalizing discourse embodied in the figure of the dominant, white, heterosexual man. But, from the ontological perspective, it is a catacretic figure used to think when names fail' (127). From our perspective, this theoretical approach could certainly be very productive in addressing and understanding the different ways in which feminisms act and situate themselves in the social domain, and the forms in which the singular and the multiple – as opposed to the One and the other – prevail in feminist politics, confirming its constitutive heterogeneity. In this respect, there is no feminism that can represent successfully the whole of them: just as 'woman does not exist', 'feminism does not exist'. Nonetheless, as soon as the feminisation of politics is posed in these terms, a main question arises: how is it possible to conceive even the gesture of unifying a politics that is in itself multiple and heterogeneous? This first issue opens up a couple of others that may be useful to address.

Firstly, if the logic of the not-all points to the de-totalising gesture of feminist politics, showing its 'always open character and its hospitality to otherness, enabling a singular-plural that brings no One together, how would this politics marked by its perseverance towards the heterogeneous coexist with the inevitable drawing of closures, frontiers and fixations of populism? That is to say, it seems to us that it is very productive to think of feminisms as a political tradition that *par excellence* has brought heterogeneity into the field of the political, and that this attachment to indeterminacy definitely functions as an antidote to the essentialisms and binarisms that easily find their way into politics. But it is not clear in the authors' argument how this de-totalising gesture aligns with populist interventions, in particular with the specific populist way *of doing* with antagonism (Biglieri, 2020). In other words, we

wonder how the political praxis that the authors link to the notion of perseverance, as that which opposes the One in the name of the irreducible, finds its communion with a form of antagonistic politics that, while making visible the irreducible tension between the part and the whole of the community, *still* involves a moment of full-ness and closure, a moment when the *plebs* claims to be the only legitimate *populus*. Because, at a certain point, this particular understanding of feminist antagonistic politics, which, in the words of Biglieri and Cadahia, 'points beyond our fixations and preserves, from within the storage chest of our desires that which cannot be substituted – but only sublimated' (124) seems closer to that ethics from which they aimed to differentiate themselves, or even more to queer politics[6], than to a populist logic of articulation. A logic that – as the authors well know, following Laclau's the-oretical developments – always oscillates between openness *and closure* through precarious and partial fixations around multiple names of the people – social justice, equality, Peronism, human rights – establishing a dividing boundary that has the fundamental role of avoiding, rather than embracing or caring for, (all) others.

Secondly, directly linked to the above, and bringing a problem that has always been a pressing issue for feminisms, we also wonder how a feminist politics which is faithful to heterogeneity can accommodate hegemonic politics *tout court*. And here we are thinking not only on the equivalential moment of politics to which Biglieri and Cadahia anchor populism's inclusive and egalitarian impulse – and which we can understand as close to feminist horizontality – but on the moment of the equivalential chain's representation to which they barely refer to: namely the hegemonic dimension itself and the very possibility of universality in feminist poli-tics. In specific terms, how is the moment of representation inscribed in the hori-zontality and openness assumed in the consensual and anonymous form of deci-sion-making of most feminist assemblies? In our opinion, the authors do not seem to be willing to discuss these questions in the field of feminisms, nor to address their analytical implications, which would require a discussion of the categories of lead-ership, identification, hegemony. In fact, when analysing the experience of feminist mobilisations in Argentina around the demand of *Ni Una Menos* [Not One Less] as a way of exemplifying a de-totalising feminist politics, the universal function of this demand is already assumed, taken for granted, with no traces of its political becoming. That is, they are not dealing with how NUM managed to obtain that function, if it still has it, or how it has been transformed since its emergence. And these are key questions when it comes to thinking about new ways of connecting feminist and populist politics. Actually, the current *Ni Una Menos* assemblies are having enormous difficulties in articulating collective actions, beyond agreeing on

---

[6]   As Miquel Bassols (2021:19) has pointed out: "Can there be a queer politics? It would be a politics that would not be defined by opposition with respect to another term, but by something incomparable, something that does not have an identity of its own, ontological, but is always so singu-lar that it is removed from any binary definition".

an annual collective manifesto. Although most interpretations of the potential of the NUM's feminist assembly politics focus on its first massive outburst or on the way in which these assemblies moved towards the already existing political fronts of Argentine feminisms, little is said about the process of opening up and metonymic displacement by which the NUM came to successfully *represent* other demands. For it was precisely in this process of emptying and de-particularisation of this singular demand that the possibility of closure and representation of the chain of solidarities between different feminist claims was achieved. A political closure which, for some sectors within the assemblies was nonetheless the possibility of expanding feminist politics beyond national borders, while for others it was the beginning of its end[7]. That is to say, the *Ni Una Menos* demand, which originally emerged as a particular claim against femicides and violence against (cis) women, began to lose its particular content while gaining its universal function through a language and political tradition that managed to impose itself over other present discourses. Against this background, even if some of the NUM assemblies across the country may still continue to be heterogeneous, we must not fail to pay attention to what and whom these assemblies actually represent at any given time and what discourses inscribe and overdetermine their demands[8]. But as we said before, this requires bringing into discussion different views and categories on how the process of representation actually takes place within feminist politics.

In this sense, if Biglieri and Cadahia's proposal, by assuming the de-totalising gesture of the logic of the not-all, harbours an understanding of the way in which feminisms assume the particular in its irrevocable singular multiplicity – its unrepresentability –, it does not seem so clear that their approach problematise the tense unfolding of that ubiquitous – but always relative – universal that marks all political practice, even the feminist one. That *wandering All* which, after the critique of the metaphysics of the emancipatory subject, some feminist critique came to understand, as Linda Zerilli (1998) did once long ago, as that 'universalism which is not One'.

---

[7]   Let us recall that in order to achieve the openness to new demands that became a hallmark of NUM, their first *Manifesto* explicitly excluded the historical demand of Argentine feminism, the right to abortion. This claim's later inclusion is what for some sectors represented the beginning of the NUM's politicisation and the end of its potential for social articulation.

[8]   In this sense, we share Biglieri and Cadahia's mistrust of an apparent immanent feminist power of assemblies resultant of the 'political performativity of bodies', and we are also definitely wary of the idea that the 'proximity and displacement by conflict' is produced by a supposedly gathered 'collective intelligence' (Gago, 2020: 175-6).

2.   WHO RADICALISES WHOM? POPULIST MILITANCY AND ITS ABSENCE OF GUARANTEES

As we have already mentioned, the other authors' crucial turn in their attempt to bridge the gap between feminism and populism is to problematise existing populist conceptualisations and proposals. Drawing on the theoretical developments of Ernesto Laclau, the authors raise two crucial points for understanding this phenomenon. Firstly, and put it in very simple terms, they argue that populism must be understood in its ontological dimension and not as 'a political moment nor a merely conjunctural political strategy' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 13). In effect, pursuing Laclau fundamental steps 'to make politics thinkable again' (Laclau, 2008: 12), they not only grant populism the status of a political category, but they also conceive it as 'a singular way of theorizing the being of the social' (Biglieri and Cadahia 2021: 18). Secondly, and in close relation to this first point, they further assert that populism's insurrectional character and emancipatory potential do not allow it to be linked to just any kind of content or politics. For them, populism only occurs when equality, among those at the bottom (against those on top), is achieved by privileging the logic of equivalence which allows for the articulation of heterogeneity, i.e. the radical inclusion of differences, rather than their erasure or suppression. Populism can therefore be conceived as synonymous with the politics of equality and inclusion, hence as the authors suggest, 'it can only be emancipatory' (35). From these premises, they introduce a watershed in the current intellectual and political debate: populism is either left-wing or it is not. Moreover, while the notion of fascism is still at play, it is possible to dispense with the left-right, inclusive-exclusive qualifiers, and speak – without apologies – only of populism as opposed to fascism.

Once again, we find Biglieri and Cadahia's approach highly suggestive. Indeed, their approach brings to the understanding of the link between populism and feminism a fruitful debate and a renewed perspective that breaks with the empirical interpretations of 'really existing' populisms – mostly right-wing of the global North – which tend to attribute a pejorative character to this form of politics. Moreover, it also invites us to reflect on the controversial distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism which has been the object of debate in recent years within populist studies and, in particular, in the field of post-structuralist discursive approaches to populism (Stavrakakis, 2017; Panizza, 2005, Mouffe, 2018; Devenney, 2020; Glynos and Mondon, 2016). In this respect, let us first say that we share their suspicion on the extent to which this left-right distinction, as well as the inclusionary- exclusionary differentiation (Mouffe, 2018; Marchart, 2018; Stravakakis, 2017), may actually contribute to understanding populism as such, or whether it rather does not bring more confusion to the political discursive approach to the matter. By pointing out that populism is one form of political articulation among others, with its own internal logic of functioning, Biglieri and Cadahia raise an entirely valid question: 'How could it be both ontologically and strategically correct to conflate fascism with

a populist form of popular construction?' (2021: 39). In effect, from our view, this kind of typology that aims at capturing and accounting for different types or degrees of populist discourses (Stravakakis, 2017), does little to actually sharpen the focus on populism and to allow for its distinction from other political practices and discursive interventions, such as democratic-authoritarian-totalitarian ones (Panizza, 2014; Barros, 2013). In contrast, it frequently contributes to homogenising them by bringing together very distinct ways of constructing the people and dealing with the tension between the *part* and the *whole* in the structuration of the community's order. As has already been pointed out, what clarifying distinction can we speak of when such dissimilar forms of politics, as the political experiences of Trump, Orbán, Lula, Bolsonaro, Perón, Kirchner, Chávez or Morales converge under the same political category?

Yet, it is precisely because of this need to separate the *wheat from the chaff* that we have some reservations about the rapid assimilation that the authors establish between populism and the emancipatory project of the left. We think that by identifying the traits of the left, as if they were specific and proper to populism, this logic becomes too close to the notions of equality and inclusion which, in any case, are also found in other forms of political articulation, such as the democratic one. This consequently leaves populism's own features still in the shadows. In our view, once we put populism back on the left-right axis – as Biglieri and Cadahia acknowledge Laclau himself tried to avoid –, we again run the risk of losing sight of its specificity, that is, of the internal logics through which populism functions, the types of popular identification it involves, and how it actually tends to perpetuate the (always conflictive) tension between the legitimate *demos* and the set of popular identifications in which it operates (Aboy Carlés 2005; Barros, 2013). Since the publication of *On populist Reason* (Laclau, 2005), if not before, the task of further characterising populism has given rise to very interesting theoretical crossovers, many of which have been carried out by Biglieri and Cadahia themselves (Biglieri and Perelló, 2019; Biglieri, 2020; Coronel and Cadahia, 2018), among other scholars within the post-structuralist field of study across the globe (Critchley and Marchart, 2004; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Stravakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Aboy Carlés, 2005; Barros, 2006; Panizza, 2013). Therefore, we wonder whether a return to this mode of characterisation might not be somewhat counterproductive to the developments that have taken place with the decisive passage from *normative* to *formal* and *discursive* approaches. Moreover, we ask ourselves if this synonymy would not end up giving back to populism a series of distinctive ontic contents – as Wendy Brown (2021) suggested in the book's foreword –, which would certainly go against the authors' attempt to understand its ontological specificity.

Now, it is precisely from this problematisation of populism, and by putting forward their own understanding of this concept, that Biglieri and Cadahia can begin to draw a possible way of conceiving populism alongside feminism. As we

mentioned before, for them populism differs from other logics of political articulation in its specific way of dealing with differences *vis-à-vis* equivalences. While populism supports constitutive heterogeneity of differences in the construction of the people, right-wing politics, which they identify as fascism, organises them through homogeneity. Contrary to general views that only see in populism the homogenising effects of an antagonistic politics that divides the social field into two opposing parts, the egalitarian and inclusive populist logic makes this type of politics hospitable towards the heterogeneity of differences. In this way, this hospitable aspect opens up a productive link with the heterogeneity and inclusion present in current feminisms and to the care politics that this implies. That is, this aspect also allows the approach of a dimension of care that apparently has gone unnoticed in populism[9], because, as the authors argue, for populist logic to embrace the heterogeneity of differences, first of all, it needs to take care of them. As we can see, once the authors disentangle populism from right-wing politics and link it to left-wing egalitarian and inclusive politics, the path to feminist politics is fairly straightforward. It is only then that they can begin to think on how these two phenomena can mutually potentiate each other, how feminism can radicalise and expand populism across national borders, and how populism can politicise feminism, giving it back its antagonistic politics.

Now, from this point of departure, the authors – as *militants* – dare to imagine a populist-feminist emancipatory project by appealing to two 'current images' of our latitudes. In these images, they find some glimpses of this popular construction crossed by a feminist tint or, we could risk, a *populist feminism* in the making: the *Ni Una Menos* (NUM) [Not One Less] movement, to which we have referred before, and the political appeal of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, former President of Argentina and the current leader of the Peronist movement: *La Patria es el Otro* [The Homeland is the Other]. We are interested in the analysis of both figures because from this analysis some questions arise about the way in which the authors pose the communion between feminisms and populisms.

Biglieri and Cadahia envision in the NUM feminist mobilisation an unprecedented restructuring of the popular camp. For them, this movement has managed to weaken the antagonisms that have marked Argentina's political history, drawing new frontiers within the social field and taking feminist demands beyond nation-state borders. In this process of internationalisation of feminist demands on a global scale lies the effective possibility of imagining a *feminist people*. In their words: 'A massive, global and historical image of resistance and living struggles against patriarchy' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 128).

---

[9]   We say 'apparently' bearing in mind the enormous attention that care policies have received in Latin American populism and their effects on women's lives – to name just one case, the one we know best, let us remember the role of the Evita Foundation. In this sense it is hard to appreciate this supposed lack of attention.

While we may agree with Biglieri and Cadahia on the restructuring effect of NUM, we still have reservations on whether it is possible to find in this form of transnational feminist politics a form of populist articulation. That is to say, can this internationalist feminism, which today carries the claim of 'Ni Una Menos' onto a global scale, be approached under the rubric of populism? For we must not ignore the fact that the internationalist reading that permeates feminisms today is conditioned by a discourse that bears the universalising imprint of socialist-Marxist ideology. And even if we can agree that under the Marxist tradition there are innumerable and more or less equidistant political languages – whose closeness allows for the formation of alliances and common fronts – as political analysts and theorists we cannot ignore the tensions and differences between one another[10]. In other words, would there not be differences between the transnational politics of Marxists and populists?[11].

For the authors, this does not seem to be an entirely valid or pertinent question, since, as we explained above, they begin this discussion by assuming the proximity of populism to the left. Yet, from our position, this form of politics of internationalist feminisms is not exactly, nor necessarily populist, since the presence of an antagonistic division of the social field between feminists and patriarchy does not ensure the emergence of populism. For the time being, we consider that the left politics that has dominated transnational feminist mobilisations has not yet proved to have populist traits. Its predominant mode of articulating differences, though gradually widening, does not cease to antagonise the 'dual system of oppression' – as Marxist feminisms recognise the combined oppression of patriarchy and capitalism – under the assumption of a resolution of the tension over the boundaries of the legitimate *populus*. This implies, at the same time, the continuous hierarchisation of the 'structural' differences which, on both sides of the frontier, prevail over the rest, according to an order (of oppression, or of emancipation) which is presented as unfailingly, and not so secretly[12], overdetermining its horizon. In contrast to this

---

[10]   We cannot ignore the debate that Laclau and Žižek had on the subject (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000; Žižek, 2006; Laclau, 2006). Among feminisms, although Fraser has recently approached the Laclauian framework and populism as a political alternative for the emancipation of the left (2017), Gago's reading rejects it out of hand (Gago, 2020: 202-6).

[11]   For De Cleen et. al. (2020) a *transnational* populism is distinguished from an *international* one because rather than an allusion to a 'cooperation between national populisms', the transnational one requires 'the construction of a 'people' that goes across national borders' (2020: 153). For Cadahia and Biglieri, this distinction is problematic because it implies ignoring that '(national) particularities are ineradicable in the conformation of a transnational people' (2021:94). We believe that De Cleen et al. would agree with them on that point as well. What is overlapping in both analyses, in our view, are the differential ways of constructing that people that prevail in progressive sectors, which make some populist and others not.

[12]   To paraphrase Žižek who pointed out that 'in the series of struggles (economic, political, feminist, ecological, ethnic, etc.) there is always one which, being part of the chain, secretly overdetermines its very horizon' (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000: 320).

way of articulation, populist discourses exacerbate that tension over the borders and give visibility to the ultimate arbitrariness of social division. This is because, in a populist articulation, the popular subject is presented both as the victim of a harm that demands reparation (*plebs*) and as the embodiment of the communal 'whole' (*populus*). In its pendular movement, this tension between being *part* and being *whole* is exacerbated and does not find a definitive resolution (Barros, 2013). In fact, it is in this failed attempt to represent the *whole* that the popular subject distances herself from her particular condition, which allows her to generate unprecedented links with other popular identifications. Thus, unlike political discourses that are articulated through other logics, in populist interventions there is no privilege of differences, and any social claim or struggle can be part of either side of the frontier. Someone who is considered an enemy at first sight, someone who is 'at the top' or who is part of the 'establishment', i.e. 'the elites' (such as the national bourgeoisie, rural producers, groups represented by the light blue anti-abortion scarves[13]) can, at a given moment, be identified as 'those from below', as 'members of the people'. This more porous, contaminated and ambivalent politics is what gives populism its disruptive and radical potency and what differentiates it from political struggles circumscribed to pre-ordained enemies, prefigured by universal systems of oppression.

In this light, we are not so optimistic about the second image either – the Kirchnerist appeal: 'The Homeland is the Other' – which the authors refer to as a 'distinct form of populist work that (...) is not articulated through the domination of the other but embraces the other of the self as that polemicist who must be cared for in order for things to flourish' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 131). For Biglieri and Cadahia, this signifier would in fact reveal the emancipatory structure of the logic of articulation of populism which, according to them, 'asserts itself through the care of the self as the other of the self' (130). That is to say, in the syntagm coined by the Kichnerist political discourse, the other would be that irreducible element that constitutes us, so, as they say, 'far from something to be eliminated' (130), we should take care of it. From their point of view, this populist gesture would already contain an effective dimension of care that has gone unnoticed, or rather, devalued by feminist politics with an autonomist slant. In effect, in this form of identity configuration there would be a space for sheltering and promoting the care of the other, and its *sororal* drifts, without neglecting the oppositional and articulatory dimension constitutive of populist formations. Recovering this dimension, therefore, would be crucial for imagining one of the ways of radicalising feminist politics through populist politics.

---

[13]   The sectors that oppose the legalisation of abortion in Argentina use light blue headscarves as a symbol of their struggle and as a way of differentiating themselves from the green headscarves of feminist activists. In this regard, in a controversial speech, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called for the formation of a social and political front that includes both headscarves, generating great controversy among her supporters, most of whom were in favour of abortion.

Now, even if we can appreciate the possibilities that this political gesture opens up for the articulation of feminist and populist political practices – and which the authors rightly point out – we nevertheless also believe it is fundamental to highlight the limits and challenges that populism still represents for feminist politics. For if the appeal 'the Homeland is the Other' sums up the logic of openness and inclusion of otherness in similar terms to a 'populist normativity', it is far from defining its political practice: oriented towards the construction of hegemony through antagonist politics. That is, first and foremost, in the back-and-forth between the *whole* and the *part* proper to populist hegemonic politics, the notion of caring for differences loses its effect. For it is not a criterion of care that will safeguard those differences from the shifting of populist boundaries. Hegemonic investiture has unpredictable effects, including the underestimation or discarding of some of the differences that were present in the first place. Secondly, the logic of populist inclusion is not infinite, nor indistinct, and, above all, it is not defined *ad hoc* by a criterion of indiscriminate openness to otherness, as many feminisms and left-wing activisms seem to assume when they conduct their political praxis by a supposed political correctness of accumulation of social differences by definition[14].

For all these reasons, and unlike some feminisms that are now questioned for their moralistic practices of 'nullification' or 'aggravation', populist praxis leaves open the way in which political differences are settled, involving then conjunctural and singular judgements that will have the agreement of some and the opposition of others. Populist inclusion is thus radically unpredictable, so that sometimes those who were previously on the opposite side of the fence join its forces; and at other times strategic alliances are forged with sectors even of the opposition – with the right, with the light blue scarves – to represent the elusive whole. This is why populism is the logic of political articulation *par excellence*, as Biglieri and Cadahia have affirmed on countless occasions. And therefore, not all feminisms would be willing to go along with it. Therefore, we should also ask ourselves what it would mean for feminisms to allow themselves to be radicalised by populism. As we have tried to show, accepting the ineradicable nature of the antagonism does not seem to be enough. It is also necessary not to elude the always unsuccessful displacement of political borders present in the failed attempts at closure and plenitude that populist hegemonic process implies. Only in this way can heterogeneity be thought beyond the acceptance of differences and acquire its radical character.

[14]   In other words, intersectionality does not always translate into the politicisation of differences; on the contrary, the mere aggregation of differences is often a means of depoliticising them.

OPEN CONCLUDING REMARKS: 'A NEBULOUS NO-(WO)MAN'S-LAND'[15]

To conclude our intervention, we would like to invoke once again the spirit of openness that Biglieri and Cadahia bring through their intervention to the apparent and sedimented antinomy between populism and feminism. As we have shown, the authors make a remarkable effort to work on the traces of a possible encounter between these two historically distant, but currently fascinating political phenomena. As they point out, their aim is to translate certain practices and experiences located in the South – equating or contrasting them with those prevailing in the Global North – with the expectation of tracing contact points which are often overlooked or dismissed out of hand.

But in doing so, as we have also tried to show in our intervention, the authors have not discussed nor acknowledged two assumptions underlying their own militant and analytical approach: on the one hand, their translation exercise was carried out on the basis of assuming an internationalist framework intimately linked to the tradition of the Marxist left which, as we pointed out above, is far from making possible the radicality of the contingency of political borders – and their overdetermined and singular inscriptions – which, whether we like it or not, populism presupposes. On the other hand, they remained distant from the discussion on how the heterogeneity inherent to feminisms can deal with the hegemonic dimension of populism. That is, even if we admit, along with them, that the logic of the not-all definitively recognises this gesture of radical assumption of singularities as something exceptional and distinctive of feminist politics – an absolute apprehension of the heterogeneous – it remains to be analysed how the moment of closure and representation, inherent to populisms, can be assumed therefrom. Following that path, it may be productive to recall Butler's reading of Antigone (2002) to which we referred earlier on, especially her insistence that heterogeneity is not without the law, which is why Antigone's action is only partially outside Creon's Law.

Now, if for Cadahia and Biglieri populism and feminism can radicalise each other from antagonism and care, for us it is instead from the tension between openness and closure, between social heterogeneity and hegemonic articulation that we can glimpse the greatest challenge to their coexistence. That is why we consider that it is still necessary to proceed with caution, but with no less enthusiasm, in thinking about their communion. This may require also an analytical register guided by a logic that operates on a case-by-case basis, and that unfolds in a singular and situated manner, which can be attentive to the specific and distinctive moments in which

---

[15]   Alluding to the words that Ernesto Laclau once wrote: '(...) between left-wing and right-wing populism, there is a nebulous no-man's-land which can be crossed — and has been crossed — in many directions' (Laclau, 2005: 87).

populist glimpses permeate feminist politics[16]. For that, this analytical path must be faithful to the indeterminacy of the social and always aware of the contingent and arbitrary locations of social struggles. Many times, this may go against the militant spirit which always tries to make history happen.

So, let us provisionally close the opening of this dialogue, then, by recalling, with reference to Hannah Arendt's reading, that one of the main limits of Marxist political philosophy, apart from the privileging of a Subject that makes history, was precisely that politics ended up deriving from history as a *making*. And as she herself also said, only Marx understood that a conception of 'making history' implied accepting that, as every craft of making implies a certain end (a made, fabricated product), 'history will have an end' (Arendt, 2018: 127). And we, as feminists and populists, know that, although we are moving in a nebulous land, our story has only just begun.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aboy Carlés, G. (2005) 'Populismo y democracia en la Argentina contemporánea. Entre el hegemonismo y la refundación'. *Estudios Sociales* (Buenos Aires), 28(1): 125-149.

Arendt, H. (2018 [1958]) *The human condition* (2nd ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Askola, H. (2017) 'Wind from the north, don't go forth? Gender equality and the rise of populist nationalism in Finland', *European Journal of Women's Studies* 26(1): 54–69.

Barros, M. and Martínez Prado, N. (2020) 'Let's not talk about it. Feminism and populism in Argentina'. *Baltic Worlds*, XIII(1): 77-84.

Barros, M. and Martínez Prado, N. (2019) 'Populismo y derechos humanos en el devenir masivo de los feminismos argentinos'. *La Aljaba*, XXIII: 33-57.

Barros, S. (2013) 'Despejando la espesura. La distinción entre identificaciones populares y articulaciones políticas populistas'. In Aboy Carlés, G., Barros, S. and Melo, J (eds.) *Las brechas del pueblo: reflexiones sobre identidades populares y populismo*, Buenos Aires: UNDAV.

Bassols, M. (2021) 'Lo femenino, más allá de los géneros. *Virtualia*, año XV, 40: 14-3

Biglieri, P. and Cadahia, L. (2021) *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Biglieri, P. (2020) 'Populismo: ¿izquierdas y derechas?', *Recerca. Revista de Pensamenti Anàlisi*, 25(1): 5-24.

---

[16]   An outline of this type of approach can be found in Barros and Martínez Prado 2019; 2020).

Biglieri, P. and Perelló, G. (2019) 'Populism'. In Stavrakakis, Y. (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Psychoanalytic Political Theory*, London/New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (2002) *Antigone's Claim*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Butler, J., Laclau, E. and Žižek S. (2000), *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*, London: Verso.

Brown, W. (2021), 'Foreword', in Biglieri, P. and Cadahia, L., *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brubaker, R. (2017) 'Why Populism?', *Theory and Society*, 26: 1-51.

Coronel, V. and Cadahia, L. (2018), 'Populismo republicano: más allá de «Estado versus pueblo»', *Nueva Sociedad*, 273: 72-82.

Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (eds) (2004), *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, London/New York: Routledge.

De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2020) 'The Potentials and Difficulties of Transnational Populism: The Case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25)', *Political Studies*, 68(1): 146–166.

Devenney, M. (2020) 'Populism, Democracy and the Transnational People: In Defense of Democratic Populism', in Eklundh, E. and Knott, A. (eds.), *The Populist Manifesto*, Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield.

Emejulu, A. (2011) 'Can "the people" be feminists? Analysing the fate of feminist justice claims in populist grassroots movements in the United States', *Interface: a journal for and about social movements*, 3(2): 123-151.

Fraser, N.; Arruzza, C. and Bhattacharya, T. (2019) *Feminism for the 99%: A Manifesto*, London: Verso.

Fraser, N. (2017) 'Against Progressive Neoliberalism, A New Progressive Populism', *Dissent Magazine*, January 28, URL: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/nancy-fraser-against-progressive-neoliberalism-progressive-populism

Gago, V. (2020), *Feminist International. How to Change Everything*, London: Verso.

Glynos, J. and Howarth, D. (2007) *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory,* New York/London: Routledge.

Glynos, J and Mondon, A. (2016) 'Populist Hype', *Populismus Working Papers*, 4.

Gwiazda, A. (2021) 'Right-wing populism and feminist politics: The case of Law and Justice in Poland', *International Political Science Review*, 42(5): 580–595.

Kantola, J. and Lombardo, E. (2020) 'Strategies of right populists in opposing gender equality in a polarized European Parliament', *International Political Science Review*, 42(5): 565-579.

Kroes, R. (2018) 'Populism and Feminism: Odd Bedfellows', *Society* 55: 18–21 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0206-x

Laclau, E. (2004) 'Glimpsing the Future', in Critchley, S. and Marchart, O. (eds.), *A Critical Reader*, London/New York: Routledge.

Laclau, E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2006) 'Why Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics', *Critical Inquiry*, 32(4): 646-680.

Laclau, E. (2008) *Debates y combates. Por un nuevo horizonte de la política*, Buenos Aires: FCE.

Marchart, O. (2018) *Thinking Antagonism: Political Ontology After Laclau*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Martínez Prado, N. (2018) '¿Pueblo feminista? Algunas reflexiones en torno al devenir popular de los feminismos', *Latinoamérica. Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos*, 67: 173-202.

Meret, S. and Siim B. (2013) 'Gender, populism and politics of belonging: Discourses of rightwing populist parties in Denmark, Norway and Austria' in Siim, B. and Mokre, M. (eds.), *Negotiating gender and diversity in an emerging European public sphere.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mouffe, C. (2018) *For a Left Populism*, London: Verso.

Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2015) 'Vox populi or vox masculini? Populism and gender in Northern Europe and South America", *Patterns of Prejudice* 49(1–2): 16–36.

Panizza, F. (2005) *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, London: Verso.

Panizza, F. (2013) "What Do We Mean When We Talk About Populism?', in De la Torre, C. and Arnson, C.J. (eds.) *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*, Washington (DC): The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Panizza, F. (2014) 'Intervenciones, identidades e instituciones populistas', *Colombia Internacional*, 82: 291-295.

Roth, J. (2020) '¿Puede el feminismo vencer al populismo? Avances populistas de derecha y contestaciones interseccionales en las Américas', *Ensayos InterAmericanos*, 4, Bielefeld: Kipu-Verlag. Center for InterAmerican Studies (CIAS) Universität Bielefeld.

Stavrakakis, Y. (2017) 'Discourse Theory in Populism Research: Three Challenges and a Dilemma', *Journal of Language and Politics*, 16(4): 523–34: http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.17025.sta.

Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G. (2014) 'Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery. The Case of Syriza', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19(2): 119–142.

Žižek, S. (2006) 'Against the Populist Temptation', *Critical Inquiry*, 32(3): 551-574.

FEMINISM AND POPULISM: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS OR A PERFECT MATCH?

JENNY GUNNARSSON PAYNE
Department for Historical and Contemporary Studies
Södertörn University, Stockholm
jenny.gunnarsson.payne@sh.se

ABSTRACT
This essay discusses Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cahadia's intervention concerning the relationship between populism and feminism, agreeing with the authors that the articulation of progressive populism and anti-essentialist feminism is necessary. The most pressing related issues, it argues, are i) the book's seeming understanding of feminism as *necessarily* being a 'smaller', perhaps even more particularistic, movement than populism; ii) its strong emphasis on the ontological necessity of one leader; a question which the essay argues is an ontic/empirical one, as well as one which might be one of the most serious obstacles for a successful articulation of the populism and feminism, and; iii) that the book's proposal of a 'ruptural institutionalism' offers a promising route for further political and theoretical investigation, which might help feminism to steer an alternative route between current hegemonic (neoliberal) feminist articulations on the one hand, and neoconservative opposition to 'gender' on the other.

KEYWORDS
Populism, feminism, anti-genderism, neoliberalism

I have approached my reading of Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cahadia's thought-provoking and skillfully argued *Seven Essays on Populism* (2021) not as an opportunity to 'review', but as an invitation to think together. The discussions raised by Biglieri and Cahadia and their attempt to grasp what from their perspective can be universalisable (xxiii), speaks to many of our shared political commitments, and their contribution in this book far exceeds the issues I will be able to cover within the bounds of this brief text.[1]

---

[1] As the authors position themselves as women, academics, Latin Americans and "political militants traversed by the various antagonisms that, between populism and neoliberalism, have emerged and continue to exist in our region", it makes sense for me to 'position' myself too. Speaking from Scandinavia (Sweden, to be specific) committed to popular feminism, an economic equality which simply cannot be achieved in today's system of global capitalism, a democracy which does justice to its proud name, sexual, reproductive and intimate freedoms, anti-racism, a transformed relationship between humans and other species, as well as to the urgent need to restructure human co-existence for true climate sustainability means that the world that we live in is a daunting place. Adding to this

With this limitation in mind, this commentary shall focus specifically on what I see as a key question for political strategy of our times, namely that of articulating progressive inclusionary populism and feminism. Like the authors, I am convinced that an articulation of such populism and feminism constitutes the most promising route to build more equal, democratic and sustainable societies. Agreeing with Chantal Mouffe (2018), from the position where I stand (Europe, Sweden), I think it is blatantly clear that the 'diagnosis' that she has made of Western Europe is correct, and, that her analysis is valid also more globally. What had, at least not yet, become as clear when her book *For a Left Populism* was published was just how central issues of sex/gender, sexuality and reproduction would become for the 'populist moment' she there describes (see Gunnarsson Payne, 2019). Since its publication, however, an increasing number of, especially feminist, scholars have paid the issue more attention (e.g. Barros and Martinéz, 2020; Biglieri, 2020; Graff and Korolczuk, 2021), and I welcome Biglieri and Cahadia's innovative intervention in this ongoing debate, which I hope will continue and develop even further in the years to come.

To this end, I shall here discuss a few related issues that concern the theorisation of populism and feminism; some of which I think have been overlooked within post-Marxist populism theory more generally and which I hope will make their way into the field, and others which are more specific to Biglieri and Cahadia's approach, and which I think require some clarification.

I will begin with arguing for the necessity of feminism's de-totalising impulse when it comes to both historical and contemporary attempts to constitute a people-as-one, as issues of sex/gender, sexuality and reproduction are at the very core of these. In short, I therefore believe that this de-totalising impulse is absolutely central for the construction of a people which is both multiple and (agonistically) divided. (This is not to say that *all* feminisms serve this function, but I shall return to this later.) Thereafter, I will discuss the extent to which contemporary feminism already follows a populist logic, first emphasising the articulatory logic of contemporary feminist mass-movements in Europe and Latin America, and second in relation to (part of) the movement's long tradition of horizontal organisation, including its uneasy relation to the idea of the One Leader. Third, I will, based on experiences from hegemonic Swedish 'state feminism'[2] and with inspiration from the authors' proposal of *ruptural institutionality* argue that this idea might be a way forward for beginning to re-think feminist institutionalism in the context of a welfare state. In doing

that, just by committing to these causes as an academic means that I pretty much tick all the boxes for the enemy picture being painted by what in common academic vernacular is referred to as rightwing populism, in a way that I only a few years ago could not have even imagined.

[2] Since the first version of this article was written, the hegemonic position of 'Swedish state feminism' has become increasingly challenged, also among people in governing positions. At the time that this article is published, the long-term consequences remain to be seen.

so, I shall pose a set of questions concerning the compatibility – or not – between feminism and the kind of populism that the authors propose.

REPRODUCING THE PEOPLE-AS-ONE: ANTI-GENDERISM, NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DOUBLE-BIND OF FEMINISM

As both I and others have previously argued, a wide range of rightwing political parties, movements and leaders have come to formulate their exclusionary notion of 'the people' not just around ideas of the nation, but also increasingly around a heteronormative and essentialist understanding of 'the traditional family', considering it the very bedrock of Christian and/or Western civilisation. Indeed, this development has made many of us talk about 'a happy marriage' between rightwing populism (or what the authors simply call fascism) and anti-gender movements, a 'marriage' which manifests itself in the shape of concrete alliances between Christian ultraconservative organisations and exclusionary nationalist rightwing political parties, in the form of political proposals such as restrictive abortion legislation, the infamous 'Don't Say Gay bill', the demonisation and defamation of Gender Studies, or the rhetoric that gender mainstreaming is nothing less than a worldwide conspiracy by a global elite (Gunnarsson Payne and Korolczuk, 2021).

As I have argued with Maria Brock (2023) 'although there is no *intrinsic* compatibility between the two political projects, their formal similarities have eased their mutual articulation'. These formal similarities consist of the division of the social field into two antagonistic camps, and the construction of an underdog (a people) and an oppressive regime (an elite) – here conflating an exclusionary notion of a national people with an idea of 'common people' consisting of 'traditional' heterosexual families with their 'own' biological children. The political promise they offer is to restore national sovereignty and autonomy of 'normal families', as against a powerful and corrupt global elite, consisting of foreign influences, such as immigrants, 'imported' feminist and queer ideologies, supra-national organisations, and transnational corporations. Their internal logic can easily be recognised from other exclusionary movements, insofar as they are mobilising 'their power by creating specific fantasies about threats to the nation and that they as a result have put themselves forward as the protectors of 'what is in us more than ourselves', that is, that which makes us part of a nation' (Salecl, 1992: 52; see also Gunnarsson Payne, 2019). The 'happy marriage' between these exclusionary nationalist populist projects and anti-gender politics – their 'opportunistic synergy' to speak with Graff and Korolczuk (2021) – furthermore consists in the fact that the latter offers further 'substance' to the former's construction of 'the people', and, importantly, offers an effective 'psychic tool' for the creation of a people-as-one.

Their mobilisation for 'traditional family values', I argue, is indeed a central component of it, as it "creates powerful fantasies about not only 'the good citizen' but

also about the '*potential enemy in every individual*' leaving every individual 'exposed to the pressures of the fantasmatic agency which 'sees and knows all'' (Salecl, 1992: 50). As I have argued elsewhere, these fantasies are especially effective for the creation of a totalising people-as-one, because they speak 'directly to commonly felt 'forbidden desires', making them 'particularly prone for triggering the politically potent feelings of fear (for the Other) and guilt and shame (for one's own forbidden desires and 'dirty deeds') in the individual' (Gunnarsson Payne, 2019; see also Gunnarsson Payne and Brock, 2023). This relates closely to Biglieri and Cahadia's formulation that in 'fascism, the 'self' can only exist, on the one hand, through its negation and rejection of the other, and, on the other hand as something previously given' (130). In this way, as I understand it, the 'work of the self' that they speak of, where 'what is opposed is the other to be destroyed' (130) serves the double function of destroying both (imagined) 'external' others, *and* the (imagined) 'internal' other (manifested in forbidden fantasies, desires and 'dirty deeds'). The relation of property of self and others that the authors write about, thereby, paradoxically leads to a destructive domination of not 'just' the 'other', but also of the parts of the 'self' which must be eliminated (but will only ever be repressed). The compatibility and psychic 'grip' of anti-gender politics and what the authors call fascism (and many others refer to as rightwing populism) are further enhanced by this 'under-the-skin-politics' in which the articulation of race, ethnicity, kinship, reproduction and sexuality function to create a very specific version of the-people-as-one.

How, then, has anti-genderism come to function so well rhetorically for the creation of an anti-establishment narrative? Would its repressive nature not be hard to convincingly combine with the rhetoric of the 'underdog'? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that policies for gender equality and sexual diversity since the 1990s has become implemented through post-political measures and thereby become articulated in a neoliberal discourse. In a time when gender equality ideals and tolerance of sexual diversity is implemented via gender mainstreaming by (some) states and supra-national organisations such as the European Union and United Nations, and promoted by transnational corporations via advertisements and social corporate responsibility projects (Gunnarsson Payne and Tornhill, 2021; see also Tornhill, 2019), gender equality and sexual diversity have become easy targets for conservative forces that are using anti-establishment rhetoric and claiming to be the voice of 'the people' as against a global elite. Moreover, as gender equality and sexual diversity are implemented in a post-political way, they not only lose their truly emancipatory potential but they become part of neoliberalism's totalising logics where gender equality becomes reduced to productivity and availability to the job market and sexual diversity to pink-washed marketing strategies. As Tornhill and I (2021) have argued, this situation has placed contemporary progressive feminist and LGBTQ+-struggles in a double-bind, with conservative anti-gender politics looming

on one side, and washed out 'lean in' feminism and pink-washed economics on the other.

In this context, feminism and LGBTQ+-movements need to acknowledge the totalising logics of *both* anti-gender conservatism *and* neoliberal capitalism and function as a de-totalising counter-hegemonic alternative to both. Also here, it is easy to agree with the authors that a 'feminism of the 99%' is necessary to take on this task. In this context, I argue that the impressive feminist intersectional and transversal mobilisation which exploded with *Ni Una Menos* (Not One Less) in Argentina and *Czarne Protesty* (Black Protests) in Poland as well as similarly inclined mass-mobilisations such as *The Women's March* and *Black Lives Matter* (emanating from the US) offer the most promising alternatives of our time. With the risk of simplifying these diverse movements, I still think it is safe to say that a mutual challenge for them and for progressive populism concerns how to keep their radical and de-totalising momentum, while finding strategies to build hegemony (see also Biglieri, 2020).[3]

ARTICULATORY FEMINISM = POPULIST FEMINISM?

Biglieri and Cahadia clearly state that an anti-essentialist understanding of the subject is a necessary pre-condition, and this too is easy to agree with. At a first glance, one might say the same about the statement that 'feminism has to be part of something bigger, and even broader political project' (Fraser, 2018: xii), but this statement also raises questions with which feminists of different political inclinations have struggled since the movement's very inception. The first question relates to 'whom' should be included as the subject of feminism, and concerns both internal critique of the movement's own exclusionary mechanisms, for instance for refusing to include or acknowledge specific demands from e.g. Black women, working class women, lesbians, and trans-people. These internal critiques and conflicts have historically been, and continue to be, central for the possibility of expanding the chain of equivalence with demands to be included under the name of Feminism (or other empty signifiers, such as Sisterhood[4]).

Considering the fact that large strands of the movement today have adopted an intersectional and transversal approach, and includes demands of not only these groups, but also articulate feminism with indigenous struggles, climate activism, demands for a secular state, and economic equality – then it is relevant to ask: How big would be big enough *not* to need to become part of something 'even bigger'?

---

[3] As the emergence of this wave of mass-feminism is rather recent, there is still little scholarly work done on their potential influence over and entry into parliamentary politics. An ongoing PhD-project by Aleksandra Reczuch is, however, currently investigating this in the Polish context.

[4] For a more detailed discussion on feminist articulatory practices and the empty signifier of Sisterhood, see Gunnarsson Payne, 2012.

To be clear: I agree that following Laclau (2005) we cannot *assume* that feminism is *the* privileged struggle, but it is of equal importance not to theorise its articulation with populism in a way that reduces it to a kind of particularistic movement which it not necessarily is. Indeed, in many ways, contemporary intersectional and transversal struggles already offer 'something bigger', and already to a large extent follow a populist logic (as previously mentioned, not all feminist practices follow this logic, but here I will focus on those doing so.)

The call for feminism to join forces with something 'even bigger' also, at worst, reminds us of previous similar debates, such as that discussed in Heidi Hartmann's (1979) long-lived text 'The unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism: Towards a more progressive union', in which she described the relationship between Marxism and feminism as one 'like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is marxism'. Criticising previous attempts to unite them for seeking to subsume feminism under the more privileged and 'more important' struggle against capital, she drew the conclusion that: 'To continue our simile further, either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce' (1979: 1). Knowing full well from Laclau that articulation does not equal subsumption, such historical examples might still serve as important fingers of warning that those making claims to represent the 'something bigger' will necessarily need to consider. In other words, the mutual articulation of struggles need to be just that – mutual – and in the current situation, it is necessary to self-critically ask: Is it really the case that populism automatically *is* this 'something bigger' – or may we not say that in some contexts the proportions may be reversed? I am aware that this question might be provocative, and it is deliberately so. To push this question a bit further, it may be helpful to look at a couple of empirical examples from the aforementioned feminist movements.

As I have discussed elsewhere, empirical examples from the Polish movement show that the demand for legal and safe abortion in the middle of the 2010s swiftly expanded from abortion to larger issues of democracy and against the oppressive regime, as the movement presented a list of postulates including, among other things, 'free and available sexual education, restoration of democratic procedures and a secular state'. They described abortion as the mere 'tip of an iceberg' and announcing that 'there is a lot to do in Poland in order to build a truly equal and democratic civil society' (Gunnarsson Payne, 2020: 13). A very similar document of demands was created by the Argentinean movement in preparations for the 8 March International Women's Strike in 2017, as cited by Malena Nijensohn (2020):

> 1. We strike because we are part of a collective and international history [...] . 2. We strike because we make visible the map of labor in feminist terms [...]. 3. We strike because we demand legal, safe, and free abortion [...]. 4. We strike to defend our sexual and gender dissidences [...]. 5. We strike to say enough violence [...]. 6. We strike to pronounce that the State is responsible [...]. 7. We strike because we demand

a secular state [...]. 8. We strike, and we construct the women's movement as a political subject [...]. (Ni Una Menos in: Nijensohn, 2022: 10).

Indeed, a number of Argentinean scholars, including Biglieri herself, has shown the same expansive tendency of not least Ni Una Menos and the subsequent 'green wave', but also of earlier feminist mobilisations in Latin America (Barros and Martínez, 2020; Biglieri, 2020; Di Marco, 2020; Gago, 2020; López, 2020; Nijensohn, 2022). A particularly interesting aspect of the empirical work done on this is that it shows on an ontic level *how* articulations take place agonistically 'on the ground', offering us very clear examples of how articulatory processes are not necessarily smooth and easy, and how they may require both conflict and renegotiation.

In another telling example from Nijensohn's work, she discusses for instance how the National Encounter of Women between 2016 and 2018 renegotiated their approach to the issue of sex work, so as to include sex workers despite the presence of anti-prostitution activists in the movement, here quoted at length to capture the complexity of the negotiation:

> One of the most heated debates in the assemblies for 8M 2017 concerned sex work. Sex workers had already participated in the assemblies for June 3 and October 19, 2016. On the first of these occasions, they suggested that the slogan "Ni Una Menos" should be extended to encompass other types of violence against women beyond femicide, such as violence against sex workers. During the strike, their participation had been very active, as they were the ones who introduced the discursivity of the alternative ways in which people could strike, posing the idea of the "sexual strike". In addition, in the National Encounter of Women 2016, the workshops discussing sex work were re-opened after ten years and were full, with more than 700 participants. It was in these circumstances, in which sex work was visibilized, that in assemblies for 8M 2017, there was a strong attack from anti-prostitution feminists. They did not acknowledge sex work as work and therefore did not want the demands of sex workers to be included in the document. At that moment, sex workers had two struggles: one for labor rights and another for institutional violence. Although they understood that the debate regarding sex work was not resolved, they demanded recognition as part of the feminist movement. After three meetings of intense debates and discussions centered only on the question of sex work, in the last assembly before the strike, the importance of including as many demands as possible to shape a diverse, plural, and broad movement was brought to the fore. This allowed the debate on sex work to be left aside and enabled sex workers' voices to be heard; both of their demands were included in the unique document. [...] On the conflict around participation of sex workers, for 8M 2018, a paragraph demanding justice for the femicides of sex workers was included in the document. Although some anti-prostitution campaigners were involved in some following assemblies, they stopped attacking sex workers and started focusing on the system of prostitution (Nijensohn, 2022: 142-143).

In an example from María Pia López's recent book *Not One Less – Mourning, Disobedience and Desire*, we learn how the slogan of the International Women's Strike in 2018 'We are all workers' encompassed *all* workers, thereby expanding and re-signifying the very meaning of work:

> whether at the machine in the factory or sewing at home, in a neighborhood organization or in the family kitchen, in the classroom or behind the wheel of a truck, caring for other people or writing about them. To strike is a diverse, multiple interruption. Its modes are as diverse as the female workers. The key notion of socialist struggles, "equal pay for equal work," is insufficient. Beyond equivalence, *we must demand the recognition of all productive and reproductive work.* (López, 2020: 49)

Though framed as a 'women's issue', this formulation, at least when articulated with anti-essentialist understanding of 'women' and an intersectional expansive approach, already represents 'something bigger' than the name and some of its slogans at first thought might do justice. Hence, while I fully agree that feminist struggles have the most potential to achieve social and political change when articulated with a broad political project, its already thoroughgoing potential for radical transformation for the 99% ought not to be underestimated.

Feminist issues such as abortion, femicide, sexualised violence, rape culture or sexual harassment have acted as 'starting shots' for mass-mobilisation, neither because they are new problems nor because feminists have not previously protested against them. Rather, in addition to being defining and often life-threatening issues to which many can relate personally and others can easily sign up against, these movements (and others around the world) have managed to effectively 'frame', narrate, and symbolise experiences of frustration, and even despair, already present the lives of *many*, in a way which could not be captured within hegemonic discourses (see Laclau, 2005: 26).

FEMINIST REJECTIONS OF THE IDEA OF THE LEADER

From what I have discussed so far, we can conclude that this kind of feminism to a great extent follows almost precisely the populist logic described by the authors, except for the final point – the necessary emergence of a leader. It is this final point that I believe is the biggest obstacle for a 'happy marriage' between current intersectional and transversal feminist mobilisation and the authors' definition of populism – and one, which I, unlike the authors, consider to be empirical rather than ontological.

Following Laclau (2005), according to Biglieri and Cahadia populist mobilisation necessarily i) begins with an experience of a lack, which is shared by many; continues with ii) the inscription of this lack in terms of a demand (like in the case of Argentina '¡Ni Una Menos!'); iii) the primacy of the logic of equivalence over the logic of difference, and the creation of a collective political subjectivity (a feminist 'people'); iv) the antagonistic division of the social space into two antagonistic camps ('the feminist people' against 'capitalist heteropatriarchy', and, finally; v) the emergence of a leader for that collectivity (2021: 16).

Even though feminism, neither historically nor in the present, has been devoid of leaders and leader figures, some strands of it are highly skeptical, or even outright critical, of the very idea of attaching their struggle to One Leader. While feminist movements have often both had *de facto* and symbolic leaders who have served as surfaces of inscription, autonomist traditions have indeed played a part in promoting, experimenting with, and not least *identifying with* 'leaderlessness'.

This can, of course, take more forms than is possible to discuss in this brief text, but a quote from the document entitled 'Rules and responsibility in a leaderless feminist revolutionary group' in 1969 serves as an example of how the very idea of a leader has often been associated with the very patriarchal structures which the movements has sought to dismantle, and have even been described as inherently exploitative: "Since there are no leaders or officers, *nor are these considered desirable as they involve exploitation,* it is necessary that all members develop equally and to the extent that leadership in other groups would require" (Kearon, 1969). The idea of leaderless and structureless groups have often been seen as an antidote to patriarchal modes of organisation (including within the left) but were also sometimes criticised for being not only ineffective but also for their propensity to obscure existing power structures within the movement (see e.g. Freeman, 1972: 152).

More recently, it has been said that leadership is no longer a 'dirty word' within feminism, not least since the so-called third wave of feminism, in which leadership has been reformulated as something which 'stems from women's real lives and recognises expertise as a product of experience', defining leadership as an activity which works in a similar manner to the consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s and 70s 'except that all individuals who call themselves feminists become leaders, moving from leaderless activism to an activism where everyone can play a role in leadership' (Sowards and Renegar, 2006: 62).

And even though Biglieri and Cahadia explain (via Freud and Laclau) that populist leadership in their definition is quite different from the oppressive patriarchal type shunned by many feminists, it is unlikely to be easily articulated with many feminists' strong belief in either leaderlessness or more horizontal and multiple understandings of leadership. This, in turn, is also related to both the fact that feminism is not, and has never been 'just' one movement, but rather is constituted and continuously reinvigorated by differences and conflicts; and that in this very process new (often informal) leader figures are produced, representing different and sometimes opposing feminist strands. These strands tend to co-exist, often in conflict, and these very conflicts are often what drives the movement forward.

The libidinal bonds described by Biglieri and Cahadia via Freud and Laclau is theoretically compelling in its emphasis that the relation with the leader 'is not one of being in love or idealization, but also one of *identification*' and therefore 'the link with the leader is also endowed with the same type of libidinal bond that operates between *peers,* i.e. other group members' (85). Compelling as it may be, the

problem with this model is, as I see it, that its *ontological* status can be questioned; the question of whether the members of a group needs to be held together by the attachment to one embodied leader, or whether the libidinal tie can be formed around the shared attachment to an idea, or a cause, is, I believe rather of ontic-empirical nature. Consider, for instance, the affective investment on a horizontal level are *not* mobilised via a mutual and shared bond with a leader, but rather through a shared attachment to a movement which rejects the very idea of the One Leader: may then not such a shared attachment still have potential to hold a group together? May not this depend on towards 'what', rather than towards 'whom' libidinal bonds are formed? And if so, can representations of these demands not be made by more bodies than one?

BEYOND LOGIC-OF-DIFFERENCE-FEMINISM: RUPTURAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE

Even if Biglieri and Cahadia do not explicitly link their argument on populism and institutions specifically to feminism, from the geopolitical position from which I write – Sweden, a country where it is possible to talk about 'state feminism' since many years – I found their ideas here highly relevant for potentially re-thinking what a populist feminism could look like in the context of a welfare state.

In a country such as Sweden, for example, gender equality reforms have mainly occurred through a significant number of feminist and, in recent years, LGBTQ+ demands being selectively met by the state. Importantly, many of these feminist reforms have focused on easing the possibilities for women to combine work and family, and to become financially independent from a partner or spouse – and thereby to become available as workforce, albeit in a strongly gender segregated job market (where typical women's professions are paid less). The royal road to gender equality, in other words, has to a great extent been seen as wage labour (and provisions such as decent parental leave pay is tied to this). In a similar manner, lesbian, gay and transgendered citizens now have access to marriage equality and reproductive healthcare (including subsidised medically assisted reproduction) making it possible to create same-sex nuclear families, as long as they do not stray too far away from the couple-norm and bilineal kinship constellations.

There is no denying that these policies, which in brief have been gradually implemented through a logic of difference (through the absorption of individual feminist and LGBTQ+ demands), have led to many highly cherished real-life improvements for women and LGBTQ+ people, especially with regards to sexual and reproductive rights and family law. Yet these policies tend to disproportionally benefit the middle classes with stable employment and 9-5 jobs, not least as daycare in general more or less follows office hours, and parental leave and compensation to stay home with an ill child, is tied to previous or present income. Queer ways of living

together outside of the homonormative coupledom (with or without children) are not receiving the same protection as twosome 'respectable' marriage or cohabitation – and as some of these provisions depend on citizen and/or residency status, yet more people fall outside of the welfare safety net. Therefore, the current incorporation of some feminist and LGBTQ+ demands into the neoliberal welfare state, may effectively be an explanation for the absence of the same kind of broad popular feminist movements as we have seen in Argentina, Poland and elsewhere. Instead, when threatened by anti-gender mobilisation, the loyalty among its opponents to existing gender equality and sexual diversity policies is likely to remain or even be strengthened.

These provisions and this 'tolerance' have indeed already led to a widely spread loyalty to Swedish gender equality and 'LGBTQ+-friendly' policies, and they have become a central part of national identity, to the extent that they have become a component of the country's nation branding. Political leaders of parties to both the left and the right call themselves feminist, and state authorities (including the Army and the Police) are participating in the annual Stockholm Pride march. In a country in which the establishment, at least on paper, are committed to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights for those who live up to certain norms of respectability and productivity, these issues are effectively 'de-politicised' – leaving the playing field open for 're-politicisation' by conservative and exclusionary political projects, for which demands for gender equality, reproductive rights and sexual diversity are being articulated with 'the elite', as against 'normal' and 'common people' (see also Gunnarsson Payne and Tornhill, 2021).

In this context, Biglieri and Cahadia's idea of *ruptural institutionality* offers an interesting opening for re-thinking an alternative to neoliberal and post-political state feminism, which have tended to articulate gender equality and sexual diversity in ways which obscure the conflict between 'those on the top' and 'the underdogs'. The state has positioned itself as the homonationalist and femonationalist protector of 'respectable' same-sex couples with or without children, and middle-class working women – while the precariously employed, those whose work does not lead to self-realisation and secure pensions, those being denied citizenship and residency due to increasingly restrictive migration policy, sexual 'deviants', and immigrant women who are not defined as properly 'integrated' (read: assimilated) into Swedish society as their 'too many children' are seen as preventing them from entering the job market. As I hope that this list of examples has clarified, current hegemonic ideas of gender equality and sexual diversity, through granting welfare and legal protection to many women and non-heterosexual citizens, simultaneously serve a disciplining function, as they are being conditioned to a great extent to 'respectability' and 'productivity'. What we see here is a tendency that much resembles that of the authors (via Bertomeu and Doménech) insofar as the 'alleged universalizability of republican freedom [is] deceptive, since only those whose material conditions of

existence are guaranteed [are] able to enjoy it' (70). Absorbing feminist and LGBTQ+ demands differentially, in other words, has hitherto allowed the Swedish state to absorb them and put them to use for productivity and discipline while at the same time keeping the fantasy of Sweden as the epitome of gender equality and tolerance intact.

A populist feminism in this context, then, would need to dare challenging the exclusionary and disciplining mechanisms of current gender equality and LGBTQ+-friendly policy and legislation, and find ways to include and represent those excluded from it in institutional settings. Although the ontic question of the 'how' – what would such institutional structures and procedures look like? – remains, it opens up for beginning to think feminism in the context of a welfare state, beyond either loyalty or the oft-repeated Foucauldian critiques that (for good reasons) have been aimed at it.

TOWARDS A 'HAPPY MARRIAGE' BETWEEN FEMINISM AND POPULISM?

Biglieri and Cahadia's book offers a brave and much welcome contribution to the theorisation of populism. The topic is highly timely, and considering current global and national problems of increasing exclusionary rightwing nationalism, geopolitical polarisation and a raging climate crisis which necessarily hits already vulnerable people the hardest, their contribution on how to radicalise politics is not likely to become obsolete anytime soon. For populism to be part of the solution, I am convinced that its thorough engagement with intersectional transversal feminism is essential, and I believe this to be the case both theoretically and politically. Biglieri and Cahadina's intervention in this regard is both thought-provoking and original, and I hope it will spur further discussion in both fields.

In many ways, the feminist mass-movements which we have seen emerging in both Latin America and Europe in recent years are testament to their compatibility with progressive populism. Feminism's expansive articulatory logic is not new: this is precisely how anti-essentialist, intersectional and transversal versions of it have developed over time (and I agree with the authors that Laclau's theory captures this more adequately than Gago's). The division of the social field into two antagonistic camps with a 'feminist underdog' against a 'heteropatriarchal elite' also has a long history within the movement, even if some feminists resist *naming* it an 'enemy'. And, even though its relationship to leaders and leadership is far more fraught than the one described in the author's definition of populism, the movement is neither devoid of *de facto* leaders nor of historical and living persons who have come to serve as surfaces of inscription for feminist struggles. At the same time, feminism is an unruly movement with internal agonistic and antagonistic conflicts which makes it highly unlikely that it will ever be possible to unite it under *one* leader. This, I

think, would be one of the greatest obstacles for the authors' proposed articulation between the two, and I am not convinced that this criterion is either essential or even necessarily desirable.

Moreover, I think that the attempt to articulate feminism and populism would need to be even more thoroughgoing – and perhaps more importantly, more open-ended – than the one proposed by Biglieri and Cahadia. The proposal to articulate care and antagonism is highly relevant, and indeed reflects much of what has been theorised and practiced by feminists for a long time, like for example in the Wages for housework campaign of the 1970s, and Social Reproduction Theory (see e.g. Bhattacharya, 2017). Without paying careful attention to these and other political actions and feminist theories, and recognizing the possibility that these contributions may actually reveal shortcomings of, and point out new directions for, populism, I believe that feminists may sooner or later end up echoing Hartmann (1979) and demand a healthier relationship or threaten with divorce (or never accept the proposal to marry in the first place). This is *not* to say that I do not appreciate the book's attempt to theoretically articulate the two, but rather, that I think that there are good reasons to further expand this theoretical discussion in the future, so as to include more thought from the vast body of feminist writing and open-endedly explore what this can bring to the table.

For as necessary as I think that progressive populism is to tackle the multiple crises of our time and offer a forceful alternative to exclusionary rightwing nationalism on the one hand, and neoliberal capitalism on the other, I think populism cannot afford *not* to learn from feminism's continuous de-totalising efforts. Indeed, what the authors call feminism's 'insistence that the reified distinction between men and women is the result of the totalizing logic of the masculine' (125) has had transformative effects, both historically and in the present, as it has redefined not only what it means to be a man or a woman (or neither) and who can be considered a citizen or a political subject, but in addition also challenged the very meaning of what it means to be human. Its expansive articulatory logic is a result of these continuous de-totalising efforts – and these, I believe, *are* absolutely necessary in order to create the multiple-and-divided-people that progressive populism requires.

Relatedly, I believe that Biglieri and Cahadia's intervention on *ruptural institutionalism* may be an important key to reinvigorate discussions of institutional feminism, in a way that would better honour precisely its de-totalising efforts, and keep re-activating them, also in context where they have made their way into power. Only so, it will be able to keep its emancipatory promise alive and offer a convincing alternative to the two contemporarily strongest totalising forces, rightwing conservative anti-genderism and neoliberal capitalism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barros, M. and Martinéz, N. (2020) 'Let's not talk about it: Feminism and populism in Argentina', *Baltic Worlds* 13(1): 77-84.

Biglieri, P. (2020) 'Ni Una Menos – not one woman less: How feminism could become a popular struggle', *Baltic Worlds* 13(1): 64-66.

Biglieri, P. and Cahadia, L. (2021) *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bhattacharya, T. (ed.) (2017) *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, London: Pluto Press.

Brock, M. and Gunnarsson Payne, J. (2023) 'That's disgusting!': Shifting politics of affect in right-wing populist mobilisation', in Stagnell, A., Payne, D. and Strandberg, G. (eds.) *Populism and The People in Contemporary Critical Thought: Politics, Philosophy, and Aesthetics*, London: Bloomsbury.

Di Marco, G. (2020) 'The Feminist People. National and Transnational Articulations. The Case of Argentina', *Baltic Worlds* 13(1): 67–76.

Fraser, N. (2018) 'Prólogo', in Fraser, N., Arruzza, C. and Bhattacharya, T., *Un feminismo del 99%*, Madrid: Traficante de Sueños.

Fraser, N., Arruzza, C. and Bhattacharya, T. (2019) *Feminism for the 99%: A Manifesto*, London: Verso.

Freeman, J. (1972) 'The tyranny of structurelessness', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 17: 151–164.

Gago, V. (2020) *Feminist international: How to change everything*, London: Verso.

Graff, A. and Korolczuk, E. (2021) *Anti-gender politics in the populist moment.* London: Taylor & Francis.

Gunnarsson Payne, J. (2012) 'Logics of sisterhood: Intra-feminist debates in Swedish feminist zines', *European Journal of Women's Studies* 19(2): 187-202.

Gunnarsson Payne, J. (2019) 'Challenging 'Gender ideology': (Anti-)gender politics in the populist moment', *The New Pretender*, 10 February 2019. Available: http://new-pretender.com/2019/02/10/challenging-gender-ideology-anti-gender-politics-in-europes-populist-moment-jenny-gunnarsson-payne/ (last accessed: 5 June 2022)

Gunnarsson Payne, J. (2020) 'Women as 'the People': Reflections on the Black Protests as a Counterforce Against Right-Wing and Authoritarian Populism', *Baltic Worlds* 13(1): 6–20.

Gunnarsson Payne, J. and Korolczuk, E. (2021) 'Antigenuspolitik-från globala diskurser till lokala strategier', in Edenborg, E., Tornhill, S. and Åse, C. (eds.) *Feministiska perspektiv på global politik.* Lund: Studenlitteratur.

Gunnarsson Payne, J. and Tornhill, S. (2021) 'The enemy's enemy: feminism at the crossroads of neoliberal co-optation and anti-gender conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*: 1-21. DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2021.1921937

Hartmann, H. (1979) 'The unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism: Towards a more progressive union', *Capital & Class*, 3(2): 1-33.

Laclau, E. (2005) *On populist reason*, London: Verso.

López, M.P. (2020) *Not one less: Mourning, disobedience and desire.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mouffe, C. (2018) *For a left populism,* London: Verso.

Nijensohn, M. (2022) 'Precarity and counter-hegemonic articulation: from the massification of feminisms toward a radical and plural feminism', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 24(1): 133–152.

Salecl, R. (1994) *The spoils of freedom: Psychoanalysis and feminism after the fall of socialism,* London: Routledge.

Sowards, S.K. and Renegar, V.R. (2006) 'Reconceptualizing rhetorical activism in contemporary feminist contexts', *The Howard Journal of Communications* 17(1): 57–74.

POPULISM WITHOUT ADJECTIVES, OR, POLITICS BETWEEN HISTORY AND ONTOLOGY

BRUNO BOSTEELS
Department of Latin American and Iberian Cultures
Institute for Comparative Literature & Society
Columbia University
bb438@columbia.edu

ABSTRACT
Seven Essays on Populism: For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective, written by the duo of Argentine philosophers Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia, is an audacious, lucid, and urgent book. It is also a text traversed by an unresolved tension between two approaches: a first, ontological approach, indebted not only to Martin Heidegger's thinking of ontological difference but also to the mobilisation of this difference in political theory in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Jorge Alemán; and a radically different, historical or conjunctural approach, for which the authors find inspiration in the evidential or indexical paradigm of Carlo Ginzburg. This review discusses the advantages and shortcomings of these two approaches, reading Biglieri and Cadahia's book, as it were, against itself.

KEYWORDS
Populism, ontology, post-foundationalism, evidential paradigm

Seven Essays on Populism: For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective, written by the duo of Argentine philosophers Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia, is an audacious, lucid, and urgent book. Its audacity depends on the clarity of its proposals and the force of the conviction with which the authors commit themselves to their ideas. Its lucidity, which is palpable on every page, is the result of an effort in conceptual clarification that in my eyes is unparalleled in contemporary political theory. And its urgency, which is equally clear, speaks to us about the need to imagine an alternative to the nightmare that we are currently living on a global scale with the resurgence of the extreme right, the climate crisis, and the general collapse of the people's trust in our democratic institutions.

The book avoids the facile jargon of today's theoretical consensus. It is committed to explaining the reasons for a militant practice nourished by the ideas of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Jorge Alemán, but also by the living struggles of 'actually existing politics', above all in Latin America as an alternative site from where to produce theory, different from the European perspective of critics of populism such as Mauricio Lazzarato, Eric Fassin or Slavoj Žižek. As the authors explain from the very start of their introduction, 'this book is an avowedly militant one in which we embrace our political position as a way of taking responsibility for our own subjective involvement' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: xxii). In this sense, we are in the presence of a rigorously honest book.

At the heart of the book sits an obscure secret: the secret of the power of the people, or of the plebs. As Biglieri and Cadahia explain in the first essay, this power constitutes the secret nucleus of all politics, or even of the political, since it is impossible to think the political without putting into play the power of antagonism at a collective level. Now, contrary to the arguments of someone like Mouffe, the authors do not believe in the conceptual usefulness of the opposition between right-wing and left-wing populisms. It is precisely due to the confusion between these two categories that critics like Žižek reject the emancipatory nature of populism and instead prefer to label it fascist, racist, or xenophobic in principle. For Biglieri and Cadahia, on the contrary, it would be better to reserve the name 'populism', without attributes, for the collective and constitutively emancipatory dimension of the power of the people, whereas the identitarian, reactionary, sexist, and racist forms of populism, which are ubiquitous today from Brazil to the United States, would be better treated as neoliberal versions of fascism. As the authors write in the second essay: 'Let's just say 'populism' as a synonym for left-wing populisms or inclusionary populisms without having to apologize, without having to clarify with adjectives. We will leave the rest for neofascism or post-fascism' (40).

A major part of the book's argument revolves around what the authors call the 'ontological dimension' of populism, for which they adopt a point of view that Laclau had inaugurated in the chapter 'Towards a Theory of Populism' in his *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (Laclau, 1977), and culminating in the great summary that is his last book, *On Populist Reason*, which intends 'to grant populism the dignity of a theory and to turn it into a political ontology for theorizing political articulations in general' (Biglieri and Cadahia, 2021: 5). In this sense, the authors distinguish three levels or three points of view on the subject of populism: the mediatic (generally pejorative), the empirical (or the historiography of concrete cases), and the ontological (or the theory of the political based on the being of the social as constitutive lack). It is on this third and last level that the authors situate the originality of their proposal:

> Now, it is within the third line of enquiry – the constitutive dimension of the political –
> that the pejorative interpretation of populism begins to be undermined and the founda-
> tions will be laid to think about its ontological dimension, i.e. to what extent populism
> becomes a logic constitutive of the political itself – not a deviation from it – and how this
> logic articulates material forms of social being. (11)

The authors do not want to limit themselves to studying 'populism as a merely con-
junctural strategy', but instead they agree with Laclau, insofar as 'the importance of his
work on populism can be summarized in how he managed to grant populism the status
of a political category in its own right' (13-14).

To continue the debate that is their book, this is where I would like to introduce a
first series of questions for my two friends: Where does this need come from to give
populism a theoretical and ontological 'status' in its own right? Why does populism
acquire the 'dignity' of the concept only through an ontology of the political? What is,
finally, ontology, if not, as I will try to show with the words of the authors themselves, a
partial sedimentation of the history of a long series of existing politics?

To understand the problem, it is useful to go back to a forceful statement in the
book's first chapter:

> It is feasible to say that a particular political articulation can be disarticulated, a specific
> people and its leader can be defeated politically, but populism as an ontology of the po-
> litical is ineradicable. That is, in an ontic sense, and as an articulation linked to a specific
> form of political expression in a specific context, populism can come to an end, but, in a
> fundamental sense, linked to the very ontology of the political, populism is simply elimin-
> inable (17).

This use of the ontico-ontological difference based on Martin Heidegger's thinking,
which will have been familiar to readers of Laclau and several of his disciples such as
Oliver Marchart, appears to me to be profoundly problematic – even, I must confess,
contrary to my own principles and convictions. Therefore, I find myself in a paradoxi-
cal situation as a reader: politically, I am in complete agreement on nearly every point
with the authors; but theoretically or philosophically, I am a bit perplexed, because I
cannot bring myself to endorse the argument about the need to project the debate onto
the level of an ontology of the political.

I fully understand the reasoning behind this argument, which the authors make ex-
plicit throughout their book. They wish to give populism the dignity of an ontological
concept to save it from its detractors, by discussing as equals with their European coun-
terparts. The defense of populism as such, without the need to add any adjectives or
attributes to convince its European critics, in this sense requires an ontological outlook.
Conversely, only an ontology of the political will allow us to salvage populism from its
right-wing or fascist stigmata. This double aim already was part of Laclau's original

project: 'De-stigmatizing populism within the theoretical field means simultaneously transforming the way the ontological dimension of the political is understood' (17). However, as Wendy Brown also suggests in the criticism she formulates in her 'Fore-word' to Biglieri and Cadahia's book, there also exists the risk that by rejecting the tension between right-wing populisms and left-wing populisms we end up with an overly clean theoretical definition of populism, in a kind of continuous stipulation freed of all the dregs of the historical, the conjunctural, or the strategic, that is, a populism purified of everything merely 'ontic', to use the Heideggerian lexicon.

Now what exactly defines the ontological dimension that in this reading would reveal itself in a privileged, if not unique, sense in populism as such, without attributes? In the authors' account, this depends on the recognition of a constitutive lack at the heart of the social, as a lack of being:

> This new way of reading the being of the social helps us understand that the political is nothing more than working through the constitutive negativity of that lack – a way of work-ing on the social through a logic articulating this constitutive lack. What political theories, currents, and traditions cannot tolerate is not the deviation that populism engenders, but the ontological indeterminacy into which it throws us (18-19).

For my part, I believe that this ontological indeterminacy implies a strange formal-ism, no matter how deconstructed or postfoundational the authors make it out to be, in which what is lacking or what functions as an absent cause is precisely the power of the people. But, conversely, this power obtains its dignity only when in its thought in its ontological dimension, defined as constitutive lack or fracture. We find ourselves be-fore a kind of structural ontologisation, or before an ontological type of structuralism, which precisely insofar as it is based on a lack of foundation can also be considered a form of poststructuralism.

This is not just a question of nomenclature. Even if they had accepted to speak of right-wing and left-wing populisms, instead of proposing an opposition between popu-lism as such and neofascism, the authors still would have kept defining the difference between these two positions in terms of the ontological lack on which the political is based: this lack is negated or disavowed in neoliberal fascism and fully recognised only in the populism that they defend in their book. In whatever terminology we adopt to talk about populism as such or emancipatory populism, in its 'ontologised' version of the political, the 'failure' or 'flaw' of really existing politics seem all too easily inverted, as if this were the moment of revelation not of a contingent lack (in a misguided form of concrete politics) but the constitutive lack of the being of politics (the lack that is the void around which the essence of the political is articulated).

Time and again, ontology acquires a heuristic value by being revelatory of (the lack of) a secret, or of an (absence of) essence. In this way, far from constituting an obstacle,

the impossibility likewise may convert itself in a paradoxical condition of possibility. It is almost as if the necessary failure at the heart of the political were to serve as the guarantee of populism's success, at least ontologically speaking:

> Thus, the secret of the constitutive uncertainty and indeterminacy of being that Laclau's populism reveals, and which is symbolized in the heart of the political field, can be read today as the unconfessed inverse of those who needed to declare its death. What many could not bear was precisely the paradoxical nature of political work that populism revealed – namely, the impossibility of the social as a condition of possibility for political praxis, a praxis far removed from rational procedure and normativity and closer to the plebeian forms through which Latin America has built the social from the political. The ontological dimension that Laclau opens up, then, frees us from the stigma associated with the "failed" character of Latin American politics, and offers us the possibility of discovering in that failure not a deviation to correct but an ontological indeterminacy to work through (19).

The effects of such an argument (which the authors share with many other postfoundational political theories) turn out to be doubly problematic. On the one hand, in the passage from the ontic to the ontological, or from politics to the political, the failure or fissure of a concrete politics turns – as if by a magician's trick – into a kind of promising condition of possibility. On the other hand, from the perspective of ontology, any consideration not worthy of being ontologised for this same reason runs the risk of being dismissed as 'merely' political, conjunctural or strategic, since it does not reach deeply enough into the ground or essence of the political. Thus, in the beginning of the second essay, the authors state that 'populism cannot be limited to a mere political strategy, but that it must be understood in its ineradicably ontological dimension' (20). And they immediately add: 'For this reason, in this essay we will explore in greater detail the difficulties of maintaining only the strategic dimension of populism, i.e. all that is lost by subjecting it to a merely conjunctural plane, and even more so when the conjuncture in question responds to a European script' (20, translation modified).

It seems, therefore, that the point of the debate is missed no sooner than it is phrased in terms of a hierarchical difference in which the European scripts, instead of being refuted on their own terms, are relegated to the 'merely' strategic or conjunctural, whereas only an ontological point of view, inspired by Laclau's work from Latin America as its locus of enunciation, would allow us to reach the conceptual 'dignity' of the political. But would it not be more effective to show that the European critics are downright mistaken in their judgments about populism, without having to invoke the hierarchy of the ontic (including the difference between left and right) and the ontological (the logic of the political based in an ineliminable, originary, and absolutely prior antagonism, before all such differences)?

And yet, there are other instances in Biglieri and Cadahia's book where they go in the opposite direction, contrary to the ontologisation as the destigmatisation of populism 'as such' or 'without attributes'. And if a first series of arguments in this regard is still ambiguous in terms of their possible use as self-criticisms, in the final chapters of the book the authors openly choose a plebeian, situated, or 'dirty' approach to politics, which runs counter to their own ontologising tendencies.

As an example of an ambiguous argument that could be read as a self-criticism, in the second essay it is interesting to see how in order to avoid falling in the same trap as intellectuals such as Lazzarato, Fassin or Žižek, who generalise the European situation is if it were the only legitimate way of – pejoratively – interpreting the experience of populism, Biglieri and Cadahia invite us to 'pay attention to how actually existing political struggles work' (28). Such a reading of the struggles in the streets and public squares of Latin America would allow us to move beyond the formal critique of populism, when the Slovenian thinker for example opposes the pure self-relating negativity that *is* the subject as such to the populist displacement of this negativity onto some excluded other: 'Along these lines, Žižek suggests that such an operation would be an externalization of our own self-negativity, since we would be projecting onto the other the fracture or lack that is within ourselves' (27, translation modified). On this topic, the authors formulate an objection to Žižek that we could equally apply to them: 'When Žižek counterposes the figure of self-negativity as something prior to the struggle against an adversary, he is also setting out from a positivized way of theorizing antagonism – namely, our self-negativity' (28, translation modified). Does not the same apply to the authors' own argument, when they articulate a whole ontology of the political based on the prior nucleus of a constitutive, structural, and ineradicable lack at the heart of the social?

We can find confirmation of this ambiguity when we observe how the authors support the notion of a constitutive lack or gap in the case of the work of the Argentine thinker and psychoanalyst Jorge Alemán, when the latter argues that capitalism 'attacks precisely what is proper to the subject – namely, its constitutive flaw, the flaw that functions as the condition of possibility for the subject to exist through it' (32). Once again, moreover, this constitutive flaw, lack or dislocation according to the authors must be interpreted on two different levels or dimensions – the sociohistorical dimension and the structural-ontological one – which should not be confused, even though under neoliberal capitalism they are in fact dangerously close to being flattened out into a single plane: 'While these two dimensions (ontological and socio-historical) appear as mixed, they follow different logics. The first implies an ineliminable dependency, whereas the second is a socio-historical construct susceptible to transformations' (33). Here, the authors seem to be defending an argument from Alemán that they had previously

rejected in the case of Žižek. Based on an ambiguous mixture of elements of Derridean deconstruction (in the case of Laclau and Mouffe) with elements of Lacanian psychoanalysis (in the case of Žižek and Alemán), this argument consists in taking for granted a fundamental distinction between an ontic lack or gap (a flaw that is conjunctural and thus can be overcome) and the ontological lack or gap (a flaw that is structural, constitutive, and therefore ineradicable). Finally, could we not say the same thing about the use of this argument in *Seven Essays on Populism* as what the authors write about Eric Fassin, another European critic of populism, namely, that in their display of an ontology of the constitutive lack of the political there is 'a sort of essentialism and a fixation' (29)?

For my part, I do not think that actual politics need 'the dignity of a theory' or 'the status of a political category in its own right' through an ontology of the political. Terms such as 'dignity' and 'right', moreover, belong in their turn to historically specific and concrete forms of politics. What we should interrogate, rather, is not only where this relatively recent need comes from to give all existing politics the categorial apparatus of an ontology but also to what extent such an ontologisation in the name of radical theory often ends up closing the path toward understanding the actual possibilities of effective practice, which rarely will be up to par with the radical philosophical theory.

As far as the first of these questions is concerned, I would say that political ontology today offers the royal road to a certain philosophy of defeat. To turn the failures from the past into the irrefutable expressions of a constitutive failure or flaw in our very own being allows the defeated to participate in a kind of ontological transfiguration of the status quo. This is what I suggested earlier by talking about the success of failure. And it has a long trajectory in the post-Marxist Left, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall. It finds its most systematic expression in the debates between Judith Butler, Laclau and Žižek, in *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*, a book in which the formulas are legion about the inevitable failure of any representation of the totality, or about the radical impossibility of a complete suture of the social in a transparent society. This unbreakable faith in the necessity of failure or the impossibility of society, not as a defect, a failure, or a shortcoming but as a condition of possibility and even as a promise, also permeates many pages of *Seven Essays on Populism.*

As for the negative effects of this ontologisation for actual politics, I think it is useful to recall a basic question raised first by Gilles Deleuze and soon thereafter by the Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chaui about Baruch Spinoza: Why did this Dutch philosopher decide to give his great treatise of ontology the title of *Ethics*? The reason for this is both simple and persuasive: because questions about being are always questions about ways of acting and being acted upon. The same, however, cannot be said about

the inverse operation. If it is always useful and persuasive to treat ontology under the title of an *Ethics* or a *Politics*, inversely ethical and political questions cannot and should not be reduced to a treatise in *Ontology*. And in many cases the ontologisation of the political, if it clearly serves the philosophers, leads rather to the blocking of concrete processes of politics.

I would even go one step further to state that there is no such thing as an ontology except as the sedimentation of concrete historical and political practices, whose operative categories can become elevated to the abstract dignity of the concept only based on a constitutive forgetting of this prior anchoring in such practices. Due to the distance between the unblemished purity of the concept and the dirty empirical nature of the ontic, this ontologisation always runs the risk of falling in the trap of a certain moralism, which ends up defending a must-be in the name of that which supposedly always already is.

Here we touch upon a sensitive point that has to do with the difference in professional formation of philosophers as opposed to those who, like me, are formed in a strange mixture of literary or cultural criticism and critical theory. However, while both are philosophers of international fame, the authors of *Seven Essays on Populism* also do not rest on their laurels, glorifying the dignity of the concept of the political based on the constitutive lack or gap in the logics of articulation of emancipatory populism. On the contrary, especially in the last chapters of their book, they repeatedly declare themselves opposed to any attempt to purify their conceptual oppositions through a gesture of absolute positivisation that would leave the terms used in a relation of strict exteriority.

In the fourth essay, 'Profaning the Public: The Plebeian Dimension of Republican Populism', they convincingly show that there is no a priori exteriority between the populist interruption or decision, on the one hand, and the consolidation of the republican institutions, on the other: 'As a result, establishing an external relationship between the decision and the institutions a priori does not help us understand the real link between the two' (62). Taken to its ultimate consequences, such an articulation between the moment of disruption (the ruptural or destituent moment) and the moment of institutionality (or the republican moment) also could lead us to reject any relation of sharp exteriority or hierarchical subordination between the ontic and the ontological.

Instead of pursuing this path, however, the authors once more mobilise the ontological difference to defend their argument in favor of a populist or plebeian republicanism:

> Most ontic studies of populism are more interested in determining the "populist content" of particular historical experiences in their political conjunctures than in examining the assumptions on which theories of populism are based. The problem is that this

> approach combines the descriptive and the normative levels in a confused way (Ionescu and Gellner, 1970), attempting to study "concrete" examples of populism in order to determine, on the *level of the given*, a series of characteristics that should be *normatively* applicable to all cases. (63)

I would say that perhaps things become much worse when it is not 'the given' but 'being' that serves as the fundamental presupposition of one's normative framework. The authors also have faith in a fact of absolute authority, except that in their case it is an ontological guarantee: the fact of an incalculable excess within the political character of the institutions. Based on their own arguments, though, they could have come to a radical questioning of this presupposition, too.

Similarly, the authors argue, 'we could say that there exists a tension within studies on republicanism that rests on a bifurcation between a liberal and a popular republicanism' (68); and later they repeat: 'But, above all, there is a clear need to distinguish between two kinds of republic: an oligarchic and aristocratic republic versus a democratic and plebeian one' (70). Now, if in this sense a scholar like Julia Bertomeu is right, so that 'it is difficult to speak of republicanism "plain and simple"' (70, in the original Spanish the authors use the expression '*a secas*'), I think we are justified in wondering why the authors think that in the case of their object of study it is in fact possible to speak about a populism 'plain and simple', without apologies (95, again *a secas* in Spanish). And the same question comes up in relation to the use of attributes to corroborate the fact that, following José Carlos Mariátegui (whose *Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality* obviously receives a homage in the title of the book of our authors), 'in contrast to reactionary or identitarian nationalisms, it is possible to discover affirmative (or national-popular) nationalisms capable of giving shape to a local subject that can contribute to universal emancipation' (91). Why would we not be able to draw the same conclusion about populism 'as such' or 'plain and simple' as what the authors here affirm about republicanism and nationalism?

In the fifth essay from which I just quoted, 'Toward an Internationalist Populism', Biglieri and Cadahia with good reason denounce the illusions of autonomism, technocracy, and liberalism. Their argument in this regard is as clear as it is convincing:

> In all these cases, the same symptom operates: namely, the belief that there is a kind of order beyond the decisional instance – i.e. an order that depends not on the singular corporality of the one making a decision, but on an abstract force operating outside of any singularity (78-79).

After which the authors immediately offer the following detailed explanation as to why such approaches in their eyes are mistaken:

> The problem with these beliefs is that they seem to share the same ontology: the existence of a non-contingent order, an order that exists outside of our here-and-now, so that any singular incarnation – any corporality that takes up that order – does nothing but contaminate it, betray it, and stain the purity of its origin (79).

However, this same belief in the existence of a non-contingent order, an order outside our here and now, is operative in the idea of an absolute ontological presupposition, based on the 'constitutive lack' or 'structural dehiscence' of society (according to Laclau) or of the subject (according to Alemán), which the authors adopt in other parts of their book. Would it not be worth reconsidering the priority of the contingent, the here and now of our singular corporeality, outside of any ontological presupposition that political philosophy would take for granted?

In the sixth essay, 'The Absent Cause of Populist Militancy', the authors provide us with more elements for a critique of political ontology when, quoting their friend and fellow traveler Gloria Perelló, they recall that Laclau and Mouffe 'argued that contingency permeates the real of necessity, and that the latter can no longer be understood as an underlying principle dictating the structuring of social identities' (103). But could we not say the same thing about the thinking of the ontological difference according to Heidegger? The ontic, too, permeates the sphere of ontology, just as the latter can no longer be thought of as a set of underlying principles that would dictate the structure of sociohistorical identities.

The danger with this argument about the contingent articulation of politics around an ontological antagonism or dislocation is that this last presupposition quickly starts to function as an absolute guarantee that contradicts the very premises of the postfoundational theory. If this is what must be avoided at all costs according to the authors, perhaps we should similarly question their dependence on the hierarchies of the ontological difference:

> When we argue that radical contingency implies traversing necessity, we return to the idea that sedimentation never manages to fully domesticate reactivation and, vice versa, that reactivation never means the complete *tabula rasa* elimination of sedimented practices. Every political intervention – no matter how radically innovative – always takes place on an established hegemonic terrain (111).

Precisely at this point of their book, Biglieri and Cadahia begin to hedge closer to an impure theory of actual politics, more attuned to the partial sedimentations of the history of struggles than to its purely ontological postulates:

> When we say that no intervention takes place as a pure act that creates something new and uncontaminated, we are ultimately saying that any irruption of the subject and new subjectivity thereby created intervenes on already partially sedimented terrains. Hence,

> also the tension between its antagonistic power and its limits, because what would it be
> like to intervene politically from a pure and uncontaminated exteriority? (111-112).

And when, following Laclau in *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (1990), the authors add in a note 'we can equate the notions of necessity and sedimentation and argue that the latter is nothing more than an always partial and failed attempt to limit reactivation' (142 n. 7), can we likewise conclude that ontology is nothing more than a series of partial sedimentations of the historical real? Unless we take this to be a purely theoretical discovery, due to the genius of Heidegger or Laclau, one day we will have to explain, for example, why the 'absent cause' has become a key term for defining the postfoundational terrain of politics today, precisely at the time when capitalism appears to be completely dominant across the global landscape.

It is in the seventh and final chapter, 'We Populists are Feminists', where Biglieri and Cadahia no longer participate in the philosophies of defeat that always ends up ontologising the given. On the contrary, instead of finding inspiration (via Laclau or Alemán) in the Heideggerian thinking of the ontico-ontological difference, here they present themselves as the feminist followers of the evidential (or indexical) paradigm of the Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg, insofar as 'he is referring to a conjectural, plebeian knowledge that neither seeks nor offers a finished picture of reality – one based on the sensory experience that sets different planes of what we have come to call the human into motion'; they add: 'But we can also see that there is something plebeian and feminine operating in this form of knowledge, a way of inhabiting not knowing, conjectures, and uncertainty that fosters a series of sensory connections still to be explored in all their radicalism' (119). Personally and methodologically, I find myself much more in agreement with this uncertain, tentative, and conjectural kind of knowledge, bordering upon nonknowledge, than with the certainties of a postfoundational political ontology.

Furthermore, it turns out that this preference is not just a matter of personal taste but corresponds perhaps to an effect of sexual difference, if we understand the masculine and the feminine as ways of positioning oneself with regard to desire and not as fixed identities established once and for all by nature. In fact, in a kind of sexual differentiation to the second degree, these two ways of understanding sexual difference could well be associated with the masculine and the feminine.

> ... one that assumes the existence of two completely separate sexes, as if the identity of
> each sex had its own self-determined existence. Thus, the elimination of one (the mascu-
> line) means the freedom of the other (the feminine). The other view focuses instead on
> the problem of love (between feminine and masculine) and invites us to interrogate the
> classic "masculine" dichotomy of the feminine and the masculine. Or, in other words, it
> helps us understand that it is the masculine locus of enunciation that has tended to create
> a totalizing and biologistic (positivized) separation between the two sexes. (125, translation

modified to keep 'masculine' and 'feminine' instead of 'male' and 'female' where the Spanish has *masculino* and *femenino*)

Is it then a coincidence if the ontological discourse appears in the context of a fairly homogeneous, 'masculine' (or even 'male') frame of reference? Or if in *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* Laclau decides to situate himself firmly on the side of Žižek, to argue in favor of an 'ahistorical', properly ontological kernel of historicity itself, as opposed to the alleged 'historicism' and 'culturalism' that both thinkers attribute to Butler? This is because, due to a kind of structural deformation, the discourse of political ontology only with great difficulty can give itself the luxury of listening to the voice that comes to it from the other – feminine or nonbinary– side of desire:

> From this other side of desire, then, feminine and masculine are not understood as a simple "opposition" – typical of masculine discourse – but as selves contaminated from within by the other of the self, whose perseverance continues to work on and shape the feminine and the masculine on the basis of difference and processes of identification not idealized by the masculine perspective (126).

Once again, this argument could be applied to the contamination between the political categories put into play in *Seven Essays on Populism*. In this sense, I believe that Biglieri and Cadahia's book brings out the secret of a surplus in the social, regardless of its exact name, whether it is called the people, the popular, the plebeian, or still otherwise. This surplus or excess, so often vilified by the elites in power, but also by the organic intellectuals of the status quo, is what is mobilised in populist politics. But in that case, I do not think that we can purify the emancipatory kind of politics as populism 'plain and simple' or 'properly speaking', while reducing the right-wing populisms that are xenophobic, racist, sexist, and transphobic as mere neoliberal 'fascism'. Populism, too, is the terrain of 'a self contaminated from within by the other of itself' (*un sí mismo contaminado desde dentro por lo otro de sí*), as the authors write so eloquently about the 'opposition' between the masculine and the feminine.

Methodologically, we can conclude that a sharp opposition between the ontic and the ontological corresponds to a 'masculine' point of view that we will have to overcome. And we should understand how the categories of political philosophy, far from having to derive their 'dignity' from the discourse of ontology, are always determined by the ontic contents that the theorists seek to think through those categories. Referring to another work written in collaboration, this time between Biglieri and Perelló, we can argue that 'the socio-historical order informs those categories through which we theorize the ontological' and that 'since theoretical categories are produced in a specific socio-historic context, they cannot escape it', that is to say, 'these categories are "contaminated" with ontic content because that is the only way they can be inscribed within the dominant discourse of the time' (126-127). Finally, with these explanations about

the inevitable contamination between the ontic and the ontological, we come back full circle to the issue of the profound honesty of the authors of *Seven Essays on Populism.* Thus, in a long endnote to their final essay, they add an observation that should alert us against any attempt to distance ourselves from the actual struggles in the name of an ontological theory – no matter how sophisticated – of the being of the political:

> Moreover, we would add, sophisticated debates often occur within academia that wind up distancing themselves from the sphere of concrete political struggles, and the terms that these same struggles use to express their discontent and to seek social transformation. [...] this attitude of renouncing certain words can lead to a kind of naïve voluntarism of naming – as if, by naming things differently, we were already creating the new and pushing back oppressive logics – that, paradoxically, reactivates the worst remnants of the omnipotence of theories of consciousness. (146 n. 1).

And promptly they make clear everything that this position, anchored in the contingency of historical struggles and their effective truth, can contribute to a critique of political ontology, based on the purity of being:

> Perhaps the problem lies in believing that the name exhausts our entire identity, and that once we name things differently it is possible to recuperate the purity of one's being. Perhaps the secret of emancipation is not so much about assigning the "correct name" as it is about theoretical movements that support our contaminated and non-totalizing use of words to name the world. (146 n. 1)

In this sense, it matters but little whether we decide to name the thing populism 'plain and simple' or 'left populism', as opposed to 'right-wing populism' or neoliberal 'fascism'. What matters, and therein lies the intellectual force of Paula Biglieri and Luciana Cadahia's book, is to understand the movements of thought that propitiates the contaminated use of our words to name our world in its struggles, its defeats, and occasionally, in its victories as well, such as the ones that we were able to witness in the last few months in Latin America.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Biglieri, P. and Cadahia, L. (2021) Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Laclau, E. (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Revolution of Our TIme, London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2005) On Populist Reason, London: Verso.

OBSTINATE RIGOUR: POPULISM WITHOUT APOLOGIES AUTHORS' REPLY TO CRITICS[1]

LUCIANA CADAHIA
Instituto de Estética
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
luciana.cadahia@gmail.com

PAULA BIGLIERI
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Facultad de Periodismo y Comunicación
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
paulabiglieri@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
In this article we offer a response to each of the authors who participated in the exchange. But instead of responding to each one separately, we decided to organise our writing around three themes. In the first place, we propose an intellectual, militant and biographical description that helps to put the original motivations of our book *Seven Essays on Populism* into context. Secondly, we offer a reflection on the role of ontology in our text, paying special attention to the critiques made by Barros & Martínez Prado, Bosteels and Marchart. Thirdly, we conclude with a deepening of the link between populism and feminism, paying special attention to the lucid observations of Barros & Martínez Prado and Gunnarsson-Payne.

KEYWORDS
Populism, feminism, ontology, antagonism

I.

We would like to begin by discussing how the idea came about to write this book together. It is not especially common to explain the biographical and contextual threads

---

[1] The article, originally written in Spanish, was translated by Camilo Roldán.

that tie together the writing of a book that aims to be theoretical. But we believe, in this case, it is important to do so. Above all else, because the theoretical operation that we attempted in *Seven Essays on Populism* (2021) is completely interwoven with our biographies and with the political situation in our region. For nearly a decade, we had been thinking together in academic, political and militant spaces, and principally from within Colombia and Argentina. As we were writing this book, Argentina was ruled by the government of Mauricio Macri, whose oligarchic project sought to dismantle all of the achievements associated with social justice and human rights while also fostering a political and legal persecution unseen since the last civic-military dictatorship. Among the harshest measures taken by the Macri government, it is worth highlighting the needless acquisition of the most aggressive foreign debt that the IMF has ever designed. If putting an end to the government's policy of borrowing had been one of the rallying cries for the national-popular movement that Kirchnerism embodied, along with recovering the political and economic sovereignty that every nation requires for organizing a project for the future, Macri, on the contrary, placed us back under the yoke for another hundred years. In Colombia, on the other hand, we had just had a very tragic presidential election. Uribe's fascist forces won the election against Gustavo Petro, the first plurinationational-popular leader to create an antagonistic bloc since the death of Gaitán. And the return of Uribe brought the return of massacres and the political persecution of the opposition. This included one of us, living in Colombia, who was fired from her university position for publicly defending the political project that Petro was leading. The outlook was very similar throughout the region. Popular forces were suffering a clear setback in their collective conquests, and the oligarchic reaction shook the whole continent. At no moment did we think that the 'populist cycle' had come to a close, but we were certain that it was suffering an important *impasse*. This was the scenario when the Critical Theory Programs Consortium that we both belong to proposed we write a book together on populist theory. At the time, the consortium was under the direction of Judith Butler and Penelope Deutscher who, together with Polity Press, took the initiative in creating a committee of women academics from the global south. The purpose of that committee was to develop a series of books produced in the south that would begin circulating—in English—certain texts and problematics that are poorly (or mis-) understood in global academia. In this spirit, we proposed writing a book about populism in Latin America. We liked the idea because, despite having no plans to make a book together, attempting to organise and theorise the experiences and debates we had taken part in as activists and academics wound up being very stimulating. And this is how we realised that we shared a lot of ideas about what we wanted to say in the book. In that sense it was a very good experience because we were constantly complementing one another and the ideas started to flow in a very organic way,

as if they were dictated by the very processes that we wanted to bear witness to. Also, it was an opportunity to disseminate a series of intellectual debates that aren't typically familiar to academia in the global north (or in anglophone literature), which is more accustomed to theoretical production on university campuses or the compilation of exoticizing experiences from 'peripheral countries.' We wanted to disrupt the deeply colonial idea that academia in the global north produces theoretical frameworks while the south is limited to making sociological descriptions of its political experiences. Both of these intellectual attitudes are very troubling for us, and our objective was quite clear: to take advantage of this political impasse and construct a *disruptive theory artifact.* We thought (and we continue to think) that it was necessary to shake up a set of issues and procedures in current political thought. And to do so, we needed to construct a pro-vocative and irreverent *gesture* that, without betraying our own Latin American legacy, would disrupt the reading that political thought itself has outlined as its task and its privileged places of enunciation that should shape that task. This means shaking up not only the issues under discussion but also the procedures for pursuing the task. In part, that implies reiterating the theoretical-political gesture of Ernesto Laclau in *On Populist Reason* (2005), a title that from the get go is a provocation and a revelation of the astute choice of granting logic and rationalism to that which (precisely for being considered anomalous, irrational and imprudent) has historically stigmatised politics in Latin America: *populism.* In strategic terms, this logic could have been given a different name, and Laclau would have saved himself quite a few headaches, but avoiding the pain would have meant conceding to a certain liberal *ethos* that permeates theoretical discussions (both on the left and the right). From the European and Anglo perspective, populism (and its theorisation) bears a certain illegibility that is highly stimulating for our continued work. Our book is an attempt to work with an incomprehension that we don't want to translate into the academic language currently in use. And we do it, para-doxically, within the philosophical archive that, of course, we adopt as our own. All of which seems to us a political (and aesthetic) gesture that helps to break the habits where the field of western philosophy has been trapped. But things get more complicated when Laclau decides to postulate populism (with all that the use of postulates implies for philosophy) as a political ontology. This gets unwaveringly declared in the introduc-tion to his last book, *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society* (2014), where he collects a series of articles that precede *On Populist Reason* and promises to develop this po-sition in a future book that, unfortunately due to his death, never saw the light of day. Therefore, only snippets of this postulate remain scattered across his different texts and, for that selfsame reason, there remains a set of questions that cannot be answered based on them, among which we might mention: in what sense does Laclau talk about ontology? Why did he choose this field of problems for discussing populism? How

does he relate logic, rhetoric and psychoanalysis to ontology? And, why does he take on the Heideggerian distinction between the ontic and ontological? In *Seven Essays*, we open the book by taking on this ontological postulate, but in a direction that may not always follow Laclau's hints. At certain points, we bring this ontology into contact with negativity and the Hegelian dialectic, something that Laclau would have roundly rejected from his Italian reading of Hegel[2], while at other points we bring it to psycho-analysis and the attendant notions of lack, jouissance and affects. Though this will be developed with greater precision in the section dedicated to conversing with our colleagues' texts, we can say now that we offer an exercise in philosophical and political imagination according to challenges dictated by the context itself. This explains why the book becomes ever more propositional and ends up setting out a series of political figures for *unearthing the future*. In some ways, this resonates with what Oliver Marchart proposes in his book *Thinking Antagonism*, when, reviewing some of Bosteels' pertinent criticisms of ontology, he suggests that postfoundationalism corresponds to an epochal 'ontological turn' (2018: 8). And he adds that this ontological turn comes from the ontological difference developed by Heidegger and radicalised by the post-structuralist thought that would become known as 'leftist Heideggerianism' (8-30). Along those lines, the post-Marxism that Laclau and Mouffe propose gets inserted, according to Marchart, within that ontological turn. But, on the other hand, he heralds something that, to our understanding, undermines this interpretive hypothesis, or at least places it within a more complex perspective, since he suggests that Laclau's originality lies in returning to introduce antagonism. We are interested in the idea of rein-

---

[2] In 2016, an important Workshop was held at Brighton University, organised by Mark Devenney (through the university's Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics) and by Paula Biglieri (through the 'Cátedra Libre Ernesto Laclau' at the University of Buenos Aires). The event was titled 'The Politics of Populism' and there we had the opportunity to hold a roundtable discussion with Oliver Marchart titled 'Theoretical Questions: Is Populist Politics Radical Politics?' Marchart gave a talk titled 'In the Name of the People' and Luciana Cadahia gave another titled 'Mediation and Negativity: Resituating Dialectics from the Theory of Populism.' Our discomfort with the strictly Heideggerian turn attributed to populist theory was already clear in this debate. We even went so far as to propose that the Hegelian turn toward negativity and antagonism that Laclau himself disdained could play an unconfessed role. In the book *Thinking Antagonism* — published by Olivar Marchart — and in the chapter titled 'La tragicidad del populismo: hacia una reativación de su dialéctica' — published by Luciana Cadahia in the collective book *A contracorriente: materiales para una teoría renovada del populismo* (Cadahia, Coronel and Ramírez 2018) — one can see this debate and the importance of the Hegelian legacy for thinking populism through antagonism (Marchart) and through negativity and the dialectic (Cadahia).

troducing antagonism. Why? Because as Marchart also suggests, 'The question of antagonisms is the question of modernity' (50), which is to say, this problem has been at the heart of German Idealism, Romanticism and Marxism.

The Laclausian operation thus opens in two different directions: on the one hand, a direction that points to the ontological turn Heidegger opened (in the terms of ontological difference) with his postulate of factic life (as an alternative to the practical life) and, on the other hand, a direction that gathers the sediments of Marxism, examining which theoretical and practical decisions were taken in its historical evolution, which alternatives were rejected in its own undercurrent, and which get reupdated with the inevitable return of the repressed. Here, a first question emerges for us, because we aren't so sure that it is possible to reconcile the Heideggerian path with the post-Marxist path of reactivating the modern legacy. How to can we read this gesture that would seem to point in two conflicting directions (the Heideggarian rejection of modernity and the desire to reupdate its inconclusive sediments)? Or, how do we read ourselves in this gesture provoked by a Latin American thinker? Here we will put forward a hypothesis that is, perhaps, not entirely clear in our book. We assume the populist theory as an emancipatory ontological turn that emerges, among other things, from Marxist sedimentations—and the modern philosophical legacy of Marxism—that have been discarded or obstructed by that same tradition. We see ourselves this way within the tradition of Marxist-critical thought, not in a position of exteriority from which to signal and criticise the impasses of a given argument, but in a position where, accounting for our own subjective involvement, we can follow the hints and immerse ourselves in the hiatuses that, as Jorge Alemán proposes, allow us to problematise the unthought in theory. Therefore, we feel that the understanding of antagonism and negativity put forward by this populist political ontology reactivates a latent sense of modernity that is not found in the ontological turn Heidegger gave rise to. Furthermore, this turn forecloses it. One mustn't forget that this entire European philosophical operation of ontological difference (and here we also include post-structuralism and post-operaism) has been taking shape together with processes of decolonisation, revealing a philosophical unconscious anxious to pay off its own imperialist past. Thus, we ask ourselves, what role has Latin American thinking and praxis played in the production of modernity? That is to say, if modernity has been characterised by discovering the keys to necessity in history and a strong foundation that organises our society, our present age, on the contrary, assumes the contingent character of history and the discovery of the absence of any kind of foundation. For that reason, we believe that the question of antagonism posed by populist theory reactivates a sense of modernity that was latent within the ontological turn.

But, at the same time, this dispute over modernity responds to a kind of thought inscribed in the same Latin American legacy. In other words: the reactivation of antagonism and negativity is a game of translations between the thought of Latin America and Europe and the possibility of understanding to what extent Latin America produces this ontological turn. What we propose in our book, then, is that the ontological turn is a movement of colonial rupture, but one that does not necessarily imply an abandonment of modernity, but rather the possibility of updating its emancipatory legacy. In that sense, we would like to clarify that we reject the 'relativistic conceptions of modernity,' wherein each place has conducted its own 'unique and untranslatable' experience. It seems to us that there is a multicultural trap in this retrospective interpretation of the past segmenting the possibilities of understanding the 'historical knots' that organise our present. This is why we prefer to think in terms of unfinished sedimentations of modernity, rather than in terms of diverse interpretations. And, at the same time, this ties us back to a particularistic thought and doesn't account for how all these supposed particularities are produced and related to each other in a great epochal and conceptual plot.

But we also distance ourselves from the decolonial interpretation, since it seeks to challenge the entirety of modernity as a history of oppression without further ado. From this point of view, on the one hand, modernity would be identified with Europe and oppression and, on the other, Latin America with otherness and passivity. Thus, two opposite and independent poles are configured with reference to each other and, as a consequence, our emancipation from the European yoke would hinge on our responsibility to recover our ancestral 'otherness.' It seems that this interpretation, which also rejects the concepts of republic, state, democracy, and a long *et cetera*, has two problems. On the one hand, it leads us to a deadlock, namely: in all praxis and all theory (even in language) we will find an impure element that has functioned as a form of oppression of the 'other'. Still, and this is paradoxical, it is leading us to reactionary arguments typical of the right. For instance, the claim that 'class struggle' is a Eurocentric and patriarchal concept, which we must therefore reject. However, we do not consider that this operation performed by decolonial theory is an inherent characteristic of it; rather, it responds to a way of thinking of our time. We sincerely believe the legacy of Levinas is present in all theoretical proposals where ethics prevail over politics. Once again, each theoretical proposal is assumed to constitute a singularity but ends up reproducing a more general form that becomes 'unthinkable'.

On the other hand, the decolonial interpretation does not attend to historical processes and does not pay attention to all the archival work that historians such as Valeria Coronel (2022), Marixa Lasso (2007), James Sanders (2004) or José Figueroa (2021)

— to name a few examples — have been doing on the history of 'actual' existing republicanism.[3] The work of these historians helps us think about two aspects: on the one hand, the active role of the popular sectors (Indigenous, *campesino*, Black and female) in the construction of more egalitarian and emancipatory republics and, on the other, the active role of these sectors and intellectuals in the configuration of modernity itself. In this sense, we consider modernity a general and dialectical process, a process in tension between a reactive movement and an emancipatory movement. And there, in this process, Latin America does not have a peripheral but a central role in the construction of these two movements. In our case, we are interested in thinking about what the emancipatory possibilities are that Latin America engenders for modernity. And Latin American populisms are one more link (theoretical and practical) in a long historical accumulation of democratic experiences of plebeian republicanisms. In that sense, it is not a matter of thinking of Latin America as an exception but rather as part of a broad process where we shape forms of emancipation for the world. We are also the political imagination of the future. Thus, one must note the difficulty that certain segments of the European intelligentsia have in understanding this and their oscillation between thinking of politics within Latin America as remnants of the past (as if 'Europe' were part of some vanguard) and as an exotic otherness to be protected in a paternalistic (or maternalistic) way. We believe that the field of populism studies offers an interesting twist—of course, this is not the only case, but it is the one we know from within. And this has to do with the fact that a relationship of greater equality emerges in the production of knowledge. We build international networks on an equal footing and we read each other in two directions: North-South and South-North. This allows a dialogue that pays attention to both the particularities of each region and their commonalities.

The wish to think of ourselves as 'in the world' (and not as a particularity that thinks exclusively in itself) finds its origins in various traditions of Latin America and the Caribbean. On a more regional level, we feel influenced by two great currents that find their roots, on the one hand, in the 19th century plebeian and socialist republicanism of Simón Rodríguez and José Martí, which gave rise to a whole continental experience of articulation between popular and emancipatory democratic institutions, and, on the other hand, in the legacy of the heterodox Marxism that José Carlos Mariátegui inaugurated with his aesthetic-political assumptions reflected in spaces such as the journal *Amauta*, the black Caribbean Marxism of intellectuals like Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire, and the influence of Andean thinkers, like Zavaleta Mercado and Silvia Rivera

---

[3] Marchant proposes some objections to our reflections on the importance of the republican hypothesis for thinking emancipation. We recommend all of these authors, whose historical-critical publications help us build connections between populism and republicanism.

Cusicanqui in Bolivia and Agustín Cueva and Bolivar Echeverría in Ecuador and Mexico.

Regarding the currents in Argentina, we recognise ourselves at the intersection of two traditions: national-popular thought and the Lacanian left. It is important to clarify that, in the tradition of Argentinian theory until the '70s, the opposition to the oligarchy had been coming from a left with liberal roots. That is, politics was divided between a rightwing liberalism and a leftist liberalism. A popular national agenda was taking shape between those two positions, which is the tradition we belong to. This is why in Argentina there is both a rightwing and leftwing anti-national popular movement. It is in this juncture that we can place the classic works of Ernesto Laclau (and those intellectuals who influenced his early thought, such as Arturo Jauretche, John William Cooke or Jorge Abelardo Ramos), passing through José Aricó, Juan Carlos Portantiero or Emilio De Ipola, to more current references, like Horacio González, María Pía López or Jorge Alemán. It is important to add that all these authors and currents mentioned have been configured as a dense network of postcolonial thought, and that decolonial theory is one more expression within this historical accumulation. We make this clarification because, in the English-speaking world (and especially in the United States), it is often believed that postcolonial Latin American and Caribbean thought starts with the decolonial theory of the 90s, omitting the historical role of plebeian republicanism, heterodox Marxism and populism from the struggle for epistemological and political emancipation in the global south. Now, all this intellectual production of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shares a common trait, namely that it is eccentric thought. What does this mean? As Jorge Alemán proposes in his book *Neoliberal Horizons in Subjectivity* (2016), which he gathers from the tradition of Argentine literature, eccentric positions are not those that are passively assumed as the periphery, but those that have the ability to create a location that escapes the center.

We could add that we come from very different disciplines where neither of us feels entirely comfortable (political science and philosophy) and so we would like to intervene in them and approach the problems of political thought in a way that can reconnect theory and praxis. This is why the book begins with an explicit declaration of our place of enunciation and our roles as both activists and academics. But our belonging to militant spaces made us very aware that this book was the result of collective work. Which is not to say that this book is here to *narrate* or *reflect* what happened in those spaces. What happened (and happens) there far exceeds what we have managed to express in *Seven Essays.* Furthermore, we always distrust the attitude of whoever, because of their activism in a movement or in public space, later becomes, through his or her books, the official spokesperson for that experience. There is something a little

deceptive there. We prefer to think of our book as an exercise in *translating* that collective experience to the field of political theory and contemporary philosophy. This is why we say that our efforts in the book are about trying to think through what, in all of those experiences, is translatable for current political theory. This exercise in translation, at the same time, supposes a kind of distancing: we don't want to identify ourselves with the 'thing', as if our voice were the exclusive owner of a political experience, rather we attempt to persevere *within* the *lived* thing, being very aware that there is an irreducible distance between us and the thing *thought*. But that distance doesn't exempt us from the historical responsibility of trying to affect praxis with our theoretical postulates. We are not interested in theories that only function within the limited spaces of global academia to the delight of a select group of intellectuals. We worry that theoretical production renounces the task of continuing to imagine the world differently. At the same time, it seems to us that all of these political experiences put many of the declarations often made in the field of political theory to the test. Thus, the challenge was to show the limits of theoretical frameworks when they are checked against reality and, at the same time, trying to think about where we can take political thought when it passes through these experiences. If we could summarise how we tried to intervene in this field of operations called 'political thought', we could say that we sought to generate the following practical effects: a) the production of a theoretical-political artifact coded in an uncomfortable name for European and Anglophone philosophy; b) the ousting, as other thinkers have already done, of the pejorative reading that the global north has made of populism; c) a contribution to epistemological decolonisation, which involves distancing ourselves from the place assigned to intellectuals from the global south that says we should limit ourselves to describing our own experiences or, at best, to offering theoretical frameworks for our region; and d) an intervention in the field of philosophy and contemporary political thought with a body of theory as eccentric as populism, daring to alter what is meant by the very exercise of political thought.

In what follows, we would like to gather several points put forward by colleagues who, with great generosity and rigour, drew upon on our book. We have taken the decision not to respond to each text separately but to gather common problematic cruxes, which could be summarised in the following way: the ontological problem of populism and its connection to feminism.

II.

We would like to begin the second part of our text by saying that the debate under consideration is not confined to the texts that each author created for the present dossier. It seems much more interesting to us that these articles (and our book) should

function as 'an excuse' for that which the authors themselves helped to propitiate, namely a debate of ideas. Although it is a common-sense expression—debate of ideas—it seems increasingly difficult to foment this kind of intellectual encounter with its unpredictable effects, organised around 'the thing itself' of the political. We are readers of the intellectual explorations of each author we invited to participate in this discussion. And it seems to us that in each text, not only do we find a reflection on the proposals and arguments from our book, but each author's intellectual (and vital) wager appears as well. Thus, we could even talk about a spiritual debate, if by spirit we refer to the living material that is imbricated in (and as) the political. If there is an attitude or disposition that we share with the authors of this critical exchange, it is a deep discomfort with a certain ethos inherited from the political philosophy of the late 20th century and the early 21st. This discomfort that we share has to do with a disposition or attitude in contemporary political thought that can be summarised, in Hegelian terms, as a 'flight from existence', upon considering that existence will not be found at the level of what the thinking demands. For us, this translates into a preemptory withdrawal that rejects collective political practices, their institutional wagers (insomuch as they are republican, democratic or feminist laboratories), and their emancipatory imaginaries. And, at the same time, it aims to make of political thought (and its etymological games) the only locus of authentic political transformation. The idea that the commons, the people, the revolution, democracy or emancipation is always something *yet to come* ends up creating the perfect alibi for intellectual political commitment to avoid concrete action, passing instead onto the disinterested and lucid judgment of those who determine at what precise point the reality—of any social process—failed. It seems to us that the great paradox of our era consists in believing that the most radical act of thinking would imply a withdrawal of the political from practical (and social) life. This intellectual operation, therefore, not only spurns the sphere of praxis, but it also comes to take its place, making philosophy the demiurge of reality. We agree with Marchart's and Bosteels' claim that this epochal issue began with an ontological turn (Marchart, 2018; Bosteels, 2014), and what this turn encapsulates is addressed in our book from cover to cover.

In that sense, the critiques and commentaries regarding our ties to ontology (and the proposal for a political ontology) have helped us to think about the type of ontological operation that takes place in our book, how we relate to the philosophical tradition that has thought this problem, and why this appeal to ontology aims neither to locate philosophy in a position above praxis nor to set up a procedure for 'purifying' thought. These commentaries also help us to understand that, even if we are indebted to Laclau's ontological wager, our understanding of ontology takes a different path that we would like to set out here. As such, it seems important for us to define what kind of

purpose we grant ontology, to then position ourselves in regards to Marchart's and Bosteels' proposals.

The point of confluence in our book is populist theory (in its national-popular aspect) and the Laclausian vocation of a political ontology. And this connects to two different ontological approaches that were complementary over the course of the book: the question of lack in Lacan and the role of negativity in Hegel. Paula's work gets inscribed within the first legacy, continuing the entrance into psychoanalysis that Laclau himself pursued and making it applicable to the findings contributed by Jorge Alemán. Luciana's works are inscribed within the second legacy, based on a reupdating of negativity in Hegel and its subterranean ties to Foucault's 'ontology of the present'. The encounter between these two ontological legacies is not without its tensions, but we feel that those tensions have been fruitful for trying to articulate two inheritances that confront each other: the intersection between the non-historical (the constitutive lack) and the historical (the ontology of our selves) to place them in the service of a philosophy of praxis. It is worth adding that we do not feel tied to any of these inheritances in the absolute. Our core concept and point of departure has always been the sphere of praxis, from there we have made, if you like, a completely 'irreverent' use—in a nod to Borgean philosophy—of the philosophical (and ontological) archives. We have played with these traditions and we have taken from them only what has been fruitful for connecting our concepts and directing thought according to the pulse of historical-practical problems. Over the length of our book, we have tried to relate the historical and the non-historical in a way that could break the spell of that flight from existence and make thought an instrument in the service of the emancipatory imagination. The question that has guided our wager has been the following: is it possible to create a theory artifact for thinking emancipation opened by political experiences in Latin America?

But let us return to the issue of the ontological turn. The first thing we would like to clarify is that reupdating ontology for the field of politics is not exclusive to the 20th century, and we can find its roots in the very tradition of modern thought. The second issue is that this contemporary turn can be treated through two legacies: the Heideggerian line and the Foucauldian line. And, regarding the second aspect mentioned earlier, we coincide with Marchart in taking back the power of ontology from philosophers. He would seem to give Heidegger a very timely turn of the screw in *Thinking Antagonism* when he tells us, 'Every thinker, as Heidegger used to say, follows the line of a single thought. What he forgot to mention was that no thought belongs to a single thinker. They always come from somewhere else, from a place 'out there:' an intellectual tradition, an academic teacher, a school of thought, a social movement, an academic or non-academic discussion...'. (Marchart, 2018: 1). Likewise, we agree with Marchart when he points out that ontology is not a separate sphere (nor a more

fundamental sphere) from the political but rather the possibility of a treatment that escapes the mainstream logic of social scientists and the type of hallowed treatment that these disciplines grant the empirical. Yet, like Marchart, it seems to us that ontology is not a path for disregarding or turning our backs on what positivism calls 'the empirical', rather it is a way to think the formations of the 'given'. We also see ourselves in his search to relate the problem of ontology to the issue of antagonism and the latter to the fundamental problem of negativity. We believe that in *Thinking Antagonism*, Marchart Hegelianises himself and contributes to a certain rupture (though not complete) with his Heideggerian legacy, though his stance seems a little ambiguous in this regard: at times he would seem to foster a kind of fusion between Hegel, Marx and Heidegger and, at others, a recognition that the ontological turn Heidegger propitiated, by putting an end to negativity (and antagonism), would present serious challenges for shaping an ontology of the political: 'It is true, Heidegger also knows about the terror before the 'nothing' and annihilation, but the negative is not given by him any productive function in a conception of 'ontic' action. He criticised Hegel for retaining a notion of negativity that was not sufficiently radical (which is the case indeed, given Hegel's logicism), but did not provide us with a better alternative. Instead, he reverted to a Zen-like passivism devoid of all negativity' (Marchart, 2018: 6).

Therefore, we have distanced ourselves from what Marchart does in his older works by including populist theory within the legacy of leftist Heideggerianism. Furthermore, in our book we maintain that populism opposes this Heideggerian ontological turn given that it is one of the few contemporary intellectual wagers that reupdates the question of antagonism (and negativity) as a situated and conflictual dimension for addressing the political.

And this brings us closer to Bosteels' position, given that we agree with his suggestion that the Heideggerian ontological turn (and that of his epigones) entails a folding back of thought onto itself, a disconnection from the sphere of praxis and a backing down from emancipatory politics. In *The Actuality of Communism*, he becomes very critical of the 'ontological turn' favored by the contemporary leftist political philosophy scene (2014: 42-74). With unsparing lucidity, he strikes down the belief that politics must resort to ontology as an expression of its radicality and as a necessity for deepening a leftist project. He finds in that operation a kind of trap and a backing down from intellectual activity. When this ontological turn becomes trapped in the analytic of finitude (a Kantian legacy) and in the destruction of being as presence (a Heideggerian-Derridean legacy), political philosophy creates a kind of animosity toward the actually existing (being as presence) and a skepticism toward politics that emerges from social life. Bosteels very precisely demonstrates how this supposed radicalisation of leftist ontology ends up creating the fantasy that it would be, through its speculative leftists, the only

one capable of truly radicalizing politics. This disconnection from social life (from the people, we would add) ends up favouring a conservative retreat, given that reality always fails under the gaze of the radical philosopher. Either it fails, as Bosteels suggests, because the (unconfessed) utopia is placed in a 'yet to come' and that future can only be prophesied by the philosopher (with his or her back turned on the present), or, Bosteels would add, this folding back of thought onto itself favoured by leftist ontology suppresses the individual and militancy, considering them metaphysical illusions from the past, and thereby obstructs any emancipatory politics that does not proceed from its own theoretical presuppositions. We agree with the majority of the assessments that Bosteels presents—though his operation points to an actuality of communism (and not that of a populism)—and we distance ourselves in some aspects. We maintain, in contrast with Bosteels, that his critique does not apply to all attempts to think through ontology but rather, on the one hand, to the specific turn favoured by Heidegger and, on the other, to the shift that such a turn entailed for the role of negativity (and consequently for antagonism), since it replaces negativity with an ontological difference and a return to the problem of being. Thus, we distance ourselves from Bosteels when he assumes that the populist theory introduced by Laclau and Mouffe would be an end to this type of ontological turn (47), something on which he seems to agree with Marchart. Another point where our paths diverge has to do with the way Bosteels equates the philosophy of Heidegger and Lacanian psychoanalysis, understood as the two halves of the forceps that would come to create a disconnection between theory and social life. In contrast with other uses of Lacanian psychoanalysis, all of our efforts in the book have been to construct a theory of militancy and the emergence of the political subject based on the notion of lack. And, in agreement with that which Bosteels' proposes in his book, this leads to an attempt to take on the dialectic between the historical and the non-historical (and between theory and current reality) in a very precise way (269-270). Ultimately, Bosteels' question is something we completely agree on: 'Is this actuality under the present circumstances necessarily limited to being a pure movement of critique and destruction? Or is there place for a unified front of common affirmation and overcoming?' (19-20). And we wonder if this 'unified front of common affirmation and overcoming' cannot imply a game of shifted and eccentric uses of the ontological tradition. We ask ourselves if the gesture of our book does not connect with the closing words of his, where he tells us: 'This means that we cannot let the Western European history lessons, regardless of whether their master-teachers are despondent or enthusiastic or both at once in a manic-depressive oscillation, determine the agenda for the rest of the world. It also suggests, as I have minimally tried to do in the last chapter of the present book and as I hope others will do for other regions, that we look elsewhere

for models or counter-models to put to the test the hypothesis of the actuality of communism' (286-287). It is true that all of these questions point to the need to think the actuality of communism and not that of populism, yet, at the same time, they are also open to all of those who continue to wager on building, through our same social realities, an authentic emancipatory politics. It is possible that the construction of our wager needs several adjustments, but it seems to us that it cannot be refuted based on other conservative uses of psychoanalysis or ontology. In fact, it helps us, on the one hand, to prefigure a theory of the individual with the same theory tools used to defuse it and, on the other hand, generating programmatic effects that pull us from the impasse in contemporary political thought. To Bosteels' genuine question, 'Can emancipatory politics today still take the form of militant subjectivisation, or should the deconstruction of metaphysics also include all theories of the subject among its targets?' (73), we respond with a resounding yes to the first part of his approach. In fact, we also question 'the emphatic need for a leftist ontology today as a sign of something missed, namely, a truly emancipatory politics' (74). And we believe that this withdrawal can be overcome through a very simple (yet no less significant) reversal, namely, instead of using psychoanalysis and ontology to dismiss the truly existing—as the speculative leftists that Bosteels alludes to have—we put these legacies in the service (to the dismay of Lacan and Heidegger) of militancy and emancipation. And, for us in Latin America, that reversal has come to be called populist theory.

Therefore, to summarise our position, we could say that we agree with Marchart on the need to turn to the issue of ontology and accept that this is not a more elevated sphere of the social but rather a precise mode for addressing (as mass media or positivism can) a single object: the political. But, in contrast with him, and in line with Bosteels, we are critical of the ontological turn that, to our understanding, arises out of the Heideggerian turn. We believe there is a theoretical disposition to be found there that, by rejecting conflict and the modern tradition of thought, creates a disconnect between theory and praxis, discounts the conflictual dimension and rejects militancy and the configuration of a political (hegemonic?) subject for emancipation. Where should we then find the key for understanding the type of ontological turn that we have proposed in our book and how does it help us to think politics in an edifying way? We believe it is found in the return to the ontological problem established by the modern Hegelian legacy, which is to say, the legacy that does not back down from linking ontology to politics and history. And we believe, oddly enough, that both Marchart and Bosteels do not stand entirely apart from this position. In the case of Marchart, it is in his recognition of the limits of the Heidegerrian ontological turn and the need to return to an ontology of antagonism coded in the modern problem of negativity. And, in the case of Bosteels, it is in his recognition of the need 'for a dialectical articulation of the

non-historical with concrete analyses of the historicity of leftist, socialist, and communist politics' (278). Or when, by critiquing in what sense the contemporary ontological turn reiterates Kant's analytic of finitude, he vindicates Hegel's dialectic of infinitude.[4] Hesitation around the abandonment or recuperation of ontology, thus, is not exclusive to contemporary philosophy, rather it has its precedent in modernity itself. The philosophical turn that Kant gave rise to, by introducing the critical method of thought, entailed, among other things, an attempt to substitute ontology (Wolff's *metaphysica generalis*), on the one hand, with the transcendental analytic, and on the other hand, to substitute *metaphysica specialis* with the dialectic.[5] Analytic and dialectic will come to be conceived of as the two critical (or philosophical) modes of proceeding opened up by Kant in the modern era, encompassed by his Transcendental Logic, and will be employed as a replacement for the dogmatic and ontological proceeding. Let's not forget that this critical operation, and the respective 'irreconcilable' split between noumenon (the thing in itself) and phenomenon (the world of experience), on the one hand, and the subject (*a priori*) and the world (of experience), on the other, would establish the foundations for an unconfessed suprasensible and normative philosophy as a guarantor for the world of experience. Hegel, for his part, will be the inheritor of this operation that Kant gave rise to, but would express his reservations regarding the disappearance of ontology as a purifying advance in critical philosophy and, at the same time, he will attempt to work this split opened by Kant in a different way. Furthermore, we could say that this purified and separate horizon of the world of experience is the first thing that Hegel would reject when he appeals to the historical and the speculative as part of a single immanent process. This is why all of his effort is dedicated to developing Logic as an *Aufhebung* (cancellation and preservation) of ontology. Beyond the strictly philosophical operation that each thinker gave rise to, what we would like to highlight here is the argument put forward by Hegel, in the first prologue to the Science of Logic from 1812, to explain why ontology cannot be cast aside without further ado. And the interesting thing to highlight is that he does not do so in the name of philosophy—as if ontology were to grant it privileged access in the order of being—but rather he does so in the name of the people (*Volk*).[6] Hegel is not as interested in the fate of philosophy,

----

[4] 'Do these proposals open up a perspective for the actualisation of communism, or does our current ontological background, always more attuned to Kant's analytic of finitude than to Hegel's dialectic of the infinite, run counter to this orientation?' (Bosteels, 2014: 44)

[5] Here we are following the interpretation proposed by the Spanish philosopher Félix Duque in his preliminary study to his introduction to the 1812 Spanish edition of the Science of Logic. (Hegel, 2011: 18)

[6] This was discovered by Félix Duque in his preliminary study to the Science of Logic of 1812 (Hegel, 2011: 38).

when it renounces ontology, as he is in where such a decision would leave a people spiritually. Like Hegel, Kant also thought that metaphysics (ontology) could not be eradicated (at most substituted) and thus assigned it a marginal place (beyond the world of experience) but, paradoxically, it would remain reserved for the philosopher and the theologist who wished to dedicate his or her life to thinking about suprasensible subjects that concern nothing less than questions of liberty. Hegel, on the other hand, would not consider ontology to be something that an 'individual' produces in solitude, when posing big unanswerable questions, rather it is a material work wrought within the historical by the collective life of the people. Let us recall that for Hegel the spiritual dimension of the popular is not something suprasensible that soars above human beings, it is, on the contrary, the very social fabric that relates men to each other. There is nothing more material than the spiritual, and ontology, for its part, is the immanence of thought and existence whose real and effective dimension (*Wirklichkeit*) gets *articulated* as the people. Thus, for Hegel, the lack of a popular metaphysics (or ontology—which is the same thing in this case) is as impossible to eradicate as is politics or ethics.[7] But this idea does not appear for the first time in the Science of Logic, rather it is a constant concern across the different phases of intellectual development that can be found in the famous collectively authored pamphlet for *The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism*, passing through his writings on popular religion (*Volksreligion*), until reaching his efforts to think this problem within the logico-speculative system of his philosophy (Cadahia, 2017).[8] In all of them there is a constant preoccupation with thinking, through philosophy, the ethical (and political) life of a people. And philosophy does not have the normative role assigned to it by Kant that, from the purified realm of Ideas, determines the direction a people should have. Much to the contrary, ontology is a sort of stain that is born from the collective historical task of a people as a spiritual subject, and it becomes its sediment. Furthermore, in his early writings, when Hegel mentions the importance of popular religion, he does so, primarily, in regards to the place 'the heart and fantasy' occupy as a worksite for the popular ethos. Without these sediments that appeal to the affective dimension, the people would degenerate into a sum of limited individuals, or to put it in Foucauldian terms, to a mere population. That is, to a mere 'empirical' fact, instead of a political and spiritual subject. And,

---

[7] 'Remarkable as it is if a people has become indifferent, for instance, to its constitutional law, to its convictions, its moral customs and virtues, just as remarkable it is when a people loses its metaphysics – when the spirit engaged with its pure essence no longer has any real presence in its life.' (Hegel 2010: 7)

[8] Even if object of this text is not to speak of Hegel's oeuvre, it is important to point out that his concern with the ontology of the people intertwines with metaphysics, popular religion (*Volkreligion*), mythology, aesthetics and fantasy.

to continue along this Foucauldian line, it is also important to recall that Foucault himself would employ this distinction between analytic and dialectic (as two paths opened by Kant) for inscribing, on the latter path (together with Hegel and the Frankfurt School), his own philosophical journey. Though, in Foucault's hands, this second path — opened by Kant and materialised by Hegel, Marx and the Frankfurt School — would undergo a new metamorphosis and dialectic thought would wear a new mask called the ontology of actuality (2010: 17-40).[9] If Kant had wanted to overcome metaphysics and ontology through an analytic and dialectic procedure, and if Hegel, for his part, made the dialectic procedure a way to keep the immanent place of ontology alive and to destroy the *a priori*, transcendental and solipsistic aspects of philosophy, then Foucault, with his return to ontology, would try to demolish the Hegelian-dialectic legacy and open a path for recuperating the historical and immanent character of the Kantian critical legacy.

We have taken this 'modern' detour through Kant and Hegel (and the recuperation of both by Foucault) to show that, beginning with Hegel, more than a word or a field of thought that opens to the question of being—something that, of course, mattered little to Hegel—ontology went on to become a philosophical procedure. And this procedure would come to be called dialectic and speculative as an attempt to construct a philosophy of experience and immanence, which is to say, contrary to the abstract formalism of Kantianism and tied to the historical development of peoples. And we do so to show that Foucault would withdraw the wager by explicitly uniting ontology with the problem of actuality, though sacrificing the dialectical procedure that he himself would exercise unconfessed and turning a deaf ear to the opening Hegel insinuated between ontology and the people. But we have also taken this detour because it will help us to understand which philosophical tradition we see ourselves in when we bring the name ontology back onto the scene. Because, for us, and in contrast to Laclau—but radicalizing his same presuppositions—populist theory is a theory of articulation for thinking the ontology of the people. And the people is nothing more or less than a political configuration. To that end, and in response to the ontological approaches of Barros and Martínez-Prado, we are not proposing an ontology of the multiple and alterity, nor for thinking populism or thinking feminism. The logic of the Not-All that we allude to is not an expression of the Spinozist and Levinasian ontology that other authors allude to. And

[9] See: 'It seems to me that the philosophical choice confronting us today is the following. We have to opt either for a critical philosophy which appears as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or for a critical thought which takes the form of an ontology of ourselves, of present reality. It is this latter form of philosophy which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, passing through Nietzsche, Max Weber and so on, has founded a form of reflection to which, of course, I link myself insofar as I can.' (Foucault, 2010: 21).

even less an expression that we are trying to think. Frankly, we are very critical of that interpretation. This is why the tension that they believe they have found between our populist position and our feminist position doesn't work, as if in each case we were maintaining two different ontologies. In short, the ontology of the people is Not-All (or the One that fails). Which is to say, the way we decided to organise with each other to imagine emancipation. Thus, Marchart takes up from the postfoundational perspective that we adopted (following what he himself developed (Marchart, 2007; 2018) to push our arguments further and affirms that 'Biglieri and Cadahia do not go as far as explicitly making the following claim, but, in my view, 'the people' are established by populism precisely as the contingent ground of society' (citation to his contribution in the exchange). Indeed, we could not agree more, and we summarise this quotation with a nod to Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and say that, if the people exists, it is because society does not. In any case, the people as political subjectivity emerges thanks to the constitutive lack, the irreducible heterogeneity or the impossibility of social closure, and it emerges to antagonise 'those above' in an attempt to mold an institutionality that includes 'those below'. This is where we diverge. Marchart wonders if our understanding of populism responds to a normative issue or to a wish list and questions the idea that 'populism *eo ipso* is emancipatory', which is the same as questioning the emancipatory nature of populism or the possibility of populism revealing an emancipatory ontology. For what runs through our entire text is the radical gesture of daring to think an emancipatory ontology from our Latin American political experience. Pulling threads and diving into the hiatuses of Laclau's theory is what allowed us to draw out the consequences of taking populist logic to the extreme: assuming aspects that could have been suggested by Laclau but that were never problematised led us to what remained unthought in his work. That is, if the equivalential trait of differences is taken to its ultimate conclusions, this can have no other outcome than the egalitarian project. What enables us to sustain the ontological dimension is to understand that the articulation of differences does not cancel heterogeneity, that differences never collapse into the fascist project of the people-as-one and that the logic of equivalence and difference belong to the ontological dimension of politics, all of which leads to the egalitarian and emancipatory character of populism. This is the reason why we do not accept the distinction between leftwing and rightwing populism, because following the line of thought we developed, they clearly present themselves as experiences of a different nature. But neither have we said, as Barros and Martínez-Prado suggest, that populism is only of the left. This is why we would like to take a moment to argue what we mean when we talk about populism plainly.

Nothing stands in the way of certain theoretical positions wanting to maintain the distinction between populism on the left and populism on the right. What we ask ourselves is if it is worthwhile to do so and what theoretical (or political) effect does it propitiate to maintain that distinction. The point is not to hew to the names but to ask ourselves, on the one hand, what we are doing with them when we set them to functioning within the field of political thought and, on the other, how fruitful or obsolete they are for accompanying, thinking and imagining the political processes of a determined period. In a strict sense, the name does not express the nature of a thing, but we do believe—and this is what separates us from those who uphold a distinction between leftwing and rightwing populism—that the names tie together historical accumulations. For example, the works of Gunnarsson-Payne laid out in this dossier open a very strategic path for studying the existence of a rightwing populism in northern Europe and its complicity with the patriarchy.

Additionally, we agree with Bosteels when, citing Deleuze and Chauí—though he does so to criticise our ontological proposal—he tells us that 'questions about being are always questions about doing'. Our stance, in regards to this, maintains that populism is the name that codes a very specific historical doing: that which has been organised for fighting against oppression and imagining emancipation. In Latin America, the intellectual work with that legacy has been called national-popular thought. It is from there, and with a calling to reupdate that historical-intellectual legacy, that we wrote our *Seven Essays...* And the entire effort of the book is toward thinking, under the name of populism, a theory of emancipation. We are aware that this position implies resituating the Laclausian legacy, given that in both 'Towards a Theory of Populism' (1977) and *On Populist Reason,* Laclau establishes a distinction between two types of populism. In strictly Laclausian terms, 'Our thesis is that populism consists in the presentation of popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology' (Laclau, 1977: 172-173).[10] But we go a step further, since

---

[10] In regards to the Laclausian legacy, the proposal to radicalise his theory assumes a greater proximity to his first approaches to populist theory as reflected in his text 'Towards a Theory of Populism.' There, he makes a series of clarifications that would disappear from his following works, which are more interested in connecting the Lacanian legacy with the Gramscian legacy in regards to a social formation. In fact, that is the text where he explores the distinction between two types of populism in greater detail. In On Populist Reason, he abandons the terms 'populism of the dominant bloc' and 'populism of the dominated bloc' and, inspired by the work of Chantal Mouffe, goes on to use the distinction between leftwing and rightwing populism. However, in his last book, and despite using that distinction, he does not pursue a theoretical development that would help us to understand in what sense he makes those distinctions. In contrast, Laclau makes the distinction in 'Towards a Theory of Populism' between two types of populism because he is interested in thinking an articulation between populism and socialism. For his part, he distinguishes between two types of contradictions. On the one hand, we find the

Laclau, in the very text we just quoted, was interested in maintaining a distinction between two types of populism: a populism of the dominant bloc and another of the dominated bloc. We quote this essay because that is where the distinction between two types of populism unfolds in a more precise and argued way. While it is true that *On Populist Reason* reestablishes a distinction in terms of rightwing and leftwing populisms, it does not perform a theoretical explication that helps us in understanding the reach of this distinction within his renovated theory of populism[11]. Even if both types of populism develop antagonism, the first does so to implement a reformation of the dominant bloc, whereas the latter, for its part, does so to promote a revolutionary kind of socialist horizon. We do not agree with this distinction because it seems to us that Laclau's position is muddled in this regard and does not help in identifying the political nature of each of these articulations. To our understanding—and this is what we have argued in *Seven Essays...*—the types of political articulation found in the dominant bloc and the dominated bloc are completely different in nature. Laclau considers both cases populism because they both appeal to the antagonism of democratic-popular interpellations. But, for us, appealing to antagonism and popular demands is not enough for identifying a populist experience. We do not believe that the line dividing populist

---

contradictions that are born from the modes of production and defined based on class struggle (socialist discourse). On the other hand, there is the contradiction of a social formation, and it is characterised by the popular democratic struggles organised by the tension between people/power bloc (populist discourse). The first is treated through classic Marxist theory, which is considered a specific type of discourse or radical popular theory. The second, by populism, which goes beyond class distinctions (but not because of that beyond the struggle against oppression). With this distinction, Laclau does not seek to take populism out of a Marxist frame. On the contrary, he is offering us the possibility of articulating the problem of the means of production with the problem of social formation and inscribing both in a socialist continuity. We could say that the great advance of populism has been in offering a theory for how the democratic-popular interpellations (which will end up being called popular demands) are capable of articulating an alternative social formation to neoliberalism (understood as another type of social formation), and taken up again from the perspective of emancipation. But the step we haven't yet taken is that of seeing how this social formation that struggles against the dominant bloc (or oligarchy) is capable of offering an alternative means of production to capitalism. It is also important to understand that it is not the same to make a distinction between two types of populisms (that of the dominant bloc and that of the dominated bloc) when the socialist question over the means of production is open as a horizon that enables the distinction that is to be established, a distinction between leftist populism and rightwing populism without that horizon in mind. Mostly because, on the one hand, one loses sight of the operative dimension that the distinction enables and, on the other, because it ends up equating two practices that enable incommensurate social formations. One points to emancipation and the other to a reformation of the power bloc.

[11] He mentions the distinction on two occasions and refers us to a text by Chantal Mouffe as the theoretical support for this distinction (p. 98). The text by Mouffe referred to is 'The end of politics and the challenge of right-wing populism' (see Panizza, 2005)

practice from the non-populist lies only in its relationship to antagonism, as if the political practices that develop antagonism should be called populist and those that neutralise it (and turn it into a differential system) should be called liberal-parliamentarian. It is necessary to delve a little deeper and try to understand the nature of each articulation and the specific way it employs antagonism. It is also necessary to leave behind the theoretical simplification that tends to identify the state or institutions with non-antagonistic political practices or with the dominant bloc and, thus, with the non-populist. We believe talking about populism requires something else. And we believe, at the same time, that there must be an emancipatory populist theory capable of understanding the role of antagonism (or popular-democratic interpellations) operating and transforming state institutions. We say that Laclau's position is ambivalent because, in his attempt to characterise the two types of populism, he gives us keys for understanding them as phenomena of a different nature. He maintains that the populism of the dominant bloc develops popular-democratic antagonism through 'a set of ideological distortions' (174) that end up defusing emancipatory potential and directing it towards a reformation of the power bloc. And this way of articulating popular-democratic interpellations, adds Laclau, supposes a different kind of articulation, given that popular interpellations are 'articulated in a way which would obstruct its orientation in any revolutionary direction' (173-174). If the so-called populism of the dominant bloc requires, on the one hand, the creation of an ideological diversion and, on the other, the promotion of a different articulation, then it is worth asking why it would make sense to use the name populism in reference to two forms of political articulation that are so dissimilar, especially when Laclau himself created the conditions for saying that populism is 'a peculiar way of articulating popular-democratic interpellations' (172) that appeals to a people tied to a specific antagonism between people/dominant bloc. Over the course of our book, we sought to explore, with greater precision, the ambiguity expressed in Laclausian theory itself, and we tried to think, in a much more concrete way, in what specific sense populism articulates popular-democratic articulations in an emancipatory register. Which means simultaneously developing and differentiating the specific type of articulation that establishes what has been called 'populism of the dominant bloc'. For Laclau, then, an experience becomes populist when 'popular interpellations appear in the ideological discourses of all of them, presented in the form of antagonism and not just of difference' (174), and that antagonistic form can be organised, whether by the dominant bloc or by the dominated bloc. For us, on the contrary, the type of articulation that takes place in each case is distinct and we go so far as to show that the way they establish antagonism is different. The 'populism of the dominant bloc' appeals to the 'popular masses' and configures an *unfolding of antagonism*, since the division people-elite remains contingent on another division presented as more fundamental (below-below)

and is conceived of by that same elite: a people-enemy of the people (migrant, Indigenous, Black, leftist, communist, sexually diverse, feminist, unionised, etc.). This type of antagonism (though one would have to check if the case in question were antagonism or a different way of organizing social discontent) is instrumentalised by one elite in its dispute with another for their place in the power bloc. We have given this form of political articulation the name fascist logic. The so-called 'populism of the dominant bloc' (or rightwing populism) does not constitute a people, rather it seeks to articulate popular-democratic interpellations to foment an interruption in the status quo that, while it never allows for imagining an emancipatory social formation, allows the configuration of a new reformation of the dominant bloc through a sacrificial logic. And we believe that it does not constitute a people because, first, it distorts the idea that the constitutive contradiction is produced between people/dominant bloc, and second, it causes the emergence of an internal contradiction in the dominated bloc: people-enemy of the people. As such, what defines populism for Laclau is a political articulation capable of developing antagonism—and only liberal-parliamentarian tendencies are excluded from populism. For us, in contrast, only popular articulations that give continuity to forms of emancipation whose constitutive contradiction applies to the state and institutions, eluding attempts to create a constitutive contradiction internal to the people, are populist. For us, and perhaps we allude to this when we say that we radicalise the path opened by Laclau, a popular articulation is populist not only when it manages to antagonise with a determined *status quo* (something that can also be found in fascist experiences) but also when it is capable of constructing an emancipatory continuity based on its constitutive antagonism (people/oligarchy). Without that emancipatory doing, there is no populism. In that sense, as Marchart suggests in his text, our book does not seek to be normative or descriptive. Rather, it is an exercise in a very realist political imagination, in the exact sense offered by Mariátegui when he wrote in 1921, 'We can only find reality along paths of fantasy (...) Fantasy, when it fails to bring us closer to reality, is of little use (...) Fantasy has value only when it creates something real'.

Additionally, when Bosteels questions us about 'where the need to grant populism a theoretical and ontological 'statute' 'with its own law' comes from?' and 'Why populism acquires the dignity of a concept only through an ontology of the political?' Our answer can be divided into several steps. First of all, we were interested in undoing the classic prejudice associated with the idea that Latin American political experiences, unless they can pass into use through conceptual filters, are considered 'failed' experiences indebted to 'theoretical frameworks' that they don't entirely fit. As if the problem were in our realities and not in the interpretive frameworks used for understanding them. Thus, when we use the expression 'with its own laws', we are exercising an epis-

temic emancipation that helps us to think about what types of theorisations we are capable of constructing based on Latin-American realities themselves. 'Where does this need come from?'. We might say from our very legacies of Latin American thought and praxis that never tire of shaping theories for thinking and inspiring our social transformations. And, in our particular case, there is the national-popular legacy. Second, we do not claim to grant it the status of ontology but the status of theory. And giving populism the status of theory does not imply 'elevating' it and granting it some type of special status that it previously lacked, rather it implies 'recognizing' in it a practical rationality (or logic) that is constantly denied to our processes under the gaze of certain canons of so-called political correctness, because we are certainly not trying to purify populism through its admission into the realm of theory. Instead, we are critiquing the reductionism with which all processes of theorisation are thought today. In short, we want to overthrow the theory of any kingdom and shatter the 'normative' and purified understandings of political theory so that when we talk about theory we understand a form of practical rationality's functioning related to everything expelled from its understanding upon use. If populism is the stain that expands until disrupting the classical comprehension of the political, its ontological dimension is the cavity or pinhole that we pull through to trip up whoever wants to find an idea of theoretical purity there. And to counteract that idea of purity we talk about the evidential paradigm. Evidence and ontology are not two different procedures but the attempt to gradually give form to an understanding of ontology that escapes the purifications and the *a priori* of thought. Thus, thinking an ontology of emancipation is not an *a priori*, as Marchart would seem to suggest. To believe that we cannot speak of an emancipatory ontology is, precisely, believing that ontology is a realm purified of political language. Our book does not establish an *a priori* ontology of emancipation in one hand and a reflection on Latin American populism in the other, rather it makes an emancipatory ontology emerge from Latin American populist praxis. And of course, to do this we play with the unilateral level of understanding (and thus our book is a kind of inverted mirror to Eurocentric liberal prejudices towards populism) but, at the same time, it is a dialectical work of the negative. Finally, Bosteels is right when he points to certain inconsistencies in our book and based on our efforts to think the play between the historical and the non-historical. But there is one that we would like to develop with greater precision. And it has to do with the distinction between ontic and ontological. This is a distinction inherited from the Heideggerian tradition and whose uses in the field of political theory would seem to reiterate the old Kantian rifts in modernity, as if they were two spheres separate and independent from each other. This positivist point of view (on understanding) for thinking the distinction between ontic and ontological is not where we see our work. In fact, we could have opted not to use that distinction and, in its absence,

employed the distinction between positive and dialectic. We believe that this could have helped us explain that they are not two different spheres but rather two distinct points of view for addressing the same phenomenon. Thus, from this dialectic point of view, we could say that the ontic and the ontological point to a distinction between the instituted and the instituting. And that the instituting supposes—though this is something we should continue to work on—a difficult play between the historical and the non-historical, having yet to explore with greater precision what effect we would seek to have upon installing a dimension of thought that hinders the Kantian and Heideggerian idea of finitude. Though we have not always expressed it clearly, the aim is not to employ it as a privileged or purified resource for maintaining a political position. Perhaps overcoming finitude passes as returning to establish the irreducible of the people, that is, something that cannot be measured in terms of duration.

III.

The final aspect we would like to explore has to do with the link we have established between feminism and populism. Even if all of the articles in this dossier defend the articulation between the two traditions, they also point to a series of limitations to our proposal. At this time, we would like to center mainly on the text by Mercedes Barros and Natalia Martínez Prado and the text by Jenny Gunnarsson-Payne, because both articles are organised around a reflection on the link between feminism and populism, but also because these three thinkers study feminism through the corpus of populism theory. When we ask ourselves about this relationship between feminism and populism, we find very different positions, ranging from sensible negations of this relationship, to the empirical study of their connections (and disconnections), to an interest in constructing a theoretical articulation between the two. And here we find two clearly demarcated positions. On the one hand, those who assume that populism is antipodal to feminism and, on the other, those who find, not only one connection between feminism and populism, but the possibility of thinking a feminist people in a populist register. We see ourselves on the latter path of intellectual work, and we believe Barros, Martínez Prado and Gunnarsson-Payne may also feel great affinity with that proposal.

All of them, together with Graciela Di Marco, are pioneers in their attempts to think the problems of feminism in a populist register. And our last essay, dedicated to feminism, is inspired by the path opened by these intellectuals. They are primarily responsible for the possibility of weaving the idea of a feminist people from Laclausian coordinates. And this idea expresses two different movements absent from the common thesis of comparative politics that perceives this operation as an instrumentalisation, neutralisation or subsuming of feminism by the signifier people or leader. Along those

lines, Di Marco tells us: 'The emergence of the people exceeds feminism, but this is its nodal point' (Di Marco in Di Marco et al, 2019: 51). Though feminism plays a central role in its current articulation, the people cannot be reduced to feminism, nor does this issue blur the boundaries toward a normative evaluation (pure/impure). Instead, there is thought given in political terms to how the articulatory axis shifts with the incursion of feminism onto the scene in the field of the popular.

And, as Barros explores in some of her works, all of this allows for the shaping of *a feminist we*. Along with Martínez Prado, she works on this aspect in the important collective book *Feminismos y populismo del siglo XXI: Frente al patriarcado y al orden neoliberal* (Barros and Martínez Prado, 2019). There, thet uphold the thesis that, in the case of Argentina, there is an articulation between the feminist movement and Kirchnerism through the defense of human rights as a space for inscribing a feminist we that, without the emergence of populist governments, would not have been possible. Gunnarsson-Payne, for her part in that same book, shows us something not always considered when studying — within the sphere of political science — the advance of an antifeminist right, namely, the role of global corporations and gender equality's paradoxical complicity with 'progressive' neoliberalism in creating the conditions for the emergence of extreme rightwing experiences in Europe and Latin America. That is, she shows that the issue of populism (leftwing/rightwing) cannot be disassociated from the more structural issue of neoliberalism and the corporate powers (Di Marco et al, 2019: 47-60). Thus, it seems to us that the path opened by Gunnarsson-Payne for thinking, in a global register, the two conflicting types of feminism (neoliberal feminism and progressive feminism) is very illuminating for understanding the conflicts between populism and a certain neoliberal feminism. Yet, at the same time, as she herself suggests in her article, her research on the affinities (or articulations) that are being produced between 'antiestablishment' discourses and anti-gender discourses has been very important, given that the extreme rightwing is attempting, via those affinities, to identify the discourse of sexual diversity with the elite and to promote a popular reactionary sentiment towards feminism.

Having said that, Barros and Martínez Prado's warning indicates that the path of investigation we have opened runs the risk of once again closing due to the presuppositions that we are acting on, given that we run 'the risk of making a story that ends up hindering the amazement of populist politics and, most importantly, undermines the contingency, arbitrariness and power of the borders that all politics births and that populism par excellence places center stage'. The first thing to doubt is the centrality accorded to care within feminism. The authors ask us what the criteria is for giving such a prominent place to a term that is not always at the center of feminist debates. The

first thing we would like to set forth is that, for us, the problem of care is not the privileged place of the feminist struggle, nor do we intend to assign it such a role in the book. Our decision was not based on normative or evaluative criteria, but on practical or strategic reasons that the occasion itself presented. The reasons why we chose that issue are threefold. First of all, because the issue of care is a crossroads between the popular field and institutions. Both spaces work on this problem and create synergies that translate into public policy. Second, because even if we don't finish exploring it in this book, the problem of care has a long history in the western philosophical tradition. We find it in the entire Greco-Latin legacy beginning with the political/ethical problem of care and knowledge of self. But it is also present in the dawning of modernity through the ambivalence of the cartesian cogito — which means care as well as thought — until its contemporary reactivation in crucial philosophical projects like Heidegger's and Foucault's. We were thus interested in exploring what it could mean for feminism to treat an ancient problem like the issue of care and what its novel aspects could be. And finally, as we argue in the book, because it seems to us that a certain feminist interpretation of care — the one that supplants a Marxist framework for work with an ethical-normative perspective — creates the ontological obstacles to articulating populism and feminism. That was why we felt it was strategic to perform a very Hegelian operation of showing how that which is seen to be antipodal (care and antagonism) can actually be thought dialectically in a single theoretical register. On the other hand, we believe that Barros and Martínez Prado are right when they suggest that we have not finished thinking the most classical Marxist framework of care and its tensions with the populist reading. It seems to us that we should more rigorously explore, not so much the disagreements, but a possible connection between the popular-democratic articulations of populism and the question of means of production that domestic care work presents.

In regards to the ontological dimension of the question that Barros and Martínez Prado's text would seem to pose, we would like to make a clarification, mostly because it gives rise to some criticisms about how to think representation, difference and the ties between feminism and populism that have nothing to do with our own ontological approaches. Instead, they are related to the ontological positions that we ourselves critique over the course of the book. The logic of the Not-All that we use for thinking populism supposes an opening and a heterogeneity but at no time have we equated that with the idea of an absence of representation or a multiple conception of reality. The ontology of multiplicity, where feminist autonomism is situated, is precisely what we have come to problematise. Nor do we propose an opening toward alterity, given that we take a distance from this Levinasian tradition of thinking the political. Our position, instead, consists in assuming that the One gets articulated as Not-All. When we

take up Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's expression '*La Patria es el otro*' ('The home-land is the other'), we do so to show that this 'other' is the heterogeneity that constitutes us. And from there, we think both feminism and populism, which both require closures, borders and attachments. All of them appear in any organisation that needs, at the same time, to define an identity and renegotiate it constantly. Without having to look further, many of the debates about which identities do (or do not) fall within feminism can be found there. If this were pure opening and hospitality toward alterity, all of the tensions that characterise the movement would not exist. We do not promote the 'Universalism that is not One' but the Universal (One) that fails. Nor do we think that feminism is marked, in its very constitution, by a differential logic. On the contrary, it seems to us that we are in a context where what we understand by feminism is undergoing a series of mutations, and there are transformative questions about why movement logic — very particular to the 90s — is no longer sufficient for thinking about what is happening to the signifier feminism. As such, this is where our intellectual wager stands in the book.

The other problem that the authors of the dossier perceive, highlighted by Gunnarsson-Payne and Marchart, has to do with the challenge of thinking the figure of the leader through feminism. We believe that Gunnarsson-Payne's approach (which could serve as a response to Marchart) is very illuminating. Even if she does not put it in these terms, she suggests a tension between the history of feminism and the theoretical interpretations of the most hegemonic feminists. And this tension is due, on the one hand, to our many examples of important leaders within feminism, and on the other, to a feminist theory, of an autonomist kind, that wants to measure the strength of the movement by how multiple, horizontal and leaderless it is, while also identifying the figure of a leader with the patriarchy. The problem that Gunnarsson-Payne finds in our reading, therefore, is not so much about the effort we make to think the figure of the leader in feminism as it is about the type of ontological reading we make of this figure. According to her, the Freud-Laclau schema does not work because, on the one hand, there would be a constant instability and confrontation in the production of feminist leadership roles (many of them informal). And, on the other hand, because the libidinal bond could be organised by an idea embodied in more than one body. We believe that these two objections are very important for continuing to think the possibilities of a populist feminism. In regards to the first point, we consider that the same approach that Gunnarsson-Payne offers could apply; namely, would it not be the autonomist theoretical interpretation that equates the libidinal bond with an idea and not with historical individuals who incarnate it and create the libidinal bond around the idea? Perhaps one would have to ask if these interpretations upon use don't end up infiltrating the reading of the praxis. In regards to the second issue, it seems to us that we will have to

wait and see how the figures of feminist leaderships evolve in spheres that escape the pure movement logic. We ask ourselves about the role of figures like Francia Márquez or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner who, even if they are not organised under the assembly logic of a social movement, articulate the popular field through their feminist leadership—though they are not exclusively limited to that figure. Perhaps we are entering a new phase that demands, as we said above, expanding the narrow interpretative frame of social movements and making it extend to more complex, transversal and proactive forms of popular organizing—instituting and instituted—to continue imagining a feminist, anti-classist, antiracist people in an emancipatory register.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alemán, J. (2016) *Horizontes neoliberales en la subjetividad*, Buenos Aires: Grama Ediciones.

Barros, M. and Martínez Prado, N. (2019) 'Mejor no hablar de ciertas cosas. Feminismo y populismo', in Di Marco, G., Fiol, A. and Schwarz, P. (eds.) *Feminismos y populismos del siglo XXI. Frente al patriarcado y al orden neoliberal*, Buenos Aires: Teseo.

Biglieri, P. and Cahadia, L. (2021) *Seven Essays on Populism. For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bosteels, B. (2014) *The Actuality of Communism*, London: Verso.

Cadahia, L. (2017) *Mediaciones de lo sensible*, Buenos Aires-Madrid: FCE.

Coronel, V. (2022) *La última guerra de las luces: revolución liberal y republicanismo popular en Ecuador*, Quito: FLACSO-Ecuador.

Di Marco, G.; Fiol, A and Schwarz, P (eds.) (2019) *Feminismos y populismos del siglo XXI. Frente al patriarcado y al orden neoliberal*, Buenos Aires: Teseo.

Duque, F. (2011) 'Estudio Preliminar' in Hegel, W.F., *La Ciencia de la Lógica*, Madrid: Abada.

Figueroa, J. (2021) *Republicanos Negros*, Bogotá: Planeta.

Foucault, Michel (2010). *The Government of Self and Others*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gunnarsson Payne, J. and Tornhill, S. (2019) '¿Atrapadxs entre el neoliberalismo y el populismo autoritario? Movilización illiberal, feminismo corporativo y crítica anticapitalista' in Di Marco, G., Fiol, A. and Schwarz, P. (eds.) *Feminismos y populismos del siglo XXI. Frente al patriarcado y al roden neoliberal*, Buenos Aires: Teseo.

Hegel, G.W.F. (2010). *The Science of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laclau, E. (1977) 'Towards a Theory of Populism', in *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism*, London: New Left Books.

Laclau, E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2014) *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society*, London: Verso.

Laclau. E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, London: Verso.

Lasso, M. (2007) *Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia 1795–1831*, Pittsburgh (PA): University of Pittsburgh Press.

Marchart, O. (2007) *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marchart, O. (2018) *Thinking Antagonism,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Mouffe, C. (2005) 'The end of politics and the challenge of right-wing populism', in F. Panizza (ed.) *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy,* London: Verso.

Sanders, J.E. (2004) *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia,* Durham: Duke University Press.

V a r i a

V a r i a

A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE SELF-OWNERSHIP CHALLENGE

WALTER E. BLOCK
Joseph A. Butt, S.J. College of Business
Loyola University, New Orleans (USA)
wblock@loyno.edu

MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN
Independent Scholar
San Francisco, CA (USA)
DrEdelstein@ThreeMinuteTherapy.com

ABSTRACT
We all, all of us, without exception, consist of nothing more than property owned by other people: the sperm from our fathers, the egg and nine month's worth of sustenance from our mothers. That being the case, how is it that we come to own ourselves? The present paper attempts to wrestle with this conundrum.

KEYWORDS
Libertarianism; slavery; self-ownership; property; rights; ownership; human beings; contract

I.   INTRODUCTION

When we were born, our bodies were made up, entirely, by property owned by other people: our parents supplied the sperm, the egg, and nine month's worth of food. This being the case, and, also, given libertarian private property rights theory, how can any of us, our parents included,[1] claim to be owners of ourselves, given that we are all comprised of material owned by others. This challenge has been thrown at libertarians,

---

[1] Since they face the same problem as do we, ad infinitum.

in an attempt to undermine their position.[2] Libertarians have attempted to defend this philosophy,[3] but, in our view, not fully successfully. The present paper is an attempt to add to this latter literature. But, before we begin, a few words.

Even if libertarians can never nail this one down, this does not constitute an utter annihilation of this perspective. Other disciplines, too, do not have all the answers. For example, physicists do not know what occurred before the Big Bang, nor how it came to be. As well, they are still quarrelling over whether reality consists of waves or particles. Astronomers have not yet determined whether Pluto is a planet or not. There are unresolved issues, too, in economics, political science, sociology, chemistry, biology, as well. And, yet, these fields of study survive, quite nicely, without a full resolution of all issues.

The same applies in the present case. Even if we cannot bat this one out of the park, libertarianism will still stand. And, indeed, this is not the only puzzle presently challenging the freedom philosophy.[4]

In section II we offer our partial solution to this problem. Section III discusses implicit contracts and IV abandonment. We conclude in section V.

II.   A PARTIAL SOLUTION

The conundrum for libertarians is the fact that in this philosophy, private property rights are sacrosanct, and so is human freedom. Yet, the two at least appear to be at odds with one another. Consider the fact that the fetus consists entirely of property owned by two other people: his father and mother. From the former, the baby is created out of, and consists of no more than, the sperm, at least initially. From the mother, ditto for the egg, plus the material with which she furnishes him for the next nine months. But if he consists of nothing apart from material furnished by, owned by, these two other people, then, by all that is sacred and holy about private property rights, he should be owned by them. Where, then, is there any room for human freedom and self-ownership, about which libertarians also pride themselves.[5] Worse, those two parents suffer from the same malady vis a vis their own parents, and so on, which leads if

---

[2] See on this Alstott, 2004; Cohen, 1992; Curchin, 2007; Fried, 2004, 2005; Hicks, 2015; Jeske, 1996; Okin, 1991; Shnayderman, 2012; Woollard, 2016.

[3] Block, 2016; Dyke and Block, unpublished; Kinsella, 2006; MacIntosh, 2007; Steiner, 1994A, pp. 242-248, 1994B, 2002, 2008; Vallentyne, 2000, 2002, 2008; Vallentyne, Steiner and Otsuka, 2005; Young, 2015

[4] Libertarians debate abortion, immigration, the death penalty, without any clear resolution in sight.

[5] There is of course a seeming exception for voluntary slavery, but, this is, paradoxically, is an embodiment of freedom, not its denigration. In the view of Boldrin and Levine (2008, 254): "Take the case of

not to an infinite regress, to a very long one. It extends at least as far back as the existence of the first human beings.

How can we save our freedom perspective from this philosophical morass? One easy response is that all parents, everywhere and at all times, make a free gift to their children of the freedom of the latter. The difficulty here is that while this is likely to be the case, we cannot count on it always being true. We offer two responses: implicit contracts and explicit ones.

III.   IMPLICIT CONTRACTS

Suppose you go to a restaurant, order a cup of coffee and drink it down. Whereupon they present you with a bill for $1 million. Are you obligated to pay this gargantuan amount of money? Of course not. If the proprietors of this establishment really want to charge you this astronomical figure, they may of course do so. Price controls are not compatible with libertarianism. But they are obliged to notify you, in advance, of this fact. They may not be obligated to go through the same intensive rigmarole as if you had purchased a house for this amount of money, but they must be clear, very clear, that this is the cost of a cup of coffee at their eating establishment. Perhaps, even, the contract should be notarized. In the absence of any such explicit agreement, there is an implicit contract that the price of this beverage is a reasonable one. That is, a buck or two; alright, in a fancy eatery, maybe $5; $10, tops. Can this implicit contract be overridden by an explicit one along the lines we have suggested? Yes. All capitalist acts between consenting adults are licit under libertarian law.

What is the implicit contract, then, between parents and children? Unless we are barking mad, it is that the former give the latter the aforementioned sperm, egg, sustenance, as a gift. The child is thus a free person, a self-owner, and there need be no regression, let alone an indefinitely large one, as previously supposed.

Does this solve the problem? Not completely, unfortunately.[6] The flaw in the ointment is that when parents hear that they can indeed over-ride implicit contracts with

---

slavery. Why should people not be allowed to sign private contracts binding them to slavery? In fact economists have consistently argued against slavery – during the 19th century David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill engaged in a heated public debate with literary luminaries such as Charles Dickens, with the economists opposing slavery, and the literary giants arguing in favor." For more on this rejection of inalienability see Andersson, 2007; Block, 1969, 1979, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004A, 2005, 2006, 2007A, 2007B, 2009A, 2009B; Frederick, 2014; Kershnar, 2003; Lester, 2000; Mosquito, 2014, 2015; Nozick, 1974, pp. 58, 283, 331; Steiner, 1994, pp. 232; Thomson, 1990, pp. 283-84.

[6] It is still worthwhile to publish an incomplete paper such as the present one. Progress, no necessarily perfection, is our motto. Hopefully, this incomplete defense of libertarianism will trigger others to leap upon our shoulders, and complete the task, one fine day.

explicit ones, as in the coffee case, they can do so in this one as well. Presumably, very few parents will do this, and thus be in a position to make literal slaves of their children. The overwhelming majority will do the decent thing and continue to abide by the implicit contract we are positing. They can make no such contract with their child at the time of sexual intercourse; for he is not yet in existence. For a contract to occur, an implicit or an explicit one, there must be two parties to it; in this case, parents on one side of the agreement, the child on the other. No, the overriding here consists of the parents agreeing with one another to override the freedom oriented implicit contract, and substitute for it an enslaving explicit contract. The parents refuse to "give" anything to their child. This solution perhaps is a step in the direction of solving the conundrum; virtually no parents will override the implicit contract granting freedom to their child; but we cannot award ourselves the proverbial cigar, since there could be exceptions to this general rule.

IV.   ABANDONMENT

Politician A puts out his garbage at the front of his property. He has a contract with a sanitation firm to come pick it up and dispose of it. But along comes politician B who steals this refuse, with the goal of unearthing embarrassing secrets to A's detriment. We know that B is a crook.[7] He stole private property. But who did he rob? A or the garbage removal service? We claim B stole from the sanitation company, not from A. The latter has "washed his hands" of this refuse; yet, it was still on his property at the time of the theft, but is was not owned by the garbage firm. Why do we make this claim? It is because A *abandoned* what would otherwise be considered his property. He left it at the front of this house in order to more easily be picked up, taken away.[8] He wanted no part of it anymore. If not for the fact that A abandoned this material, in favor of the disposal company, B would have been within his rights to grab it.

In like manner, the father *abandoned* his sperm. He "disposed" of it. He no longer had any right to it. He now has no more right to this part of his body than A had to his leavings when he set them out at his curbside.[9]

What of the mother? Has she also abandoned her egg? Not at all; it still remains inside her body. She has no more given up her egg any more than A did his garbage before he placed it near the street for pickup Nor has the mother abandoned the food she gives to the baby for the nine months of her pregnancy. So can we then say that the

---

[7] A probably is, too, but that is an entirely different matter.

[8] For a discussion of abandonment from a libertarian point of view, see Block, 2004B, 2015; Block and Nelson, 2015; Kinsella, 2003, 2009A, 2009B, 2009C, 2011; Long, 1993

[9] We abstract from the disanalogous contract A had with the garbage removal service.

mother can seize slavery ownership over her child, whereas the father may not? If we said this, we would be halfway forward in the direction of defending libertarian theory against this criticism. But we cannot aver any such claim. Instead, we interpret her continued willingness to remain pregnant as her agreement to give her egg to the being who is now her son. She makes this gift to him right after he is created.[10] She cannot do this at the time of intercourse since the baby does not yet exist at this point. There is no one, yet, for her to give any gift to. But she can and indeed does precisely this as demonstrated (Rothbard, 1956) by her willingness to remain pregnant. So, neither she nor the father of her child may properly claim ownership rights over the latter.

Are we there yet? Have we now fully defended the freedom philosophy against this objection, instead of only partially, as with the implicit contract argument? Unfortunately, we have not. There still remains a loophole through which a determined set of parents can drive the proverbial truck.

Who says that the father must of necessity abandon his sperm? He may well deny it. Politician A can put a sign on his garbage, placed at the edge of his acreage, saying: "This trash is mine. Do not remove it." So can the father make an oath to his wife and others if need be that he is *not* abandoning his sperm. He intends that this former part of his body will now form part of his son, who he will subsequently hold in the bond of slavery. He can have his statement to this effect notarized so that there can be no question of his continued property rights in his sperm.

At first glance, the mother is in a worse position than the father in terms of asserting ownership over her son. As we have seen, by remaining pregnant, we deduce she is making a gift of her egg and the food she confers on her baby. But, cannot she rescind this? Our deduction is merely by way of an implicit contract. Cannot the mother say, in effect, to the child, that unless you agree to be my slave, I'm withdrawing this gift of mine to you? It is now too late to withdraw the egg. This is already part of her child. But she may evict the baby from her premises, whereupon it will die, at least in the first two semesters, given present medical technology (Block, 2014).

It cannot be denied that all this talk about making a contract with a youngster, still in the womb, can only be characterized as lunatic; or, to put a better slant on this, as highly theoretical.[11] Suppose, then, that the court appoints new guardian for this baby. This worthy has the best interests of the child at heart, we may not unreasonably posit. He acts in behalf of the baby, since the mother is threatening not to do so, either by acting in such a way that he will die, or become her slave. His guiding principle is to promote the welfare of this still unborn child. "Death before dishonor" has ringing tones, but let

---

[10] We regard the beginning of the child's existence when the two celled fertilized egg comes into being.

[11] We reject the appellation "ridiculous." Why? The mother who makes this threat can no longer be considered his guardian (Block, 2011).

us posit that what is best for this baby is to be the alive slave of his parents, rather than deceased, due to being evicted from the womb before he reaches the safety of the third trimester. Where there is life, there is hope. His parents will likely pre-decease him. Perhaps they will manumit him before that point, although they need not do that, since the proper master of the slave has the right to kill him. This would not be considered murder; e.g, unjustified killing.

V.   CONCLUSION

We do not fool ourselves into thinking we have nailed this conundrum. But the perfect is the enemy of the good, and this challenge is a convoluted one. We content ourselves in the thought that an imperfect attempt to solve a problem is better than none. It is perhaps a good first step in that direction. Hopefully, other writers will continue this process and improve the product, just as we have tried to stand on the shoulders of the scholars whose efforts we cite.

REFERENCES

Alstott, Anne. 2004. No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Andersson, Anna-Karin. 2007. "An alleged contradiction in Nozick's entitlement theory." Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall: 43–63; http://mises.org/journals/jls/21_3/21_3_3.pdf

Block, Walter E. 1969. "Voluntary Slavery." The Libertarian Connection, Vol. I, No. 3, April 13, pp. 9-11.

Block, Walter E. 1979. Book review of Nancy C. Baker, Baby Selling: the Scandal of Black Market Adoptions, New York: The Vanguard Press, 1978; in Libertarian Review, January, Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 44-45.

Block, Walter E. 1999. "Market Inalienability Once Again: Reply to Radin," Thomas Jefferson Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall, pp. 37-88.

Block, Walter E. 2001. "Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism and the Law: Reply to Kronman," American Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer, pp. 351-371.

Block, Walter E. 2002. "A Libertarian Theory of Secession and Slavery," June 10; http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block15.html

Block, Walter E. 2003. "Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein," Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol.17, No. 2, Spring, pp. 39-85.

Block, Walter E. 2004A. "Are Alienability and the Apriori of Argument Logically Incompatible?" Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 1.

Block, Walter E. 2004B. "Libertarianism, Positive Obligations and Property Abandonment: Children's Rights," International Journal of Social Economics; Vol. 31, No. 3, pp 275-286.

Block, Walter E. 2005. "Ayn Rand and Austrian Economics: Two Peas in a Pod." The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring, pp. 259-269.

Block, Walter E. 2006. "Epstein on alienation: a rejoinder" International Journal of Social Economics; Vol. 33, Nos. 3-4, pp. 241-260.

Block, Walter E. 2007A. "Secession," Dialogue. No. 4; pp. 1-14; http://www.uni-svishtov.bg/dialog/2007/4.07.WB.pdf

Block, Walter E. 2007B. "Alienability: Reply to Kuflik." Humanomics Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 117-136.

Block, Walter E. 2009A. "Yes, Sell Rivers! And Make Legal Some Slave Contracts" The Tyee. July 25; http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2009/07/24/SellRivers/

Block, Walter E. 2009B. "Privatizing Rivers and Voluntary Slave Contracts" July 27; http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block134.html

Block, Walter E. 2011. "Terri Schiavo: A Libertarian Analysis" *Journal of Libertarian Studies*; Vol. 22, pp. 527–536.

Block, Walter E. 2014. "Evictionism and Libertarianism." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 290-294.

Block, Walter E. 2015. "Expiration of private property rights." The Journal of Philosophical Economics. Vol. VIII, Issue 2, Spring.

Block, Walter E. 2016. "How we come to own ourselves." Polish Academich Journal - Societas et Ius Version; Issue 5.

Block, Walter E. and Peter Lothian Nelson. 2015. Water Capitalism: The Case for Privatizing Oceans, Rivers, Lakes, and Aquifers. New York City, N.Y.: Lexington Books; Rowman and Littlefield.

Boldrin, Michele and David K. Levine. 2008. Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; http://www.dklevine.com/general/intellectual/against.htm; http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectual/against.htm; http://mises.org/store/Against-Intellectual-Monopoly-P552.aspx

Cohen, Joshua. 1992. "Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family." Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 263-286; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.1992.10717280?src=recsys

Curchin. Katherine. 2007. "Debate: Evading the Paradox of Universal Self-Ownership." https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00288.x

Dyke, Jeremiah and Walter E. Block. Unpublished. "'I Am Here Now' and Our Claim to Self-Ownership"

Frederick, Danny. 2014. "Voluntary Slavery," Las Torres de Lucca 4: 115-37, http://www.lastorresdelucca.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=145:laesclavitud-voluntaria&Itemid=24&lang=en

Fried, Barbara. 2004. "Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay." Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 32 (Winter): pp. 66–92.

Fried, Barbara. 2005. "Left-Libertarianism, Once More: A Rejoinder to Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka." Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33 (Spring): pp. 216–222.

Hicks, Daniel J. 2015. "On Okin's critique of libertarianism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 45, Issue 1, pp. 37-57; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2014.996118?journalCode=rcjp20

Jeske, Diane. 1996. "Libertarianism, Self-Ownership, and Motherhood." Social Theory and Practice. Vol. 22 (Summer), pp. 137–160.

Kershnar, Stephen. 2003. "A Liberal Argument for Slavery," Journal of Social Philosophy, 34 (4): 510-36.

Kinsella, Stephan N. 2003. "A libertarian theory of contract: title transfer, binding promises, and inalienability" Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring, pp. 11–37; http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_2.pdf;   http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_2.pdf

Kinsella, N. Stephan. 2006. "How We Come to Own Ourselves." September 7; http://www.mises.org/story/2291

Kinsella, Stephan. 2009A. "A Critique of Mutualist Occupancy." August 2;

http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/08/a-critique-of-mutualist-occupancy/; http://blog.mises.org/10386/a-critique-of-mutualist-occupancy/

Kinsella, Stephan. 2009B. "Left-Libertarians on Rothbardian Abandonment." August 22; http://www.stephankinsella.com/2009/08/left-libertarians-on-rothbardian-abandonment/

Kinsella, Stephan N. 2009C. "Homesteading, Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the Civil Law." May 22; http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-and-unowned-land-in-the-civil-law/

Kinsella, Stephan N. 2011. "The relation between the non-aggression principle and property rights: a response to Division by Zer0." October 4;

http://blog.mises.org/18608/the-relation-between-the-non-aggression-principle-and-property-rights-a-response-to-division-by-zer0/

Lester, Jan Clifford. 2000. Escape from Leviathan. St. Martin's Press. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0312234163/qid%3D989845939/107-8070279-6411737

Long, Roderick T. 1993. "Abortion, Abandonment, and Positive Rights: The Limits of Compulsory Altruism," Social Philosophy and Policy vol. 10 no.1, Winter, pp. 166-191; http://praxeology.net/RTL-Abortion.htm

MacIntosh, Duncan. 2007. "Who Owns Me: Me or My Mother? How to Escape Okin's Problem for Nozick's and Narveson's Theory of Entitlement." In Liberty, Games and Contracts: Narveson and the Defence of Libertarianism, edited by Malcolm Murray, 157–172, Chap. 11. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.

Mosquito, Bionic. 2014. "The Sanctity of Contract." April 19;

http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-sanctity-of-contract.html

Mosquito, Bionic. 2015. "Walter Block, Specific Performance Contracts, and Abortion." July 12; http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2015/07/walter-block-specific-performance.html

Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, http://www.amazon.com/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465097200

Okin, Susan Moller. 1991. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books.

Rothbard. Murray N. 1997 [1956]. "Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics." reprinted in "The Logic of Action" Vol. I. Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar. pp. 211-254; http://www.mises.org/rothbard/toward.pdf

Shnayderman, Ronen. 2012. "Freedom, self-ownership, and equality in Steiner's left-libertarianism," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 219-227.

Steiner, Hillel. 1994A. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2mi4-xFgT7NNWhEQWNhbXB6enc/view

Steiner, Hillel. 1994B. "The Fruits of Body-Builders' Labour." In Ethics and Biotechnology, edited by AnthonyDyson and JohnHarris, pp. 64–78. London: Routledge.

Steiner, Hillel. 2002. "Self-Ownership, Begetting, and Germ-Line Information." In A Companion to Genethics, edited by JustineBurley and JohnHarris, pp. 317–324. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Steiner, Hillel. 2008. "Debate: Universal Self-ownership and the Fruits of One's Labour: A Reply to Curchin." Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 350–355. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00318.x.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1990. The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Vallentyne, Peter. 2000. "Introduction: Left-Libertarianism – A Primer." In Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner, 1–20. Hampshire, UK and New York, NY: Palgrave.

Vallentyne, Peter. 2002. "Equality and the Duties of Procreators." In The Moral and Political Status of Children, edited by David Archard and Colin Macleod, 195–211, Chap. 11. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vallentyne, Peter. 2012. "Libertarianism." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition). Accessed July 23. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/libertarianism/

Vallentyne, Peter, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka. 2005. "Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried." Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 33, Spring, pp. 201–215.

Wisniewski, Jakub Bozydar. 2010a. "A Critique of Block on Abortion and Child Abandonment." Libertarian Papers Vol. 2, No. 16;

http://libertarianpapers.org/2010/16-wisniewski-block-on-abortion/

Woollard, Fiona. 2016. "I, Me, Mine: Body-Ownership and the Generation Problem, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 98, No. S1, pp. 87-108.

Young, Andrew T. 2015. "Argumentation Ethics and the Question of Self Ownership." Journal of Private Enterprise 30(3), pp. 79–88; file:///C:/Users/WBlock/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/Content.Outlook/6I1PKZ08/Argumentation%20Ethics%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20Self-Ownership.pdf

HOBBES, MONTAIGNE E LA DIFFERENZA DEI COSTUMI

PAOLO SLONGO
Università degli Studi di Padova
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia,
Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata
slongopaolo@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
The article aims to focus on the problem of the "difference of Manners" in the eleventh chapter of *Leviathan*. Through the analysis of the text, it emerges how the problem posed here by Hobbes seems to recall in some way what emerges in Montaigne's *Essais*, when he speaks of the diversity, or of the variety, of the *mœurs*. It is therefore a question of asking whether what Hobbes is talking about are ways of being individuals capable of reacting with greater or less pertinence to a given situation. Or if it is instead a question of rigidly codified behaviors, customs proper to a certain group or a certain population. It is therefore necessary to understand what role instruction and education by the public authority have in *Leviathan* in regulating and disciplining the conduct of the subjects and their ways of life, in order to ensure the maintenance of the political order.

KEYWORDS
Hobbes, Manners, Montaigne, Conducts, Instruction

1. LE 'MANIERE' NELLO STATO CIVILE

John Florio, il primo traduttore in inglese dei *Saggi* di Montaigne[1], nel suo celebre dizionario bilingue italiano-inglese del 1598, alla voce «*Costumi*» e alla voce «*Maniere*» rinvia in entrambi i casi a «*Manner*» come al loro primo significato. Suggerendo nella traduzione l'equivalenza semantica dei due termini, Florio porta nell'ordine: «*manner, fashion, use, custome, woont*»[2]. Nel secolo XVI e XVII anche il francese «*maniere*», uso sostantivato dell'aggettivo «*manier*» (i filologi moderni lo fanno derivare da *manus*), poteva essere adoperato come sinonimo di *mœurs* (o *meurs*, come talvolta ancora si legge in Montaigne), cioè di "costumi". E tuttavia

---

[1] The Essayes, or Morall, Politike and Millitarie Discourses of Michaell Lord of Montaigne, trad. J. Florio, Printed by V. Sims for E. Blount, 3 Voll., London 1603.

[2] J. Florio, A Worlde of Wordes, Edward Blount, London 1598, p. 215.

"maniere di essere" e "costumi" non si sovrappongono esattamente quanto al loro significato. La prima espressione rinvia infatti ad uno *stile*, ad un certo tipo di condotta o di comportamento che non necessariamente è indicizzato a una visione comune delle cose. La seconda, "*mœurs*", concerne una condotta collettiva, spesso ben stabilita, una consuetudine (*coutume*) talvolta anche codificata e, per ciò stesso, perfettamente identificabile. Nel primo caso l'originalità della condotta individuale mantiene un suo ruolo, il soggetto può pretendere cioè di praticare, malgrado tutto, uno spazio che ritiene essere di libertà; nel secondo è richiesta piuttosto la conformità alla regola preesistente, ad una relativa omogeneità delle condotte soggettive. Le "maniere" si trovano, in questo caso, ad essere legate a convenienze e consuetudini sociali già stabilite e, quindi, restano espressione delle *mœurs*, dei costumi (*mores*) effettivamente in uso in un determinato tempo e in un determinato luogo. La questione da pensare è perciò la seguente: le maniere di essere particolari non sono nient'altro che l'applicazione obbligata dei costumi? Del *dentro* che si esteriorizza in un *fuori*? O piuttosto i costumi lasciano spazio ad uno stile che, pur iscrivendosi in una configurazione riconosciuta, è tuttavia in grado di imprimere alla pratica di sé il proprio contrassegno rispetto a un uso socialmente accettato e consolidato storicamente per la sua forza consuetudinaria[3]?

Partiremo dal capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano*[4], "*Of the difference of manners*", che ci aiuterà a mettere a fuoco il problema che cerchiamo di indagare. Quando Hobbes parla qui della diversità o della «varietà» delle *manners* si tratta di maniere d'essere *individuali*, suscettibili di reagire con maggiore o minor pertinenza ad una situazione data, oppure si tratta di comportamenti codificati, costumi propri ad un certo gruppo o ad una certa popolazione, come era ancora in Montaigne? E soprattutto: quale peso i caratteri e l'educazione degli uomini hanno sulle condotte di ognuno e sulla necessità del mantenimento dell'ordine nel *Common-wealth*? Da un lato è certo che nel capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano* ciò di cui si tratta è una «inclinazione generale» che si riferisce ad una caratteristica comune e sempre uguale

---

[3] Sulla redazione scritta del diritto consuetudinario in rapporto al tema dell'abitudine ci permettiamo di rinviare al nostro La forza della consuetudine. Costumi, costituzione, governo in Montaigne e Montesquieu, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2020. La bibliografia sul concetto di "abitudine" è vastissima. Per una ricognizione complessiva si veda almeno M. Piazza, L'antagonista necessario. Il pensiero francese dell'abitudine da Montaigne a Deleuze, Mimesis, Milano 2015, e Id., Creature dell'abitudine. Abito, costume, seconda natura da Aristotele alle scienze cognitive, il Mulino, Bologna 2018. Cfr. anche T. Sparrow, A. Hutchison, a cura di, A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu, Lexington Books, Langham 2013. Sulla declinazione politica del concetto di abitudine si veda la sezione monografica della rivista «Conceptos Históricos», 6, 9, 2020, intitolata "El Hábito como Concepto Político".

[4] Il Leviathan è citato da T. Hobbes, Leviathan, edited with an Introduction by C. B. Macpherson, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1985; la traduzione utilizzata è: Hobbes, Leviatano, o la materia, la forma e il potere di uno Stato ecclesiastico, trad. it. a cura di A. Pacchi con la collaborazione di A. Lupoli, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2004 (d'ora in poi Leviatano, con l'indicazione del numero del capitolo e della pagina seguito, ove presente, da quello dell'edizione inglese).

a se stessa, in qualche modo "naturale"[5] per l'umanità nel suo insieme; dall'altro però si tratta di rendere conto delle reazioni individuali più o meno adattate alle circostanze (*circumstances*) – cioè ai contesti 'ambientali' che si presentano di volta in volta –, il che lascerebbe supporre che su un fondo di "naturalità" l'artificio è comunque in grado di intervenire senza pregiudicare per questo il suo statuto.

Il concetto di *manners* – 'costumi' – compare nel *Leviatano* a designare un insieme di comportamenti regolari che consentono di descrivere la vita collettiva degli uomini. Qui la nozione di 'costumi' non soltanto non sembra avere una dimensione assiologica, ma non rinvia a comportamenti la cui specificità differenzia un gruppo umano da un altro, da questa o quell'epoca, in cui la consuetudine, l'abitudine, la lunga durata, sarebbero i fattori costitutivi. Al contrario, le *manners* indicano un insieme di tendenze ad agire presenti nella 'natura umana', e sono esplicitamente definite attraverso la distinzione dall'idea di 'uso' che sarebbe invece storicamente relativa: «Per COSTUMI (*Manners*) – scrive Hobbes all'inizio del capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano* sul quale ci concentreremo – non intendo qui il comportamento educato (*Decency*) come il modo in cui si dovrebbe salutare un'altra persona o il modo in cui si dovrebbe lavarsi la bocca o usare gli stuzzicadenti in compagnia e altre questioni di *buona educazione* (*Small Morals*), ma piuttosto quelle qualità umane che interessano la loro vita associata (*living together*) in pace e in unità»[6]. L'attaccamento alla consuetudine, nel senso del diritto consuetudinario (assunto per distinguere il giusto dall'ingiusto), sarà descritto da Hobbes come un'inclinazione che si spiega solo per mezzo dell'*ignoranza* delle fonti autentiche della "giustizia"[7].

La prima parte del *Leviatano* («Dell'uomo») segue una traiettoria che va dall'interno all'esterno o, per meglio dire, dall'elemento 'psico-fisiologico' a quello sociale. Il capitolo decimo dell'opera ha messo in luce il funzionamento pratico del confronto a partire dalla stima sociale di qualcuno in funzione delle proprie qualità naturali o della posizione che occupa nel mondo. Si tratta in particolare, per Hob-

---

[5] Carl Schmitt rileva come nella teoria hobbesiana della sovranità il fondamento naturalistico – le passioni e i bisogni degli esseri umani – coesiste con l'apertura verso un ordine trascendente (C. Schmitt, Il Leviatano nella dottrina dello Stato di Thomas Hobbes (1938), in Id., Sul Leviatano, trad. it. a cura di C. Galli, il Mulino, Bologna 2011, p. 77).

[6] Leviatano, cap. 11, "La differenza dei 'costumi'", p. 78; Leviathan, p. 161.

[7] Sul rapporto tra costumi e diritto consuetudinario in Hobbes, si veda C. Béal, Hobbes, la coutume et la Common Law, in «Noesis», 34, 2020, pp. 29-42. Cfr. A. Milanese, Les mœurs selon Hobbes, in F. Toto, L. Simonetta, G. Bottini, *Entre nature et histoire. Mœurs et coutumes dans la philosophie moderne*, Classiques Garnier, Paris 2017, pp. 109-138. Il tema giuridico della consuetudine in Hobbes, di cui non è questione in questa sede, è certamente molto rilevante e meriterebbe una trattazione a parte (si veda M. Piccinini, «I speak generally of Law». Legge, leggi e corti nel Dialogue di Thomas Hobbes, in «Scienza & Politica. Per una storia delle dottrine», 26 (51), 2014, pp. 119-163).

bes, di mostrare come la combinazione dei poteri strumentali (ricchezza, reputazione, relazioni) e dei poteri naturali (bellezza, forza, eloquenza, prestanza) permette di acquisire sempre maggior *potere* ed influenza. E tuttavia, nello stesso tempo, il valore di un individuo è sempre relativo: esso ha il suo «prezzo»[8], il che vuol dire che dipende dal giudizio altrui, che risponde a sua volta a determinati criteri di utilità sociale. Questa logica della comparazione incontra il suo punto di ancoraggio nella «*Repubblica o Stato»*, proprio perché è nella sua *persona fittizia* che si trova la «fonte dell'onore civile». Una maniera per dire che il riconoscimento delle qualità naturali che, *di diritto*, può avere luogo al di fuori dell'istituzione delle repubbliche, non può di fatto compiersi realmente se non nel seno dello stato civile, cioè nel *Common-wealth.*

È solo in questo quadro che il possesso di potere e influenza può essere legittimamente assicurato e giuridicamente protetto. Il capitolo undicesimo tratta perciò della diversità delle maniere di comportarsi nello stato *civile.* Hobbes infatti mette subito in chiaro il suo rifiuto di assimilare le «*manners»*, le «maniere», alle *small morals,* a ciò che dipende dal *decorum,* dal comportamento esteriore, dal «comportamento educato come il modo in cui si dovrebbe salutare un'altra persona», e cioè alle "buone maniere", alla *buona educazione* degli uomini. La sua attenzione si rivolge piuttosto a «quelle qualità umane che interessano la loro vita associata in pace e in unità»[9]. La differenza delle maniere di essere di cui si tratta, dunque, è innanzitutto una differenza nella *maniera,* cioè nella via (*way*) che porta alla «soddisfazione» (*contented life*). E questa differenza di dispiega su un piano di somiglianza, «un'inclinazione generale di tutta l'umanità (*generall inclination of all mankind*)»[10]: il carattere «perpetuo e ininterrotto»[11] del desiderio di un sempre maggiore *potere* che si estingue solo con la morte. In conformità con i principi fondamentali dell'ontologia hobbesiana, come noto, ogni essere è corpo e ogni corpo è in movi-

---

[8] «Il valore, o PREGIO di una persona, coincide, come per tutte le altre cose, col suo prezzo, cioè con quanto si sarebbe disposti a dare per l'uso del suo potere. Non è perciò un valore assoluto, ma dipendente dal bisogno e dalla stima di altri» (Leviatano, cap. 10, cap. 11, p. 70; Leviathan, p. 151)

[9] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 78; Leviathan, p. 160. Sui 'codici di comportamento' nella prima età moderna si veda il fondamentale volume di N. Elias, La civiltà delle buone maniere. La trasformazione dei costumi nel mondo aristocratico occidentale (Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, 1936-37; trad. it., in due volumi, il Mulino, Bologna 1982-83).

[10] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 78; Leviathan, p. 161.

[11] Ivi. Sulle radici storico concettuali dell'antropologia individualistica di Hobbes, «corrispondente ad un essere umano per il quale i suoi vincoli sociali, politici e religiosi sono diventati problematici», si veda R. Koselleck, Critica illuminista e crisi della società borghese, trad. it. di G. Panzieri, il Mulino, Bologna 1972, p. 26 sgg.

mento, un corpo in movimento si muove eternamente a meno di non esserne impedito, e i «piccoli inizi di movimento all'interno del corpo umano»[12] sono chiamati *conatus* (*Endeavour*)[13].

Il *desiderio*[14] designa, nella maniera più generica, il *conatus* nel suo movimento di avvicinamento «quando si rivolge a qualcosa che ne è la causa»[15]. Appare chiaramente come questo movimento incessante non ha termine – scrive Hobbes: «non si dà infatti in questa vita né il *finis ultimus* né il *summum bonum* di cui si parla nei libri degli antichi filosofi morali»[16] –, anche se esso si arresta con la morte. Esso è, in senso stretto, *interminabile* e dunque, per essenza, insoddisfatto. Ne discende che la *felicità* – contrariamente a quanto accade negli Antichi – non consiste nel riposo di uno spirito soddisfatto, ma al contrario in un movimento incessante, sempre *inquieto* e insaziabile[17].

L'acquisizione di un oggetto desiderato, lungi dal soddisfare il soggetto rappresenta soltanto il 'rilancio' del desiderio verso un *altro* oggetto, e così via di seguito[18].

---

[12] Leviatano, cap. 6, p. 41; Leviathan, p. 119.

[13] N. Marcucci, Lo specchio del Leviatano. Il potere di riconoscere tra antropologia e rappresentanza, in L. Bernini, M. Farnesi Camellone, N. Marcucci, La sovranità scomposta. Sull'attualità del Leviatano, Mimesis, Milano-Udine 2010, pp. 65-73. Per una tematizzazione precisa della dottrina del conatus, cfr. M. Bertman, Conatus in Hobbes' De Corpore, in «Hobbes Studies», XVI, 2001, pp. 25-39.

[14] Sul desiderio in Hobbes, si veda G. Fiaschi, Il *desiderio* del Leviatano. Immaginazione e potere in Thomas *Hobbes*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2014. Sull'immaginazione nel suo carattere soggettivo, cfr. Id., Hobbes on Time and Politics, in «Hobbes Studies», XVIII, 2005, pp. 3-27. Sul tema del desiderio approfondisce R. Rudolph, The Micro-Foundations of Hobbes' Political Theory: Appetites, Emotions, Dispositions, and Manners, in «Hobbes Studies», IV, 1991, pp. 34-52; si veda inoltre L. Foisneau, Hobbes on desire and happiness, in «Homo Oeconomicus», 31, 4, 2014, pp. 411-422.

[15] Leviatano, p. 41; Leviathan, p. 119. Cfr. A. Biral, Hobbes: la società senza governo, in Id., Storia e critica della filosofia politica moderna, a cura di G. Duso, Franco Angeli, Milano 1999, spec. pp. 90-92.

[16] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 78; Leviathan, p. 160. Sul piano antropologico in cui si inscrive il rifiuto hobbesiano della morale degli antichi, si veda l'importante saggio di C. A. Viano: Analisi della vita emotiva e tecnica politica nella filosofia di Hobbes, in «Rivista critica di storia della filosofia», XVII, 1962, pp. 355-392, in part. p. 372

[17] L. Strauss, La filosofia politica di *Hobbes*. Il suo fondamento e la sua genesi (1936), in Id., Che cos'è la filosofia politica? Scritti su Hobbes e altri saggi, con il saggio di A. Momigliano Ermeneutica e pensiero politico classico in L. Strauss, a cura di P. F. Taboni, Argalia, Urbino 1977, p. 307. È approfondendo la posizione di Tacito e del suo recupero teorico nell'ambito dell'arte di governo italiana del Quattrocento e del Cinquecento, che Hobbes legge l'ambizione come la causa dell'insoddisfazione e della sofferenza, nei confronti della quale la funzione pubblica assolve un compito di contenimento degli eccessi. Per un approfondimento, cfr. G. Borrelli, Il lato oscuro del Leviathan. Hobbes contro Machiavelli, Cronopio, Napoli 2009.

[18] Si veda A. Ferrarin, Artificio, desiderio, considerazione di sé. Hobbes e i fondamenti antropologici della politica, Ets, Paris 2001. Sulla crucialità del nesso temporalità-antropologia-politica: M. Farnesi Camellone, La passione rimossa. Nota sulla speranza nel Leviatano, in G. M. Chiodi - R. Gatti, a cura di, La filosofia politica di Hobbes, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2009, pp. 233-240. Cfr. F. Izzo,

Ora, questo processo trova la sua spiegazione causale, per Hobbes, nel fatto che l'oggetto del desiderio dell'uomo non è mai davvero un oggetto (un oggetto *qualsiasi*), ma piuttosto l'assicurazione futura del suo godimento, vale a dire la perpetuazione del desiderio stesso. Si tratta allora di rendere possibile la riproduzione del desiderio futuro senza accontentarsi della sua soddisfazione immediata. Lo scopo è così chiaramente definito: l'azione «volontaria» si congiunge all'*inclinazione* per cercare di assicurare le condizioni della soddisfazione *potenzialmente* permanente dei desideri, e non semplicemente la loro soddisfazione puntuale. La cosa può essere intesa in due modi, che tuttavia non sono incompatibili tra loro: consolidare il bene acquisito lanciandosi in nuove imprese (il re assicura il suo potere per mezzo delle leggi e per mezzo della guerra); oppure considerare che il bene acquisito non offre una soddisfazione sufficiente (il re intraprende allora nuove conquiste, ma può anche aspirare a vivere nel lusso e negli agi, ovvero desiderare di essere lodato e ammirato per qualcosa d'altro dalla sua sola funzione regale propriamente detta). In ogni caso, in Hobbes, il motivo *oggettivo* del consolidamento del bene acquisito si lega al carattere *soggettivo* del desiderio ininterrotto. A partire da questa aspirazione fondamentale, il vero luogo della «differenza» delle maniere di essere si situa nella via da percorrere per consolidare il godimento *presente* ed «assicurarsi per sempre l'accesso al desiderio futuro»[19].

In un certo senso si tratta di una questione di *metodo,* che dipende dalla disposizione passionale di ogni individuo, dalla differente maniera di reagire che nasce dalla «differenza di conoscenza o di opinione»[20] di cui ciascuno dispone per valutare le cause suscettibili di produrre gli effetti desiderati.

All'inizio del capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano* Hobbes tratta di questa «disposizione»[21] passionale nel triplice registro del «potere», della «competizione» e del «desiderio di agi e di piaceri sensuali». Cerchiamo di seguire il suo movimento di pensiero. Il desiderio ininterrotto riceve una prima e fondamentale determinazione nella forma del desiderio *del potere* o, meglio, del desiderio *incessante* del potere.

Forme della modernità. Antropologia, politica e teologia in Thomas Hobbes, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2005.

[19] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 78; Leviathan, p. 161. «Disposeth» ricorre 8 volte nel primo libro del Leviathan, 6 nel capitolo 11 («inclined/inclination», semanticamente affine a «disposition», ricorre 29 volte nel primo libro con 22 occorrenze nel cap. 11). Nel capitolo 11 della traduzione latina del Leviatano – "De Varietate morum" – Hobbes usa sempre «disponit» (da disponĕre: l'atto di «disporre», collocare in una determinata maniera, e quindi, in senso figurato, anche l'inclinazione, l'attitudine, la disposizione d'animo verso qualcosa, una postura, un modo di vita). Cfr. Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, sive, De materia, forma, & potestate civitatis ecclesiasticae et civilis, Joan Blaeu, Amsterdam 1668, pp. 49-54.

[20] Leviatano, p. 78.

[21] Leviatano, pp. 78-79; Leviathan, p. 161.

Di fatto, la causa prima individuata da Hobbes[22] coincide qui con la speranza di un piacere più intenso di quello già ottenuto. La «causa» del processo sarebbe in questo senso l'insoddisfazione relativa legata al bene già acquisito, e il desiderio, correlativo, di ottenere una soddisfazione più grande. Sembra di essere di fronte ad una sorta di avanzamento irrefrenabile del desiderio, ad un movimento cioè che non è già più padroneggiato realmente e in cui le condotte *differiscono* per la via che intraprendono, nella quale – sotto questa pressione – ciascuno segue, secondo le proprie passioni (pulsione guerriera di conquista, voluttà, piacere dell'adulazione, ecc.), la sua strada particolare[23]. Avanza cioè alla sua maniera, e secondo il suo capriccio, senza che intervenga una strategia ben congegnata, tanto che ciascuno può avviarsi in questo modo anche alla propria perdita. Questa causa secondaria evocata da Hobbes nel passo che abbiamo visto è accompagnata da un'altra «causa», concernente l'insoddisfazione legata all'esercizio di un potere «moderato». Si può intendere qui il «*moderate power*» di cui non è possibile accontentarsi non tanto come un potere "limitato" opposto ad un potere "assoluto" nel senso intensivo di "senza divisione", ma piuttosto come un potere che viene esercitato in riferimento ad un certo "spazio" di influenza, e che si oppone in questo modo al senso estensivo di un potere *absolutus* che cerca di dominare *tutte* le cose illimitatamente, insaziabile nell'estendere il suo dominio tanto all'esterno come all'interno. Se si mette in rapporto questa «causa» con l'altra (entrambe in un certo senso cause secondarie), i tre esempi esposti da Hobbes illuminano – a partire da una certa disposizione singolare e passionale, da una certa attrazione o da una certa repulsione – sia l'una che l'altra di queste due cause efficienti.

La 'causa prima', certo, è comunque per Hobbes direttamente legata al consolidamento del bene acquisito: si tratta sempre di acquisire di più per assicurare il potere e i mezzi che procurano il benessere di cui si dispone. Il potere chiama il potere poiché il potere garantisce il potere. Ecco perché anche i re «che detengono il massimo potere» non hanno pace finché non lo abbiano assicurato per mezzo delle leggi sul loro territorio e per mezzo della guerra all'esterno. Accade come se la messa in luce della «causa» principale più che avere a che fare con l'idea di un'insoddisfazione fondamentale riguardasse quella di un necessario rafforzamento della

---

[22] E che Hobbes giudica apparentemente secondaria, senza tuttavia scartarla anche se questa non è sempre all'opera.

[23] Cfr. G. Fiaschi, «...partly in the passions, partly in his reason...», in G. M. Chiodi – R. Gatti, a cura di, *La filosofia politica di Hobbes*, cit., pp. 81-107; A. Pacchi, *Hobbes and the Passions*, in Id., *Scritti hobbesiani, 1978-1990*, FrancoAngeli, Milano 1998, pp. 79-95. Si veda sul tema C. Galli, *Ordine e contingenza. Linee di lettura del Leviatano*, in C. Galli, a cura di, *Percorsi della libertà. Scritti in onore di Nicola Matteucci*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1996, pp. 81-106. In generale, sulla riflessione antropologica di Hobbes ci si riferisca al lavoro critico di D. D'Andrea, *Prometeo e Ulisse. Natura umana e ordine politico in Thomas Hobbes*, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma 1997. Sulle radici cristiane dell'antropologia hobbesiana si veda W. B. Glover, *Human Nature and the State in Hobbes*, in «Journal of the History of Philosophy», IV, 4, 1966, pp. 293-311.

soddisfazione presente. Il principale movente del desiderio di potere sarebbe allora la conservazione e l'affermazione del potere già acquisito al fine di godere dei benefici che esso procura, piuttosto che un desiderio senza freni che non sarebbe più sottoposto a questa esigenza. In questo senso, la via intrapresa dalle azioni *volontarie* e dalle *inclinazioni* degli uomini per assicurare un'esistenza soddisfacente sarebbe in qualche modo un metodo, un calcolo razionale, il frutto di un'interpretazione valutativa teleologicamente applicata. Nel «*desire of power after power*», «*power*» indicherebbe una sequenza logica razionalmente guadagnata: la ragione organizza attrazioni e repulsioni, impone loro una valutazione, le dispone in un rapporto mezzi-fini, catalogandole in antecedenti e susseguenti[24]. Il nuovo potere consolida il primo senza sostituirsi ad esso, l'effetto cumulativo del potere protegge così il potere e i godimenti (di ogni tipo) che esso stesso suscita.

Ma, si potrebbe obiettare, perché mai allora arrestarsi su questa strada? Cos'è che garantisce che il potere supplementare ottenuto per assicurare il primo non sarà esso stesso a sua volta minacciato se non ci si impegna nella caccia ad un *nuovo* potere suscettibile di garantire il precedente, e così via all'infinito senza mai giungere alla meta? È precisamente questo che Hobbes vuol far intendere: «*when that in done*» («una volta raggiunti questi fini»), vale a dire quando i sovrani hanno *razionalmente* assicurato il loro potere con le leggi e con la guerra, *there succeedeth a new desire* («matura in loro un nuovo desiderio»[25]). In altri termini, quando la causa prima (il consolidamento del bene acquisito) ha compiuto la sua opera, le cause seconde, ma non per questo meno efficienti (il bene acquisito è ancora insoddisfacente, e il potere ancora troppo ristretto), ne prendono quasi naturalmente il posto. È a questo punto che il calcolo razionale che presiedeva in modo omogeneo al primo movimento («i re [...] dirigono i loro sforzi ad assicurarselo») cede il posto ad un affetto passionale, cioè ad un'*inclinazione* che muta da situazione a situazione in risposta agli stimoli esterni. Nel *desire of power after power*, «*after*» non indica più una sequenza logica ma piuttosto il concatenarsi di *inclinazioni*, o semplicemente di *gusti* che, al di fuori del desiderio generico di riconoscimento, sono assenti in un calcolo meramente utilitaristico. Se l'affermazione del potere può effettuarsi per mezzo di una di queste nuove vie questo accade sempre in maniera *contingente*.

Hobbes, insomma, cerca a tenere insieme i fili di una trama che può disfarsi ad ogni istante: il fatto cioè, già rilevato da Montaigne e che Hobbes riprende a suo modo, che la vita «non è altro che movimento (*Motion*)»[26], e che tuttavia questo movimento tende a cristallizzarsi di volta in volta in *manners* – appunto – abiti,

---

[24] A. Biral, Hobbes: la società senza governo, cit., p. 87.

[25] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 79; Leviathan, p. 161.

[26] Leviathan, chap. 5, p. 130; Leviatano, p. 51. Cfr. Montaigne, Les Essais, éd Villey-Saulnier, PUF, Paris 2004³, II, 1, "De l'inconstance de nos actions", p. 333 (d'ora in poi Essais, con l'indicazione del libro, del capitolo e della pagina). La traduzione utilizzata è quella di F. Garavini (Montaigne, Saggi, 2 voll., Adelphi, Milano 1966)

maniere di essere. Già dal titolo del capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano* sembra risuonare più di un'eco di una probabile lettura di Montaigne da parte di Hobbes[27]. Un breve passaggio attraverso Montaigne potrà dunque aiutarci a meglio definire il problema in questione qui.

2.   «SELON QUE PORTE L'INCLINATION»: MONTAIGNE E LA PIEGA DEI COSTUMI

Il motivo dell'*inclinazione* emergeva in Montaigne in corrispondenza con quello, classico, dell'abitudine, cioè al centro della sua analisi della socializzazione dei modi di vita. È infatti attraverso l'abitudine che si presenta davanti a noi una via già tracciata sulla quale ci incamminiamo quasi naturalmente perché conforme ad una regola[28]. Come dire che, nel caso dell'essere umano, se la regola non è «naturale», tuttavia è naturale che vi siano delle regole, articolate le une alle altre e componenti un insieme di abitudini già acquisite, «les façons et formes reçues», le maniere (*façons*) che bisogna «suivre entièrement»[29], e che fanno blocco formando ciò che Montaigne chiama la *coutume*: è infatti «par l'entremise de la coutume que chacun est content du lieu où la nature l'a planté»[30]. In breve: per Montaigne, ogni società umana disegna una «contexture» fatta di maniere, che trova da sé stessa la sua struttura e *compone* con tutte le parti disparate che riesce a riunire insieme un corpo organizzato. Pensando il corpo sociale come un intreccio di relazioni concrete, come un insieme strutturato di funzioni vitali che rendono possibile un composto *regolato* e si alimentano dei suoi «commerci», Montaigne trasferisce metaforicamente le attività fisiologiche e biologiche a quel corpo *vivente* che è la società. Corpo vivente in un *milieu* fisico concreto e determinato, dunque : «si par expérience nous touchons à la main que la forme de notre être dépend de l'air, du climat e du terroir où nous naissons, non seulement le teint, la taille, la complexion et les contenances, mais encore les facultés de l'âme»[31].

Come i frutti – leggiamo nell' "Apologie" – nascono differenti, così uomini e animali «naissent aussi plus et moins belliqueux, justes, tempérants et dociles [...] ici enclins à la superstition, ailleurs à la mécréance; ici à la liberté, ici à la servitude [...],

---

[27] Cfr. E. Ferrari et Th. Gontier, sous la direction de, L'Axe Montaigne-Hobbes. Anthropologie et politique, Classiques Garnier, Paris 2016. Sul rapporto tra Hobbes e Montaigne si veda anche R. Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572 – 1651, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993. Sull'importanza di Montaigne per Hobbes ha insistito G. Paganini, Hobbes e lo scetticismo continentale, in «Rivista di storia della filosofia», LIX, 1, 2004, pp. 303-328. Sappiamo per certo che Hobbes possedeva un esemplare della traduzione inglese di John Florio degli Essais nell'edizione del 1613.

[28] Cfr. B. Sève, Montaigne. Des règles pour l'esprit, PUF, Paris 2009, pp. 179-199.

[29] Montaigne, Essais, cit., I, 23, p. 118.

[30] Essais, I, 23, p. 116.

[31] Essais, II, 12, p. 575.

selon que porte l'inclination du lieu où ils sont assis, et prennent nouvelles complexion si on les change de place, comme les arbres»[32]. Il corpo sociale – in Montaigne lo spazio effettivo degli scambi e dei «commerci», l'*ambiente* delle relazioni in cui niente è fissato una volta per tutte ma tutto si scambia – è colto nella sua costante mutazione e nell'interazione dinamica, nella sua *metabolé*, «selon l'inclination» che produce al livello delle opinioni, dell'immaginazione e delle pratiche degli uomini, «se la natura racchiude nei limiti del suo normale procedere, come ogni altra cosa, anche le credenze, i giudizi e le opinioni degli uomini»[33]. Si tratta cioè per Montaigne di un corpo che subisce continue metamorfosi, attraversato da flussi di umori. Il corpo sociale è sempre *en mouvement*, attraversato da questi flussi che indeterminano il limite tra la sua salute e la sua malattia[34]. L'analisi sociale e politica negli *Essais* è certo anche un'inchiesta sul presente storico di un'età malata, l'età delle guerre civili come sarà in Hobbes – ma che è sempre pensata a partire dal movimento della *contexture* sociale, la vita di un corpo come *diventa* costantemente. Il corpo di una società *in divenire*, dotato di una temporalità specifica in quanto corpo sociale e politico, *incline* «ici à la liberté, ici à la servitude», che richiede l'analisi delle condizioni dei suoi modi di vita particolari, e passa attraverso l'esperienza dell'inseparabilità dei suoi processi vitali materiali e della singolarità dei suoi modi di vita, del suo *esprit* e delle sue *maniere*.

L'emergenza del 'sociale' come tessitura storica e materiale era premessa negli *Essais* di un discorso che problematizza i fondamenti dell'immagine stessa del corpo politico, inteso come oggetto sul quale agisce il legislatore. Le pretese di quest'ultimo di mettere mano sovranamente, dall'alto e "razionalmente"[35] alle *patologie* del sociale sono in Montaigne radicalmente ridimensionate. Montaigne è attento alla dinamica interna, alla *fisiologia* del corpo sociale in quanto corpo storico[36].

---

[32] Essais, III, 12, p. 575. Da tutto questo deriva, per Montaigne, che gli esseri viventi assorbono, come per una specie di osmosi con il milieu, il tono e i contenuti, la maniera di comportarsi, di vestirsi, e i modi di vivere nei quali essi sono progressivamente, incessantemente catturati: la maniera di essere, i costumi e le abitudini versi i quali il tempo e il luogo li «inclinano», come gli alberi, e che danno loro «tel ou tel tour».

[33] Montaigne, Saggi, cit., II, 12, p. 763.

[34] Essais, III, 13, p. 993.

[35] «La raison humaine – scrive Montaigne nel capitolo "De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy receüe" – est une teinture infuse environ de pareil pois à toutes nos opinions et mœurs, de quelque forme qu'elles soient: infinie en matière, infinie en diversité» (Essais, I, 23, p. 112).

[36] «On a raison de donner à l'esprit humain les barrieres les plus contraintes qu'on peut. En l'estude, comme au reste, il luy faut compter et regler ses marches, il luy faut tailler par art les limites de sa chasse. On le bride et garrote de religions, de loix, de coustumes, de science, de preceptes, de peines et recompenses mortelles et immortelles; encores voit-on que, par sa volubilité et dissolution, il eschappe à toutes ces liaisons. C'est un corps vain, qui n'a par où estre saisi et asséné; un corps divers et difforme, auquel on ne peut asseoir neud ny prise.» (Essais, II, 12, p. 559). Sul punto ci permettiamo di rinviare al nostro Les règles et la vie: Montaigne et la normativité du social, in Montaigne et le social, sous la direction de Ph. Desan, Hermann, Paris 2022, pp. 25-40.

Si tratta di riconoscere che ogni interpretazione della nostra «condizione» civile è inevitabilmente *dinamica*. La società e lo stato non sono per Montaigne qualcosa di stabile e oggettivo, essi costituiscono piuttosto un *ambiente*, un *milieu*, un contesto al quale dobbiamo rivolgere uno sguardo per procedere a dei giudizi di carattere pratico, ma senza capacità di oggettivarne precisamente le strutture, come pretenderà la scienza politica hobbesiana, né di disporre di strumenti regolatori affidabili e capaci di offrire risultati definitivi: «Noi guidiamo gli affari agli inizi e li teniamo in pugno; ma poi, quando sono avviati, sono loro che ci guidano e ci trascinano, e dobbiamo seguirli»[37]. Senza essere del tutto impotenti, noi siamo chiamati a *ployer*, a *piegare*, che non significa affatto subire ma piuttosto saper aggiustare, comporre con la "circostanza" e secondo l'esperienza, inclinarsi. La vera posta in gioco dell'*inclinazione* è in Montaigne quella di una vita propriamente «*réglée*» che consiste, secondo Montaigne, nel fatto di arrivare a comporre con la *mobilità* delle cose e innanzitutto con quella degli esseri umani, delle loro credenze e dell'*ethos* sociale che ne è il presupposto, in uno spazio e in un tempo determinato, lontano da ogni 'teoria generale', cioè senza «il soccorso di alcuna dottrina»[38] che prescinda dall'esperienza delle relazioni concrete e dal darsi *fluido* dei modi di vita, dalle istanze plurali e variabili di cui la *police* – come governo di ciò che muta – deve tenere conto[39].

Mentre dunque i modi di vita, le *moeurs*, i costumi, sono in Montaigne la forza di composizione e connessione che riunisce, per un certo tempo, la vita come *passage* alla sua forma sempre in movimento, il moderno giusnaturalismo assolutizzerà la volontà del soggetto di fronte a una sovranità statuale che può affermarsi solo separando vita e forma in ogni ambito[40]. In tutto il *Leviathan* il processo di disciplinamento delle maniere di vita ricorre ogni volta che Hobbes si sforza di eliminare strati di materiale potenzialmente conflittuale, *critico*, al fine di raggiungere un fondamento non controverso, *stabile*, capace di assicurare l'accordo nel *Commonwealth*. L'esempio più noto nella sua descrizione della «condizione naturale dell'umanità» nel capitolo tredicesimo del *Leviatano* svolge una funzione cardine nella teoria del contratto, creando una motivazione per gli uomini a sottomettersi a un potere sovrano. «In tali condizioni», dice Hobbes riferendosi allo stato di natura,

---

[37] Saggi, III, 10, p. 1360.

[38] Saggi, II, 12, p. 722.

[39] Machiavelli lo aveva affermato nei Ghiribizzi al Soderini: gli uomini non possono comandare alla loro natura, ma soltanto procedere per quanto possono 'accomodandola' alla varietà de «li ordini delle cose». I Ghiribizzi al Soderini (1506) sono riportati in: Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, a cura di M. Martelli, Sansoni, Firenze 1971, pp. 1082-83.

[40] Montaigne marca così la sua distanza dalle categorie della modernità incipiente: le teorie politiche dell'individualismo moderno non trovano in lui un precursore, ma piuttosto un loro «critique par anticipation», come ha detto efficacemente Frédéric Brahami (F. Brahami, «Être à soi»: la place du politique dans les Essais, in Montaigne politique, sous la direction de Ph. Desan, Honoré Champion, Paris 2006, p. 41).

nel quale i «selvaggi» continuano a vivere, «*in that brutish manner*», in molti luoghi d'America, «non vi è posto per l'operosità ingegnosa (*Industry*), essendone incerto il frutto: e di conseguenza, non vi è né coltivazione della terra, né navigazione, né uso dei prodotti che si possono importare via mare, né costruzioni adeguate, né strumenti per sostare e rimuovere le cose che richiedono molta forza, né conoscenza della superficie terrestre, né misurazione del tempo, né arti, né lettere, né società; e, ciò che è peggio, v'è il continuo timore e pericolo di una morte violenta; e la vita dell'uomo è solitaria, misera, ostile, animalesca e breve (*solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short*)»[41].

L'ironia che traspare qui deriva dal confronto con un altro, altrettanto famoso, passaggio di Montaigne nel capitolo "Dei Cannibali", di cui Hobbes però rovescia il significato[42]. Con il suo ritratto della condizione miserevole dell'uomo nello stato di natura Hobbes cambia radicalmente di segno alla descrizione dei modi di vita delle società 'selvagge' del capitolo trentunesimo degli *Essais*, dove Montaigne immagina come avrebbe mostrato a Platone l'ammirevole assenza d'artificio con cui si governano gli abitanti di quelle nazioni del Nuovo Mondo[43]. L'essere possibile dell'«umana condizione» si apre nei *Saggi* di fronte alle diverse voci che ne segnano la vicenda, è anzi chiamato a *raccoglierle*, in quell'apertura alla *distinzione*[44], alla *curiosità*, all'osservazione dei modi di vita singolari che dall'Umanesimo, sulla via

---

[41] Leviatano, cap. 13, p. 102; Leviathan, p. 187.

[42] Il passo di Montaigne suona così: «È un popolo, direi a Platone, nel quale non esiste nessuna sorta di traffici: nessuna conoscenza delle lettere; nessuna scienza dei numeri primi; nessun nome di magistrato, né di gerarchia politica; nessuna usanza di servitù, di ricchezza, di povertà; nessun contratto; nessuna successione; nessuna spartizione; nessuna occupazione se non dilettevole; nessun rispetto della parentela oltre a quello ordinario; nessun vestito; nessuna agricoltura; nessun metallo; nessun uso di vino o di grano. Le parole stesse che significano menzogna, tradimento, dissimulazione, avarizia, invidia, diffamazione, perdóno, non si sono mai udite. Quanto lontana da questa perfezione egli troverebbe la repubblica che ha immaginato» (Montaigne, Saggi, cit., I, 31, pp. 273-274; Essais, cit., pp. 206-207). Attraverso la traduzione inglese di John Florio, il passo degli Essais (con la sua 'formula negativa') è ripreso quasi alla lettera da Shakespeare nella Tempesta (trad. it. a cura di G. Baldini, Rizzoli, Milano 2006, Atto V, scena I, p. 173).

[43] Essais, cit., I, 31, p. 205; Saggi, cit., p. 272. Cfr. D. L. Sedley, Nasty, Brutish, and Long. The Life of Montaigne's Essais in Hobbes' Theory of Contract, in Montaigne after Theory / Theory after Montaigne, ed. by Z. Zalloua, University of Washington Press, Seattle & London 2009, pp. 161-179. Montaigne può lodare, nella consapevolezza della grande varietà delle cose, le virtù dei Cannibali, il loro coraggio esemplare, la nobiltà delle loro maniere in guerra, la sincerità, e la perfezione della loro «police». Sul tema si vedano i saggi raccolti nel numero monografico di «Montaigne Studies», XXII, 1-2, 2010: "Montaigne et le Nouveau Monde". Sull'immagine del 'selvaggio' nella modernità, si veda S. Landucci, I filosofi e i selvaggi, Einaudi, Torino 2014². Sulla skepsis in Hobbes e Montaigne, cfr. G. Paganini, Ce que Hobbes a appris de Montaigne: épistémologie et métaphysique, in Les usages philosophiques de Montaigne. Du XVIᵉ au XXIᵉ siècle, sous la direction de P. Desan, Hermann, Paris 2018, pp. 121-139. Sul tema della varietà in Montaigne ci permettiamo di rinviare al nostro Governo della vita e ordine politico in Montaigne, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2010

[44] «DISTINGO est le plus universel membre de ma Logique» (Essais, II, 1, p. 335).

disincantata della moderna scepsi, conduce a Montaigne[45]. Nel *Cortegiano* l'esemplarità rappresentata dal principe è modello in atto delle maniere di vita, centralizzare i poteri è insieme accentuare le *consuetudini,* e dunque i modelli di comportamento: solo il principe può mostrare che la *particolarità* delle tradizioni è la loro stessa relatività[46]; negli *Essais* l'esemplarità dei costumi è regola del governo della vita e dei processi di soggettivazione che implica: «Je sens ce profit insperé de la publication de mes meurs qu'elle me sert aucunement de regle»[47].

La normatività dell'interazione sociale, l'inclinazione, la *piega* descritta da Montaigne (*tel ou tel plì*), la sua capacità 'regolativa' derivante dalle pratiche, in Hobbes perde ormai ogni significato: nel *Leviatano* le *manners* mancano di un'autonoma forza *nomica* rispetto alla "libera" volontà del soggetto individuale. Nel capitolo undicesimo la disposizione passionale "soggettiva" che muta a seconda delle situazioni procede effettivamente dalla «differenza di abitudini e di educazione (*difference of customes, and education*)», scrive Hobbes concedendo qualcosa alla tesi di Montaigne[48], ma dopo l'analisi della «inclinazione generale che costituisce il primo principio universale della filosofia civile» – cioè il desiderio *incessante* di potere –, il paragrafo successivo del capitolo introduce un'altra inclinazione alla rivalità, alla contesa, la cui *causa* dev'essere trovata nella «competizione». Il titoletto in margine suona: "*L'amore per la rivalità derivante dalla competizione*"[49]. È da notare come la «competizione» è qui posta senza ulteriore giustificazione particolare, senza alcuna contestualizzazione storico-concreta, come se andasse da sé che il desiderio di potere comporti una competizione in grado di suscitare l'inclinazione alla rivalità. La «*competition*», dirà Hobbes nel capitolo tredicesimo, è, con la diffidenza e l'orgoglio (*Glory*), una delle cause principali di contesa[50]; essa spinge all'offensiva in vista di un vantaggio qualsiasi, fa ricorso alla violenza pur di conseguire il *dominio* sulla

---

[45] La curiosità ha una funzione capitale nell'antropologia hobbesiana, essa è per Hobbes ciò che essa era già per Montaigne: «une concupiscence de l'esprit» (a Lust of the mind), che si alimenta della «volupté» prodotta dalla continua «génération du savoir», e che oltrepassa per questo la «brève véhémence» dei piaceri della carne (cfr. E. Ferrari, «L'Homme en général». Remarques sur l'anthropologie de Montaigne et Hobbes, in E. Ferrari et Th. Gontier, sous la direction de, L'Axe Montaigne-Hobbes, cit., p. 32).

[46] B. Castiglione, Il Libro del Cortegiano, a cura di Bruno Maier, Utet, Torino 1973, IV, XXIII, pp. 475-476.

[47] Essais, cit., III, 9, p. 980; Saggi, cit., p. 1305.

[48] Leviatano, cap. 8, p. 60; Leviathan, p. 139.

[49] «Love of Contention from Competition», in Leviathan, cit., chap. 11, p. 161.

[50] Leo Strauss ha insistito sulla minore centralità del concetto di gloria nel Leviatano rispetto alle opere precedenti, interpretandolo come segno di una trasformazione in senso borghese di un immaginario morale 'cavalleresco' (L. Strauss, La filosofia politica di *Hobbes*, cit., in part. pp. 191-201). Incamminandosi sulla via aperta da Strauss, Q. Skinner ha ricostruito la formazione umanistica di Hobbes (Reason and Rethoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996). Nel solco di Strauss, si veda anche B. Carnevali, Potere e riconoscimento: il modello hobbesiano, in «Iride», XVIII, 46, 2005, pp. 313-335.

persona degli altri o sui loro beni. E tuttavia il processo sarebbe inintelligibile se non intervenisse, sullo sfondo, il postulato dell'uguaglianza naturale degli uomini: questa uguaglianza relativa (in realtà la possibilità permanente di un processo di compensazione che permette di riequilibrare le forze presenti) non è effettiva soltanto nello "stato di natura", ma è invece una caratteristica *costante* della condizione umana. È proprio perché vi è uguaglianza relativa delle «attitudini» che è pensabile uguaglianza relativa «nella speranza di raggiungere i propri fini»[51]. Se, dunque, «due uomini desiderano la medesima cosa di cui tuttavia non possono entrambi fruire, diventano nemici e, nel perseguire il loro scopo (che è principalmente la propria conservazione e talvolta solo il proprio piacere) cercano di distruggersi e di sottomettersi l'un l'altro»[52]. Qualsiasi sia il campo d'esercizio dei desideri, essi si riducono al desiderio di *potenza*. Tutto in Hobbes viene ridotto a potenza: ricchezza, bellezza, onore e sapere non sono che «specie diverse di potere»[53]. Ciascuno cerca di assicurarsi in anticipo le condizioni della propria conservazione e cerca, quindi, di ottenere tutti i mezzi in virtù dei quali sarà possibile soddisfare in futuro i desideri che potranno insorgere. Dunque, l'essere umano è lanciato in una rincorsa ai mezzi per anticipare e garantire il proprio futuro. Questo accumulo di *mezzi* è tale per cui gli uomini entrano inevitabilmente in competizione fra di loro, e questa può, sempre, degenerare in guerra.

3.   «CUSTOMES AND EDUCATION»

Nel capitolo undicesimo del *Leviatano* (in corrispondenza della glossa marginale ("*Civil Obedience From Love of Ease*") Hobbes riprende la disposizione passionale caratterizzata dal desiderio di agi (*ease*) e di piaceri sensuali, intesa questa volta come uno dei motivi dell'inclinazione «all'obbedienza nei confronti di un potere

---

[51] Leviatano, cap. 13, p. 100; Leviathan, p. 184. La logica della costruzione hobbesiana risulta condizionante gli sviluppi della politica moderna e difficilmente superabile all'interno del presupposto individualistico che la struttura. Essa riduce la politica ad uno spazio artificiale istituito tra due poli: il soggetto individuale e il soggetto collettivo (G. Duso, Ripensare la rappresentanza alla luce della teologia politica, in «Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno», XLI, 2012, pp. 9-48). Il ruolo che Hobbes attribuisce agli individui uguali si oppone ad un piano relazionale in cui si accetta il fatto che qualcuno governa e gli altri sono governati. Questa dissimmetria, infatti, non può trovare giustificazione in un orizzonte come quello dell'antropologia hobbesiana. Gli individui uguali, attraverso il processo di autorizzazione e il patto, divengono i soggetti costituenti la comunità politica. La loro funzione fondante il corpo politico ha come esito la costituzione del sovrano-rappresentante e l'assoluta sottomissione alla sua volontà da parte degli individui divenuti sudditi.

[52] Leviatano, cap. 13, p. 100; Leviathan, p. 184.

[53] Leviatano, cap. 8, p. 60; Leviathan, p. 139.

comune»[54], vale a dire come trasferimento di una protezione personale fragile ad una protezione comune assicurata. Correlativamente a questa ripresa di un motivo già evocato nel primo paragrafo del capitolo appare una nuova nozione: il timore della morte (*Fear of Death*) e delle ferite, che introduce nel testo, nella maniera più diretta, l'altro principio universale – con il desiderio di potenza o di potere – della filosofia civile. Il ragionamento è il seguente: la causa del trasferimento della protezione è la paura (della morte e delle ferite) legata alla precarietà che risulta a sua volta dalla rivalità, ma si tratta di un timore che è del tutto inseparabile dal desiderio di *ease*, il desiderio di potenza fissato all'acquisizione del conforto e dell'esercizio del piacere non è che il versante positivo del timore derivato dalla minaccia permanente che suscita la rivalità nelle sue forme più violente. La protezione comune alla quale ci si affida a causa della constatazione dell'impotenza personale a soddisfare i propri desideri scongiurando i pericoli che, ad ogni istante, ne compromettono la realizzazione, appare alla fine come l'unica "soluzione" in grado di limitare gli effetti nefasti della coppia desiderio di potere/paura della morte.

Il paradosso è che l'essere umano in fondo non aspira che ad un'esistenza *confortevole*, Hobbes pensa dunque a una vita che contiene il suo stesso superamento verso ciò che egli chiama il «*commodious living*», caratterizzato dai «*contentments of life*», gli oggetti di consumo[55], che però può essere assicurata solo affidandosi a movimenti bruschi e violenti che mirano soprattutto ad evitare il peggio. Il mantenimento dell'autorità di un potere comune può evitare – in qualche misura – gli inconvenienti del movimento sregolato pur garantendo i benefici di un movimento tranquillo. Ma ecco che all'improvviso il dispositivo generato dalla congiunzione dell'insoddisfazione di alcuni e dell'ambizione di altri (in altri termini, la perseveranza del desiderio incessante di potere) riattiva la rivalità nell'acquisire «ricchezze, onore e comando o altro potere»[56], e nello stesso tempo incrementa, invece di ridurre, le cause di «disordini e sedizioni» che possono sfociare nella guerra civile. Il timore dell'oppressione sarà allora il solo mezzo per l'individuo «per garantirsi la vita e la libertà»[57]. L'osservazione ha qui una portata generale, ma non c'è dubbio che Hobbes stia pensando anche alla situazione storica dell'Inghilterra di cui analizzerà le cause nel *Behemoth*. Coloro che sono insoddisfatti della loro condizione

---

[54] Sul significato dell'espressione "potere comune" in Hobbes si veda M. Piccinini, Potere comune e rappresentanza in Thomas Hobbes, in Il potere. Per la storia della filosofia politica moderna, a cura di G. Duso, Carocci, Roma 1999, pp. 123-141, in part. p. 132.

[55] Le passioni che inducono (that encline) gli uomini alla pace, scrive Hobbes nel capitolo 13 del Leviatano, sono la paura della morte, il desiderio delle cose che sono necessarie «to commodious living» e la speranza di ottenerle con la propria «Industry» (Leviatano, I, cap. 13, pp. 103-104). «"Commodious living" is a general name for whatever people consider to be necessary for a satisfying life» (A. Alexandra, "All men agree on this...". Hobbes on the Fear of Death and the Way to Peace, in «History of Philosophy Quarterly», 6, 1, 1989, pp. 37-55, qui p. 38).

[56] Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 79; Leviathan, p. 161.

[57] Ibidem, p. 80; Leviathan, 163.

presente conservano la speranza di migliorarla «rimescolando le carte» e inaugurando un nuovo «gioco», vale a dire facendo una scelta che implica nuove alleanze; essi incontrano in questo modo "oggettivamente" il desiderio di prestigio di quelli che ambiscono ad esercitare un comando e che non possono mettere alla prova il loro valore «se non attraverso la guerra»[58]. È così che l'incontro di desideri di potenza proiettati in differenti direzioni, seguendo la disposizione passionale dei protagonisti ma obbedendo in ogni caso ad un movimento vitale naturale, può minacciare in maniera permanente una pace civile precaria. Ragion per cui solo l'*artificio* che sceglie secondo un calcolo razionale è in grado di sospendere la guerra e di imporre le condizioni di una pace civile che è sempre, comunque, minacciata dalla dissoluzione[59].

Tutti gli elementi presenti nel testo ci orientano verso un'apparente descrizione, in qualche modo anticipata, dello stato di natura che sarà teorizzato nel capitolo tredicesimo del *Leviatano*. In realtà qui non abbiamo a che fare con un'ipotetica genesi (il passaggio dallo stato di natura allo stato civile), quanto piuttosto con la descrizione della maniera in cui si istituisce – nel cuore stesso dello stato civile – la differenza dei "costumi" (*manners*), cioè delle *maniere di essere* in funzione di un'inclinazione generale che tende a diversificarsi sotto il peso dell'educazione e dell'abitudine («*customes and education*»). I motivi del passaggio dallo stato di natura allo stato civile sono conservati intatti nello stato civile e continuano ad agire in esso contribuendo così al suo mantenimento. E, reciprocamente, i fattori dissolventi della pace civile sono costantemente all'opera nello Stato e minacciano dall'interno la coesione del legame sociale: le caratteristiche dello stato di natura non sono esteriori allo stato civile, esse agiscono piuttosto al suo cuore stesso[60].

---

[58] Ibidem, p, 79; Leviathan, p. 162.

[59] A. Biral, Hobbes: la società senza governo, cit., p. 94.

[60] Nel De Cive, dopo aver affermato che l'uomo non è atto per nascita alla società, Hobbes aggiunge: «non nego che gli uomini desiderino per necessità naturale di aggregarsi l'un l'altro. Ma le società civili non sono semplici aggregazioni, ma alleanze, per stringere le quali sono necessari patti e fede. La forza di questi patti e fede resta ignota ai bambini e agli ignoranti, così come la loro utilità lo resta a chi non conosce i danni che derivano dalla mancanza di società. Per cui, i primi, non comprendendo cosa sia la società, non possono entrare in essa, e i secondi, ignorandone i vantaggi, non se ne curano. È chiaro dunque che tutti gli uomini (essendo nati bambini) sono per nascita inadatti alla società (born unapt for Society); e che molti, inoltre (forse la maggior parte), vi restano inadatti per tutta la vita, per una malattia dell'animo (defect of minde) o per mancanza di educazione (want of education). Ma sia i bambini che gli adulti hanno natura umana. Quindi, l'uomo è reso atto (Man is made fit) alla società non dalla natura, ma dall'educazione (by Education)» (Hobbes, De Cive. Elementi filosofici sul cittadino, trad. it. a cura di T. Magri, Editori Riuniti, Roma 2014, I, 2, p. 82). Per Aristotele l'uomo è un animale politico (zoon politikon), quindi la polis esiste "per natura", è un fenomeno naturale. Per Hobbes, invece, lo stato di natura non è caratterizzato dalla socievolezza ma dal suo contrario: la guerra di tutti contro tutti.

Hobbes gioca dunque sui tratti essenziali della natura umana così definiti, presenti sia nello stato civile come nello stato di natura, e nondimeno fondamentalmente contraddittori nelle loro aspirazioni e, perciò stesso, sempre potenzialmente conflittuali. Così, nella fondazione hobbesiana della sovranità, la vita nello stato di natura è definita solo dal suo essere incondizionatamente esposta a una minaccia di morte (il diritto illimitato di tutti su tutto) e la vita politica, cioè quella che si svolge sotto la protezione del Leviatano, non è che questa stessa vita esposta a una minaccia che riposa ora soltanto nelle mani del sovrano. Se Hobbes sembra anticipare nel capitolo undicesimo la descrizione dello stato di natura che sarà l'oggetto di gran parte del capitolo tredicesimo, è perché lo stato di natura (che egli chiama più spesso «condizione naturale dell'umanità») rappresenta in realtà una radicalizzazione dello stato civile, in altri termini lo stato civile *meno* il «potere comune»: il comportamento degli esseri umani in assenza di una «autorità» capace – perché dotata di un potere *irresistibile* – di assicurare il rispetto delle convenzioni e delle leggi. Resta il fatto che, nello stesso tempo, la descrizione proposta nel capitolo undicesimo del *Leviathan* mette in evidenza la situazione *consueta* dei cittadini in uno stato civile garantito da un sovrano imperfetto[61].

La consuetudine, i dogmi, l'autorità, contrassegnano l'infanzia dell'uomo, un'epoca di falsi saggi e di opinioni insensate (non-sense), lungo il corso della quale all'uomo è stato impedito di fare un uso autonomo delle sue facoltà razionali e di affidarsi solo a sé stesso. Ma una volta che le catene della consuetudine sono spezzate la massa dei pregiudizi può essere relegata nella dimensione di un morto passato. Nulla di quello che gli «antichi autori» di morale e di politica ci hanno lasciato, nulla di ciò che gli uomini hanno fatto indossando un qualche *abito* può e deve essere salvato, perché salvezza dal timore, dall'oppressione, dalla crudeltà, dalla guerra, esiste soltanto abbandonando ed opponendosi decisamente ad ogni *custome* e alla sua autorità consolidata dal tempo. L'imbricazione dell'ignoranza e dei costumi gioca così un ruolo decisivo nella ricerca e nell'accettazione della protezione e dell'autorità altrui, ma questa stessa «ignoranza delle cause» dell'origine del diritto e dell'equità, della legge e della giustizia, *dispone* ad accettare i costumi come regola di vita delle nostre stesse azioni[62]. Hobbes può affermare allora, sempre nel

---

[61] Cfr. T. Hobbes, Behemoth, trad. it. a cura di O. Nicastro, Laterza, Bari 1979, pp.74-75. Parlando dei «dottori della chiesa romana (Romish)», Hobbes scrive: «quanto al potere temporale che consiste nel giudicare e punire le azioni compiute contro le leggi civili, essi affermano di non pretenderlo direttamente, ma solo indirettamente, cioè solo nella misura i cui tali azioni tendano ad ostacolare o promuovere la religione e la morale (good manners)» (ibidem, p. 10). Si veda sul punto M. Farnesi Camellone, L'orologio del Leviatano. Il tempo vuoto dell'obbedienza, in La sovranità scomposta, cit., p. 105.

[62] Leggiamo nel capitolo "Della consuetudine e del non cambiar facilmente una legge accolta", nei Saggi di Montaigne: «Una volta, dovendo far valere una nostra tradizione (observations), accolta con piena autorità e in una zona assai estesa intorno a noi, e non volendo, come si usa fare, imporla soltanto con la forza delle leggi e degli esempi, ma cercando invece di risalire fino alla sua origine,

capitolo undicesimo, che in assenza di *scienza* gli uomini sono spinti di necessità a riferirsi, per l'agire, a ciò che già esiste, e questo necessario riferimento ha potuto creare la tradizione e la consuetudine – *custome* –, assunta come fonte di verità e di giustizia[63]. Il costume è sinonimo di «dogmatismo» se con questo termine si intende l'accettazione e il fare proprie delle opinioni non basandosi su una preliminare analisi "razionale" ma sulla fiducia in uomini considerati particolarmente saggi o più saggi di altri, credenza che rimane integra finché persiste l'ignoranza[64]. L'illusione legicentrista – l'esercizio di una volontà, quella del legislatore, posta a fondamento delle regole – riduce il nesso delle *moeurs* allo statuto di un effetto irrazionale, passionale, delle *opinioni* e delle *condotte* molteplici e mutevoli degli uomini, le loro maniere di vita, pensando così allo stesso tempo – e necessariamente – un'incapacità assoluta della società ad autoregolarsi. Hobbes fornisce l'espressione filosofica più coerente di questo orientamento del pensiero politico-giuridico: senza l'autorità dello Stato sovrano che, tramite la legge, mantiene gli uomini «nel rispetto», essi sono destinati a dilaniarsi[65].

scopersi che il suo fondamento era così debole che poco mancò che non me ne disgustassi, io che dovevo inculcarla in altri» (Saggi, cit., I, 23, p. 151).

[63] Il costume diviene così, in contrapposizione alla ragione, ottusa ripetizione e cammino che si inoltra nell'oscurità: «L'ignoranza delle cause e della prima costituzione del diritto, dell'equità, della legge e della giustizia dispone a fare della consuetudine e dell'esempio (Custome and Exemple) la regola delle proprie azioni (the rule of his actions), in modo tale da ritenere ingiusto ciò che viene punito per consuetudine e giusto ciò di cui si può addurre un esempio di impunità e di approvazione oppure (secondo l'espressione barbara dei legali che si servono unicamente di questa falsa misura della giustizia) un precedente. È un atteggiamento simile a quello dei bambini che non hanno altra regola per le buone e le cattive maniere (of good and evill manners) se non la correzione che ricevono dai loro genitori e dai loro maestri, con la differenza che i bambini sono costanti nell'osservanza della regola (are constant to their rule), mentre gli uomini non lo sono. Infatti, una volta diventati forti e ostinati, si appellano alla ragione partendo dalla consuetudine (from custome to reason) e alla consuetudine partendo dalla ragione (and from reason to custome) secondo quel che serve ai loro scopi di volta in volta. Si allontanano dalla consuetudine (receding from custome) quando il loro interesse lo richiede, e si mettono contro la ragione tutte le volte che la ragione è contro di loro» (Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 82-83; Leviathan, pp. 165-166).

[64] «Il difetto di scienza (Want of Science), cioè l'ignoranza delle cause, dispone, o piuttosto costringe, ad affidarsi al consiglio o all'autorità altrui. Infatti, tutti coloro che sono interessati alla verità, se non si affidano a loro stessi devono fidarsi dell'opinione di qualcun altro che ritengono più saggio di loro e non hanno motivo di sospettare che li ingannì. L'ignoranza del significato delle parole, che è difetto di comprensione, dispone ad accogliere con fiducia non soltanto la verità che non si conosce ma anche gli errori e, quel che più importa, le assurdità (the non-sense) di coloro ai quali si presta fiducia. Non è infatti possibile scoprire né l'errore né l'assurdità senza una perfetta comprensione delle parole» (Leviatano, cap. 11, p. 82; Leviathan, p, 165). Qui, ancora, si avverte chiaramente l'eco delle pagine che Montaigne dedica alla 'forza della consuetudine' nel capitolo 23 del primo libro dei Saggi (cfr. Saggi, I, 23, specialmente pp. 150-153).

[65] Sul 'mito' moderno della legge, cfr. P. Grossi, Mitologie giuridiche della modernità, Giuffrè, Milano 2007[3].

Nella filosofia politica hobbesiana, l'armonizzazione *artificiale* degli interessi presuppone il regno della legge, e si fonda sulla paura della sanzione: là dove le passioni non possono autoregolarsi, là dove l'onore che deriva dalla nobiltà d'animo o «eccellenza di coraggio» (*Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage*) diventa raro da trovarsi[66], l'ordine civile non può essere assicurato che dal timore, «la passione sulla quale si deve contare»[67] al fine di fondare l'obbligazione politica e di preservare la pace civile. In assenza di *normatività* inerente ai 'costumi', agli abiti di vita (*Manner of live*), solo il sovrano legislatore è capace di porre ostacoli ai desideri concorrenti degli uomini, solo delle «catene artificiali» possono limitare la loro libertà innanzitutto concepita come libertà di movimento, così la consuetudine è concessa soltanto dal *silenzio della legge*: «Quando una consuetudine che duri da molto tempo acquista l'autorità di legge, non è la lunghezza del tempo che le conferisce autorità, ma la volontà del sovrano manifestata dal silenzio (poiché il silenzio è talvolta indice del consenso), ed è legge finché dura il silenzio del sovrano su di essa»[68]. Le leggi civili ristabiliscono il contenuto della 'legge naturale' che esse stesse garantiscono attraverso la forza e l'autorità della volontà che le promulga. I «costumi» (*Manners*) nello stato civile non fondano alcuna regola legittima – com'era in Montaigne, dove la bontà delle norme era legata alla loro *durata*[69] – se non sono sanzionati dal sovrano o se non sono «conformi» al diritto naturale. La singolarità e lo statuto *passionale* dei costumi obbligano a cercare altrove la fonte di una normatività *oggettiva*.

4. «PUBLIQUE INSTRUCTION»

Nella dialettica di soggetto individuale e soggetto collettivo che anima il Leviatano, il soggetto individuale, proprio in quanto sta a fondamento della politica, non ha più una dimensione politica e il soggetto collettivo, il *popolo*, non agisce mai nella realtà empirica – fatta di relazioni, rapporti, costumi, maniere di essere storiche, gruppi che preesistono all'individuo – perché integralmente incorporato nel sovrano-rappresentante. L'effetto di spoliticizzazione delle *manners* coincide così, in Hobbes, con lo scopo dell'istituzione del potere sovrano, cioè la neutralizzazione del conflitto e la negazione dell'agire politico dei governati di fronte a chi governa. Ma al contempo ridetermina per gli individui moderni così prodotti – come il capitolo undicesimo ha messo in luce –, un modo di agire, uno spazio di riproduzione e proliferazione di una nuova, specifica maniera di vita, cioè lo spazio di un *gioco*

---

[66] Leviatano, cap. 15, p. 121.

[67] Ivi, cap. 14, p. 114.

[68] Leviatano, cap. 26, p. 220.

[69] «Senz'altra costrizione che il rispetto della loro usanza (*de leur usage*)» (Montaigne, Saggi, II, 37, p. 1032).

garantito dalla legge[70] in cui essi potranno giocare un ruolo, come *opinione pubblica*, solo perché autorizzati dal rappresentante sovrano[71]. Il sovrano che li rappresenta li include in quanto individui nel corpo politico – come appare nella celebre immagine del frontespizio del *Leviatano*[72] – anche con la sua azione disciplinante.

Il Leviatano così è un grande dispositivo di disciplinamento delle condotte e delle forme di vita dei cittadini, di riduzione del loro *conatus* interno al funzionamento del corpo politico[73], e svolge questa funzione *ri-educatrice* tramite la «*publique Instruction*» che agisce sulle opinioni, sull'immaginazione e sulle *manners* dei sudditi[74]. La sovranità è l'istituzione su cui si fonda *tutta* l'esistenza collettiva, è quindi un diritto e un dovere (*officium*) del sovrano quello di «nominare i maestri e di decidere quali dottrine siano conformi o contrarie alla difesa, alla pace e al bene del popolo»[75]: per il sovrano infatti «far sì che i sudditi siano istruiti» non è «soltanto un

---

[70] «Con le leggi dello Stato è come con le regole di un gioco (Lawes of Gaming): qualsiasi cosa i giocatori (the Gamesters) stabiliscano di comune accordo non è ingiusta per nessuno di loro» (Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 282; Leviathan, p. 388). Cfr. R. Santi, Hobbes, Montaigne et les raisons de la loi, in L'Axe Montaigne-Hobbes, cit., p 196.

[71] Cfr. G. Duso, La rappresentanza politica. Genesi e crisi del concetto, FrancoAngeli, Milano 1988, p. 82.

[72] Sull'uso retorico del frontespizio, si veda T. Brederkamp, Thomas Hobbes's Visual Strategies, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan, cit., pp. 29-60. Per una innovativa interpretazione di quell'immagine, cfr. S. Chignola, Homo Homini Tigris: Thomas Hobbes and the Global Images of Sovereignty, in «Philosophy & Social Criticism», 48, 5, 2021, pp. 726-754.

[73] Cfr. A. Bardin, Hobbes, materialismo e libertà, in «Scienza & Politica. Per una storia delle dottrine», 30, 58, 2018, pp. 51-70, qui p. 68. Sul tema del disciplinamento delle condotte, si vedano i corsi di Michel Foucault al Collège de France degli anni 1977-1979 (Sicurezza, territorio, popolazione. Corso al Collège de France [1977-1978], trad. it. Feltrinelli, Milano 2005 e Nascita della biopolitica. Corso al Collège de France [1978-1979], trad. it. Feltrinelli, Milano 2005, ed. stabilita da M. Senellart, sotto la direzione di F. Ewald e A. Fontana). Si vedano le osservazioni di P. Schiera, Specchi della politica. Disciplina, melanconia, socialità nell'Occidente moderno, Il Mulino, Bologna 1999, spec. pp. 59-105. Sulla problematica dello Stato moderno nella sua funzione di collettore disciplinante dei comportamenti politici individuali e di gruppo durante l'ancien régime, cfr. G. Oestreich, Problemi di struttura dell'assolutismo europeo (1969), trad. it. in Lo stato moderno. I. Dal Medioevo all'età moderna, a cura di E. Rotelli e P. Schiera, Il Mulino, Bologna 1971, pp. 173-191.

[74] Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 273; p. 376. Cfr. M. Piccinini, Thomas Hobbes: Corpo politico e artificialismo, in Id., Corpo politico, opinione pubblica, società politica. Per una storia dell'idea inglese di costituzione, Giappichelli, Torino 2007, pp. 71-91, qui specialmente p. 84. Cfr. M. Farnesi Camellone, Indocili soggetti. La politica teologica di Thomas Hobbes, Quodlibet, Macerata 2013, pp. 25-26.

[75] Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 274; p. 377. All'inizio del capitolo ("Of the OFFICE of the Sovereign Representative") Hobbes scrive: «La funzione (Office) del sovrano, (monarca o assemblea che sia) consiste nel fine per il quale gli è stato affidato il potere sovrano, cioè nel procurare la sicurezza del popolo (the safety of the people); a ciò è obbligato dalla legge di natura, e di ciò deve rendere conto a Dio, autore di quella legge, e a nessun altro fuorché lui. Inoltre, per sicurezza qui si intende non una mera sopravvivenza, ma anche tutte le altre soddisfazioni della vita (contentments of life) che ognuno possa procacciarsi con lecita industria senza pericolo o danno per lo Stato (by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth)» (Leviatano, p. 273; Leviathan, p. 376). È già

dovere ma anche un vantaggio e una sicurezza (*Security*) contro i pericoli che possono derivare a lui, come persona naturale, dalla ribellione»[76]. Tra i precetti che devono essere insegnati ai sudditi per disciplinarne le condotte sul modello dei comandamenti del patto mosaico, il quarto Comandamento[77] – che prescriveva agli Ebrei di celebrare «ogni sette giorni un *Sabbath*, nel quale veniva letta e commentata la legge, e nella cui solennità veniva loro rammentato che il loro re era Dio, che questi aveva creato il mondo in sei giorni e si era riposato il settimo, che il loro re era lo stesso Dio che li aveva redenti dal loro penoso lavoro di schiavi in Egitto»[78] – viene riformulato da Hobbes nella prescrizione al sovrano di organizzare ben stabiliti momenti rituali che interrompano il tempo sociale del lavoro ordinario[79] creando tempo *libero* (*Leasure*)[80], cerimonie civili di un *Common-wealth* bene ordinato, in

qui la funzione "governamentale" del potere, come direbbe Foucault. Che significa condurre, orientare, in particolare indirizzare alla finalità conveniente comportamenti e condotte assunti come liberi di procacciarsi contentments of life, regolandone aspetti individuali e coordinate generali nella società degli scambi economici e dei rapporti di produzione: l'individuo realizza pienamente la propria libertà solo all'interno della 'società civile'. Una suggestiva lettura 'biopolitica' del Leviatano viene sviluppata in L. Bernini, La macelleria del Leviatano. Come nutrirsi delle carni di un mito, in La sovranità scomposta, cit., pp. 11-53.

[76] Leviatano, p. 276; p. 379.

[77] Hobbes enumera i Comandamenti nell'ordine in cui compaiono in Esodo, 20: 2-17, e non secondo il canone valido per la Chiesa cattolica e luterana.

[78] Nel Leviatano Hobbes afferma con forza che il regno di Dio significa, tanto nel Vecchio che nel Nuovo Testamento, un regno politico reale: «il regno di Dio è un Common-wealth civile, in cui Dio stesso è il Sovrano, in virtù, prima, del Patto Antico e, poi, del Nuovo» (Leviatano, cap. 38, p. 368).

[79] Rituali e cerimonie rappresentano un processo narrativo il cui ritmo e cadenza sono garantiti dall'autorità del sovrano rappresentante. Per Hobbes «il volgo», da solo, non potrà mai arrivare a conoscere i suoi doveri, né una volta uditi, ricordarli, tanto sono distanti dallo stato normale delle sue opinioni e inclinazioni: «il popolo non riesce ad apprendere ciò, né, quando gli viene insegnato, a ricordarlo – neppure dopo una sola generazione a ricordarne tanto da sapere in chi risieda il potere sovrano –, se non vengono stabiliti dei tempi precisi, distinti da quelli del suo lavoro ordinario, nei quali esso possa dedicarsi a coloro che siano incaricati di istruirlo» (Leviatano, p. 277; Leviathan, p. 381). Sulla «Scuola della legge di Mosè» e l'istituzione del sabato, si veda Leviatano, IV, cap. 42 (Il «potere ecclesiastico») e cap. 46 (Le «tenebre» che si originano da una «vana filosofia» e da «tradizioni leggendarie»).

[80] Come ancora accade ai «selvaggi d'America», al tempo dei primitivi «la vita degli uomini si basava su un'esperienza rozza (grosse Experience); non esisteva metodo, vale a dire non si seminava né si piantava la conoscenza separatamente, lontano dalle erbacce e dalle volgari piante dell'errore e della congettura. Essendo la causa di ciò la mancanza di tempo libero (want of leasure), impedito loro dalle necessità della vita e da quelle di difesa dai vicini, era impossibile che fosse altrimenti sino all'edificazione dei grandi Stati (great Common-wealths)» (Leviatano, cap. 46, p. 539). Hobbes contrappone qui un'esperienza grossolana (grosse) alla ragione "civilizzata". La civiltà esige ragione perché la ragione permette agli uomini di avere «tempo libero», e perché il tempo libero rende possibile la Industry che è necessaria per erigere un Common-wealth. L'esperienza senza ragione non induce operosità, e gli uomini privi di operosità sono oziosi: «risulta evidente che non si deve considerare parte della filosofia quella conoscenza originaria chiamata esperienza (called Experience), su cui si fonda la prudenza, poiché non è conseguita con la ragione ma è presente tanto nelle bestie (Brute Beasts) che

cui la parola detta si faccia strumento di istruzione e civilizzazione[81] e «in cui i sudditi possano riunirsi insieme e (dopo aver rivolto preghiere e lodi a Dio, il sovrano dei sovrani) ascoltare l'esposizione dei loro doveri, la lettura e la spiegazione delle leggi positive cui tutti generalmente sono interessati, nonché sentirsi rammentare l'autorità che le rende leggi »[82]. Risuona qui l'eco di un passo dei *Saggi* nel quale Montaigne svelava il «fondamento mistico» dell'autorità delle leggi: «Ora, le leggi mantengono il loro credito non perché sono giuste, ma perché sono leggi. È il fondamento mistico della loro autorità; non ne hanno altri»[83]. L'autorità «che le rende leggi» è per Hobbes, ormai, il comando del sovrano che diviene l'unico attore legittimato a stabilire cosa sia giusto e cosa sbagliato in un contesto nel quale i cittadini si sono auto-obbligati all'obbedienza, ma alla quale devono essere *sempre* ri-educati perché quell'attitudine sia conservata[84].

Il sovrano dispone dell'ufficio di *dire* la legge e di interpretarla, cioè di fissare per tutti («*be put in mind»*, dice Hobbes) le definizioni, e controllare il significato delle parole di cui può e deve definire il buon uso «attraverso una generale previdenza

---

nell'uomo» dice Hobbes (Leviatano, cap. 46, p. 538). In termini di "attitudini", Hobbes sembra opporre «esperienza» a produttività e collegare «esperienza» e pigrizia (secondo il durevole stereotipo del 'selvaggio' ozioso). La libertà dei moderni è insomma una libertà produttiva. Essa va anche prodotta, e cioè insegnata dallo Stato. Il potere "spirituale" dello Stato così, tramite l'istruzione, deve insegnare la libertà e produrre dei soggetti che credono nella libertà.

[81] Produce, per dirla con Norbert Elias, una trasformazione dell'esistenza sociale nel suo complesso in coincidenza con la genesi moderna dello Stato, «una modificazione del comportamento che procede nel senso della 'civilizzazione'» (N. Elias, Potere e civiltà. Il processo di civilizzazione. II, trad. it. il Mulino, Bologna 2010, p. 307).

[82] Leviatano, p. 277; p. 381. Un ruolo centrale nell'impartire la "giusta educazione" nel Leviatano è svolto dalle Università: «Quanto ai mezzi e ai canali (Means, and Conduits) attraverso i quali il popolo può ricevere questa istruzione (receive this Instruction), dobbiamo anzitutto cercare quali siano i tramiti attraverso cui tante opinioni contrarie alla pace dell'umanità, basate su princìpi falsi e inconsistenti, si siano nonostante ciò tanto profondamente radicate in esso [...]. Laonde è chiaro che l'istruzione del popolo dipende totalmente dal corretto insegnamento (right teaching) impartito alla gioventù nelle Università» (Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 279; Leviathan, p. 383).

[83] Montaigne, Saggi, III, 13, p. 1433. Su questo celebre passo si veda J. Derrida, Dal diritto alla giustizia, in Id., Forza di legge. Il «fondamento mistico» dell'autorità (1994), trad. it. Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2003, spec. pp. 60-64.

[84] «I nomi di giusto e ingiusto, quando sono attribuiti agli uomini significano una cosa e quando sono attribuiti alle azioni, un'altra. Quando sono attribuiti agli uomini, significano la conformità, o la non conformità, dei costumi (Manners) alla ragione. Mentre, quando sono attribuiti alle azioni, significano la conformità, o la non conformità, alla ragione non dei costumi, o abiti di vita (or manner of life), ma di azioni singole.» (Leviatano, cap. 15, p. 120; Leviathan, p. 206).

(*Providence*) attuata nella educazione pubblica»[85], e grazie alla quale l'intesa dei sudditi e una relativa *libertà*[86] diventano per loro non soltanto possibili ma suscettibili di espansione, una volta tolto il pericolo della pluralità dei diversi modi di vita con i propri differenti criteri del bene e del male, del giusto e dell'ingiusto, di cosa è onorato e disprezzato, cioè una volta ridotti a varianti ininfluenti, a libertà che non nuocciono. Mentre la «disposizione» ad un docile *ascolto*, la formazione di una postura di soggezione o reverenza (*awe*)[87] e con essa l'inclinazione a ricevere «tutto ciò che l'autorità pubblica vi voglia imprimere»[88] è lo scopo del disciplinamento delle «menti del popolo» all'obbedienza, ma anche della regolazione *pastorale* della sua «libertà», delle sue condotte, della sua attitudine mentale e pratica di fronte alla vita, e cioè dei suoi «costumi»[89].

Nel modello hobbesiano la pretesa di ridurre la politica all'ordine di una razionalità formale costituito da norme giuridiche e capace di neutralizzare il conflitto interno sembra includere anche una certa «*Providence*» esercitata dallo Stato e volta a produrre un certo tipo umano, a sviluppare una certa disposizione d'animo nei

---

[85] Leviatano, cit., cap. 30, p. 273; Leviathan, p. 376. È contro i doveri del sovrano «permettere che il popolo resti ignorante o male informato sui fondamenti e le ragioni di quei suoi diritti essenziali [...], in quanto tali diritti non possono basarsi né sulla legge civile né sulla deterrenza (terrour) di punizioni legali. Infatti, una legge civile che proibisca la ribellione (e tale è ogni opposizione ai diritti essenziali della sovranità) costituisce obbligazione (in quanto legge civile) soltanto in forza della legge di natura che proibisce la violazione della promessa; un'obbligazione naturale che se gli uomini non conoscono, non possono neppure conoscere il diritto con cui il sovrano fa ogni legge. Quanto alla punizione, essi la prendono per un atto di ostilità che, quando ritengono di avere abbastanza forza, cercano di evitare con altri atti di ostilità» (Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 274; Leviathan, p. 377).

[86] Anche se l'individuo è immerso nella relazione con altri, sente ormai questa relazione soprattutto come una minaccia costante: la libertà «risiede, quindi, soltanto in quelle cose che il sovrano ha trascurato nel disciplinare (in regulating) le azioni dei sudditi, quali la libertà di comprare, di vendere e di fare fra loro altri contratti». La minaccia della pena, le «catene artificiali chiamate leggi civili» (Leviatano, cap. 21, p. 177), che il potere del sovrano è chiamato ad amministrare nell'interesse di tutti i sudditi "libera" le loro relazioni (comprare, vendere, fare contratti), e la loro Industry, rimuovendo l'ostacolo che ciascuno di essi, individuo naturalmente libero, rappresenta per ogni altro in assenza di regole comuni.

[87] Sull'uso del termine «awe» in Hobbes, si veda C. Ginzburg, Rileggere Hobbes oggi, in Id., Paura reverenza terrore. Cinque saggi di iconografia politica, Adelphi, Milano 2015, pp. 67-75.

[88] «Le menti del popolo (Common-peoples minds), a meno che non siano corrotte dalla soggezione ai potenti o imbrattate dalle opinioni dei dottori, sono come un foglio bianco (clean paper) suscettibile di ricevere qualunque cosa l'autorità pubblica vi voglia imprimere (imprinted in them)» (Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 275). Sulla «vana filosofia» insegnata nelle Scuole dell'antichità e «propagatasi» poi nelle Università e nella Chiesa, cfr. Leviatano, cap. 46, spec. pp. 540-545.

[89] Al sovrano spetta dunque una «funzione pastorale» primaria di insegnamento della verità, egli esercita così, in virtù di un'autorità che discende da Dio, l'«ufficio di pastore supremo» dei suoi sudditi (Leviatano, IV, cap. 42, p. 440).

sudditi, un'inclinazione, un'«attitudine» capace di prevenire/correggere la stessa «ingiustizia dei costumi»[90]. Riformulando nel *Leviatano* «il senso del decimo Comandamento» Hobbes scrive che bisogna *insegnare* ai sudditi che «non soltanto gli atti ingiusti, ma anche i progetti e le intenzioni di compierli (ancorché impediti dal caso) costituiscono ingiustizia, la quale consiste tanto nel carattere delittuoso dell'atto (*irregularity of the act*) quanto nella malvagità della volontà»[91]. Anche se la differenza delle maniere di essere poggia su una sorta di idiosincrasia passionale, questa non è però del tutto innata. Essa dipende solo in parte dal temperamento, l'elemento fondamentale deriva dall'educazione e dall'istruzione: il disciplinamento delle «attitudini» fa sì che il soggetto venga *conformato* ai criteri dell'ordine in cui si trova inserito.

Per Hobbes, tra l'antropologia soggiacente all'ipotetica condizione di assenza di ogni potere politico nello stato di natura e quella che opera all'interno dello Stato vi è continuità. La materia passionale che è alla base della necessità dell'ordine supporta la funzione di una ragione disciplinante volta a rendere *compatibili* le inclinazioni dei singoli predisponendole alla costruzione di un popolo sovrano composto da individui in-differenziati, riducendo all'uniformità e alla prevedibilità dei comportamenti ciò che è plurale, e dunque indocile e difforme[92], bisognoso di essere ricondotto alla misura richiesta da un ordine che vuole occupare ogni spazio disponibile per la ragione soggettiva, indifferente al *milieu* determinato dei modi di vita, alla *piega* del loro darsi storico. L'educazione nel Leviatano mira infatti a introdurre, «nella istruzione del popolo sui diritti essenziali della sovranità», la «disposizione» alla pace e alla stabilità di quell'ordine, condizione necessaria dell'attitudine alla «*Industry*»: mira cioè a «far accettare qualcosa di così conforme alla ragione (*so

---

[90] «L'ingiustizia dei costumi (Injustice of Manners), è la predisposizione (disposition) o l'attitudine (aptitude) a far torto [ad altri]; è ingiustizia prima di metter capo all'azione (before it proceed to Act) e non presuppone alcuno specifico individuo oggetto del torto (injured)» (Leviatano, cap. 15, p. 121; p. 207). Non si tratta più qui di punire le infrazioni degli individui, le condotte che di per sé costituiscono reato, quanto piuttosto di correggere la loro 'potenzialità', o meglio quella particolare capacità che «viene generalmente chiamata IDONEITÀ o attitudine (FITNESSE, or Aptitude)» (Leviatano, cap. 10, p. 77; p. 159). Di nuovo: una preoccupazione pastorale appare insita nella costruzione della moderna statualità (non si dimentichi che nel frontespizio del Leviatano il gigante tiene nella mano sinistra un bastone pastorale, simbolo dell'*auctoritas* spirituale).

[91] Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 278-279; Leviathan, p. 383.

[92] È ormai lontano l'elogio machiavelliano (e poi montaigneano) della 'diversità': «Quinci nasce che una republica ha maggiore vita, ed ha più lungamente buona fortuna, che uno principato; perché la può meglio accomodarsi alla diversità de' temporali, per la diversità de' cittadini che sono in quella, che non può uno principe. Perché un uomo che sia consueto a procedere in uno modo, non si muta mai, come è detto; e conviene di necessità che, quando e' si mutano i tempi disformi a quel suo modo, che rovini.» (Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, III, 9, Tutte le opere, cit., p. 213)

consonant to Reason) che, chiunque sia libero da pregiudizi, non ha bisogno, per impararlo, che di udirlo»[93].

---

[93] Leviatano, cap. 30, p. 275; Leviathan, p. 379 («needs no more to learn it, than to hear it»).

UNA DISCUSSIONE TEORICO-NORMATIVA E COMPARATIVA SULLE DISPOSIZIONI ANTICIPATE DI TRATTAMENTO
UN MODELLO ITALIANO PER IL CONTESTO ALBANESE

DENARD VESHI
Corresponding   Author
Department of Law
University College Bedër (Albania)
dveshi@beder.edu.al

CARLO VENDITTI
Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza
Università della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli (Italy)
carlo.venditti@unicampania.it

RAFFAELE PICARO
Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza
Università della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli (Italy)
raffaele.picaro@unicampania.it

ABSTRACT
While the Italian Parliament ruled on the Advance Directives (ADs) in December 2017, Albania has not yet adopted a specific law regulating end-of-life situations. This scientific contribution studies the Albanian legal system and the documents published by the two main public health advisory bodies National Bioethics Committee and the National Health Committee as well as the national medical jurisprudence and the Code of medical ethics. After examining the importance of ADs and having considered the national and international literature that emphasized the patient's right to self-determination, this paper provides some suggestions while also taking into consideration the rules adopted by the Italian Parliament in December 2017. In the conclusions, this research highlights the importance of the ad hoc rules governing the ADs based on the findings of the investigation of the Italian model. Furthermore, in light of the current pandemic, an innovative interpretation of the Albanian penal code is proposed.

KEYWORDS
Patient Autonomy; Code of Medical Ethics; End-of-Life Decisions; Albania/Italy.

INTRODUZIONE[1]

Il concetto di autonomia del paziente, in forza del quale è stato messo in discussione l'atteggiamento paternalistico in campo medico, è stato inizialmente sviluppato negli Stati Uniti intorno alla fine degli anni '60. Da questa epoca in poi il professionista medico è stato, con sempre maggior forza, richiamato alla necessità di non nascondere le informazioni di diagnosi e di cura ai pazienti e alle loro famiglie; giocoforza preclusa è divenuta ogni decisione che fosse assunta, in vece del paziente, sulla base di meri criteri oggettivi, tratti dalla scienza medica, in base ai quali individuare dapprima la diagnosi e, poi, la prognosi della malattia. In altri termini, si è passati dal concetto di salute basato su criteri medici oggettivi, al concetto più ampio di benessere psico-fisico in relazione al quale, invero, l'obiettivo finale deve essere ravvisato, attraverso la condivisione delle informazioni mediche, nella determinazione di un processo decisionale partecipato tra il medico e il paziente.[2]

La stessa evoluzione teorico-normativa si è prodotta anche con riguardo alla legislazione costituzionale albanese. Invero, nella previgente costituzione albanese del 1976, a fronte di dell'assunzione da parte dello Stato della fornitura gratuita del servizio medico (articolo 47), era fissato, quale obiettivo principale, la protezione dei cittadini sul piano del rafforzamento della loro salute, con lo scopo in allora dichiarato con particolare riferimento alle giovani generazioni, di accrescerne la tempra al lavoro e alla difesa nazionale (articolo 36). In questa prospettiva, vale a dire in vista della finalità di supportare una crescita del paese tramite il lavoro delle giovani generazioni, il paternalismo medico aveva ottenuto una sua consacrazione nella normativa di livello costituzionale, appunto perché ai medici era permesso di assumere la scelta di cura in base a criteri medici oggettivi piuttosto che in considerazione del benessere psico-fisico del paziente.

Diversamente è oggi nella vigente costituzione del 1998 laddove, infatti, il diritto all'assistenza sanitaria (articolo 55, comma 1) è considerato uno strumento indispensabile per la protezione della dignità della persona umana (preambolo e articolo 3), piuttosto che uno strumento finalizzato a sostenere la solidarietà o la difesa nazionale. Detto altrimenti, il principio, anche di carattere etico, imperniato sull'autonomia decisionale del paziente in relazione alla scelta di cura, ha trovato un significativo riconoscimento costituzionale in stretta connessione col diritto alla protezione della dignità personale del paziente.

---

[1] Divisione del lavoro: Introduzione e L'importanza delle Direttive Anticipate di Trattamento (autore: Carlo Venditti); La nomina del fiduciario (autore: Raffaele Picaro); Conclusioni (autore: Denard Veshi).

[2] K. M. SWETZ et al., "Advance directives, advance care planning, and shared decision making: promoting synergy over exclusivity in contemporary context", Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 48, no. 3, 2014, pp. e1–e3.

Nella letteratura etica, focalizzata sull'aspetto relativo al processo decisionale del malato, i due riferimenti principali di autonomia del paziente sono costituiti dal modello individualista e dal modello relazionale.[3] La differenza principale che intercorre tra loro consiste nella considerazione delle circostanze esterne che influiscono sulla decisione finale assunta dal paziente.

L'approccio individualistico si basa sugli scritti di John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) e Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) ove l'uomo autonomo è – e dovrebbe essere – indipendente e autosufficiente, vale a dire un individuo autorealizzato che dirige i suoi sforzi verso la massimizzazione dei propri personali guadagni.

Tuttavia, è apparso evidente che l'indipendenza propria dell'individuo risulta essere costantemente minacciata dagli altri individui, i quali evidentemente sono altrettanto egoisti.[4] Questo approccio etico finisce per considerare in modo altamente sospetto l'influenza dei fattori esterni sul processo decisionale individuale.[5] Dall'angolo visuale della scelta del paziente, l'autodeterminazione individuale di quest'ultimo dovrebbe essere autosufficiente, ossia in grado di riconoscere l'interferenza altrui e ignorarla.

L'attenzione al processo cognitivo di decisione è un risultato diretto della filosofia analitica, caratterizzata dall'enfasi posta sulla chiarezza e sulla precisione argomentativa. Etimologicamente, il termine autonomia deriva da radici greche che significano "autogoverno", o capacità di autodeterminazione e autogoverno.[6] Questo approccio è stato adottato dalle scuole utilitaristiche e neoliberiste e nella maggior parte dei paesi dell'Europa occidentale. Secondo l'interpretazione liberale dell'autonomia, l'autodeterminazione consiste nella capacità di prendere decisioni senza l'interferenza di fattori esterni. Il modello individualistico sottolinea la capacità decisionale, sicché la motivazione della decisione deliberativa assume un'importanza fondamentale.[7]

Negli anni '80, gli studiosi dell'etica della cura (c.d. *feminist ethics of care*) iniziano a considerare l'autonomia del paziente come una qualità relazionale e, pertanto si tende progressivamente a valutare il fatto che le identità dei pazienti vengono in realtà a formarsi all'interno del contesto delle relazioni sociali.[8] Secondo questo orientamento, le relazioni sociali assumono un'importanza tale da portare alla considerazione della persona quale una "seconda persona", ossia da intendersi

[3] M.A.L.OSHANA, Personal autonomy and society, J. Soc. Philos. 1998, pp. 81–102.

[4] L. CODE, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 77.

[5] L.F. DEGNER, J.A SLOAN , and P. VENKATESH , The Control Preferences Scale, CJNR 1996, pp. 21–43.

[6] J.K. SKILBECK, and S.PAYNE , End of life care: a discursive analysis of specialist palliative care nursing, J. Adv. Nurs. 2005, pp. 325–334.

[7] H.G. FRANKFURT , Freedom of the will and the concept of a person, in CHRISTMAN J. (ed.), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.63–76.

[8] C. MACKENZIE and N. STOLJAR, *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

come il risultato delle influenze determinate da una serie molteplice e varia di fattori esterni tra i quali anche i social network.[9] Il modello relazionale colloca quindi l'autonomia individuale su un piano più ampio, nel quale vengono ad evidenziarsi i fattori interpersonali ed esterni.[10] Si tratta perciò di un orientamento che, tra l'altro, tende ad enfatizzare il ruolo dell'eventuale fiduciario in funzione di un miglioramento complessivo del grado di autonomia espresso dal singolo paziente.[11]

Sebbene l'approccio dominante nell'etica medica occidentale sia la prospettiva liberale, che appunto si concentra sull'idea di autodeterminazione,[12] vari legislatori hanno codificato, direttamente o indirettamente, il fattore relazionale in relazione all'esercizio di autonomia da parte del paziente.[13] Questo differente approccio legislativo conferisce dunque rilevanza ai possibili fattori esterni alla sfera strettamente individuale e, in particolare, alle interazioni sociali e al possibile ruolo del fiduciario quali fattori che esercitano una determinante influenza sulla formazione del processo decisionale della persona.

Nella cornice del contesto teorico brevemente delineato, il presente contributo intende considerare le DAT dallo specifico punto di vista giuridico prendendo a riferimento il modello italiano. In coerenza con la letteratura nazionale ed internazionale,[14] si intende perciò porre in evidenza l'importanza delle DAT e, in modo peculiare, si vuole evidenziare il valore della nomina del fiduciario come strumento che apre all'effettiva applicazione dell'approccio relazionale in riferimento all'esercizio di autonomia del paziente.

La ragione dell'assunzione a paradigma del modello italiano delle DAT sta principalmente nella circostanza che l'Italia – rispetto ai paesi di lingua latina (Italia, Francia, Portogallo e Spagna), inglese (Irlanda e Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord) e tedesca (Austria, Germania e Svizzera) – è l'ultimo Stato, in ordine di tempo, che ha introdotto nel proprio ordinamento una disciplina legislativa per le DAT.[15] Si deve peraltro considerare che il ruolo della legge 219/2017 è

---

[9] A.BAIER , Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.

[10] H. BIGGS , I don't want to be a burden! A feminist reflects on women's experiences of death and dying, in SHELDON S and Thomson M (eds.), Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law, London: Cavendish Publishing, 1998,pp. 279–295.

[11] M R. HUNT, and C. ELLS , Partners towards autonomy: risky choices and relational autonomy in rehabilitation care, Disabil. Rehabil, 2011,pp. 961–967.

[12] F.RANDALL , and R.S.DOWNIE , Palliative Care Ethics: A Companion for All Specialties, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

[13] D.VESHI , E. KOKA , C.VENDITTI , The importance of legal proxy in end-of-life decisions in some western European countries. Riv It Med Leg. 2019, 39,pp. 901-914.

[14] D.VESHI ,1 et al., End-of-Life Decisions in Albania: The Call for an Ethical Revision, Liverp Law Rev. 2020, 41, cit.,pp.315-330, D.VESHI ,2 et al., The Role of Legal Proxies in End-of-Life Decisions in Albania: the need for an ad hoc Law, BioLaw J. 2020, 3,cit., pp. 303-313, D. VESHI, E. KOKA, C. VENDITTI, The importance of legal proxy in end-of-life decisions in some western European countries. Rivista Italiana di Medicina Legale, cit., pp. 901-914; BLACK B. S., et al. Surrogate decision makers' understanding of dementia patients' prior wishes for end-of-life care. JAH 2009, 21, cit., pp.,627-650.

[15] D.VESHI , E.KOKA , C.VENDITTI , op. cit.;

così fondamentale nella prospettiva della protezione del diritto all'autodeterminazione del paziente, che la Corte costituzionale italiana, durante la revisione dell'articolo 580 c.p. in correlazione con il suicidio medicalmente assistito, ha inteso guardare proprio alla detta legge del 2017, ancorché la sospensione del trattamento da parte di un paziente incosciente rappresenti una pratica essenzialmente diversa dal suicidio medicalmente assistito e, perciò, ad esso non assimilabile.[16]

Negli ultimi anni, dunque, il panorama giuridico italiano si è radicalmente trasformato. Per un verso, le DAT sono state riconosciute in conseguenza dell'intervento normativo del 2017 mentre, per l'altro, il suicidio medicalmente assistito, come risultato dell'interpretazione giurisprudenziale che ne ha fissate le concrete condizioni di esercizio, non comporta la punibilità del medico. Da siffatto nuovo contesto giuridico è conseguito che l'articolo 17 del Codice di deontologia medica italiano debba essere interpretato alla luce sia delle pronunce della giurisprudenza, e in specie di quella costituzionale, sia degli indirizzi applicativi inseriti in data 6 febbraio 2020 con riguardo al Codice di deontologia medica italiano. Lo stesso dicasi per l'articolo 38 del medesimo Codice di deontologia medica italiano il quale, pure, deve essere letto ed interpretato in coerenza con la nuova legge italiana del 22 dicembre 2017.[17]

Mentre negli ultimi anni l'Italia ha riconosciuto le DAT nonché – sia pure nei limiti delle condizioni fattuali delimitate in sede giurisprudenziale - il suicidio medicalmente assistito, in Albania si riscontra ancora un notevole grado di incertezza giuridica in ordine alle situazioni di fine vita. Entrambi gli Stati hanno riconosciuto che la sospensione o l'interruzione del trattamento da parte di un paziente cosciente è considerata lecita poiché il paziente può acconsentire, e di fatto acconsente, alla sospensione o alla sospensione del trattamento medico. Ciò è stato anche normato nell'articolo 6, comma 2, lettera ç), della legge albanese n. 10.107 del marzo 2009 così come nell'articolo 1 della legge italiana n. 219 del 22 dicembre 2017. Peraltro, in entrambi i paesi l'eutanasia viene considerata quale fattispecie di omicidio, perciò punibile ai sensi del codice penale (articolo 76 c.p.al. e articolo 575 c.p.it.). Tuttavia, nei due Stati trova spazio un approccio giuridico sostanzialmente differente, sia con riguardo al caso del suicidio medicalmente assistito - come detto legittimato in Italia, a determinate condizioni, dalla giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale – sia in riferimento alla sospensione o alla interruzione del trattamento medico da parte di un paziente incosciente (appunto regolata dalla legge italiana n. 219/2017).

---

[16] Corte Costituzionale, Sentenza 242/2019, Giudizio di Legittimità Costituzionale in via incidentale,

[17] E.KOKA , D.VESHI . A new law of 'living will' in Italy: A critical analysis. Liverp Law Rev. 2019, 40, pp., 113-130. Va precisato che la legge 219/2017 va interpretata in correlazione con il decreto 10 dicembre 2019, n. 168 'Regolamento concernente la banca dati nazionale destinata alla registrazione delle disposizioni anticipate di trattamento' e la circolare del Ministero dell'Interno n. 1/2018 che ha previsto delle disposizioni particolari per la validità formale delle disposizioni anticipate di trattamento.

Di certo bisogna considerare che l'inquadramento giuridico delle situazioni di fine vita rientra nella competenza nazionale di ciascuno Stato.[18] In base alla gerarchia delle norme, la legislazione interna albanese deve essere interpretata in coerenza non solo con la costituzione albanese, ma anche con i trattati internazionali che sono stati ratificati in Albania (articolo 116 Costituzione albanese). Va altresì osservato che i vari codici hanno un'importanza particolare nella legislazione albanese poiché per la loro approvazione non è richiesta la maggioranza semplice, bensì quella dei tre quinti dei membri del Parlamento (articolo 81, c. 2, lett. d, Costituzione albanese). A luglio del 2011 l'Albania ha ratificato la Convenzione sui diritti dell'uomo e la biomedicina (Convenzione di Oviedo) che – com'è noto - riconosce l'importanza delle DAT nel suo articolo 9. Anche se la legislazione albanese non regola le DAT, la revoca del trattamento sanitario potrebbe comportare l'esistenza di fattispecie penali quali, ad esempio, l'omicidio del consenziente (articolo 99 c.p.al.) o la fattispecie degli omicidi commessi in altre circostanze specifiche (articolo 79, c. 1, lett. b) c.p.al.).[19] Sono queste le ragioni per le quali risulta essere di fondamentale importanza, una regolamentazione delle DAT in Albania, proprio in considerazione dell'importanza, innanzitutto sul piano etico, da riconoscere alla dignità della persona umana, in funzione dello stesso suo riconoscimento presente anche nella premessa della vigente costituzione albanese.

La ricerca considera la situazione giuridica italiana in considerazione del fatto che il legislatore albanese post-comunista si è ispirato al legislatore italiano in varie occasioni. Nel concreto, nel 1993, una Task Force internazionale si è recata in Albania per la codificazione moderna della legislazione nazionale.[20] Uno dei membri più importanti del gruppo era il professore italiano Gianmaria Ajani. Negli anni '90, la maggior parte dello staff academico albanese parlava la lingua italiana. La collaborazione giuridica italo-albanese è stata ulteriormente rafforzata dal Prof. Ajani che ha collaborato con l'Università di Tirana e la sua stessa università, ovvero l'Università di Trento, durante il programma TEMPUS iniziato nel 1991.

Il presente contributo scientifico intende pertanto fornire una panoramica generale delle situazioni di fine vita in Albania, concentrandosi sulle DAT. Si intende altresì offrire un'indagine sui principali orientamenti in campo medico presenti nella giurisprudenza albanese.[21] Attenzione specifica è stata perciò rivolta ai due principali enti pubblici, il Comitato Nazionale di Bioetica e il Comitato Nazionale della Salute, istituiti come organi consultivi per le questioni mediche; peraltro senza

---

[18]D. VESHI , and G.NEITZKE , Advance directives in some Western European countries: a legal and ethical comparison between Spain, France, England, and Germany, Eur. J. Health Law 2015, pp., 321-345.

[19] In Italia, non esiste una fattispecie simile. Esiste comunque l'aggravante di 11-sexies: l'avere, nei delitti non colposi, commesso il fatto a danno di persone ricoverate presso strutture sanitarie o presso strutture sociosanitarie residenziali o semiresidenziali, pubbliche o private, ovvero presso strutture socioeducative. Questo comma è stato aggiunto dall'art. 14, L. 11 gennaio 2018, n. 3 con decorrenza dal 15 febbraio 2018.

[20]Currently, Mr. Markus Jaeger Head of Independent Human Rights Bodies Division chez Council of Europe. He joined the Council of Europe in 1989.

[21]D.VESHI ,1 et al., *op. cit.*, D.VESHI ,2 et al., *op. cit.*

riuscire ad individuare alcun documento specifico, redatto da questi enti, che sia esplicitamente rivolto alle situazioni di fine vita o alle DAT. Particolare attenzione viene altresì data al Codice di deontologia medica poiché si tratta dell'unico documento legale che include taluni riferimenti al processo decisionale di fine vita.

Oltre a fornire un'interpretazione innovativa del codice penale albanese, l'originalità di questo contributo scientifico risiede nello studio delle decisioni di fine vita in Albania attraverso un approccio giuridico che prende a riferimento il modello italiano del dicembre 2017.

Il presente studio include le seguenti sezioni. La sezione 2 sottolinea l'importanza delle DAT ed indaga sul quadro giuridico albanese che disciplina le DAT concentrandosi sul Codice di deontologia medica. La sezione 3 evidenzia il ruolo del fiduciario nelle decisioni di fine vita includendo, in via generale e non dettagliata, anche l'approccio relazionale applicato dall'etica della cura. Nella conclusione, gli autori sostengono che l'attuale assenza di una legge albanese *ad hoc* che disciplini le decisioni di fine vita finisce per non dare adeguata protezione all'autonomia decisionale del paziente circa la cura cui deve sottoporsi. Inoltre, alla luce della non definitivamente superata situazione di pandemia, gli autori propongono un'interpretazione innovativa del codice penale albanese, specie per ciò che concerne i casi di sospensione o interruzione dei trattamenti medici destinati ai pazienti in stato di incoscienza, alla quale potrebbero altresì guardare gli altri Stati ove sussiste una situazione normativa paragonabile a quella albanese.

L'IMPORTANZA DELLE DIRETTIVE ANTICIPATE DI TRATTAMENTO

I pazienti possono esprimere la propria volontà medica attraverso le DAT. Le DAT dovrebbero essere considerate come delle dichiarazioni mediche che, sulla base del principio dell'autonomia, forniscono direttive per le cure mediche future, in caso di sopravvenuta incapacità decisionale della persona. I cittadini possono esprimere le loro dichiarazioni mediche in due forme diverse: il c.d. testamento biologico, cioè l'atto scritto con il quale il paziente esprime la propria volontà di trattamenti sanitari, nonché il consenso o il rifiuto rispetto ad accertamenti diagnostici o scelte terapeutiche ed a singoli trattamenti sanitari; o tramite la nomina di un fiduciario, il quale deve conoscere, ed essere in grado di riferire, le volontà e i valori morali del paziente. Dal punto di vista medico-legale, questi tipi di DAT dovrebbero essere complementari.[22] In altre parole, un cittadino dovrebbe sia redigere il c.d. testamento biologico, sia nominare un fiduciario.

La legge italiana n. 219 del dicembre 2017 disciplina entrambe le dette forme di dichiarazioni mediche. Com'è noto, si tratta di una normativa che è stata approvata dopo il caso mediatico di un famoso DJ italiano che in seguito ad un incidente

---

[22] D.VESHI , G.NEITZKE , 2015, *op. cit.*

stradale nel giugno 2014 era divenuto cieco e tetraplegico. Nel febbraio 2017, con l'aiuto di una terza persona anch'essa di cittadinanza italiana, il DJ raggiunse la Svizzera, dove attuò la scelta di praticare il suicidio assistito. La cronologia di questi eventi non può essere considerata casuale per tre motivi. Innanzitutto, il disegno di legge (DDL) 2350 è stato anche il risultato del caso Englaro.[23] In secondo luogo, la Camera dei deputati – una delle due camere del Parlamento italiano – aveva approvato il DDL dell'attuale disciplina delle DAT nell'aprile 2017, a meno di due mesi da questo evento. In terzo luogo, la Corte costituzionale italiana, nella decisione del settembre 2019 (Corte costituzionale italiana, R.O. 43/2018), ebbe ad esaminare l'articolo 580 c.p. durante il procedimento a carico della persona che aveva aiutato il DJ ad attuare la sua scelta di fine vita.

Le DAT sono espressioni scritte delle preferenze dei cittadini in merito a trattamenti sanitari specifici a cui desiderano acconsentire o che desiderano rifiutare in caso di incapacità futura. Si pensa che l'origine delle DAT potrebbe collocarsi negli ordini di «Non Rianimazione» che i medici erano soliti scrivere nelle cartelle mediche dei pazienti, dopo averne discusso con loro e con le loro famiglie.[24] In caso di incapacità, le DAT possono creare un «ponte» tra pazienti e medici.[25] Inoltre, le DAT – specialmente se espresse attraverso un intenso dialogo con i medici – migliorano l'autonomia del paziente.[26] Per di più, solo il riconoscimento delle DAT comporterebbe la parificazione tra le situazioni dei pazienti coscienti e di quelli incoscienti, il che a sua volta comporterebbe l'attuazione del principio di uguaglianza, anch'esso protetto nelle costituzioni nazionali (articolo 18 in Albania e articolo 3 in Italia). Le DAT si basano sul solido fondamento morale del principio di autonomia. Come affermano Buchanan e Brock,[27] le DAT sono atti «di autodeterminazione» che si basano sulla c.d. visione di estensione dell'autonomia. In altri termini, si può concordare con l'affermazione secondo la quale «così come abbiamo un diritto morale di autonomia di influenzare le nostre preferenze sui nostri interessi nel presente, così abbiamo un diritto morale di autonomia di effettuare (in anticipo) le nostre preferenze sui nostri interessi sopravvissuti».

Quanto alla struttura da riconoscere all'atto giuridico, come in Italia le DAT vanno considerate un atto unilaterale,[28] pure in Albania le DAT medesime dovrebbero essere considerate come un negozio giuridico unilaterale il quale, invero, è destinato a produrre effetti giuridici nella sfera individuale non economica dell'autore poiché il loro scopo consiste nell'acconsentire ovvero nel rifiutare i trattamenti

---

[23] D. VESHI , Ethical and legal issues in cases of withdrawing treatment from an incompetent patient in Italy. Med Law. 2013, 32, pp.,577-585.

[24] MT. RABKIN , G.GILLERMAN , NR.RICE . Orders not to resuscitate. NEJM. 1976, 295, pp., 364-366.

[25] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, *Advanced Statements about Medical Treatment,* London, 1995.

[26] MR, HUNT, C. ELL, Partners towards autonomy: risky choices and relational autonomy in rehabilitation care. Disabil Rehabil, 2011, 33, pp., 961-967.

[27] AE.BUCHANAN , et al. (1989). Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

[28] E.KOKA , D.VESHI , *op. cit.*

medici futuri per il caso di incapacità di autodeterminarsi.[29] Le DAT, quindi, dovrebbero in ogni caso essere viste come un'applicazione del diritto all'autodeterminazione (articolo 27 della costituzione albanese e interpretazione sistematica degli articoli 2, 13 e 32 della costituzione italiana) perché esiste un diritto alla vita, ma non un dovere di vivere.

Il diritto all'autodeterminazione in materia di salute può essere limitato solo nei casi in cui un intervento pubblico miri a proteggere la comunità (articolo 6 della legge albanese 10.107/2009 e articolo 2 della legge italiana 180/1978). Tuttavia, l'intervento pubblico deve mirare non solo alla protezione della salute altrui, ma altresì non deve danneggiare o, per meglio dire, deve essere in grado di eventualmente migliorare la salute del paziente. Questa interpretazione è in linea con quella della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo (CEDU) nella quale si è affermato che «la necessità terapeutica non può essere considerata disumana o degradante ... [quando] ... la necessità medica ha dimostrato di esistere in modo convincente .... e questo trattamento medico migliora la salute del paziente» (CEDU, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, ricorso n. 10533/83, par. 81 e 82).

Sebbene questa pronuncia abbia riguardato l'interpretazione dell'articolo 3 della CEDU (Divieto di tortura), è comunque corretto il riferimento ad essa poiché la motivazione prende a riferimento il concetto di benessere del paziente anche nelle situazioni in cui i medici non rispettano il diritto all'autodeterminazione di quest'ultimo onde perseguire esigenze connesse alla sicurezza pubblica. Peraltro, paradigmatico al riguardo è il dibattito, non ancora sopito, in ordine alle situazioni del paziente affetto da Covid-19.

La complessità delle questioni giuridiche ed etiche relative alla sospensione del trattamento sanitario per un paziente incosciente deriva dalla necessità di ricostruirne la volontà. L'assenza di una legge *ad hoc* che regoli le DAT crea incertezza giuridica poiché i medici e il personale medico non sanno cosa fare in caso di una richiesta di sospensione o interruzione di trattamenti medici per pazienti incoscienti. Parte della dottrina giuridica ritiene che la revoca del trattamento non possa essere punita perché nonostante i fatti siano simili ai reati di omicidio del consenziente (articolo 99 c.p.al. o articolo 579 c.p.it.) o di omicidi commessi in altre circostanze specifiche (articolo 79, c. 1, lett. b) c.p.al.),[30] esiste la causa di giustificazione penale; adempimento di un dovere (articolo 21 c.p.al. o articolo 51 c.p.it.).[31] Tuttavia, una parte della comunità scientifica sostiene che i cittadini non hanno il diritto morale di morire e quindi nel caso di un paziente incosciente, anche se durante un certo periodo egli abbia manifestato il consenso a rifiutare o sospendere le cure mediche, esiste la necessità di salvare la vita del paziente. In questi casi, il medico

---

[29] D.VESHI ,1 et al., *op. cit.*

[30] Nota 19.

[31] S.CANESTRARI , Le diverse tipologie di eutanasia: una legislazione possibile. Riv It Med Leg, 2013, pp., 751–775.

non è responsabile né di sequestro di persona né di violenza privata (articoli 109 e 110 c.p.al e articoli 605, 610 and 613 c.p.it.) in quanto esiste la causa di giustificazione costituita dallo stato di necessità (articolo 20 c.p.al o articolo 54 c.p.it.).[32]

Considerando il quadro giuridico generale, e in particolare gli articoli 6-11 del codice civile albanese (c.c.al.), le DAT possono essere redatte solo da persone con piena capacità giuridica, raggiunta al compimento dell'età di 18 anni. Inoltre, anche i cittadini emancipati dovrebbero avere il diritto di redigere le DAT perché la persona emancipata è pienamente capace di intendere e di volere (articolo 7, comma 2, codice della famiglia albanese) e la capacità rimane anche se il matrimonio è dichiarato invalido o è stato risolto prima del raggiungimento dei diciotto anni (articolo 6, comma 2, c.c.al.). Queste regole sono simili al sistema giuridico italiano. Considerando le DAT come un negozio giuridico, ciò significa che anche i minori emancipati possono redigerle. La legge italiana 219/2017 non stabilisce espressamente che i cittadini emancipati possono redigere le DAT; tuttavia, l'articolo 3 disciplina i casi dei minori e degli incapaci (interdetto, inabile, o nei casi di nomina dell'amministratore di sostegno) senza menzionare il caso dell'emancipazione. Inoltre, la nota dell'articolo 3 disciplina i casi di interdizione dei cittadini di maggiore età e dei minori emancipati, ritenendo questi ultimi come cittadini pienamente capaci di agire.

Sotto altro profilo, inoltre, non devono essere prese in considerazione le opinioni o le dichiarazioni semplici che non mirino a produrre un effetto giuridico nei rapporti con i medici. I medici devono prestare molta attenzione alle dichiarazioni sanitarie di trattamento rese dai pazienti perché, da un lato, non dovrebbero prendere in considerazione semplici opinioni, ma dall'altro devono essere consapevoli che le preferenze dei pazienti possono cambiare nel corso dell'evoluzione di una malattia.[33] Di conseguenza, l'articolo 4, comma 1, della legge n. 219 stabilisce che le DAT possono essere redatte solo dopo avere acquisito adeguate informazioni mediche sulle conseguenze delle loro scelte. Ciò potrebbe essere ottenuto seguendo un processo di quattro passaggi: comprensione, apprezzamento, ragionamento e comunicazione della scelta.[34] È fondamentale che i cittadini comprendano le informazioni diagnostiche e prognostiche (comprensione). Dopo aver compreso i rischi e i benefici di un particolare trattamento sanitario, i pazienti devono avere la capacità di correlarli alla propria futura situazione particolare di incoscienza (apprezzamento) confrontando trattamenti alternativi in modo logicamente coerente (ragionamento). Alla fine, essi dovrebbero comunicare la loro scelta terapeutica in vista di un futuro stato di incoscienza (comunicare una scelta).

[32] G.IADECOLA, Note critiche in tema di "testamento biologico". Riv It Med Leg, 2013, pp., 3-4, 473-483.

[33] JT.BERGER, D.MAJEROVITZ, Stability of preferences for treatment among nursing home residents. The Gerontologist, 1998, 38, pp., 217-223.

[34] J.MOYE, et al. Assessment of capacity to consent to treatment: Challenges, the "ACCT" approach, directions. Clin Gerontol, 2007, 31, pp.,37-66.

Sebbene il quadro giuridico albanese non stabilisca regole specifiche in merito alle decisioni di fine vita, è necessario esaminare il codice di deontologia medica albanese del novembre 2011. Il Codice di deontologia medica è stato pubblicato dall'Ordine dei medici albanese ed è giuridicamente vincolante per tutti i medici che esercitano la loro professione nel territorio albanese (articolo 3). In altre parole, in caso di violazione, possono trovare applicazione sanzioni disciplinari (articolo 68 Codice di deontologia medica e articolo 1 Regolamento dell'08.04.2016 dell'Ordine dei Medici albanese). Le stesse regole sono applicate in Italia dalla Federazione Nazionale degli Ordini Dei Medici Chirurghi e Degli Odontoiatri.

L'articolo 39 del Codice di deontologia medica albanese afferma in modo esplicito che, nel caso di un paziente incapace, il medico deve agire secondo il proprio giudizio, sempre però considerando l'interesse del paziente. Il medico, dunque, attraverso una consultazione con i suoi altri colleghi nonché con i parenti del malato, decide il trattamento terapeutico da praticare. Si comprende, pertanto, che le DAT non sono prese in considerazione poiché la problematica è imperniata sulla ricerca e sull'attuazione del c.d. *best interest* del paziente, piuttosto che sulla ricostruzione della volontà del paziente. In definitiva, questa impostazione non protegge l'autonomia del paziente e il suo diritto all'autodeterminazione.

L'attuale formulazione paternalistica dell'articolo 39 del Codice di deontologia medica albanese non è in coerenza con la costituzione albanese per due motivi principali. In primo luogo, esso viola il principio fondamentale dell'eguaglianza, stabilito dall'articolo 18 della costituzione albanese. Invero, il detto articolo 39 opera una distinzione tra pazienti coscienti e incoscienti, consentendo il diritto di rifiutare le cure mediche solo agli appartenenti al primo gruppo. Ciò significa che una persona incosciente finisce per non essere più considerata come una *persona* a tutti gli effetti e, appunto, tutte le sue precedenti volontà perdono di validità. In secondo luogo, l'articolo 39 è in contrasto anche con normative di diritto internazionale che, tuttavia, l'Albania ha ratificato. In specie, l'articolo 9 della Convenzione sui diritti dell'uomo e la biomedicina (Convenzione di Oviedo) dell'aprile 1997 stabilisce che «I desideri precedentemente espressi a proposito di un intervento medico da parte di un paziente che, al momento dell'intervento, non è in grado di esprimere la sua volontà saranno tenuti in considerazione». Sebbene, secondo tale articolo, i «desideri precedentemente espressi» non siano giuridicamente vincolanti, l'articolo 39 del Codice di deontologia medica albanese non ne include affatto l'importanza. Di conseguenza, quest'ultima disposizione risulta non coerente con la stessa costituzione albanese nella quale vi è l'espresso riconoscimento che le leggi e gli altri atti normativi del Consiglio dei ministri e, ovviamente, anche gli atti amministrativo del governo o degli organi indipendenti – ed è appunto il caso dell'ordine dei medici – devono essere allineati non solo con la costituzione ma anche con gli accordi internazionali ratificati (articolo 116 della costituzione albanese). Del resto, sin dal luglio 2011 la Convenzione di Oviedo è entrata in vigore anche in Albania.

E' necessaria quindi, anche in Albania, una legge diretta a regolare le DAT con la quale esse in primo luogo, riconosciuta l'importanza dell'autonomia del paziente, andrebbero rese vincolanti per il medico. Ciò potrebbe senz'altro scaturire dalla circostanza che le DAT siano state redatte da pazienti in un momento nel quali essi erano forniti di una piena capacità di agire. Inoltre, la legge non dovrebbe limitare la loro esecuzione nel tempo o porre dei limiti all'oggetto del trattamento sanitario. Si aggiunga, poi, che le persone che non sono in grado di scrivere dovrebbero avere l'opportunità di videoregistrare le proprie DAT.

Si tratta di elementi tutti presenti nella legge italiana n. 219/2017 ed alla quale il legislatore albanese potrebbe senza difficoltà ispirarsi.

Nello specifico, i medici sono tenuti a rispettare le DAT. Questa raccomandazione è in armonia con legge italiana sulle DAT. L'Italia non aveva riconosciuto la forza vincolante delle DAT (DDL 2350), ma nel dicembre 2017 ha modificato la sua scelta politica.[35] In questi casi, i medici sono tenuti a seguire la volontà del paziente. L'attenzione alle DAT è il risultato diretto del fatto che l'autonomia individuale richiede come condizione preliminare la capacità di agire.[36] Poiché l'agente deve disporre di tutte le informazioni adeguate sull'incapacità futura, si raccomanda che le decisioni di fine vita siano prese entro dodici mesi dal momento della loro esecuzione.[37] Ciò è dovuto al fatto che la partecipazione del paziente alle decisioni di fine vita, durante le cure palliative, determina una tensione nel contrasto tra due diverse propensioni, l'una nella direzione di mantenere il controllo sulla vita e, l'altra, verso il desiderio di essere curati.[38] Ne consegue che le DAT scritte nei centri di riabilitazione - dove i pazienti hanno avuto diverse conversazioni e confronti con i loro medici - sono più precise riguardo alle future scelte di trattamenti sanitari nel caso di un'eventuale futura incapacità di autodeterminarsi.

Si è detto che le DAT non dovrebbero avere un limite di tempo. Questa limitazione era prevista anche nel DDL italiano 2350 che, per vero, non è mai stato approvato nello stesso testo da entrambe le camere del parlamento italiano. Il DDL 2350 aveva sottolineato l'idea di alcuni studiosi che ritengono cruciale il rinnovo delle DAT. Secondo loro, questa revisione dovrebbe avvenire ogni 1-5 anni.[39] Inoltre, il rinnovo periodico delle DAT consentirebbe di tenere il passo con la situa-

---

[35]E. KOKA , D.VESHI , *op. cit.*, D.VESHI , E.KOKA , C.VENDITTI , *op. cit.*

[36] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. End of life care strategy: promoting high quality care for all adults at the end of life. 2008.

[37] C. GARDINER , et al. Exploring the transition from curative care to palliative care: a systematic review of the literature. BMJ Support Palliat Care, 2011, 1, pp., 56-63.

[38]J. SEYMOUR , et al. Planning for the end of life:: the views of older people about advance care statements. Soc Sci Med, 2004, 59, pp., 57-68.

[39] CH A. ERIN , J.HARRIS . Living wills: anticipatory decisions and advance directives. Rev Clin Gerontol, 1994, 4, pp., 269-269.

zione medica propria. Il rinnovo delle DAT rappresenterebbe il recepimento legislativo della filosofia di Derek Parfit,[40] il quale ritiene che l'identità personale non sia continuativa nel tempo e nel luogo.

Per evitare i problemi che potrebbero derivare dal lungo periodo intercorso tra la redazione delle DAT e la loro esecuzione, considerando l'esperienza italiana, si potrebbero formulare due indicazioni. La prima riguarda le scoperte mediche, nel senso che i desideri precedentemente espressi sono validi fino al momento in cui vi è una scoperta medica o un cambiamento tale nelle condizioni patologiche del paziente che se il paziente le avesse conosciute avrebbe cambiato le sue posizioni in ordine alle DAT già espresse. Questa soluzione è stata prevista sia nel paragrafo 62 del Rapporto Esplicativo della Convenzione di Oviedo del 1997 che nell'articolo 4, c. 5 della Legge italiana n. 219/2017. La seconda indicazione considera il potere del fiduciario, vale a dire che l'incertezza dei cambiamenti circa l'evoluzione della personalità può essere risolta dando un potere più ampio al fiduciario che deve verificare se le istruzioni, fornite nell'atto di sottoscrizione, corrispondono ancora alla volontà attuale del paziente. Questa soluzione è stata adottata per la prima volta in Germania (articolo 1901 bis (1) BGB).

D'altronde, va altresì notato che questa politica risulta anche essere stata incorporata nell'articolo 4, comma 5 della legge italiana n. 219/2017. Invero, come anticipato, quest'ultima disposizione ha codificato le menzionate due soluzioni. Mentre in generale il medico è tenuto a rispettare le DAT, il medico, in accordo con il fiduciario, può disattendere le DAT, in tutto o in parte, qualora esse appaiano palesemente incongrue o non corrispondenti alla condizione clinica attuale del paziente ovvero sussistano terapie, non prevedibili all'epoca della sottoscrizione, capaci di offrire concrete possibilità di miglioramento delle condizioni di vita. La legge albanese diretta a regolare le DAT dovrebbe includere anche questi due casi.

Altro profilo attiene al fatto che le DAT non dovrebbero avere una limitazione nel loro oggetto. L'approccio paternalistico adottato nel Codice di deontologia medica potrebbe limitare l'oggetto delle DAT non riconoscendo la possibilità di includere in esse i c.d. *life support medical equipment*; in particolare, la nutrizione e l'idratazione artificiali o la ventilazione artificiale. Mentre la comunità medica concorda sul fatto che la ventilazione artificiale è un trattamento sanitario, nel caso della nutrizione e dell'idratazione artificiali sono state avanzate argomentazioni controverse.[41] Anche se tutta la comunità medica concorda che la nutrizione artificiale tramite l'addome è un trattamento sanitario, alcuni dubbi rimangono nel caso

---

[40] D. PARFIT, *Reasons and persons,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984.
[41] P. SCHMIDT , R. DETTMEYER , B.MADEA , Withdrawal of artificial nutrition in the persistent vegetative state: a continuous controversy. Forensic Sci Int, 2000, 113, pp., 505-509.

dell'alimentazione nasogastrica. Tuttavia, gli studiosi che non riconoscono l'alimentazione nasogastrica come trattamento sanitario concordano sul fatto che l'alimentazione nasogastrica debba essere considerata come una gestione medica generale.[42]

Va precisato che la nutrizione artificiale e l'idratazione artificiale hanno aperto un grande dibattito etico-giuridico in Italia. Secondo il DDL 2350, l'alimentazione e l'idratazione, nelle diverse forme in cui la scienza e la tecnica possono fornirle al paziente, sono forme di sostegno vitale e fisiologicamente finalizzate ad alleviare le sofferenze fino alla fine della vita. Si è inoltre sostenuto che esse non possano formare oggetto delle DAT. Questo approccio si basava sul fatto che l'alimentazione e l'idratazione artificiale erano considerate una cura di base e non un trattamento sanitario. Tuttavia, uno dei chiarimenti più importanti della legge italiana n. 219/2017 è stata la loro classificazione come trattamenti sanitari (articolo 1, comma 5). Pertanto, i cittadini possono anche sospendere l'alimentazione e l'idratazione artificiale. L'adozione esplicita di questa regola nella legge albanese eviterebbe tanto la discussione bioetica su questo tema che l'approccio paternalistico ancora adottato nel Codice di deontologia medica albanese del 2011.

Nell'auspicabile intervento legislativo andrebbe anche precisata la forma richiesta per le DAT nonché le condizioni per riconoscere loro validità ed efficacia.

La legge italiana del dicembre 2017 sottolinea esplicitamente l'importanza di adeguate informazioni mediche (articolo 4, comma 1) fornite al paziente. Tenendo conto che la società albanese non è consapevole dell'importanza delle DAT o delle altre forme o situazioni di fine vita,[43] un'informazione medica adeguata deve ritenersi, forse, ancor più determinante, accanto, ovviamente all'indicazione dei requisiti formali delle DAT, siano essi attinenti alla forma scritta ovvero a qualsiasi altra differente forma. Mentre la legge italiana del dicembre 2017 circoscrive la validità delle DAT alla redazione in forma scritta (articolo 4, comma 6), in Germania le dichiarazioni orali sono considerate comunque giuridicamente vincolanti; in specie esse valgono quali desideri di trattamento (*Behandlungswünsche*) qualora si tratti di dichiarazioni sanitarie orali con oggetto specifico nonché corrispondenti alla situazione medica attuale del paziente; valgono invece come desiderio presunto (*mutmaßlicher Wille*) in caso di dichiarazioni di carattere generale e non specifico (articolo 1901b (2) BGB).

In Albania, una nozione simile a quella attribuita alle DAT è quella di «amanet». Questa nozione deriva dalla lingua turca e si traduce in «una supplica per l'amor di Dio». Le «amanet» sono dichiarazioni orali rilasciate al familiare più vicino che generalmente includono indicazioni relative alla proprietà, alla successione ed all'organizzazione dei funerali - ad esempio il luogo di sepoltura o la cerimonia funebre

---

[42] N. HOPPE, J. MIOLA, *Medical law and medical ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
[43] H.ORGAN , R. RAMA . Approaches to end-of-life care: a comparison between the UK and Albania. Future Hosp J, 2016, 3,pp., 134.

- nonché consigli per il futuro come, sempre ad esempio, prendersi cura del coniuge o dei figli. Tuttavia, la società albanese non è pienamente consapevole dell'importanza delle DAT.[44] Pertanto, la legge albanese dovrebbe seguire il modello italiano limitando il requisito formale delle DAT unicamente alla forma scritta. La logica conseguenza di questa previsione sarebbe poi, tra l'altro, la netta differenzierebbe tra la nozione tradizionale di «amanet» ed il concetto di DAT.

Nel caso di persone incapaci di scrivere, le DAT potrebbero essere espresse attraverso la videoregistrazione. Questo approccio dimostrerebbe l'applicazione del principio di eguaglianza stabilito nell'articolo 18 della costituzione albanese considerando i cittadini che non sono in grado di scrivere come membri a pieno titolo della società albanese. Inoltre, nei casi di emergenza e urgenza, la revoca può essere effettuata anche mediante dichiarazione orale videoregistrata consegnata al medico in presenza di testimoni perché in questi casi non c'è tempo per le formalità previste in via generale. Si tratta di regole che, invero, sono state fissate nell'articolo 4, comma 6 della legge italiana del dicembre 2017.

In definitiva, *de iure condendo,* possiamo affermare che la legge albanese diretta a disciplinare le DAT dovrebbe esplicitamente imperniarsi sul riconoscimento dell'autonomia del paziente e del suo correlato diritto all'autodeterminazione. A questo fine, un buon testo cui ispirarsi potrebbe essere fornito proprio dalla legge italiana del dicembre 2017.

LA NOMINA DEL FIDUCIARIO

Prima di considerare gli aspetti giuridici connessi alla nomina di un fiduciario, occorre soffermarsi su alcune argomentazioni etiche di carattere generale relative all'autonomia relazionale (c.d. etica della cura).

Come si è visto in precedenza, negli anni '80 le studiose di bioetica femminista iniziarono a sviluppare un nuovo approccio al principio dell'autonomia. Le differenze di genere - come l'importanza delle relazioni interpersonali per le donne - vengono applicate ad alcuni aspetti della conoscenza morale i quali hanno portato allo sviluppo dell'etica della cura. L'autonomia viene infatti vista come una qualità relazionale fondata sulla convinzione che le persone sono socialmente radicate e che le loro identità si formano nel contesto delle relazioni sociali.[45] Perciò, in questo senso, le relazioni sociali sono considerate fondamentali; esse cioè sono così importanti che una persona viene vista come una «seconda persona», creata appunto a seguito delle influenze determinate da tutti i fattori ad essa esterni oltre dalle relazioni interpersonali.[46]

---

[44] D. VESHI ,1 et al., *op. cit.*

[45] C.MACKENZIE , N.STOLJAR . *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

[46] A. BAIER, *Postures of the mind: Essays on mind and morals,* University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 1985.

L'autonomia relazionale è quindi una locuzione generica atta ad individuare l'autonomia personale in un contesto di situazioni culturali ed economiche, con particolare riguardo alle relazioni sociali.[47] Questo modello considera l'identità e gli interessi dinamici continuamente plasmati in forza delle relazioni vissute con altre persone. Il modello relazionale, dunque, supporta di certo il concetto di autonomia della persona, ma con una portata di maggiore ampiezza ove, appunto, sono evidenziati i fattori interpersonali ed esterni.[48]

Per i fautori dell'autonomia relazionale, allora, non è affatto irragionevole che un determinato paziente possa delegare ad un'altra persona l'attuazione di una propria decisione personale. In questa differente prospettiva del significato di autonomia, il ruolo svolto dal fiduciario non può che essere accentuato. Ad esempio, i familiari, i medici, i parenti o le altre persone interessate hanno l'obbligo morale di cooperare per aiutare il paziente a prendere delle decisioni difficili in merito alle situazioni di fine vita. Nell'autonomia relazionale, i medici condivideranno tutte le informazioni con il paziente (e la famiglia del paziente) e trascorreranno più tempo con essi. Questo approccio porta sicuramente ad un miglioramento dell'esplicazione di autonomia da parte del paziente.[49] Dall'approccio femminista all'etica risulta pertanto che il fiduciario costituisca una figura giuridica di grande rilevanza nelle decisioni di fine vita.[50]

Dall'angolo visuale proprio del giurista, la nomina del fiduciario deve essere effettuata tramite un documento scritto. Il fiduciario, che ha l'autorità di prendere decisioni in materia di assistenza sanitaria per conto del paziente una volta che egli è dichiarato incosciente, può essere inteso quale surrogato del diritto all'autodeterminazione del paziente in quanto sua «estensione».[51] Il fiduciario deve dunque accantonare il proprio giudizio dando lo spazio maggiore possibile all'individuazione e ed alla comunicazione di ciò che il paziente avrebbe fatto se fosse stato cosciente.[52] In altre parole, il fiduciario deve fare la scelta medica che il paziente avrebbe fatto se fosse stato in grado di farlo.

L'Albania non ha una legge *ad hoc* che regoli il ruolo del fiduciario nelle decisioni di fine vita. Questa legge *ad hoc* creerebbe un'eccezione alla regola generale secondo cui una procura è valida finché il rappresentato è pienamente capace di agire (articolo 76, comma 1, lett. c) c.c.al.); regola, peraltro, presente anche nel codice civile italiano (articolo 1722 c.c.it.). Inoltre, una legge *ad hoc* per l'Albania costituirebbe altresì un'eccezione alla regola generale secondo cui la delega è valida

---

[47] C. MACKENZIE, N. STOLJAR, *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

[48] BOTTOMLEY, Anne, LIM, Hilary, Feminist perambulations. Fem Per Land Law, 2007, 1.

[49] MR. HUNT , C. ELLS, Partners towards autonomy: risky choices and relational autonomy in rehabilitation care. Disabil Rehabil, 2011, 33, pp., 961-967.

[50] D.VESHI , E.KOKA , C.VENDITTI , *op. cit.*

[51] BUCHANAN, *op. cit.*

[52] LA.FROLIK , Is a guardian the alter ego of the ward. Stetson L. Rev, 2007, 37,p., 53.

solo per le transazioni legali che hanno un valore economico (interpretazione dell'articolo 64, comma 2 c.c.al.). Ebbene, per la prima volta la legge italiana n. 6 del 9 gennaio 2004 ha modificato il codice civile italiano introducendo un'importante eccezione ai suoi canoni generali attraverso la figura dell'amministratore di sostegno (articoli 404-413 c.c.it.).[53] Nello stesso solco si pone anche la successiva legge n. 219/2017 che all'articolo 4, commi 1 e 2, ribadisce la medesima eccezione.[54]

Sebbene il quadro giuridico albanese non stabilisca regole specifiche per quanto riguarda il ruolo del fiduciario nelle decisioni di fine vita, come sopra indicato, il Codice di deontologia medica albanese del novembre 2011 fissa alcune regole in questa delicata materia. Sebbene l'articolo 39 del Codice di deontologia medica non sia in linea con la convenzione di Oviedo del 1997, esso ha comunque sottolineato il ruolo delle persone vicine al paziente incosciente.

Il ruolo del fiduciario è stato codificato dalla legge italiana n. 219/2017. Questa legge potrebbe essere considerata come modello in Albania anche per una disciplina del ruolo e della nomina del fiduciario. Infatti, nel caso in cui il paziente non abbia nominato un fiduciario, la legge albanese può scegliere un sistema di delega automatica come stabilito in Italia per la nomina dell'amministratore di sostegno (articolo 3, comma 4 legge n. 219/2017). In altre parole, in Italia, se il paziente non ha nominato il fiduciario o designato un amministratore di sostegno, il giudice può nominare un amministratore di sostegno, in base alle regole previste nel capo I del titolo XII del libro I del codice civile. Questo schema potrebbe essere utilizzato in Albania anche per la nomina del fiduciario e, d'altronde, un sistema di designazione affidato in ultima istanza all'autorità giudiziaria sarebbe di certo più congruente con il senso di equità che deve connotare i rapporti sociali.[55] Per di più, questa scelta politica sarebbe più conforme ai principi di sussidiarietà e rispetto della vita privata e familiare, i quali assurgerebbero pertanto ad un ruolo di importanza fondamentale nell'ordinamento interno.[56] Si aggiunga, infine, che generalmente i membri della famiglia sono nominati come fiduciari.

Sfortunatamente, questo approccio presenta alcuni svantaggi. In primo luogo, la famiglia tradizionale non è più l'assetto più diffuso nella società, a causa dell'alto tasso di divorzi in Albania[57] così come, per vero, anche in Italia[58]. Per esempio, nel 2015 (unico anno di coincidenza tra le statistiche), su ogni 100 matrimoni, si sono registrati 15 divorzi in Albania e circa 30 (precisamente 29.73) in Italia. Nel 2018,

---

[53] D.VESHI , G.NEITZKE , 2017, *op. cit.*

[54] D.VESHI , E.KOKA , C.VENDITTI , *op. cit.*

[55] S. SAHM , R.WILL ,G. HOMMEL, Attitudes towards and barriers to writing advance directives amongst cancer patients, healthy controls, and medical staff. J Med Ethics, 2005, 31, pp., 437-440.

[56] RJ.JOX , et al. Substitute decision making in medicine: comparative analysis of the ethico-legal discourse in England and Germany. Med Health Care Philos, 2008, 11, pp., 153-163.

[57] INSTAT, Nascite, decessi e matrimony, 2016. http://www.instat.gov.al/al/temat/treguesit-demografikë-dhe-socialë/lindjet-vdekjet-dhe-martesat/#tab2

[58] ISTAT, Matrimoni, Separazioni e Divorzi, 2016. https://www.istat.it/it/files//2016/11/matrimoni-separazioni-divorzi-2015.pdf

in Albania, il numero dei divorzi è aumentato a 21 divorzi su ogni 100 matrimoni celebrati. In secondo luogo, ciò potrebbe portare a un sistema di «opt-out», in cui i cittadini non nominano un familiare che ritengono non essere in linea con i propri valori.[59] In terzo luogo, poiché la legge avrebbe già stabilito un ordine di deleghe automatiche per il processo decisionale medico, i cittadini potrebbero perdere l'incentivo a nominare un fiduciario. Tuttavia, in Albania la famiglia è un nucleo molto importante che viene costituzionalmente garantito (articolo 53 Costituzione). Un sistema di delega automatica sarebbe in linea con altri paesi del Mediterraneo.[60]

La legge albanese dovrebbe anche prendere in considerazione la possibilità di istituire un'autorità imparziale per risolvere l'eventuale conflitto tra il fiduciario e i medici. In tali casi, vi sono due potenziali soluzioni. La prima è risolvere i conflitti all'interno dell'ospedale; la seconda è ricorrere ad un giudice «specializzato». Il primo metodo fornisce il raggiungimento di una decisione in maniera più rapida sulla base di criteri medici ed è stato attuato in Portogallo nei casi di obiezione di coscienza; il secondo modello è più neutro ed è stato implementato in Gran Bretagna e in Germania.[61] La legge albanese dovrebbe anche considerare la protezione del paziente incosciente tramite l'istituzione di un'autorità che sorvegli l'attività del fiduciario.

Il legislatore italiano non ha previsto regole giurisdizionali specifiche per nessuno di questi casi. Ad ogni modo, considerando l'articolo 24 della Costituzione italiana, che riconosce il diritto di agire in giudizio, ne consegue che in caso di conflitto tra il fiduciario e lo staff medico, un processo civile verrà aperto. Tenendo conto che la legge del dicembre 2017 non stabilisce un giudice «specializzato» per decidere tali casi, la decisione spetterebbe ad un giudice della giurisdizione ordinaria.[62] Questa scelta politica solleva due problemi principali. In primo luogo, nelle decisioni di fine vita in cui sono coinvolti principi etici, legali e medici, la necessità di un giudice «specializzato» è fondamentale. In secondo luogo, nelle situazioni di fine vita la decisione di un giudice deve essere presa rapidamente, e la giurisdizione ordinaria - anche nei casi di procedure sommarie introdotte dalla legge italiana n. 69 del 19 giugno 2009 - è troppo sovraccarica per farlo. Comunque, quanto all'ordinamento albanese, questi procedimenti potrebbero entrare nelle sezioni specializzate delle controversie relative a minori e familiari prevista nell'articolo 320, comma 1, lett. c) c.p.c.al. e disciplinata negli articoli 350-357 c.p.c.al.

---

[59] JOX J, *op. cit.*

[60] In Italia: Articolo 4, comma 4, Legge no. 219 del Dicembre 2017; In Francia: Articolo 1111-6 del *Code de la santé publique*; in Portogallo, Articolo 11 Legge del 16 Luglio 2012; in Spania: Articolo 9 Legge del 14 Novembre 2002; e in Svizzera: Articolo 378 Codice Civile.

[61] In Portogallo: Articolo 9 Legge del 16 Luglio 2012; in Inghilterra e Wales: Articoli 45–53 del *Mental Capacity Act 2005*; in Irlanda: Articoli 13–32 *Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013*; in Scozia: Articolo 50 *Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000*; in Germania: Articolo 1904 Codice Civile.

[62] E.KOKA , D.VESHI , *op. cit.*

Il legislatore albanese potrebbe decidere di incorporare il modello italiano in considerazione del fatto che l'interpretazione sistematica dell'articolo 43 della Costituzione albanese e dell'articolo 2 c.p.c.it. riconosce il diritto di agire in giudizio. Tuttavia, il parlamento albanese avrebbe comunque il problema di istituire un giudice «specializzato». Questa politica garantirebbe l'imparzialità - che non può essere acquisita nel caso di una decisione all'interno agli ospedali - e la decisione sarebbe anche più rapida rispetto a quella del giudice ordinario. La sessione «specializzata» sarebbe simile ai procedimenti nei casi di minori prevista negli articoli 350-357 c.p.c.al.

CONCLUSIONI

Più volte si è ricordato che nel dicembre 2017, l'Italia ha disciplinato le DAT.[63] Nella società albanese non vi è tuttavia piena consapevolezza dell'importanza di riconoscere l'autonomia del paziente nelle situazioni di fine vita.[64]

Gli autori hanno esaminato il sistema giuridico nazionale considerando anche la giurisprudenza medica e la posizione delle comunità mediche e biomediche. Questo contributo scientifico ha confermato che in Albania non c'è una legge *ad hoc*, non ci sono delle sentenze relative al fine vita e gli organi ausiliari del governo non hanno pubblicato alcuno specifico documento in relazione a questo tema. Gli autori hanno perciò analizzato il Codice di deontologia medica essendo esso l'unico documento giuridico albanese che prende in considerazione talune regole da adottare per le situazioni di fine vita. Hanno quindi sottolineato che l'articolo 39 del Codice di deontologia medica ha applicato un approccio paternalistico, in contrasto con la tutela del principio etico dell'autonomia del paziente. Pertanto, questo articolo non risulta essere allineato con la Convenzione di Oviedo, ossia una convenzione internazionale ratificata dall'Albania nel luglio 2011.

In relazione all'ordinamento albanese, gli autori suggeriscono anche alcune raccomandazioni per il legislatore ispirate alle soluzioni adottate con la legge italiana n. 219/2017. La necessità di regole *ad hoc* che disciplinino la decisione di fine vita è aspetto indispensabile nella prospettiva del massimo rispetto da riconoscere alla dignità del paziente, proprio perché la comunità medica albanese ha sempre seguito un approccio paternalistico nella relazione di cura con i pazienti.

Alla luce del modello italiano, dunque, gli autori hanno valutato che il legislatore albanese possa prendere quest'ultimo a riferimento per adottare una disciplina delle DAT. L'introduzione di una legge albanese così modellata, renderebbe i medici vincolati al rispetto delle DAT, quanto meno quando esse fossero redatte in

---

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] D.VESHI ,1 et al., *op. cit.;* D.VESHI ,2 et al., *op. cit.*

forma scritta e senza alcuna limitazione relativamente all'oggetto o al tempo di durata. Inoltre, nel caso di cittadini incapaci di scrivere, dovrebbero altresì essere stabilite talune regole particolari allo scopo di coinvolgere anche questi ultimi nelle proprie decisioni di fine vita. Per di più, la legge albanese, per la via testé indicata, darebbe importanza al ruolo indispensabile del fiduciario, rendendo quindi possibile la risoluzione di quei difficili problemi, nel corso del lavoro esaminati, che si pongono per riconoscere piena efficacia alle DAT e, in specie, con riguardo alle DAT dal contenuto vago o generico ovvero redatte molto tempo prima della loro esecuzione.

Durante la pandemia di Covid-19, l'applicazione dei principi etici è stata messa in discussione. Se la curva epidemica degli individui infetti si appiattisse per un lungo periodo, anche il sistema sanitario albanese soffrirebbe, come invero avvenuto per il sistema sanitario italiano nella prima parte del 2020. Il principio di giustizia è il principio etico principale che dovrebbe guidare l'equa ripartizione delle scarse risorse mediche durante i fenomeni pandemici. Sebbene non andrebbe fatta alcuna distinzione tra i pazienti affetti da Covid-19 e gli altri che necessitano degli stessi trattamenti sanitari, la priorità dovrebbe essere data, onde massimizzare i benefici di cura,[65] ai pazienti più giovani ed agli operatori sanitari nonché ad altri pazienti che si prendono cura dei malati (promuovendo in tal modo il valore strumentale).[66]

A fronte dell'eventualità che non tutti i pazienti potrebbero avere la possibilità di usufruire dei trattamenti sanitari necessari, l'accesso alle cure dovrebbe essere comunque garantito. Questa raccomandazione è in linea con il Principio 8 della Carta europea di etica medica, secondo il quale «nel rispetto dell'autonomia personale, il medico agisce in conformità con il principio di efficacia del trattamento, tenendo in considerazione l'uso appropriato delle risorse». Pertanto, finché dura la pandemia, i medici dovrebbero proteggere la dignità umana e garantire le cure mediche a tutti i pazienti a norma del Principio 3 della Carta europea di etica medica e, quindi, allocare le scarse risorse dei trattamenti sanitari in base alle priorità stabilite dal principio etico di giustizia.[67]

In altre parole, considerando le scarse risorse mediche durante la pandemia mondiale, nonché l'applicazione del modello italiano, che a sua volta incorpora la dottrina nazionale e internazionale, nei casi di sospensione o interruzione dei trattamenti sanitari da parte di pazienti incoscienti che avevano espresso la loro volontà direttamente – tramite desideri precedentemente espressi (articolo 9 Convenzione di Oviedo) – o indirettamente – tramite il fiduciario o i propri familiari (articolo 39

---

[65] EJ.EMANUEL , et al. Fair allocation of scarce medical resources in the time of Covid-19. NEJM. 2020; RICCIONI L, et al. Clinical ethics recommendations for the allocation of intensive care treatments, in exceptional, resource-limited circumstances. Recenti Prog Med, 2020, 111,p., 207.

[66] EJ.EMANUEL , et al., *op. cit.*

[67] D.VESHI ,1 et al., *op. cit.*

Codice di Deontologia Medica Albanese) - anche in assenza di una disciplina giuridica albanese *ad hoc,* i medici non dovrebbero essere ritenuti responsabili di omicidio (articolo 76 c.p.al.), né tantomeno di omicidio commesso in altre circostanze specifiche (articolo 79 c.p.al.), ovvero di omicidio del consenziente (articolo 99 c.p.al.).

RICONOSCIMENTI

ESSERE E RELAZIONE
RISPOSTE ALLE OBIEZIONI DI ALCUNI AMICI

CARMELO VIGNA
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali
Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia
carmelo.vigna@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
This essay contains the responses given by Carmelo Vigna to some critics regarding their respective contributions published in the book "Essere in relazione" (Orthotes, 2022) on the topics of fundamental ontology and intersubjectivity. In the background, there is criticism of Emanuele Severino's neoparmenidism.

KEYWORDS
Ontology, univocism, neoparmenidism, intersubjectivity, transcendentalism.

1. PREMESSA

Ringrazio, anzitutto. Ringrazio Paolo Bettineschi, Riccardo Fanciullacci e Susy Zanardo, curatori (e in parte anche autori) del volume *Essere in relazione*[1], dedicato alla mia vita accademica. Nella raccolta dei saggi pure alcuni altri Colleghi, che parimenti ringrazio, riprendono in modo diretto e/o indiretto i temi di filosofia cui mi sono dedicato. In tutte le loro pagine ho trovato affettuosa comprensione e, in non pochi casi, larga consonanza quanto ai risultati della ricerca. Solo tre degli autori (Francesco Botturi, Leonardo Messinese e Franco Totaro, amici carissimi) hanno avanzato alcune riserve di notevole importanza. Mi pare opportuno, per onorare a mia volta il loro interesse alle mie pagine, provare a chiarire, di rimando, i luoghi da loro criticamente visitati. Anche nel tentativo di meglio farmi intendere. La filosofia come mestiere è anche questo, cioè disputa. Già Platone amava sentenziare che la verità nasce spesso dalla "frizione" fra i vari punti di vista in campo.

---

[1] Cfr. P. Bettineschi, R. Fanciullacci e S. Zanardo (a cura di), *Essere in relazione. Scritti in onore di Carmelo Vigna*, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2022.

2. RISPOSTA A FRANCESCO BOTTURI

Traggo dal titolo dell'intervento magistrale di Francesco Botturi, amico da una vita, il punto teorico da discutere con lui[2]: quale rapporto c'è fra trascendentalità intenzionale (la trascendentalità della tradizione classica) e trascendentalità relazionale (la trascendentalità intersoggettiva)? Francesco teme una certa incompatibilità tra le due cifre speculative. Vorrei qui ragionare, invece, intorno alla loro sostanziale compatibilità, in segno di gratitudine per l'attenzione che Francesco ha dedicato alle mie modeste pagine sul tema. La mia "trascendentalità relazionale", vorrei dire, non intende sostituire la tradizionale trascendentalità intenzionale, ma solo *integrarla.* Il tema dell'intersoggettività è un luogo teorico che da certa tradizione della Scuola è stato di fatto trascurato, quando non trattato, addirittura, come speculativamente irrilevante e perciò delegato alle (opinabili) considerazioni sociologizzanti delle "scienze umane". Alludo qui soprattutto al magistero di Gustavo Bontadini (ma poi, e ancor più, a quello di Emanuele Severino). Spero che Francesco me ne dia atto.

Ma vengo subito al tema. La prima annotazione di Francesco che intendo sottolineare segue alla mia definizione di "trascendentale" (intenzionale), definizione che egli condivide. Si tratta della definizione classica, cui prima ho accennato, secondo la quale la nota di trascendentalità designa un attributo che va predicato di qualsiasi ente. Francesco, comunque, riconosce che il sottoscritto non intende negare "valore di verità" a questa tradizione. Aggiunge, però, che il sottoscritto finisce di fatto per "curvare" *tutto* lo spazio della trascendentalità originaria in senso intersoggettivo. In qualche modo snaturandone la complessità. Di qui le sue riserve, se ben lo intendo.

Provo ad affrontarle, allora, queste sue riserve, cominciando da alcune battute sue che in dettaglio riprendono il senso della "curvatura". Prima mi fa dire, Francesco, e con qualche ragione: la trascendentalità tradizionale non può essere trattata come la prima mossa dell'originario. "Illud quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit" (v. Tommaso, che fa eco ad Avicenna) non è "qualcosa" (un "ens"), ma è un "qualcuno". O, se si vuole, è un "qualcosa", *ma come un "qualcuno".* Solo *nell'*accadimento di questa relazione intenzionale originaria una soggettività realmente si dà; e si dà *anche* come poi capace di intenzionare in qualche modo "tutte le cose" (raccolte nella nozione di "*ens*").

Ma una tesi siffatta – egli osserva subito dopo – in sede di critica, importa "una grave conseguenza". Quale? Torno al suo testo: "... lo sguardo della trascendentalità semantica finisce per sporgersi su qualcosa di parziale (i nomi dell'ente) contraddicendo l'apertura trascendentale che è secondo totalità; in definitiva, una

---

[2] Cfr. F. Botturi, *Trascendentalità intenzionale e trascendentalità relazionale*, in P. Bettineschi, R. Fanciullacci e S. Zanardo (a cura di), *Essere in relazione. Scritti in onore di Carmelo Vigna*, op. cit., pp. 41-50.

trascendentalità contraddittoria aperta di principio al tutto dell'essere, ma aperta di fatto su qualcosa di parziale" (pp. 42-43).

Ancora Francesco, ma stavolta riportando una mia citazione: allora, se la prima battuta della realtà trascendentale che è il logos sta nell'affermazione "c'è qualcuno" (come io effettivamente dico), ne viene (e lo dico ancora io) che il qualcuno, per un verso, è interno alla teoria classica (qualcuno è pur qualcosa) e per altro verso è *previo* al qualcosa come ciò che realmente accade nell'esistenza in quanto relazione ad altro come altri.

Ma è proprio questa configurazione dell'originario che pare a Francesco insostenibile: *implica contraddizione* (come ha poco prima osservato: l'orizzonte intenzionale è infinito, ma viene nel contempo trattato come un che di finito).

Rispondo: altro è la cifra della trascendentalità "intenzionale", che è propriamente un *sapere originario* e altra è la cifra della trascendentalità "reale", che è la stessa *soggettività originaria vivente*. Certo, in entrambi i casi è implicato un "orizzonte trascendentale", ma la soggettività originaria non è solo la *sede* della manifestazione di qualcosa (l'aristotelico "*to de ti*"), ma è pure la *sede del desiderare qualcosa*. E *anche* nel desiderare qualcosa si dà un che di trascendentalmente originario (il volere). L'antropologia filosofica della Scuola lo ha sempre tenuto ben presente: il *sapere* qualcosa *termina* intenzionalmente nella *nozione* di ente, il *desiderare* qualcosa termina nella *cosa stessa*[3]. E se nel primo caso la potenza astrattiva del logos genera, appunto, la nozione di qualcosa in generale (la nozione è un *ens ideale, cioè* una *species*), che sta – come nozione (come significato) - in pari con l'orizzonte del logos quanto al suo manifestare, nel secondo caso il desiderare (pregno del logos) – quando avesse solo a che fare originariamente con una determinatezza empirica (una pietra, un albero ecc.), vivrebbe una disequazione radicale insanabile (questa sì, contraddittoria), perché sarebbe una apertura infinita sul... quasi-niente. E poiché il logos anche come desiderio è (necessariamente) intenzionalità di..., si avrebbe in questo caso una intenzionalità che si appunta sul vuoto (cioè: da un lato il quasi-nulla e dall'altro lato l'infinità desiderante dell'intenzionale come orizzonte). Il logos desiderante *sarebbe anzi solo questa cosa qui*, giacché diventerebbe la forma intenzionale di una "cosa" determinata, e nient'altro. Cioè non si realizzerebbe come logos desiderante *trascendentale*. Detto ancora in altri termini: il desiderio trascendentale senza un oggetto adeguato, ossia un oggetto in equazione con il desiderio, sarebbe nulla di desiderio (trascendentale). Eppure, il logos desiderante trascendentalmente aperto vive in ogni essere umano. Come mai? Semplice: vive perché si imbatte, anzi, si è originariamente *già imbattuto*, in una altra

---

[3] Eco di questa strutturazione dell'antropologia (la forma dell'anima e le sue "potenze" o "facoltà") può esser considerato l'attacco del *De ente et essentia* di Tommaso d'Aquino. La prima grande partizione dell'essere è, infatti, per Tommaso (che riprende una notazione aristotelica) la partizione tra *ens reale* ed *ens ideale*.

intenzionalità trascendentale reale. Cioè in una soggettività altra (in un "tu" che è prima dell'"io"), che fa equazione o saturazione del desiderio.

Ma questo punto analitico mi pare dall'amico Francesco condiviso. Quindi non vi insisto. Torno invece sulla differenza tra le due forme di trascendentalità e sulla loro compatibilità. Se l'intenzionale trascendentale si deve predicare tanto del sapere quanto del desiderare (questo si è sempre insegnato nella Scuola) e se il trascendentale del sapere comincia dalla *nozione* di ente (dove poi si risolvono tutte le altre "*nozioni*" – v. Tommaso), quel trascendentale del sapere – atto di un logos umano reale ("*Hic homo cogitat*" – obbietta Tommaso ad Averroè) – è un atto di un logos nella realtà *già relato* a un altro logos umano reale. Senza questa *previa* relazione nell'ordine del reale (del desiderio) nessun logos umano è concepibile come dato nella realtà.

Ne viene che si deve tener per fermo necessariamente che l'intersoggettività originaria già data *in re* è la *condizione di possibilità* dell'apertura del piano del sapere (cioè della trascendentalità intenzionale). E non è che il trascendentale del sapere finirebbe per avere un contenuto parziale (una nozione). Il contenuto del trascendentale del sapere ha un oggetto intenzionale trascendentale che però *termina* in (produce) una nozione. Certo, la nozione di trascendentale in quanto nozione è ontologicamente parziale (Aristotele già osservava che la verità è l'essere più debole), ma *in quanto a ciò che significa* riguarda naturalmente il tutto, e non la parte. Esattamente come la nozione di gatto; la quale, in quanto nozione, è un essere ideale (ontologicamente un... quasi-niente), ma – in quanto a ciò cui si riferisce – comprende l'insieme di tutti i gatti reali e possibili (cioè si riferisce a un ambito "universale"). Insomma, io so dell'universale *nella* nozione, ma non ho certo presente e manifesto ciò che la nozione significa.

Concludendo e riassumendo: la *nozione* di ente in senso trascendentale e il trascendentale *vivente* che è il logos, differiscono come un quasi-niente (la nozione di ente dove termina il logos come sapere) differisce da un orizzonte trascendentale reale (da una totalità intenzionale aperta al tutto reale che è l'altra soggettività). Entrambe le cifre hanno a che fare con la trascendentalità, certo, ma ciascuna nel proprio ordine: una è *nozione* del trascendentale, l'altra è *realtà* (intenzionale) del trascendentale. La prima sta a capo dell'ordine del *sapere*, l'altra sta a capo dell'ordine della relazione al reale (dell'agire e del fare secondo il desiderio). Nella prima si comincia con un "c'è qualcosa", nella seconda si comincia con "c'è qualcuno". Ma quel "c'è qualcuno" vien *prima* (*in re*). Solo *poi* (in senso strutturale) il logos si volge originariamente a "qualcosa": ossia lo fa manifesto.

3. RISPOSTA A FRANCO TOTARO

Franco Totaro, anche lui vecchio e caro amico, indica due luoghi di dissenso, che esigono certamente una messa a punto da parte mia[4]: a) il rapporto tra ente ed essere e quindi il giudizio critico sulla proposta ontologica di Severino (cioè sul neo-parmenidismo; il giudizio di Franco è positivo, il mio negativo); b) la elaborazione dei rapporti intersoggettivi come rapporti costitutivi dell'originario, su cui Franco avanza alcune perplessità. Provo a dare qualche delucidazione sul primo punto.

A. Franco concede a Severino la verità dell'affermazione dell'eternità dell'essere, di *ogni* essere. Anche l'ente finito, dunque, è da intendere come un ente eterno. Concede anche a Severino la verità della tesi secondo cui il divenire deve essere inteso come una differenza di apparire. Franco però è convinto che si possa comunque dare una differenza tra finito e infinito o, come egli ama scrivere, tra "condizionato" e "incondizionato". La differenza poi sarebbe questa: "... tutto è eterno, ma l'eterno a noi *non appare* (come tale, cioè totalmente) nella sfera dell'apparire nella quale noi siamo situati" (p. 254; il corsivo è dell'Autore). *Dovrebbe* apparire, quel legame, ma di fatto non appare. Che l'eterno non appaia nella sfera dell'apparire è una (ovvia) constatazione (severiniana); che l'eterno *dovrebbe* apparire mi pare una aggiunta del mio amico Franco (se l'ho capito).

Come che sia, questa sarebbe la citata differenza tra "condizionato" e "incondizionato". Ebbene, questa differenza autorizza a porre a Severino (Franco così prosegue) una questione fondamentale: "... ogni aspetto dell'essere condizionato merita di essere assunto nella relazione di sintesi con l'essere incondizionato? Oppure gli aspetti deficitari e manchevoli dell'essere condizionato, che sono fenomenologicamente constatabili nell'ampio spettro dell'esperienza sia fuori di noi sia in noi stessi, vanno 'oltrepassati' nella positività assoluta dell'essere incondizionato?" (ibid.). Manco a dirlo, la risposta di Franco è positiva. Questa (dico io) pare una versione un po' particolare della struttura della inferenza metafisica di bontadiniana memoria, trasferita in contesto severiniano. Severino, per questa via, dovrebbe dunque essere riportato all'interno della tradizione classica. Ossia, detto in soldoni: il neo-parmenidismo, secondo Franco, potrebbe esserne considerato una (legittima) variante.

---

[4] Cfr. F. Totaro, *L'orizzonte dell'intero tra essere e relazione intersoggettiva. Convergenze e divergenze nel confronto con Carmelo Vigna*, in P. Bettineschi, R. Fanciullacci e S. Zanardo (a cura di), *Essere in relazione. Scritti in onore di Carmelo Vigna*, op. cit., pp. 249-262.

Seconda parte della rivisitazione del neoparmenidismo da parte di Franco. Franco ora invoca l'assiologia: una saldatura "sintetica" del finito "manchevole e deficitario" con l'essere assoluto inietterebbe nell'assoluto deficit e manchevolezze. Come rimediare, allora, a questa palese contraddizione? Ponendo, risponde il mio amico, come compito del finito (degli umani) di colmare in qualche modo il deficit ontologico! Ogni finito così avrebbe (avrà) la pienezza della propria finitudine e la sintesi cui prima si è accennato non porterebbe alcuna negatività nell'assoluto. Ne seguirebbe che non è necessario porre la cifra tradizionale della creazione come rapporto tra il finito e l'assoluto, perché questo comporterebbe pensare che l'essere (finito) viene dal nulla. E allora? Risposta: "Depurata dal suo coefficiente nichilistico, la creazione può essere incorporata nel concetto di salvezza, intesa come conferimento della pienezza dell'essere dell'ente che ha già l'essere in sé, ma non ha ancora conseguito la *pienezza* o, per così dire, il valore d'essere nella sua pienezza".

Tralascio altri corollari del discorso. Ognuno può leggerli nelle pagine del saggio di Franco. Mi limito a osservare che concedere a Severino la sua tesi fondamentale: l'essere, ogni essere (ente) è eterno, *cioè è necessario e necessariamente relato a ogni altro essere (ente)*, toglie la possibilità di discorsi di ontologia come quelli che la benevolenza di Franco nei confronti del nostro vecchio Maestro ha messo in campo[5]. E toglie a maggior ragione qualsiasi discorso di assiologia (Severino, peraltro, ha sempre negato l'una e l'altra cosa: ontologia del finito-che-finisce e assiologia).

Sembra che nelle tesi di Franco l'eternità sia coniugabile in generale con una certa privazione d'essere (il male è una forma di privazione) e che questa privazione sia riscattabile dagli umani portando a compimento l'essere che manca. Qui mi pare che si dimentichi che nel pensiero di Severino, come ho appena avvertito, eternità e necessità relazionale sono attributi di ogni essere. E se ogni essere è eterno ed è necessariamente legato a ogni altro essere, ogni essere non è solo di qua o di là dal tempo dell'apparire: è anche assolutamente immodificabile. Non può essere diversamente da come è. Del

---

[5] L'eternità *e* la necessità di legame di ogni essere nella totalità dell'essere (v. Severino) dà all'eternità di ogni essere il significato dell'assolutezza ontologica. Ma eterno si usa dire, in qualche modo, anche di un ente finito che ha cominciato a esistere e che permarrà, appunto, "in eterno", per volere del suo Creatore (qui "eterno" equivale propriamente a "immortale"). Resta tuttavia, se creatura è, la sua *vertibilitas in nihilum* (che si può e si deve escludere solo in relazione all'Essere assoluto). Questa distinzione tra "eterno" (in senso severiniano, cioè in senso assoluto) e "immortale" mi pare a volte poco presente nei testi che contengono un esame critico delle tesi severiniane. Da un lato si ratifica l'eternità (severiniana) di ogni ente e, dall'altro lato, si ha in mente una qualche non assolutezza di ciò che si considera eterno (in senso severiniano).

resto, questo sempre ribadisce Severino nelle sue pagine. Eterna è anche la variazione dell'apparire del finito. Eterna dovrebbe essere allora anche la negatività che Totaro attribuisce al finito (Severino si guarda bene però dall'introdurre questa "decezione"). E non c'è dunque assiologia possibile (in un contesto rigorosamente severiniano).

E in ogni caso, aggiungo io, non è possibile equiparare una differenza di apparire con una differenza di essere. Se il finito differisse dall'infinito solo per la differenza di apparire, perché il suo essere è da ritenere eterno e necessario, l'assoluto non avrebbe alcuna potenza sul finito. Quindi... non sarebbe un che di assoluto, perché limitato dall'esserci eterno e necessario del finto. Allora, *tutto* sarebbe finito. Ma finito da che?

E ancora. Intendere la cifra della creazione di qualcosa – introdotta in protologia dalla metafisica classica – come semplice (e autocontraddittorio) venire dell'essere dal nulla è semanticamente fuorviante. Si sa che nella Scuola sempre si annotava, per evitare equivoci sull'*ex nihilo*, l'aggiunta: *ex nihilo sui et subiecti* (con "*subiectum*" si intendeva alludere alla "materia prima" come luogo originario, mentre il "*sui*" escludeva l'autoproduzione). La creatura viene, si diceva, dal suo Creatore. Dunque , da Lui *dipende* ontologicamente. In senso assoluto.

Noi possiamo pensare in qualche modo l'atto creatore solo a partire da quell'inevitabile e radicale dipendere del finito dall'infinito. Del relativo dall'assoluto. Il resto è, parlando *en philosophe*, un mistero. *En philosophe,* il tentativo di leggere il mistero della creazione mettendosi dal punto di vista di Dio (come qualcuno a volte prova a fare) è un esercizio ovviamente impossibile. Produce solo un sapere immaginario...

Per concludere – quanto alla mia interlocuzione su questo punto con Franco – non posso che ribadire, purtroppo e col dispiacere di dispiacere all'amico, quanto in altra sede ho ragionato sulla improponibilità speculativa (autocontraddittorietà) del neoparmenidismo. Il tentativo di ricondurre il neoparmenidismo di Severino alle battute fondamentali della metafisica classica (cioè poi all'inferenza metafisica), se a Severino si concede che ogni ente è eternamente necessario, è un tentativo, certo generoso, ma ineseguibile. Lo stesso Severino, del resto, ha più volte rifiutato queste "curvature" della sua proposta ontologica[6].

---

[6] Sulle polemiche suscitate dal neoparmenidismo di Severino e sulle risposte di Severino, rimando alla puntuale recensione contenuta nel bel libro di N. Tarquini, *Eternità e divenire. Emanuele Severino e la metafisica classica*, Orthotes, Napoli-Salerno 2022.

B.   Sul secondo punto., cioè sul tema dell'intersoggettività, la mia risposta a Franco può essere più breve, anche perché la distanza da lui segnata mi pare per buona parte frutto di un malinteso reciproco. Sono infatti d'accordo con Franco quando scrive: "Il trascendentale soggettivo è l'apertura illimitata al mondo oggettivo nelle sue svariate configurazioni e non si cristallizza in figure specifiche. Nel mondo *oggetto* dell'apertura trascendentale è inclusa anche l'alterità, ma non è incluso il suo centro di totalizzazione. Io non colgo il luogo *intimo* della intenzionalità trascendentale che sembra appartenere ad altri" (p. 259). Questo non raggiungere l'"intimo" di un'altra soggettività o il suo "centro di totalizzazione", cioè poi il contenuto determinato della coscienza altrui come fenomenologicamente dato, non dice nulla contro l'avvertimento (fenomenologico) dell'apparire d'altri come un'altra soggettività (trascendentale) dinnanzi al mio sguardo, specialmente quando altri mi guarda[7] (e non solo come un insieme di "indizi": comportamentali, linguistici ecc., oggettivamente rilevabili, ma "cosali"). Nessun essere umano scambia un altro essere umano con una pianta o con un animale. A meno che non voglia offenderlo o addirittura toglierlo di mezzo.

Ma al di là della constatazione fenomenologica immediata, si può dar conto di quanto fenomenologicamente dato, considerando che l'intenzionalità trascendentale è principio formale primo della nostra corporeità (santa verità aristotelica, di contro al dualismo platonico). Ed è assurdo pensare che questo principio non *appaia* nella nostra corporeità. Ché, anzi, tutta la connota. "Tra-spare", il logos, in ogni essere umano: certo, dove più e dove meno (nel corpo). "Tra-spare" molto nella comunicazione linguistica (logos è parola e non solo pensiero), "tra-spare" nell'incrocio degli sguardi (di amore o di odio; v. sopra), traspare nella mimica del piacere e del dolore, traspare pure in certa presenza silente ecc. ecc. Negare l'esserci a me dell'altra trascendentalità significherebbe fare a pugni con la comune esperienza umana. Solo questo io difendo. E mi pare che anche Franco su questo convenga o possa convenire, una volta dissipato l'equivoco dell'accesso all'intimità dei pensieri dell'altro uomo (intimità, ribadisco, che non è fenomenologicamente data nei suoi contenuti determinati).

4.   RISPOSTE A LEONARDO MESSINESE

Al terzo amico carissimo, Leonardo Messinese, devo una risposta che mi consente di tornare sul neoparmenidismo, ma tornarvi da un lato un poco diverso da quello frequentato nella risposta a Franco Totaro. Anche Leonardo vuole

---

[7] Rimando - per una conferma autorevole - alla eccellente fenomenologia dello sguardo (d'altri) contenuta ne *L'Être et le Néant* di J.P. Sartre.

ricondurre Severino nella "casa del padre"[8]. Il padre in questo caso è Bontadini (in Franco Totaro la riconduzione era anche riconduzione nella casa del fratello di Severino, che è poi Virgilio Melchiorre, Maestro di Franco), che Leonardo ammira da anni, anche perché il Maestro suo è stato Aniceto Molinari, amico a sua volta di Bontadini per fondamentali affinità speculative (sempre a partire da Parmenide, "padre venerando e terribile").

Con Leonardo viene a tema un certo senso dell'univocità dell'essere (presente di fatto nelle pagine di Franco, anche se non in modo così diretto ed esplicito come in Leonardo). La cosa non mi meraviglia. Come è noto, esiste, certo non da oggi, una "filiera" di metafisici che inclina a coltivare l'univocità dell'essere. Da Parmenide in avanti, passando per non poche pagine platoniche (veicolo fondamentale ne è la figura della partecipazione, tanto amata anche dai Medievali). In effetti, solo con Aristotele questa filiera speculativa trova un duro oppositore (nell'Aristotele storico e poi nell'aristotelismo, e pure in parte del tomismo come Scuola.) Da noi, e di recente, l'univocismo è stato di fatto ripreso soprattutto da Bontadini (non proprio esplicitamente teorizzato; forse perché Bontadini aveva avuto a Maestro l'aristotelico-tomista Amato Masnovo) e poi onorato alla grande da Severino. Aniceto Molinaro era molto sensibile al tema. Questo mi pare il contesto in cui mi permetto di inserire anche il mio amico Leonardo. Il quale, infatti, pur praticando la distinzione tra essenza ed esistenza in ordine alla trascendentalità dell'ente, di tal distinzione chiede poi che pensare dell'*esistenza*, ossia dell'atto d'essere. E lo chiede dopo aver sostenuto che la *prima* forma di trascendentalità è quella che viene affermata, quando si afferma che l'essere è l'essere e non è non essere (Parmenide). La trascendentalità della relazione di essenza ed esistenza sarebbe in qualche modo di seconda battuta, se ho ben capito, e si reggerebbe sulla prima. La quale comparirebbe in quell'esistenza che è "coprincipio" dell'essenza (nella struttura dell'ente determinato). Qualcosa deve necessariamente essere in comune a tutti gli esseri, così Leonardo, ma questo qualcosa non può certo cercarsi dal lato dell'essenza, perché da quel lato stanno piuttosto le differenze dell'essere (le quali di certo non sono nulla). Si dà dunque almeno un "elemento" della sintesi che l'ente è (cioè il suo esistere), dove vale il principio di Parmenide. Detto in altri termini: se l'esistenza, *coprincipio* dell'essenza negli enti determinati o finiti, è *essere*, essendo l'essere il non-non-essere o il non-nulla, *quell'essere* non può diventare non-essere. Quindi, ogni essere (Dio o il filo d'erba), avendo in sé l'esistenza (almeno) come coprincipio, gode di una permanenza strutturale nell'essere. È quindi un che di eterno (v. Severino).

[8] Cfr. L. Messinese, *Consenso e (qualche) dissenso sulla metafisica classica*, in P. Bettineschi, R. Fanciullacci e S. Zanardo (a cura di), *Essere in relazione. Scritti in onore di Carmelo Vigna*, op. cit., pp. 161-175.

Nel ragionamento di Leonardo (Bontadini e Severino si muovono qui in modo diverso, perché non manovrano teoreticamente a partire dalla distinzione di essenza ed esistenza), dunque, l'eternità dell'ente finito sarebbe garantita da questo coprincipio (l'atto d'essere che si deve comporre con l'essenza, perché qualcosa sia). Per altra via, come è facile intuire, si ripropone così la tesi severiniana della eternità dell'essere, di ogni essere.

Questo punto di metafisica è piuttosto sottile. Provo a delucidarlo a mia volta. Ho altrove argomentato intorno all'autocontraddizione implicata dalla tesi severiniana che sostiene l'eternità di *ogni* essere. Attribuire all'esistenza come coprincipio dell'essenza quello stesso statuto che Severino attribuisce all'ente eterno, non libera certo dalla contraddizione. Semmai la moltiplica, anche solo per il fatto che non si capisce come un'essenza determinata sia in relazione a un'esistenza assoluta. La quale inevitabilmente assolutizzerebbe a sua volta l'essenza, essendo *anche* l'essenza un coprincipio. Se i due coprincipi non possono che essere concepiti come coesistenti (altrimenti non sarebbero) e se uno dei due è eterno, eterno sarà inevitabilmente anche l'altro. Allora, quando un ente determinato non c'è più nell'orizzonte della presenza, devo necessariamente pensare che non è diventato niente, ma che solo è "sparito". Quel che ha sostenuto Severino. E che è quel che finisce per concedere a Severino il mio amico Leonardo.

A mio avviso, la "mossa speculativa" indifendibile (mi duole dichiararlo) di Leonardo sta in questo: nel chiedersi *di che natura è* l'essere dell'esistenza (del finito). La risposta a questa domanda, se proprio la si vuol dare, non va cercata nell'esistenza (come coprincipio), ma nell'altro coprincipio, cioè nell'essenza. *La* natura *dell'esistenza dell'ente è la sua essenza.* Non certo l'essere che non è non essere...

È vero che l'esistenza (come coprincipio) dice dell'atto d'essere che l'essenza come coprincipio non dice. Di qui la distinzione *reale* di essenza e di esistenza (difesa strenuamente da Tommaso, anche a correzione chirurgica della distinzione forma-materia di eredità greco-aristotelica). Ma essenza ed esistenza non sono due "cose" o due sostanze realmente date (divise come la cartesiana *res cogitans* è divisa dalla cartesiana *res exstensa*). Sono solo coprincipi che *si determinano a vicenda.* L'esistenza dice che l'essenza è un che di reale e non un che di semplice ideale, l'essenza dice che l'esistenza è determinata, determinata appunto secondo l'essenza. Ossia l'esistenza ha un limite: cioè finisce (negli enti determinati).

La coprincipialità di essenza e di esistenza riguarda, parlando in generale, ogni essere. Anche l'essere assoluto, dove l'essenza però non "determina" l'esistenza, perché è assoluta e quindi assoluta è anche l'esistenza. In questo senso la relazione coprincipiale dell'essenza e dell'esistenza è realmente distinta nel finito, mentre non lo è nell'Infinito essere. In questo senso la relazione essenza/esistenza è il vero trascendentale predicabile dell'Intero dell'essere, mentre l'essere come quel che non può non essere non è predicabile dell'intero dell'essere, ma è predicabile solo

dell'essere assoluto (se un essere assoluto si dà; e l'inferenza metafisica dice che è necessario che si dia).

Il dissenso con Leonardo mi pare tutto qui. Egli, rovesciando l'ordine della trascendentalità prima da me esposto (che a me pare ovviamente quello giusto), pone come originaria l'assolutezza dell'essere, la quale darebbe "luce" (dice lui) al senso dell'esistenza (come coprincipio) dell'ente. Ne sarebbe il vero senso radicale. Ma Leonardo così non solo dimentica che il primo per noi è l'ente, non certo l'Essere come un che di reale (questo Essere è invece – come reale – *risultato* dell'inferenza metafisica; ossia è una mediazione non una immediatezza), ma anche dimentica che iniettando nell'esistenza dell'ente l'assolutezza dell'essere che non è non essere finisce per ratificare l'immanenza ontologica severiniana, inevitabilmente autocontraddittoria. Proprio quella da cui vorrebbe in qualche modo distinguersi.

Ad abundantiam. Si può pure osservare che l'Essere assoluto *in un certo senso* non è solo l'Essere assoluto, ma è anche l'Essere assoluto e l'essere relativo (Dio+mondo=Dio), giacché l'essere relativo assolutamente dipende nel suo esistere dall'Essere assoluto. Non gli sta "accanto", cioè, quasi fosse ontologicamente autonomo. Se così fosse, l'Essere assoluto non sarebbe assoluto nell'essere. Si tratta dunque di una dipendenza assoluta del finito, che nulla aggiunge all'Essere assoluto. Siamo costretti a questo corollario dalla natura dell'inferenza metafisica. Ma come concretamente intendere questo, oltre a dire che non si tratta di rapporti quantitativi, ma qualitativi, non si riesce a dire. La relazione Dio-mondo, come relazione creaturale, ha qualche comprensibilità a partire dal mondo, ma è (*per noi*) *speculativamente incomprensibile* a partire da Dio.

INFORMATION ON THE JOURNAL

Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics is an open access philosophical journal, being published only in an electronic format.

The journal aims at promoting research and reflection, both historically and theoretically, in the fields of moral, political and legal philosophy, with no preclusion or adhesion to any cultural current or philosophical tradition.

Contributions should be submitted in one of these languages: Italian, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish.

All essays should include an English abstract of max. 200 words.

The editorial staff especially welcomes interdisciplinary contributions with special attention to the main trends of the world of practice.

The journal has an anonymous double peer review referee system.

Three issues per year are expected.

The copyright of the published articles remain to the authors. We ask that in any future use of them Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics be quoted as a source.

All products on this site are released with a Creative Commons license (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 IT) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/it/

ETICA & POLITICA/ETHICS & POLITICS POSITION ON PUBLISHING ETHICS.

The Editors of Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics have taken every possible measure to ensure the quality of the material here published and, in particular, they guarantee that peer review at their journal is fair, unbiased and timely, and that all papers have been reviewed by unprejudiced and qualified reviewers. The publication of an article through a peer-review process is intended as an essential feature of any serious scientific community. The decision to accept or reject a paper for publication is based on the paper's relevance, originality and clarity, the study's validity and its relevance to the mission of the journal. In order to guarantee the quality of the published papers, the Editors encourage reviewers to provide detailed comments to motivate their decisions. The comments will help the Editorial Board to decide the outcome of the paper, and will help to justify this decision to the author. If the paper is accepted with the request of revision, the comments should guide the author in making the

revisions for the final manuscript. All material submitted to the journal remains confidential while under review.

Once the author receives a positive answer, he/she should send the final version of the article since proofs will not be sent to him/her. Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics will publish the paper within twelve months from the moment of the acceptance, and the author will be informed of the publication.

The journal is committed to such standards as originality in research papers, precise references in discussing other scholars' positions, avoiding plagiarism. E&P takes these standards extremely seriously, because we think that they embody scientific method and are the mark of real scholarly communication.

Since Etica & Politica/ Ethics & Politics is devoted solely to scientific and academic quality, the journal neither has any submission charges nor any article processing charges.

The following guidelines are based on existing Elsevier policies and COPE's Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors

1. PUBLICATION AND AUTHORSHIP

EUT (Edizioni Università di Trieste), is the publisher of the peer reviewed international journal Etica & Politica/ Ethics & Politics.

The publication of an article in a peer-reviewed journal is an essential step of a coherent and respected network of knowledge. It is a direct reflection of the quality of the work of the authors and the institutions that support them. Peer-reviewed articles support and embody the scientific method. It is therefore important to agree upon standards of expected ethical behaviour for all parties involved in the act of publishing: the author, the journal editor, the peer reviewer, the publisher.

Authors need to ensure that the submitted article is the work of the submitting author(s) and is not plagiarized, wholly or in part. They must also make sure that the submitted article is original, is not wholly or in part a re-publication of the author's earlier work, and contains no fraudulent data.

It is also their responsibility to check that all copyrighted material within the article has permission for publication and that material for which the author does not personally hold copyright is not reproduced without permission.

Finally, authors should ensure that the manuscript submitted is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere.

2. AUTHOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES

E ti ca & Politica/Ethics & Politi c s is a peer-reviewed journal, and Authors are obliged to participate in our double blind peer review process.

Authors must make sure that all and only the contributors to the article are listed as authors. Authors should also ensure that all authors provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.

3. PEER REVIEW AND REVIEWERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

Both the Referee and the Author remain anonymous throughout the "double blind" review process. Referees are selected according to their expertise in their particular fields.

Referees have a responsibility to be objective in their judgments; to have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, with respect to the authors and/or with respect to the research funders; to point out relevant published work which is not yet cited by the author(s); and to treat the reviewed articles confidentially.

4. EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Editors hold full authority to reject/accept an article; to accept a paper only when reasonably certain; to promote publication of corrections or retractions when errors are found; to preserve anonymity of reviewers; and to have no conflict of interest with respect to articles they reject/accept. If an Editor feels that there is likely to be a perception of a conflict of interest in relation to their handling of a submission, they will declare it to the other Editors. The other Editors will select referees and make all decisions on the paper.

5. PUBLISHING ETHICS ISSUES

Members of the Editorial Board ensure the monitoring and safeguarding of the publishing ethics. This comprises the strict policy on plagiarism and fraudulent data, the strong commitment to publish corrections, clarifications, retractions and apologies when needed, and the strict preclusion of business needs from compromising intellectual and ethical standards.

Whenever it is recognized that a published paper contains a significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distorted report, it will be corrected promptly. If, after an appropriate investigation, an item proves to be fraudulent,

it will be retracted. The retraction will be clearly identifiable to readers and indexing systems.

6. POLICY ON EDITORIAL NORMS AND STYLE

In accordance with the pluralist principle and the breadth of interests that characterize the editorial line of *Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics*, the review leaves the contributors free to choose which style of quotation to adopt in the composition of their article. Of course, this style must conform to one of the two internationally recognized models in the area of scientific publications in the humanities, namely the Chicago A (equivalent to APA) or the Chicago B, both defined by *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 17ᵗʰ edition. Moreover, the reference to the complete source must contain all the information required by the ISO
690 standard, both if it is provided only in the final bibliography (Chicago A)
and if it is provided in a note (Chicago B).

7. PAST ISSUES AND STATISTICS

Past issues with download and visitors statistics for each article are provided by EUT publisher through its official repository.:
http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/handle/10077/4673

EDITOR:

RICCARDO FANCIULLACCI (Bergamo) riccardofanciullacci@libero.it
PIERPAOLO MARRONE (Trieste) marrone@units.it
FERDINANDO G. MENGA (Caserta) ferdinandogiuseppe.menga@unicampania.it

EDITORIAL BOARD:

ROBERTO FESTA (Trieste) festa@units.it
GIOVANNI GIORGINI (Bologna) giovanni.giorgini@unibo.it
EDOARDO GREBLO (Trieste) edgreblo@tin.it
FABIO POLIDORI (Trieste) polidori@units.it

WEBMASTER:

ENRICO MARCHETTO (Trieste) enrico.marchetto@gmail.com